 Thank you very much Natalie. The French have an expression called Esprit d'escalier which really to sum it up it means the kind of thought that you ideally wanted to express as an event which didn't occur to you until you were leaving. I think we could call framing the usual strategy an Esprit d'escalier in space. It must be extremely interesting to read and what you have told us. You are as you say an outsider to the machine but the more you spoke the more it became clear that you were also an insider to the machine which gives you a point of view I think a very particular validity. Thank you very much for your presentation. If I may open the floor to questions or comments. Anybody who wants to ask a question or make a comment if you wouldn't mind please seeing who you are and who what your affiliation is and I repeat what I said at the beginning the exchange will be on the record. Yes Ben. What would you now knowing where you are now what would you have done differently? I think we probably because it was a lot of learning by doing a lot of the things were not explained sufficiently at the beginning in terms of how the process was organized and they weren't explained because we didn't know ourselves but if somehow one could rewind and already have that plan clear in your head. I think it would have been useful particularly when it comes to the member states to explain to them why it was that we did things the way we did and why we felt that for instance circulating a text too early would have actually damaged the text itself. You know the reason that we gave was half true and half not. The reason that we gave officially was particularly in the last stretch was because of the UK referendum campaign and we don't want to interfere in it and we don't want leaks to happen and leaks happen anyway and we couldn't prevent front page headlines on the Sunday Times saying you know top secret plans on a European army rubbish but anyway the real reason I mean beyond I mean that that was that was a real reason but the other real reason why it wasn't circulated was because of this idea of protecting the text you know not not but I don't think we made we explained that sufficiently we were a bit perhaps too secretive but not because we wanted to be secretive because we didn't know how we were going to organize that that process. On content if I think of how the world has changed since the global strategy has come out I think we I think the emphasis and again it goes back to this Trump point I mean the emphasis on multilateralism global governance are there and on the UN is there but probably if we were to write it now it would have a more prominent role and although already back then we made an effort at not only pointing to the United States as a core partner but broadening out we probably would have broadened out even a bit more you know as a sort of other anecdote in all of this I remember when you know I think it was February or March of 2016 when when I was beginning to write the actual text itself and Felix I said to me you know write that text and reread every sentence thinking if it would still be relevant post Brexit if they were to be Brexit and if they were to be the election of Donald Trump and of course she was half joking when she said it but but I took her seriously I did it but probably in retrospect after it happened I think the language of multilateralism would have been even stronger and this whole idea of the EU as a defender of multilateralism would have been even stronger. Thank you. Yes Mark. Mark Minnes I really enjoyed your few words and I think what was really rich about was the diversity that you brought to it in terms of your approach but I was wondering how important was leadership in the process and was there ever a risk that the box would emasculate the strategy? I think that we had to be as I said you know I think in terms of the actual skeleton you know so what are the priorities? I mean all this came top down to be in all honesty I mean I remember thinking about it in the summer of 2015 and the work hadn't even started and the table of contents was there and it didn't change the order changed. My order started global and then it went down back home to security and then so you know obviously there were changes to the table of contents but the content remained very top down and I think that it wouldn't you know it goes back to this this idea of you know there needs to be a clear organizing principle to something and but then the flesh has to come from everyone else and you know as I said you know if you I think if you solicit things in a in a different way in a slightly less conventional way you get extremely interesting input coming from the box because the box knows you know things that those outside the box can't know so to me the input that the outside the box people can give is on on the broad brush organization of something on the overall tone on the discourse but the nitty gritty detail can only come from the inside because the outside cannot know which goes back to this idea of how much more could we learn from one another if there was more interaction and interaction which goes beyond moments you know like conferences like meetings like you know I'm a big fan for instance of you know sort of having you know just having second months of you know sort of people from whatever the UN into a National Foreign Ministry or the EAS but having people from think tanks in academia as not as interns but seconded you know they're they're doing their work but for six months actually understanding how that machine works and vice versa I think it's far too little of that and I push very strongly particularly when it comes to the EAS there is such a new and therefore relatively unfossilized structure that can therefore do this far more than at times National Foreign Ministries that have been there for a long time. Yes please. Would you care to say how much UK actors whether governmental or non-governmental where significant contributors to the exercise and possibly even to go further than that and speculate about what would be from the 27th point of view the best form of relationship that would take place between the EU and the UK something so generous perhaps. So on the UK's contribution actually United Kingdom was extremely constructive in this whole process and I considered it an ally throughout. It was not a member I mean there were a couple of points on which they were a bit difficult from the eventual NPCC point the headquarter point they they had a specific problem with there was a specific they were very hard on Russia and that actually I mean I knew that they were hard on Russia but it was definitely on one end further out there than the Baltic countries for example so that that was but but they were always extremely constructive and wanting to find and look for compromise and going back to the analogy of the blanket they were you know they were firmly convinced that it was okay not to have a hundred percent of of their share of the blanket so so that's as far as the UK pre-Brexit in terms of Brexit I shouldn't be saying this because it's on the record but let me put it this way well point number one I cannot see a good way out of this particularly when it comes to the United Kingdom itself. Point number two well let's see if Brexit actually happens I mean you know who knows who knows. Point number two point number three if Brexit were to happen I would be extremely surprised if the relationship with the EU is going to look anything like what the EU has with anyone else and you know I think that the on the economic side of it it's going to be extremely difficult to find the win-win agreement because the bargaining power between the two sides is so unequal and we've understood how unequal it is since the referendum we thought it was actually far more balanced than it is but when it comes to foreign and security policy there I think there is a lot to a lot of mutual gain to be had and and I hope but this is a hope it's not you know unfortunately I'm not sure it's going to materialize the the poison that will inevitably and is already affecting the core Brexit negotiation and that poison is there because these bargaining powers are so unequal is not going to filter through and touch foreign and security policy it's a hope but it's not an expectation I mean truth be said it hasn't happened up until now but it's also true that there hasn't been a negotiation when it comes to foreign security policy and surprisingly I would say that the UK's position on this has is and remains very constructive in theory but it still remains extremely vague on on the details you know what kind of relationship they would like to have with the with the European Union but when it comes to CSDP traditionally understood there I would say that you know there were plenty of very good ideas particularly in the early 2000s before therefore you know as the WU was being shut down CSDP was coming into being just before the Eastern enlargement in which there was discussion for example about how to include the Norway's and Turkey's in different forms of decision-shaping but not decision-making meaning sit around political and security committee or the council and you therefore listen and maybe participate in the discussion but you don't have a vote but hey no one votes anyway so it's as good almost as being there I mean I think all those very good ideas which then back then never materialized because of Cyprus and all the rest of that story could actually be dusted off the shelf today when it comes to the UK so I think on on CSDP traditionally understood I definitely see the scope for a win-win on this broader issue of what is it that European security and defence beyond CSDP is going to look like there is more complicated it's more complicated because we don't quite know what the security and defence union is actually going to be in practice I mean we know the different bits that are being put in place but exactly what shape all that's going to have in 234 I mean who knows how long this transition is going to last but you know probably quite some time so it's difficult to imagine the relationship on that bit because it's difficult I mean it's difficult today to really understand where we as Europeans are going to be in that part of the story. I'm Horst Sieglach, member of the Institute. I can share some of your experiences from our own insight and also involvement in German policy papers like the last white paper and I think it is now nearly fashionable to involve the wider public and NGOs and academia in the development of these papers. But I still think the success of your paper is even more commendable because it is multinational and it is also in a very critical time. My question is how are the ideas developing for example I noticed in the white paper, the German white paper and in the global security there is a new term very fashionable resilience. It's a kind of cross-fertilization I think, discussions everywhere and resilience not only ready to absorb shocks from outside but resilience also in view of partners and you mentioned the issue of interests and values from my outside view. If you speak about neighborhood policies there is less emphasis on human rights, democracy, more and resilience. Resilience translates in stability, more interest of the EU in stability of the neighborhood instead of transformation as it was in the past. Do I see it correctly that this is a policy decision? And the second question is top-down approach. Was there any enforcement from top-down to use the term strategic autonomy? Very briefly on the German story, actually I forgot to mention this, not so much the white book that indeed was a parallel process to the global strategy but the previous 2014 German review was incredible inspiration to us. And many of the ideas when it came, in that case it was not tailored to a strategy but it was tailored more broadly and many of the ideas that we then actually imported in the process of global strategy making were taken from the review. I remember there was the situation room experiment bringing in civil society people in a situation room time, this is something that we did. The commissioning opinions to experts both in the case of Germany, Germans and non-Germans in the case of the EU and non-EU is again something that we did. So that was incredible inspiration. So on the question of resilience, no, I would not look at it as stability. So resilience, what does it mean? Resilient, if you look it up on a dictionary and generally you get various definitions but a lot of it tends to then boil down to a condition that metals have. And metals are resilient when they bend without breaking but they bend, they change. So to me resilience is a dynamic concept. So in that respect it's not stability if stability is understood as something static. But neither and there you are right, neither is it transformative in the way in which a transformative approach was understood in the past. Indeed because a transformative approach which often in EU talk ended up in whatever policies of conditionality on democracy and human rights were things that we talked about but actually we didn't really do. So resilience to me captures the principle pragmatism which is at the heart in terms of the overall philosophy of the strategy. The pragmatism comes from the fact that you observe things as they are and you observe the fact that for instance if you're looking at the evolution of a particular third country that evolution is not a linear. There are lots of ups and downs. You therefore need to have the condition of resilience to bounce back, to change, to adapt. The authoritarian state is not resilient, it may look stable and that stability as whatever North Korea can last a long time but it's ultimately in and of you not resilient. But at the same time you are driven by your principles and therefore your interpretation of resilience brings in the political participation and human rights and all of that. So to me it's a way of capturing both sides of this debate and it goes back to this issue of interest and values not being disentangled from one another. Strategic autonomy, no, that didn't come top down at all. I wonder whether you can guess where it came from but so seriously it was probably the most important thing that one particular member state was attached to and obviously that is France but we did not take in the French interpretation of strategic autonomy. The French interpretation of strategic autonomy tends to have a very strong industry sort of interpretation. Strategic autonomy means that you buy and use and make and buy and use European. The way which is the European post Brexit defence industry which is the largest it just so happens to be France. Our interpretation of strategic autonomy in the strategy and everything that came up and particularly in the implementation plan and security and defence is the ability of Europeans to promote and protect their interests and values all the things that are in the global strategy together with partners when they can so that's the choice that we make and if our partners don't want to partner with us then we have to be able to do it alone when necessary so preferably with partners alone if necessary and so you are autonomous strategically to protect and promote your interests and values which is not the traditional French interpretation of the term. My name is Declan Power, I'm a security and defence analyst and my question is a small country like Ireland but when it comes to demystifying issues to do with European defence that's quite an important factor here in terms of the stewardship of public opinion. Oftentimes small special interest groups would take some of the points that you made today and would distort them in such a way as to very much spoke the populace and if we needed proof of that some of the previous referendums that we've seen here and had to be run again were because of those kinds of things. So you've been telling us about how practitioners, bureaucrats, academics think tanks in particular if I'm taking you correctly have a big role in distributing the information out in a useful way is there anything else, any other advice that you would have and how to bring the message in a way to influence the general public about the benefits of what European defence can do particularly in terms of multilateralism and other things that are no brainers I think for most people. Thanks. I have maybe to kind of add on to that a bit. You seemed to be a tad optimistic about the prospects of success of this venture in the shorter order than the longer term. I see a number of complications. I mean you have described yourself the problems that arose for you from straddling the commission and the member states. That is an unresolved issue but above all I would like to join in what Declan Coller has said there is a very big job to be done in the formation of public opinion. You know even when it comes to Germany at the height of the concern with what Donald Trump had been doing Angela Merkel went no further than saying it may be that time has come for us to think of doing something for ourselves somewhat. It was a very qualified kind of reaction and a very understandable reaction but that is the reaction of the head of government of the most important member states. We since have had the intervention of Emmanuel Macron but for my money the public opinions in the member states are not by any means ready for this big jump so what do you see in the shape of arriving at that situation because we need that you know we have to get the support of our electorates for what we do. Okay so I'll first actually answer this because then that leads me to answering your question Declan. So okay I think one observation is that actually this is an easier cell than integration in other policy areas. It's all relative in life. If you look at polls what's quite striking I mean take your barometer but what's striking is that more or less two thirds across the EU public opinion supports more Europe on security and defence matters. The reason why they do of course differs widely from one member state to the other but it's I think far easier to sell more Europe on foreign security policy including defence than on economic integration particularly whatever if you go and have a conversation in Italy about this or migration you know I mean on other policy areas. So it's all relative and this is a slightly I think easier one than others and certainly than it used to before but I think the question is so extremely valid and it connects to Declan's to my response to Declan's question which is the fact that obviously this has to be framed in the right way and in different member states the framing will have to be different and the framings obviously cannot contradict one another but there will be shades because at the end of the day Europe is diverse and thank God it is. So what are the elements of a narrative that could work for instance in a member state like Ireland? And to me there are you know particularly when it comes to this defence bit and we were having a bit of this conversation over lunch. I think there are two elements. Element number one is this is all about an integrated comprehensive approach and it's not as if the European Union is going to be doing less of diplomacy and development and energy and migration and research and infrastructure and done done done done. That will still be there and in fact we have to do more of that as well but we cannot deny that defence particularly when it comes to the EU context was the sort of you know ugly duckling and it has been the ugly duckling since 1954 and if we can all accept and I think across the EU we can all accept the fact that majorities you will always have minorities everywhere but the defence bit is an element. It may not be and it isn't the main element to fix problems but it is an element to them and therefore if we recognise this and we recognise that this is the bit that we are weakest on then surely we can present a narrative to citizens that is compelling. Couple to it, I think the European conversation about defence is not the NATO conversation about defence. It is not about spending more on defence. That's the NATO conversation and it regards 22 EU member states but it's the NATO conversation. The EU conversation about defence is about spending together and again I think that's something that citizens can understand. I mean citizens can understand that actually we spend a lot of money on defence we spend 250 billion a year on defence collectively. We waste between 25 and 100 billion a year of that money. So surely there is a strong logic and a compelling narrative a simple narrative to sell to citizens about how defence cooperation is actually in the interests of the public. So that's sort of the answer to the narrative question. In terms of the question of what about the divisions? I mean of course they are there and they are still there. Can all of this alignment of the stars that I've been mentioning is it sufficient to overcome those divisions? And of course I don't have an answer to that question. I mean all I can say is that this alignment has never been there so if there is a chance it is now but we will have to wait and see whether it's sufficient but what makes me hopeful that at least there is a possibility is not so much that I see and I don't see a convergence of whatever threat perceptions in Europe a convergence of strategic cultures in Europe. No I don't see that. I think threat perceptions will always differ in Europe because we are where we are in geography and that doesn't change. Strategic cultures are a product of political systems of history I mean of so many things that again those I mean I cannot imagine the Irish and the French strategic concepts ever to become fully convergent and one and the same but does it is that an insurmountable obstacle? And to that I would say no it's not. There is a prerequisite to overcoming that obstacle you know the obstacle of the divisions and the differences and I think it boils down to one word and it's solidarity. Now if we can work on that political concept and we work on it because there is the ultimate recognition that we cannot achieve what we want to achieve at home and in the world without the help of the rest of the Union because we are all small states and small states know this bigger states are realising this. My last anecdote from the work on the global strategy was when I inserted a sentence in the text that read as a Union of well first it read 28 and then I just took out the number but as a Union of small to medium sized member states and I thought to myself let's see how the Germans and the French and the Brits are going to react to that sentence and they didn't change it they didn't even suggest changing it and I think there is this growing recognition that actually we're all small and that unless we're together and we can only be together through solidarity we're lost. Thank you very much. We have to, I'm sorry, we have run out of time. Natalie as an outsider who has become an insider. Not quite. You have given us an inspirational talk and your insights have been extraordinarily valuable to us especially could I say you're at the end relatively optimistic perspective on the future. It's a future that I think we would all like to believe in that we would all like to hope that we can indeed arrive in solidarity as a position where Europe can pull its way in the world united. Thank you very much.