 Okay, I think we'll go ahead and get going. My name's Andrew Wilder. I'm the Vice President of the Asia Center here at USIP. And on behalf of USIP, let me welcome you here. It's good to see a room full of people interested in a very topical topic. I think many of you know USIP was founded in 1984 by Congress as an independent national institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible, practical, and essential for US and global security. The Asia Center at USIP, which is hosting today's event, our priority countries are working in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, Myanmar, China, and North Korea. And then we also support activities in other countries. But most of our events here focus on these five priority countries. USIP's Pakistan program has been active in the country with the country office since 2013, where we partner with civil society organizations, innovators, scholars, and policy makers. We have supported programs across the country focusing on tolerance of diversity, which is the main focus of our work in Afghanistan, using arts, media, and culture to foster dialogue, peace education, and also working with the police services of Pakistan to increase citizen engagement with the police. Another major focus of our work, both in Pakistan but also back here in Washington, is to convene local peace builders, as well as key stakeholders, on a variety of topics like we're having today that are essential to, I think, these kind of issues related to Pakistan. Today's focus is to discuss the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship at a particularly critical time. The Trump administration recently announced a new strategy towards the region in August, at which President Trump reiterated US concerns over terrorist safe havens in Pakistan and the continued conflict in Afghanistan. The new strategy indicates that US is running out of patience with Pakistan and is looking for new ways to influence Pakistan behavior. Not surprisingly, the announced strategy provoked a strong response from Pakistan and stoked fears that the US would throw its support behind India as its major partner for engagements in Afghanistan and the region. Despite the fraught relationship, there are still efforts to remain engaged. This is illustrated by the recent visit by Pakistan's foreign minister here in Washington, who we hosted here in USIP a couple weeks ago. Also last week, senior US delegation visit to Islamabad. The revive meeting of the quadrilateral cooperation group in Oman earlier this week with representatives from the US, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, which served as an additional platform for dialogue on shared security and counter-terrorism interests in the region. And there was also planned upcoming visits by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to the region. So today's discussion will present varied perspectives on where US-Pakistan relationship can go from here. Our Asia Center Associate Vice President, Muid Yusuf, will moderate the discussion and introduce the panelists and with that, I'll turn it over to you, Muid. Thank you. Thanks. Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks for joining us again. What I will do here is briefly introduce the panelists and then we'll get into the substance of the event. I just wanna lay out the format for all of you. Rather than sort of the usual panel where each of the speakers would speak for about 10 to 15 minutes, this is gonna be a conversation slash debate. So I've requested the panelists and you keep your watches out because they won't listen to me. To speak for no more than three minutes as putting out their opening remarks, answering a question, a policy question, which is if they were advising the US president right now, what would be their suggestion on what to do with the US-Pakistan relationship? After that, we'll have a moderated discussion among the panelists here for a while and then I promise to leave at least half an hour for all of you to chip in with your questions and comments. So we'll go with that very quickly. To introduce the panelists, although none of them require an introduction, but from my left to right, Laurel Miller is a senior foreign policy expert at the RAND Corporation. Very recently, left the State Department where she was the acting special rep for Afghanistan and Pakistan and prior to that, the principal deputy special representative in the same office. Ambassador Zalme Khalilzad has been US ambassador to Iraq, to Afghanistan, US presidential envoy to Afghanistan and also US's permanent rep to the United Nations from 2007 to 2009. To my right, Vikram Singh is the senior advisor for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress. Before that was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia and also been the deputy special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the State Department. And last but not least, to the far right, Ambassador Robin Raffael, former US ambassador to Tunisia, 40 years of experience in the foreign service. And until 2014, she was the coordinator for non-military assistance to Pakistan based in Islamabad and is also formerly the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia. I believe the first one back in 1993. So you can see we have a wealth of experience of people who've worked this account in the US government from various perspectives at different times, but these are also panelists who've actually studied this relationship and analyzed it for years in their own individual capacities. Couldn't have had a better one. I can promise you that we're in for some excitement. I'll give you that one too. If it's okay, let me begin from my left and go down for opening remarks and then we'll have a conversation. This is on. I'll start with an observation about the nature of the dysfunction in the US-Pakistan relationship and then a comment on how I think it would be better to think about how to resolve or reduce that dysfunction. And I think we can get into some more specifics about what US policy we all think should be as we go forward. I think that both sides in the relationship are too focused on trying to persuade the other side of the correctness of their point of view, to persuade the other side to think about the problems and challenges in the way that they do. So from the US side, for instance, the US very focused on trying to persuade with argumentation, not only with pressure, but with argumentation, persuade the Pakistanis to see the risks and the opportunities in Afghanistan the way that the United States does. I liken this to the problem of road rage. The problem of road rage. I think you're never going to persuade another driver that you were right and they were wrong. In fact, the only people who hear loud and clearly what your arguments are and have some understanding of them are the people in your own car, typically your wife sitting next to you. And you don't resolve the problems by exhibiting that rage and trying to, as I said, persuade the other driver that they're the ones who aired. My recommendation is to focus more on practical action than on trying to, from the Pakistani perspective, persuade the United States of the correctness of their historical argument and the necessity of looking at the problems of the region through a historical lens and through an India-centric lens and from the US perspective of overly focusing on trying to persuade the Pakistanis that the problems that we see in the here and now moment in Afghanistan are the dominant ones and that our way of resolving them is the correct way. Now, the Pakistanis often have complained to US officials that they think the US is overly transactional in its approach to the relationship. My recommendation is not to be less transactional in the relationship, but to the contrary, to be much, much more transactional about the relationship, to see it as a relationship of two parties with two sides in which there is a need for exchange of benefit. And through that perspective, I think what the United States needs to see is not only what are the ways to pressure Pakistan to take seriously US concerns, but to make a clearer case as to what is on offer for Pakistan. And I don't mean carrots in the sense of financial assistance. I mean, what is it that the United States is prepared to do in terms of its strategy in the region and its vision of the relationship to attract the Pakistanis to something that can be of mutual benefit? And from the Pakistani perspective, I think there's much more that can be done to articulate how they see an exchange of being something that could be a basis for the relationship. What is it that they are prepared to do and not do? And what is it that is on offer from their perspective that could appeal to American interests? So a transaction in exchange based on a recognition of each side's interests, of the other side's interests, rather than being overly focused on how to, again, persuade the other side that each's own interests are the ones that need to dominate the conversation. All right, thank you and thank you for sticking to the time. Well, thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. I look at the issue of U.S.-Pakistan relations from two angles. There are more angles to be looked at, but I look at them from two. One is in terms of the global balance of power, particularly in Asia. And what we have, if I was to talk to our president, would be that China is rising as a great power, our relationship could become competitive. It is already in some regard, become more and might become even hostile. And what we need is a balance of power in Asia that can help us deal with this rise of China. The more there is a balance, the more the prospect for avoiding some of the worst things that could happen in the evolution of relations between the current dominant power ourselves and the rising power of China. And in that regard, our relationship with India is very important. We need to nurture it, we need to strengthen it. Stronger India is in our interest to balance China, India plus Japan plus other Asian powers who have a similar concern about the future Asia balance. And today, the Secretary of State spoke at CSIS talking about the 100 years future perhaps borrowing from the Chinese, talking of a very long-term relationship, Indo-Pacific, a very ambitious era that's coming. That will have implications for our relations with Pakistan given the unfortunately zero some way these two have been thinking about each other. And that's gonna have a complicating effect on our relations with Pakistan. Despite our effort that each relationship is important in its own right and we value it, it is inevitable. Second is the issue of another big global issue is terrorism, extremism. It's one of the big challenges of our time. Perhaps, I don't know how you would rank it, given other concerns. And there Pakistan could be a partner. We could develop because it can play an important role, but it's a part of the problem right now. And so, the two put together makes for a very difficult relationship. I would think it's very important that we try to change Pakistan's policies on support for extremism and terror, which has cost us a lot in Afghanistan. Not only in terms of resources that we have spent to build the Afghans, to re-establish the Afghan state, and not only we have lost a lot of lives, our reputation, our security is all at stake. We have embraced the objective that we won't allow Afghanistan to become a place from which terrorists could once again attack us. And Pakistan has been undermining that for the most part. It's not completely, but for the most part. It's been, and we have been constrained in our approach because Pakistan is important. We go through Pakistan to supply our forces. We have some counter-terrorism concerns, security of Pakistan itself, security of nuclear weapons. All of that are very important issues, but what we've done so far hasn't worked. We need to try a new approach, and the new administration has tried to do an approach. Now, I think this has had a salutary effect so far. We see some positive signals from Pakistan, but I think it's a typical response so far, which I have seen before. I'm sure all of us have seen when the pressure is on the rise, and they do some things to, you know, all of a sudden you get a couple of al-Qaeda people turned over, you get some other nice gestures that are made to kind of diffuse the prospects for increased pressure, but the pattern then goes back to the way it was, and hopefully this time it's different. The release of these hostages, the visit to Kabul by the army chief, the restart of conversations, but I suspect my judgment would be until we have a verifiable change, and that is to close their sanctuaries. There is a roadmap for closing the sanctuaries, starting with the Akhani network. We need to, if we are to remain committed to Afghanistan and want to do it at a reasonable price, then the change in Pakistan will be significant, and we need to persist. What do we need to do to, I think I'm a little pessimistic based on a lot of experience in dealing on this issue. I think it will come to a coercive phase. Right now we're saying one last chance. There will be a visit relatively soon to Pakistan. A visit has occurred already. Some progress was made in the conversations, the interagency group that went there already, but a more senior visit will occur, and I think there is an effort to lower the temperature, to keep your head down, to tell the Taliban keep your head down, and let the American anger dissipate, then good days will be here again, and we can go back to business as usual. But I think that there's no patience for that. I can say that with great confidence, and that there will be consequences. It's my judgment, and we will kid to that phase. Unfortunately, I'm pessimistic, and there are a lot we can do. A lot is under consideration, and I'm sure during the question and answer, we can get some of those. I think if Pakistan changes, which I hope it will, because we all want to affect this policy, it's an important country, 200 million people, their weapons, important geopolitical location, and all that, it could be a great partner for the second task, which is the terrorism, India, the power, I said. There is a big role for our partnership with Pakistan, and I hope we can get to that. Thank you. Thanks, Ambassador Lauren. Thank you, thanks, William, thanks for having this. So it's such a remarkable, remarkably good time to have a discussion on Pakistan. Hostage release incident, unfortunately, a terrorist attack that killed several Pakistanis in Quetta, just happened, the Vice President has just called the Prime Minister after that hostage rescue incident, and so some positive signs there, and then the Secretary of State has just given a major speech on India, so you really couldn't find a better day to have this discussion, which makes me suspect that USIP has some power behind the scenes. If I were conspiracy-minded, I would be wondering. Is that enough going on in this question? Ambassador Haliazad basically hit two of my, I think, four things that I would raise to a president who's thinking about how do we get a constructive dynamic in the US-Pakistan relationship. The first is obviously the terrorism issue. Unfortunately, it's not, in some ways, it's not actually the most important because it's not the strategic issue, but it is the burr, it is the thorn, and the unanswerable question for American policymakers has always been, is it an issue of won't or is it an issue of can't? That is to say, is it that Pakistan will not crack down on terrorist safe haven and the freedom of action that terrorist networks have or is it that Pakistan genuinely cannot? It's very similar to a dilemma we face with China and North Korea. Can the Chinese pressure the North Koreans or can they not pressure the North Koreans? And where you come down on that deeply influences how you see the nature of the relationship. I would say that since the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, both the consensus in the United States has been that the problem is that Pakistan won't, it is not that Pakistan can't. And I don't think that has changed and I don't see that changing absent some significant progress in counter-terrorism cooperation that I believe would have to go so far as to actually not just affect Afghanistan but also Kashmir and also other aspects. So I think that the only way is a sense that there is a serious effort to crack down on militant groups from LET to TTP is the only path actually that would start to change that belief. So this is a fundamental challenge and it makes it hard to deal with the other areas. So the second I would say is just the Afghanistan piece. So what is, what are Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan? What are the United States' interests in Afghanistan and do those things align? And basically they don't. So this is why we've had a hard time. The fundamentally for Pakistan, the best thing to have is applying friendly Afghanistan where Pakistani influence extends all along the Durand line and over. That is to say, governorships and who's in charge of security should be something that is compatible with Pakistan's interests in those parts of Afghanistan and that is that sort of a fundamental way that for Pakistan, this would be a good outcome. For the United States, that's not the case at all. And whether it's the United States welcoming Indian cooperation, whether it's the United States wanting to see Afghanistan as a place from which it can project power and maintain its counter-terrorism capabilities, whatever that may be, these issues are at odds. And so that's the first area of interest that would require attention from a president trying to fix our policy. The second, the next is the sort of regional context. So Pakistan has tilted towards China and China is trying to invest very heavily in Pakistan. There's a sense, I think, among Pakistani leaders that maybe we've got the relationship we need with China and the opportunity to have massive investments China-Pakistan economic corridor, et cetera. Pakistan's place in China's vision of its Belt and Road Initiative and how it's building connectivity westward is both potentially a great opportunity for Pakistan but also likely a double-edged sword for Pakistan. One, the commitments will probably be far less beautiful than they look because that is the history of these kinds of commitments from China. And two, they will come with lots of strings attached. So that leaves you in a situation where the United States seems to be pretty comfortable, bipartisan, comfort with a very robust India relationship and the Pakistanis are seeing a China relationship as in some ways a hedge and in some ways an opportunity to get resources into Pakistan that dwarf anything that Western countries are going to be able or willing to provide. And so you've got a little subset of the global strategic balance issue. And I think if you start looking regionally now, is Pakistan going to, once again, every several years, Pakistan plays a pivotal role for the United States, whether that's after 9-11, whether that's the opening to China, whether there are regular moments where Pakistan-U.S. relations become extraordinarily important and Pakistan and the United States behave as allies for a brief moment. Are we going to have another one of those moments or are we shifting to a world in which essentially China, Pakistan, and then a handful of countries scattered across the region, maybe Sri Lanka, almost certainly Cambodia, who knows with some of these other countries are sort of one side and the United States, India, Singapore, Japan, Australia are sort of on another side. And for this is interesting because one of those dynamics is Pakistan on the democratic community of nations supporting continuing constructive international order, or is it more on the Chinese side of this equation, which is a desire to revamp the international order in a way that's more favorable to China's perceived interests and how that plays out with Pakistan will be key. And so for the United States, looking at how you shape those decisions becomes a critical factor. And I'm sure I've hit my three minutes, so I shall stop. You're doing pretty good actually, there you go. Let's see if I can follow suit here. Thanks very much. Always a pleasure to be back at USIP. I'm going to return to the more parochial immediate as much as I appreciate all of these strategic issues and I share all of these concerns and analysis, but let me return to the more parochial which is the recent policy changes, the recent policy speech and Pakistan's response. The first thing I would say, and both to the US government and to the Pakistani government is this whole debate has gotten far too emotional. The US, for understandable reasons, gets very frustrated and talks about the safe havens and double game and all of this kind of thing. And again, for understandable reasons, but what reaction do you get? First of all, you get denial of any safe havens and then you get the litany of the history of all the sacrifices Pakistan has made. Again, true, but it doesn't really move the whole discussion forward. And so my first point would be both to our government and to the government of Pakistan, try to be more dispassionate and rational about this whole issue. The second point I would make is that it is time to get serious and getting serious for the US side does not mean wagging our finger more vociferously and saying this time we really are serious and you have to do what we want or else there will be consequences unspecified, but dire. And Pakistan's response to that, which is not the desired response, is well, we really don't need the United States or their aid, we do stuff on our own and we have options and we'll put off the visits by American officials and we'll go to Moscow and we'll go to Beijing and so on and so forth. And oh, by the way, we will remind the American audience of what they did a million years ago in the 80s of supporting the madrasas and inviting Jalaluddin Hekhani to the White House, where Zuhar Zal was Ambassador Halilzad. That's true, Hekhani never came to the White House. That's a photoshopped. To know that that's not a photoshopped, the misidentification of the person who was Maulvi Khalis was. Okay, but whatever, same kinds of guys and Ambassador Halilzad had a lot more hair. I did. That was photoshopped. My point is neither of these approaches to the problem moved the ball ahead. They're not serious. What is serious is for both sides to put on the table some thoughts about the issues that are really concerning here. First one is what's the appropriate role of India in Afghanistan? When the Pakistani Prime Minister was here and did an interview on CNN or maybe it was Asia Society, one of these two venues, he said, none. Well, obviously, that's not gonna work. On the other hand, on the other side, the United States is encouraging a greater role for India. We all know that India is a key point for Pakistan and India's role in Afghanistan is what really underscores Pakistan's behavior there. So we really need to think seriously, we and they, about what that appropriate role is. Secondly, we need to think carefully about the Heqani network. Now it is assumed and implied regularly on the U.S. side that if it weren't for the safe havens in Pakistan, everything would be going well for us in Afghanistan. I recall a few years ago being told by someone at the NSC that they'd done a study to determine how many of the attacks were done by the Heqani network. And at that point, it was 15%. The way we talk, you would think it was 99. Now I think it's clear that some attacks are worse, different from others, but I think we, a lot worse, but we need to really look at what it is that's getting in our way in Afghanistan. Clearly, the safe havens is part of it, but another part of it is the issue of the governance in Afghanistan, of how the government, particularly outside of Kabul, is perceived by the population, which is part of the reason that the Taliban make a bit of headway in Afghanistan. So we need to really look at this dispassionately and clearly, and I think we would conclude that one of the things that we need to do and that everyone in the coalition needs to do is to focus more on governance in Afghanistan, even though this administration has said this isn't about governance. I think a lot of it is about governance. We need to be honest with one another on that. Then there's also the point of, what is it that the Taliban want? We, in most of our statements, many of our statements conflate the Taliban with al-Qaeda and ISIS. Has the Taliban now adopted an international agenda? Like ISIS, like al-Qaeda? I don't know, they didn't start out that way, but I think that's something we really need to consider seriously and again, dispassionately. And then finally, both sides say, and many others as well, that there's no military solution in Afghanistan, yet what's on the table is primarily a military solution. So I think both the American side and the Pakistani side need to look seriously to the elements of a political solution. And my own view is that we shouldn't sequence this because if we wait to get started until we have a military advantage, we could be waiting for months and years. So we need to prioritize on both sides a political process. Thanks, thank you all. Thank you for kicking this off. As I've sort of heard all of you, I think there are three themes that I pick up out of what you've said. One is, I think, a bit of tension between the strategic and the immediate. Perhaps a conversation about line structures going forward. Where does Pakistan fit into that? And the immediate need in Afghanistan and the safe havens and terrorism and where that is. The second thing I would say is, I think all of you I've heard you say is that this can work well, but a number of things have to change and important things have to change in terms of behavior and expectations, which is also fair. And third, I think the underlying sort of thread, if I were to add this up, is perhaps a need for a more direct and less emotive conversation, both in the public and private space on where this can or cannot go. And I think that the current environment is a very good example of some things have happened which seem to be suggesting positivity. And two weeks later, we may be having another event in the polar opposite environment. That's the history of this relationship. So how do you avoid that? With that, let me just begin, if I may, with a couple of fundamental questions, you know, which are necessary to move forward. Mr. Khalid, you mentioned the idea of, we have a new strategy and this strategy may work. You will see something. What is the strategy beyond saying that it's a new strategy? You know, we understand that there's a coercive angle to the strategy, but play this out for us. Of course, oh, sorry. We're webcasting this, so we need this. I think the key elements of the strategy, as I understand it, is one, to revalidate the objective of the United States because the administration came with skepticism towards whether the goals that we had and the strategy that we were following was the right one, whether Afghanistan worth the effort that the United States was making. And the new team, the new president, the skeptical president came to the judgment to revalidate the objective, that yes, we need to stay in Afghanistan. We need to preclude Afghanistan once again from becoming a terrorist safe haven. Second was then, how should we go about achieving that goal? Recognizing that progress has been made, but there are important deficiencies, important mistakes, were made by the previous administration and dealing with Afghanistan, that those need to be corrected. First, the force level needs to be increased in the immediate future. The previous administration had not done what the military thought was required that reduced the force to might too soon, that it had dissipated the benefits of its own policies by putting timeline, we increase and then we decrease within this timeframe in a way sustaining the opposition by announcing that because the opposition said, all we have to do is to wait them this year out. So they were enabling the opposition to some degree almost to re-signaling that the Taliban were not adversaries, more or less. That's the Afghan problem. We're there only to do al-Qaeda and others. Fourth, slow on enablers for the Afghan forces, although they took the responsibility for the war. Slow in building an air force. I mean, I could go on the litany of the mistakes of the previous administration, fortunately, we were much too long to... But you mentioned on the Pakistan part, specifically, what is the strategy on the Pakistan part? The Pakistan part is the first is more than any other president, both the ones that I worked for, President Bush and President Obama. It's frontally recognizing the sanctuary issue. Number one, that this is a problem that we can't continue the policy of positive engagement and assistance program with Pakistan with this, and to develop a roadmap for coercive steps to incentivize them to cooperate. One last chance, diplomacy, I think it's having a salutary effect. I give them already credit that they have achieved some, but they shouldn't celebrate because we have seen this before. And that they need to follow through. The next step is likely to be if they don't cooperate to take them off of the list of being major non-NATO allies. The following that put some people on sanctions list. They can't travel to the United States if they have bank account before them. The next step is target some. The next thing, I mean, we could go on. There is a lot of long of step that would have to be. Let me, if I can come to Vikram and then I'll come to you, Lord. This is a debate in this town that goes on. Coercion, what does coercion mean? Don't coerce, it may not work. I wanna ask you, which, and basically the others rightly pointed out, there are steps that can be taken. There's no question if the US decided it can make a mess of Pakistan in terms of how the pressure could go up. The question is the returns. Is there a coercive path that allows commensurate returns in Afghanistan or the largest strategic piece that we've talked about? I mean, I would really echo Robin and defer to both Laurel and Robin. I don't see Pakistan sort of finally bending to coercion. I think that's just, I think that's a bit fanciful. I think it's works in tactical situations when you're like, this matters and we've gotta do this and you can get something done where especially as we just saw, you know, the New York Times has covered saying there was a SEAL team ready to go. So I'm sure that had a salutary effect on the Pakistanis' willingness to move quickly to avoid that. But I think that this is a strategy that is spoken of right now in holistic terms. There were lots of the right words, but the only actual material investments we're seeing were increasing some troop levels, relatively modestly, but increasing troop levels in Afghanistan, taking out the timeline and saying we're gonna be tough on you, Pakistan. The diplomatic strategy, political strategy, the resources that would go into that, the economic aspects of what that's going to look like, how you help a country, both countries actually deal with poor governance, corruption and things like that. I don't see any substance, any actual, there's no stuff, there's no there, there. Where's the beef on those parts? So I think Laurel and Robin probably are a better position to speak to this than I am, but that's my feeling. Okay, I'll let you defend here. But I would say, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that there is no one I know within the U.S. government that doesn't agree with the desirability of eliminating the safe havens, of achieving some kind of change in Pakistan's strategic approach. The debate is all centered on what is the feasibility of achieving that. And I do think that sometimes gets lost in the emotion of the debate. I think it's important to recognize that the current, the new administration's strategy explicitly requires a change in Pakistan's behavior in Afghanistan. That is baked into the strategy, the terms of the strategy. It is baked in the sense of Pakistan's behavior in Afghanistan being one of the principal risks to failure of the strategy. It's not just that there's a strategy for Afghanistan and we want help from Pakistan. It is, in fact, in the strategy's own terms required to achieve that. So if you don't achieve that, under the terms of the new strategy, the strategy will not succeed. My own view is that coercion alone is not going to achieve that change in Pakistan's behavior in Afghanistan that is desirable, that some level of pressure and applied consistently is likely necessary in order to make clear the importance that the United States ascribes to what it's requesting of Pakistan. But unless there is also something that attracts the Pakistanis to cooperation with the US, I don't think it's going to work. And that means having a strategy for Afghanistan that is compelling to the Pakistanis. I don't think the current approach, which is predominantly a military approach, as Robin noted, is one that the Pakistanis are going to find compelling because I don't think they think it will succeed and that it certainly will succeed in the short term. And I would come back to the point that Robin made that prioritizing, achieving a political settlement that would have some prospect of addressing Pakistanis interests is a way to attract Pakistan into cooperation. But I largely think that the new strategy is the status quo with a modest increase in resourcing levels. Masjid, can I just? I want to make a couple more short to this point. Just give me one second, one second, and you will get more material. Masjid, if I could ask you. Well, wait a minute. The flips, I want to address these first. I'm going to come to you. One second, one second, one second, one second. Before she comes, she hasn't spoken. Just give me one second, I will be back to you. Told you, you've got to watch out for me. Okay, let me ask you, and then I'll come to you, Masjid Khalidzad, but what about the flip side? Because there is a critique here, which I think makes perfect sense from where people are coming at it. Coercion, let's say it doesn't work, but on the other hand, then is more of the same rewarding behavior that has been undermining the US interests in Afghanistan? How would you come at that? I think the answer to both of those is yes. And therefore, what you need to do is move beyond the coercion, which I agree with Laurel, I don't think is going to work in and of itself, and start looking seriously at the issues which I outlined in there are more, but for Afghanistan, I outlined them, and have a serious discussion on those. Ambassador Khalilzad made a good point, which was we've tackled the safe haven issues directly. It's not that nobody ever said anything about safe havens, that's been the subject from time immemorial, but we did tackle it more bluntly, but we need to get into a dialogue about it, not a you do what we say, or there's gonna be sanctions. So I think it's really serious discussions about the issues. Several things, one, I think sometimes we speak with greater confidence about what will work, what won't work, than perhaps is justified, because our record of being able to predict what countries will do is very poor. I don't want to go back, even in this particular region, it's very poor. So we need to be a little more humble when we talk about complex issues and what will work, what won't work. That showed more of a prejudice rather than real hard headed analysis in my view, which is we thought the Soviets would never leave Afghanistan and they would win. And I remember the young analyst going to endless meetings about how the Soviets are gonna prevail. And that got us into all kinds of trouble with that assumption, which is we didn't care who went into Afghanistan, who came to fight, what the ideology of the group were, because we didn't think there would be a post-Soviet Afghanistan. So, and I just don't know what will work with Pakistan and what won't. I just don't know. But certainly what we have tried hasn't worked. Patience hasn't worked. Talking to them hasn't alone hasn't worked. We know that. I was in meetings with President Bush, invited President Musharraf and President Karzai and the Y-Ziles over there, working in a charm and so forth hasn't worked. So perhaps maybe the threat of the only thing at work when we had our, you know, when we said, look, you either cooperate or we'll do something very serious. And President Musharraf said, I'm not in agreement with this, but I'm gonna do it because I don't want what you just threatened to take place. But I don't like it. I don't think this is the right thing to do. So, sometimes a combination, and I'm never saying one shouldn't have a, what Robin said and what others have said, we should have serious conversation. Who would say we shouldn't have serious conversation? Could anyone say, anybody who has got a degree of responsibility to our national security would oppose a serious conversation? The question is, when is the conversation really serious? When is the other side gonna take you seriously? And I believe that a combination of coerciveness, plus I would say, also putting a lot of positive things on the table for Pakistan, I favor that I'm perhaps a more hardline person here on the panel in terms of coerciveness, but I also think we should put something positive on the table if they cooperate. And I also believe we should, Afghanistan and as we should be sensitive to Pakistani legitimate security concern, that has to be part of it. But I do believe as far as the negotiations with the Taliban are concerned, that as long as they think that time is on their side and they're not gonna negotiate seriously, I think we need to have a little more, this new strategy work at seven. I'm sure there will be time for negotiations if this strategy works. I don't know whether this strategy will work. I'm not saying that I know it will work. A lot of things can go wrong. Some things can go right. A lot of things could go right. And therefore we need to play it out a little bit. And not to, it's typical in Washington the day we announce something and then we all dump on it. Okay. So, but I think that the- Do you want assistance? Sure. Your response, I think it's a fair point that we shouldn't overestimate our ability to understand the calculations, the strategic calculations of another country and what they will and will do as a general principle. But part of the reason why I think the essentially coercive strategy is not likely to prosper is not because of the Pakistanis. It's because of our side, the US side because there are limitations to how far we can go. There are limitations to the costs that it will make sense for the United States to bear from a US national security perspective. And so when you- Can you specify those? I mean, you were there practicing it for a while, so why- Use the language before you- Yeah, so what limitations? Some of it has to do with the nuclear issues. Do we need another adversary, nuclear harmed adversary? Some of it has to do with the India relationship to be honest, to not be able to have access to the Pakistani leadership when there are, as there surely will be, crises in the region is a cost to us. It's a cost to India as well. And furthermore, there are the practical considerations of the operations in Afghanistan. The United States military is still heavily dependent on the airlines of communication, on the ground lines of communication into Afghanistan. And finally, look, there's no solution in Afghanistan over the objections of Pakistan. So if you're not working with Pakistan, but you're working against Pakistan or in an even more adversarial relationship, then you're not going to find stability in a solution to the problems in Afghanistan that brings greater stability to the region. I'll come back, I'll come back. I would just on this, how to approach this particular aspect, I would just say that I don't think Pakistan has been secretive about its strategic priorities and its strategic calculations. I think the problem is that they differ from ours and the focus is how do you find a mutually acceptable accommodation that will give the Pakistanis enough confidence that they're gonna have an outcome that they can live with to go to Zal's point, that you're not gonna have a success in Afghanistan without something that Pakistan buys into. How do you make that work? Because that's the real world. Changing strategic calculus is not something that really happens. I mean, strategic calculus of a country might change, but it won't be changed by external factors. It'll be changed from within. A fundamental challenge to this and something that a new administration coming in can sort of do a reset on is how do you deal with the bifurcated nature of the Pakistani state? So how do you deal with the strategic calculus of the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus versus the strategic calculus and needs of the Pakistani civilian government? And is there a more constructive approach to that? Most of the time what has happened has been a necessary but ultimately counterproductive reliance on and therefore reinforcing of the military domination of the Pakistani state. That I think is actually a fundamental challenge to Pakistan's long-term stability and viability. Very short to figure. I think that the strategic calculations policies, I would say, are not just driven by domestic factors, I'm sorry to say, it's also driven by what are likely that you can achieve it. What's the price you're gonna pay for it? Is the price worth pursuing that? Or can you live with something slightly less than the ideal? And I think that we have tried some of the points that people have made. I mean, we've been there now for 15 years. Even from my limited experience, I was instructed to go to see President Musharraf and offer him whatever is reasonable to get an agreement on the sanctuary issue. And I have to say, President Karzai, I called him the night before saying that our American ambassador is coming, whatever you two agree is acceptable to me too. And it isn't that one hasn't tried. I am a little different than perhaps. I have a lot of regards for you that the Pakistani calculus is known. What it is, I frankly don't know what the heck they want. I think that's a good question to ask. Because I mean, you're saying they want governance of eastern provinces and southern provinces selected by some of us, is that? They've never said that. They say we want a peaceful Afghanistan. Okay, let me ask the other panelists. Let me ask the other panelists maybe they can say. Robin. Why don't they say it? If you do one, they don't say it to the American. Ambassador, you're assuming they know. My cards are falling all over the place. Okay. We'll be quiet. I told you this could go on. Robin, let me ask you one thing and then answer whatever you want. I think there's a point here, which is a strategic divergence that Vikram raises. There's a question of strategic interest. There's a question of what Pakistan wants. In my reading, you add up everything Pakistan talks about or wants. And there is one word it will end up on. It's called India. So now the question is, what is the way forward on that? Because it is also absolutely clear that the U.S. has made a decision or a clear priority has been laid out for good, bad, ugly reasons in a separate debate. But how do you actually move forward when the India-Pakistan relationship remains where it is? Okay, well. And can you keep what does that mean? No, no, no. Let me, let answer. Let answer. I was on India with Robin say, what does it mean on India? We're asking. We're asking. First of all, that's why the first thing on my list about which we have serious discussions was India, of course. And I don't think either side knows what the end point is, but I do not think that we've had a serious discussion. It's much easier to put on what Pakistan wants in India. And I think it's much easier to design a military policy than it is to have serious discussions. I totally agree. Who doesn't want serious discussions? I'm just saying they haven't actually happened on this point. Okay. Is it because of us? You think we haven't been ready to have serious discussions? I think it's both. I think it's both. Okay. I think part of it is that the US is inhibited by the Indian view of not wanting the US to be involved in the India-Pakistan relationship. And so if you go down that road of having a serious discussion with the Pakistanis about India and you already know you can't go very far, there aren't a lot of creative ideas. It doesn't mean that there couldn't be more of a conversation than there has been about what are some moderate steps to address Pakistanis' concerns or maybe just showing an interest in Pakistani concerns would have some salutary effect. But there are limits to how far it can go. No, no, no, no, no, no, no. Just a question that says, now what she has said is that there... You need a mic, you need a mic. People can hear you and before that... That the Pakistan policy in Afghanistan is really affected in the Pakistani calculus, if I understood you correctly, because Pakistan would like us to do something for them on the Indian front. It isn't that they want something in Afghanistan in exchange for which there could be an agreement. You just read because we are constrained about talking about the other front. And is that what you meant? Ambassador Khalidzad, okay, can I go to Vikram? That's why we haven't... That's a constraining factor on having a serious U.S.-Pakistan dialogue about what Pakistan wants to be in India, as I don't mean to suggest that there's a quid pro quo there that Pakistan is trying to use the sanctuaries in Afghanistan issue and our concerns about Afghanistan as a way of leveraging it. I'm gonna come to Vikram, talk about a failed moderator. I apologize. I think, well, maybe next time we should have four of us and four Pakistanis and then we'd get real... I won't be moderating that much. Here's the thing, having a serious dialogue that includes on recognizing that we have different strategic objectives does not mean accommodating their strategy. I am not against the coercive parts. I'm just saying the other parts need to be there, too. So I think we're in a relatively similar place. Because the reality is that the strategic ship is sailing. I mean, Pakistan, if you ask me, is actually at a point of diminishing returns and is throwing a rope and hoping that China will grab it and help it to be able to continue this path. India is moving. India is moving. The United States-India relationship is moving. China is moving. And I think Pakistan has thought, the U.S. is tilting that way. We've got all these messes here. Let's see if we can't get something good out of China. It's good that the quadrilateral talks are continuing. It's good that the Chinese and the Pakistanis are saying they wanna have a constructive role in supporting some sort of peace process, but there's not much there there, to be honest. And I think that there's... So time can sometimes be on your side, too. At the end of the day, if you look at the focus in India on jobs and economic growth and all of these, and innovation and all these other things, those are things that Pakistan needs to figure out how it has the space to focus on for its own people and its own future. And that's where there's an avenue for sort of saying, let's figure out investing in Pakistan for its own people and future in a way that gives you guys the space to take some risks in some other areas. So I keep the mic, Vikram. I wanna come to a couple of regional questions and then open it up for the audience. The question I have for you is, what is it that we ultimately want from India in Afghanistan? Because it's interesting, I was in the region when the speech happened, and of course the Pakistani reaction, we all know it was fairly vocal. On the Indian side, I actually got a very mixed reaction. Part of it was, we're not putting in troops into Afghanistan. We're already putting in money into Afghanistan. Why are you signaling us out? So it was also a bit of a, because they felt that the Pakistan's worst instincts would come out without them actually getting anything in return. Is there clarity on what is it, what more is it that we want from India? So it's actually not about India, right? It is about India for Pakistan, but it shouldn't be about India. Pakistan is going to believe that anywhere there's an Indian road being built underneath the road are 500 raw agents, right? And that's just not going to change that paranoia. So ultimately Pakistan can, you know, it's, as long as it's demanding, basically has a paternalistic attitude to Afghanistan having to just accommodate being part of Pakistan's backyard, I don't think it's going to find satisfaction. What we want is for Afghanistan to be able to have constructive bilateral relationships with any country it wants to have those relationships with and that obviously should include India. And India has poured $2 billion and lost many people to terrorism in Afghanistan. And I think the United States is never going to not support that kind of a role. Well, at the same time, it will be willing to say, but maybe India should not take a security role. Maybe India should make sure there's high levels of transparency to reassure Pakistan that there's not something nefarious happening. And Kabul should be able to provide that insurance. The fact is the international community has to start treating Kabul and Afghanistan as a responsible state if it's going to ever become and be able to behave as one. And so the Pakistanis' concern should be getting addressed through Kabul and Kabul should be setting what it wants India to be doing inside Afghanistan. Okay. Lauren, if I may ask you, because you've sort of done this most recently in your official capacity, there's a larger region. The mention of Russia, Iran was conspicuous by its absence in the president's speech and there were sort of questions on why. Russia is a player. We know there are now publicly reported sort of instances of Russia supporting the Taliban, the Iran connection as well. There's a larger piece to the U.S.-Iran relationship. We know where that is going, the tensions with Russia. Where does the rest of the region fall into this? And are we possibly looking at a scenario where these potential court and court spoilers or whatever you want to call them do not see an interest in supporting the current U.S. strategy? Is there a U.S. strategy to counter that? I would say not enough. I think the new strategy was a lost opportunity in this sense in that it was billed as being a regional strategy, but it's not really a regional strategy. It's an Afghanistan strategy with Pakistan components as they relate to Afghanistan and a glancing reference to India. And frankly, the India element of this, the invitation to India to engage more in Afghanistan came across to me as very thrown in at the last minute as a nod to regionalism. I do think there's a need for a much more robust regional strategy and I think there's a lot of risk in the current strategy from a broader regional perspective in that the countries of the region that you mentioned, Iran, Russia, not precisely in the region, but sees itself as a regional player and China as well have had a grudging acceptance and an approving position vis-a-vis the American military presence in the region up until now. But that's because they have seen it until now as necessary to prevent greater instability in Afghanistan and spillover of that instability and because the United States position from the outset was that we are not seeking permanent bases in a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The current strategy looks much more like an intention to have a permanent presence militarily in Afghanistan and indeed some senior U.S. officials, military officials in particular, have talked about the desirability of a permanent military platform. I think that that element of the strategic approach, whether or not it's formally part of the strategy or not, risks causing these other regional players to become an increasingly adverse position to the United States and unwilling to be supportive of the strategy and more willing to hedge against the strategy through relationships with competitors in Afghanistan. Let me ask two last brief questions with brief answers, please, the regional part. I mean, we're talking about the regional part. We've all known that, thank you. We all know that Afghanistan without the region is an incomplete puzzle in terms of the solution. The question I have is that if the region feels that indefinite U.S. presence, perhaps a basing strategy as they internalize it, the Russians of the world, Iran's of the world, Pakistan, even China, if they find that to be antithetical to their long-term interest in the region, coercion or no coercion, what is the rational explanation for why they should support this current strategy? Because one of the things I feel, quite frankly, is we are not messaging enough on why we think this is in the rational interest of these other sides to jump on board. Very briefly, if you could, please. First of all, our most enduring successes internationally have been places where we have had long-term commitment and presence. If you look at South Korea, we have an armistice agreement, no peace. Presence there has been a very positive, stabilizing presence. Look at Europe, our long-term presence has been there. Sometimes that's, I think, often our most enduring successes have had to do with enduring engagement and military presence. And the struggle against extremism and terror is going to be multi-generational. And there is to be a military component to this struggle, not exclusively. And we need a presence from our national interest point of view. In that region, an Afghanistan is one place, not necessarily a deep place, but we'll have to find ways to be present in that part of the world to shape it, to be able to protect ourselves, our interests. And maybe Afghanistan will be one such place. We have particular concerns. There is the issue of nuclear terrorism, weapons falling into the wrong hands. All kinds of things where we need to have urgently be able to deal with it, rapidly to deal with it. And being an Afghanistan is not necessarily a bad thing. Now, why would the region support it? They have a choice to make. Region two, I mean, if stabilizing Afghanistan should be, and countering extremism should be a kind of an interest of everybody. We are doing the heavy lifting. Many of them are free riders, so to speak. So, we'll see what happens after this strategy is implemented a little bit. And it's a sovereign country, as I think you said we should treat it that way. Maybe as part of negotiations about the settlement, our presence with the Afghan might put it on the table. We never would like to be someplace where we are not wanted. We're not gonna overthrow the government of Afghanistan and say, you must keep us there. But it really depends on so many factors. And therefore, I don't think we can even predict that. And I don't believe that we priori say we do not want to make the enforcers there. It would be like the Obama administration there that's saying we'll get out by the end of 2014. Well, welcome to Daesh, welcome to Taliban. And the reason in part that the regional players are playing with the Taliban is because Daesh emerged and they thought the Taliban are better than Daesh. Why not use one against the other? So, there are costs to kind of announcing that you won't do XYZ, you're gonna get out. There are costs associated with it. The record is that it's not successful. It didn't produce what the architects thought it would produce. If I may ask you quickly, domestic politics. I know you look at Pakistan internally as well. This is an election year, super early election year because Pakistan's gonna have elections next year but they're already into election mode. Is there a risk here of both sides misjudging each other's red lines and the appetite or the ability of the political elite to absorb risk? Both sides, the unpredictably here and perhaps what is happening in Pakistan and where we try and see and situate these red lines or where we have for the past 15 years may have moved but neither side has really caught up to it. And thus you end up in a place where neither wants a rupture but you've crossed the red line. I'm just thinking of, for instance, a Navy SEAL to release the hostages. Maybe Pakistan doing something that it felt was okay. Last time, why is it not okay? Now, you know. Now, I think that's clearly the case, especially when you have in the makeup of Pakistan political parties, one party in particular, the PTI, who's been very critical of US involvement in Afghanistan. So yes, there is a risk. But if I might just make one other point, I think it's important to realize that there may not be as much of a difference between the civilians and the military in Pakistan as we sometimes think. I mean, clearly the military is the implementer of much of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy but I think there's more of a meeting of the minds than sometimes we think. And I would also say, Vikram, I think things have moved a bit from your description of Pakistan's strategy as time has gone by. And I don't see the strategic difference between the US and Pakistan as great as it has been perceived in the past provided we deal with the India issue. That's sort of the big one. So let me open it up. I will request the panelists to stay here for five extra minutes because we started late and had a very good conversation. If I'll entertain in the order that I see the hands, please introduce yourself and make it brief so that as many people as we can get in with their questions, please. Thank you so much. First with a note of thank to USIP for the distinguished panel. I have a comment and a question. My name is Akbar. I'm a former World Bank official. First is the built in question, how to deal with Pakistan. It looks like imposed charge and there is a jury to announce a verdict. So the comment is just why this topic was picked up in a way that- I can answer that. Okay. The second my question is actually, it seemed that the failures of Afghan government are being implied in Pakistan when you build relationship is need for more and more diplomacy rather than using the term last chance of diplomacy. I think as you said, it's correcting the point of view. There are perceptions and trust and I would like to have your comments. Thank you. Let's take another one and then we'll ask who answers, right here. Right here. Thank you very much. This is Mohammad Shafiq. My question is from all the panelists regarding the strategy. I believe it's very clear in the strategy that Pakistan is an issue. I'm going to save Haven's issue and state sponsor of terrorism is an issue. And also probably everybody in this room realize that in the last 16 years all the negotiations and diplomacy has failed. Otherwise we wouldn't have sit here and debating about the issue. What will be your suggestion to President Trump to apply the existence new strategy? What will be the tools exactly other than the diplomacy which has failed in the last 16 years? Thank you. So let's get the questions. A very quick answer to you, sir. As institutions that provoke discussion and debate I think it is important to call a spade a spade. The conversation in Pakistan in this town is about how to deal with Pakistan. So I take responsibility for this but I don't think there's any need to sugarcoat the conversation that we're having. Nobody is saying do X or Y. You've seen a diversity of views on the panel. But I think it's important to put out for the audience around the world because we also have cast this what the reason for this panel is. And the reason is the official statements that are coming out are very much of that genre. So we had to sort of put out what was there. We can't sort of decide on and on. That's the reason. But there's no, not at all, no pun intended here. Please. Well I think you're absolutely right that there are issues internal to Afghanistan. Nobody would deny that. I mean I think whether Robin or whoever mentioned you there are, you know, Afghanistan started when we went there from a very difficult spot with the state of Afghanistan disintegrated. There wasn't much of a state institution. I always tell the story of how the Afghan entire banking system had only $170 million. This is a country of 30 million people. And but now the Afghan state has been reestablished. There's progress made. We used to have 140,000 troops coalition. Now we're talking about 10 to 13,000 and with some enablers, the judgment is they're gonna hold and maybe change the balance. Now if you, the assessment is it, I'm sure there are different views that if you affect the sanctuary, you're gonna make it easier for the enhanced capabilities for the Afghan on forces, the building up of their forces and with the other reforms that are needed. And I think that hasn't been announced but there is a very significant exchange with Afghanistan on what Afghanistan will have to do as part of this new strategy. We haven't really discussed that, but it's very detailed. And you know, whether they will implement every one of those and produce them in time of course remains to be seen but there are Afghan commitments. So I don't see them as either or that you don't deal with the Afghan internal issues and therefore only focus on Pakistan. I think we need to do both and the approach to Pakistan is to change its approach to Afghanistan. We all agree on that. And therefore there is positive incentive as well as negative incentive to bring that about. But the previous approach doesn't work. Others on the second question? Yeah, how does this? I would reject the proposition that the diplomacy has failed. I mean, I don't think it's correct to look at a strategy that has been predominantly military for 16 years with huge volumes of resources poured into the military effort and on the other hand, a much more lightly resourced and inconsistent fits and starts diplomatic effort on the peace front which is what I assume you were referring to and compare those two and say it's the diplomacy that's failed. I think that there is space for a much more robust diplomatic effort to try to launch a peace process than there has been. I don't see that in the cards in the near term because that isn't the policy that the president expressed in his August 21st speech. I'm not saying there's no interest and no intention but it's clearly not the dominant motif of the policy currently. And to the contrary, the policy appears to be to focus predominantly on the military effort to achieve some measure of success on the battlefield and then to look at the possibility of negotiating a political settlement from a position of greater strength. So that suggests that once again, we're going to be in a phase of a more minimized diplomatic effort in Afghanistan. Yes, just one point. Zala's absolutely right that enormous progress has been made in Afghanistan in the last 16 years but it's also true and part of the question that I was posing is what is the reason that the Taliban has staying power? Is it primarily that there are safe havens in Pakistan or is it because there are limitations particularly outside of Kabul on the local governance which has caused people to turn towards the Taliban? And by that, I mean no disrespect at all to President Ghani who everybody knows works 22 hours a day if not 24 and has a vision but his ability to implement it is limited. And I think that's part of the reason you've got a problem with the Taliban. The gentleman here and then I'll come to this side. Hi, my name is Ross Connally. I'm from the National Defense University here in DC. Do you think that there's an avenue for possible cooperation between the US and Pakistan with regards to Iran? The gentleman here. Thank you so much. I'm Hakim Asher. Actually, it seems that Pakistan is a wholesale shop with so many problems. Can you look at it, Ross? It looks that Pakistan is a wholesale shop with so many problems. But if we just focus on counter-terrorism issue, especially the bottom line of the new US strategy is to close the sanctuaries and hand over Akhanees. What are the tools? How could you convince Pakistan to do that? Because we have failed to convince Pakistan. I think we had a lot of discussion about this but we can come back. Hakim, do you want to start with any? I don't think so. It's been particular. Others can speak to it. There's a whole bunch of tense dynamics between Pakistan and Iran. So I don't know if you're talking about just in the region, vis-a-vis Baluchistan or vis-a-vis Eastern Afghanistan. I don't know if that's what you were getting at. But no, I think that we would do well to focus on can we cooperate with Pakistan on Afghanistan as a good foundational starting point because getting much more afield and with the India Elephant in the room, the challenges to what we can achieve together are really immense. And so I think we should just be clear-eyed about that. Right here and then we'll go back. Thank you very much. What a wonderful discussion. Ambassador Khalilzata, I have a question. Could you introduce yourself quickly, please? Nazir Azim, Karimi Afghan Independence Journalist. My question is regarding the recently conference in Oman, Pakistan, India, China, and Afghanistan. Are you optimistic about the result conclusion? The expert in Afghanistan was not satisfied about the conclusion and result. Do you think that solve Afghanistan and Pakistan problem? We'll take one from the back and then come back to the panel. Great. Hi, my name is Shweta Ramachandran. Quick question. Do you think the United States has any interest in helping India and Pakistan engage on a bilateral, I don't know, bilateral talks on Kashmir, for instance, and how important is that factor, do you think, playing out? Because that conflict is often cited as the next melting pot in the region. So just wanted to hear your thoughts on that. Do you want to start and then we'll come back? I'll comment on the talks in Oman. This is the quadrilateral coordinating group between involving the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. This is a group that met a number of times in the past and it's the first meeting in over a year, maybe about a year and a half even. I think it's important to keep expectations of that format in check. It is a useful format for diplomatic dialogue about how to potentially launch a peace process, how to resolve some of the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it is not a forum for peace talks for Afghanistan and it's not a forum that's likely to achieve dramatic breakthroughs. So I would advise having very modest expectations so as to not once again have unwarranted disappointment when it doesn't produce some dramatic breakthroughs, which I don't think is feasible. But it is useful for the U.S. and China to continue to engage on Afghan and Pakistan issues as a way of trying to bridge some of the gaps. On the Kashmir question, I would just say, I don't think the issue is, at least in the past, the issue has not been lack of potential interest on the part of the United States and being helpful on that issue. It's been a complete rejection by India of any involvement by the U.S. in the Kashmir issue and I'm not questioning their reasons necessarily for that, it's just simply the fact that it's not possible for the United States to play a role in resolving the Kashmir issue without both of the directly involved parties being willing to see the United States play that role. I think that on the peace talks, I agree that the conditions are not in place for significant progress. I think the new strategy has to have some time to change the balance on the ground. We'll see whether that happens. And then I think there may be an opportunity for serious negotiations. Now, I'm not opposed to being always open to negotiations and engaging, including direct engagement with the Taliban. I'm not opposed to talking to people, including adversaries. But when asked to be realistic, peace success in the peace process contingent on the conditions on the ground and the broader environment and for the moment, that's not, we're not there. And that's why I think the Afghans are disappointed in the media because nothing significant came out in terms of a press statement or press engagement after the Oman talks. But it was something positive of limited utility. Just a photo of this point on more than that. I wouldn't give it any more credence than that at this point. Scott, there's a nice place to sit. This is going to echoing back to Mohamed's question. But I think there's one of the themes here has been, well, let's not, we've tried diplomacy and it hasn't worked. So we need to go back to a more coercive approach. I'd actually completely invert that. I think that we, I don't honestly feel that we've tried diplomacy to the extent that we have in other situations, both recently and through history. I don't think we've ever really integrated the intelligence, military and diplomatic political mission for this part of the world for a whole variety of reasons. I don't think it's ill will or ill intent, but it hasn't come together as an integrated mission thus far. And so I would actually say you sort of had, you know, 15 one year military campaigns that have not added up to success rather than that you've had lots of diplomatic attempts that have not added up to success. And I think most of the strategies going all the way back to the Bush administration on their face have the right elements. And this current one has the right elements if you look at basically what was said and what was written on smart people thinking behind it. But thus far, for a host of reasons, we've not really figured out what an integrated approach looks like that properly resources the non-military and non-intelligence components. I would totally agree on the point that diplomacy hasn't been fully tried. But I'd like to add one further point on the quadrilateral meeting. And that is there was some criticism of it because the Taliban didn't attend or wasn't invited or whatever. I think that there is a lot of room for those four powers and additionally some others to discuss and come to some sort of common understanding before you bring the Taliban into it. It's very preliminary, but as Laurel says, I think it's very useful. Take the last question right here and then we will end it with right here up front. Thanks. Thank you, my name is Ian Solomon. I'm on a Bill Mohn-Vikram's point about an integrated diplomatic approach. And we haven't heard very much today about development, power, infrastructure, energy, water, health services, education. And I'm wondering is that because it's irrelevant, premature to talk about, overshadowed by security and other issues, assumed to be a given? Why is that not a bigger part of this conversation and should it be? Good, that's a good question. Anyone? Do you mean in Afghanistan or in Pakistan? In Pakistan. In Pakistan. Well, I think there's less and less scope for the United States to be playing a role in that because the United States' assistance to Pakistan has been dropping rather precipitously. It's not that it's not important. I mean, obviously from an internal Pakistani perspective, stabilizing the country, dealing with its security issues, dealing with these issues purely from a social welfare perspective is crucially important. The role of the United States in helping that is somewhat limited and is increasingly limited. So I think the fact that we're not discussing it here is because it's less and less a feature of U.S. policy. I would simply add it's not because it's not important. We know it's important. It is in part because it's overshadowed by these other issues. It's in part because there's less money. But I think it's also in part because the whole development theory, philosophy, how you really bring change is under challenge. And there's active dialogue. You would know World Bank, NGOs, everywhere else about how you actually are effective in doing that. I'm not at all confident. We know the answer to that. So I think that's one reason we weren't. To build on that and just to add, I think there's also been a considerable frustration within the U.S. government about the results that have been achieved as a result of our investments in Pakistan and in Afghanistan as well. Let me just end by asking all the panelists one word. A year from now, Pakistani elections, you have a year to play fighting season in Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship next year at this time. Better, same, worse. Same, I think worse. I would say same. Same. No better, huh? All right, you've got your answer. 90 minutes, well spent. So I'm not even gonna try and summarize this. This is gonna take me a while to internalize and absorb. Let me just end by saying, using the sort of moderator's prerogative, to say that as the Institute of Peace, we work very hard on these kind of difficult issues. Looking at nonviolent means to resolve conflict, to improve relationships, to further U.S. interests. And Pakistan is a particularly, U.S.-Pakistan relationship is a particularly difficult one given the history behind it. But when sort of one goes through international relations training or teaches students, one of the things I always remember from my lessons and imparting that further is that when two countries feel that they are acting entirely rationally in self-interest, and there are people outside who can point to and say, yes, from their calculus, this makes sense. And if two countries with rational calculi end up in a collision course, chances are that's gonna happen. And that's been my worry for this relationship. Increasingly so, that if you get into the U.S. mine and the Pakistani mine from where they're coming at, it's very difficult to convince the other that there may be a change that is needed. One hopes it doesn't go there, but you've heard the complexities here. We don't have a clear answer precisely because very, very good, smart, sensible minds have worked on this issue, and yet it in some ways challenges us still. So with the hope that we can find a way forward in the interest of the region, U.S., and everybody else, please join me in thanking the panelists, and thank you all. Thank you. I'm glad I am back. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you. Yeah.