 I have essentially two questions. The first one is the tax side was almost completely absent from the presentation. For example, when we think about transfers, if some of the transfers to other poor people are financed out of indirect taxation on consumption goods, there are some calculations which are showing that when you look at the balance, the balance is negative. And it may be the case that poor people are paying more in terms of taxes than they are receiving in terms of transfers. So it seems to me that we cannot simply push the taxation thing aside and only focus on transfers. My other point is really about another thing which is another concept which I thought was missing, minimum wage. Which as a matter of fact, in the most Latin American country, there is a minimum wage. Now it is true that in Mexico, if I remember well, it is rather low, but in a country like Colombia, it must be something like 70% of the median income, which is one of the highest in the world. And moreover, this is legislation which is very severely controlled. So this is definitely a very important element in determining informality or formality. And this leads me to another point which is that, and I'm very much aware of that because in my country, this has been a huge, huge discussion, which is the fact that above the minimum wage, the non-wage costs, like social contributions, presumably over time at an equilibrium, will be passed on the workers. Simply because if there is enough competition on the labor market above the minimum wage, let's say after twice the minimum wage, so the issue on the side of firms, the issue is very much linked to the existence of minimum wage. And I think it is really important to take that into account and more generally to admit that there are other, there are many other determinants of formality and formality than the status of contributions. I have a question for Santiago Levy. Could you maybe elaborate a little bit more on how the universal social protection systems could incentivize people to move to formal employment and also in relation to taxes because you also mentioned the example about the reduction in payroll taxes and how that had incentivized formality. But governments can only reduce payroll tax or any other taxes until a limit because somewhere the taxes need to come from. Thank you. Thanks. Just quickly. I think it's maybe important to distinguish between employment and self-employment to remember that the bulk of the poor are really self-employed, meaning they are small farmers. And there are situations where social assistance to self-employed can be effective if it helps them build assets. In the case of Procampo, the assets were there, there was a large multiplier effect to the transfers. The bright approach is to build the assets first in such a fashion that the transfers be put to work on the assets that people accumulate. So I think we are maybe coming to be too hard on the social assistance and when we think of who the poor are, there may be more scope to use social assistance in a productive fashion providing we use them in such a fashion as the assets are being built, as the transfers are being made. First of all, I wanted to thank the participants because the challenge was already trying to gather all the information about social protection left aside trying to include taxes. So I think they did a great job. However, lots of things were left behind and I wanted to mention two. One of the first ones is related to eligibility and the use of proxy means testing. To which extent this is creating problems in order to target the poor and to which extent can we move away from it to an income test, at least in Latin America. And linked to this, nothing was mentioned about protection in the case of unemployment. So there's, in some countries, there's a presence at least of unemployment insurance. In some others, I think we still have systems of severance payments only. And if you put together this with the fact that we have proxy means testing rather than means testing for those who are not affiliated, actually there's no protection in case of unemployment. So which directions could we follow in this sense? I appreciate all the efforts in gathering data and the three presentations were very good in that sense. But I think we should perhaps go beyond coverage. I know it's hard to summarize multi-country evidence, but I think if we are, for example, you mentioned the case of Brazil, if we're reducing a very regressive social insurance program for diplomats and, or in my case, scientific researchers in Argentina, which is outrageous in international terms, is that bad? If we're reducing entitlements, if we're shifting them to cash transfers for poor children? So I think there's the issue of the budget constraint that Francois mentioned and how we're financing that. If you're expanding programs that's not sustainable and then you end up in a macroeconomic crisis, that's also not necessarily something good. So I think we should try to go beyond coverage and talk a little bit about incidents in terms of income groups, but also in terms of age. I think in Latin America, we've seen a great expansion for, you respect, other people. And we can also consider what would have been the alternative use of funds. Paul Mosley, University of Sheffield. I'm fascinated by your vicious circle of informality and poverty induced by social protection story. But maybe it oversimplifies a bit because there are other determinants of formalization and productivity apart from just social protection. So in the Latin American country, I know Best, which is Bolivia. Sure, in the sectors where informalization is increasing because of structural change, such as mining, productivity is falling there. On the other hand, there are other sectors such as construction and manufacturing where because of structural change, there is a tendency for formality and therefore productivity actually to rise. And so in spite of having been a huge expansion of social protection, productivity overall across the entire economy is actually rising. So maybe the vicious circle isn't as prevalent as you say. The title of this session was social protection and age, but I'm afraid we didn't hear too much about age. So I wonder if the panelists could give us some of the insights about what the role of age might be because we all know it's becoming fashionable also in age circles to put some more resources to the protection in its various forms. So is that a good idea as such? If that's a good idea, what should be the specific role of age? Is that the cash transfers are of course the big fat nowadays, perhaps age funding should be used more like the purposes to which our commentator was referring to. And I also wonder if we have any reason to suspect that the eight finance programs might be somehow different from the other programs, either because of the funding modalities or different funding modalities or because of the different environments they are working in. Absolutely in agreement with Francois. I mean, each country has a different situationality. The minimum wage really matters a lot in Colombia. And clearly then the incidence of social security contributions is going to change because the minimum wage implies that it can be shifted back. So that clearly is part of the story. And also to link with Paul, there are many other determinants of informality here. We have to talk about taxes. We have to talk about small tax regimes for small firms and large firms, about the size dependent tax regimes that are very, very prevalent in Latin America that are also a very important component of the fact that many firms remain small. I didn't speak about any of that because this was only on social insurance, but clearly the taxation side, the issues associated with access to credit, the issues associated with income taxation mattered importantly. And this was a way overly simplified only focusing on social insurance. So if you wanted to do this more and more fully, this is what I actually tried to do in the book, you have to look at the whole incentive structure coming not only from the social insurance part, but also have to look at the taxation part, the part associated with labor regulations, which nothing was mentioned here about severance pay and all that stuff that also affects firm level choices. On Francois's point about looking at the overall system of taxation fully in agreement, what you want to do at the end of the day is look at the incidents of the structure of consumption taxes, labor taxes, and transfers, and the net of all that. And certainly what you want to do is after you look at the net of all that, make sure that the net of all that is progressive, not that each individual component by itself but that the net of all that. As it stands today, I think that the system, I didn't speak much about that but I agree, it's not really that distributive. It's not really that distributive. I think that at most, maybe 1% of GDP is really being redistributed through all this. So that's another reason why I think the system is sort of not good. On Allen's question, I fully agree, perhaps I was misunderstood. My main query is not with social assistance or with poverty or transfers for poverty. That's not my main concern. My main concern is the dichotomy in social insurance that segments the labor market. Clearly transfers to the poor can be translated into assets, land assets like in the case of Procampo, human capital assets like in the case of Progresa, and clearly you want to build their assets, both physical assets and human capital assets. The problem that I'm focusing on is that those assets, particularly the human capital assets that you're building through the targeted poverty programs, are not getting the rate of return that they should be getting in the labor market because not the social assistance component, the social insurance component is making that difficult. So fully in agreement that we should focus on them. But we're not getting as much as we could potentially get from the building up of assets. And this is data that some study we did at the IDB, it's interesting. We've just done a 20-year longitudinal study of the first cohorts of people that benefited from Progresa. And we're asking whether the labor market outcomes of those cohorts of people that have more human capital than their elders are better. And with the exception of the people that migrated to the U.S., the answer is no. So it's a very sad story. It's a sad story that says you've invested in all these human capital assets through social assistance, but the labor market is not allowing that these assets actually produce a rate of return that should be getting. So that's my main query. And I don't want to come hard on social assistance on the country. I want to come forward. So maybe I should stop there because of... Thank you. I will pick some other questions to start with. There was a question about eligibility and moving to income tests instead of proximate tests. I'm not quite sure about that. I think that the target of the program in general terms has been working well. So that was probably one of the things that we learned in this period, was how to implement these programs, how to target these programs. About the question, Guillermo's question, if I understood his thinking about, well, we can change the architecture by other ways, by, for example, changing the benefits, and that probably would be a good idea. So I think that's where the political economy and the story of the development of social protection systems in Latin America shows the difficulties to do such things. So that I think we must take that into account when discussing these issues. And I completely agree that, first of all, that we left aside taxes and minimum wages and there were important changes, for example, in the case of Latin America, in Uruguay, in Argentina, in Brazil, increases in real minimum wages were very important. And in this period, they did not have the potential adverse effects because they were equality-enhancing and the labor market was very dynamic in this period, but it was a special context in the region. So, and I cannot comment on it, I'm sorry. Okay, my two minutes are going to be really brief. Going back to Ellen's point, our discussion, I think it's really important. Basic services, education, healthcare, housing and so on, are perhaps even much more important than transfers in cash. But this is not what we, what was the theme of the panel today, but she makes the really important point that we need to get that right too. And perhaps that is her priority. On the tax side, I think it's important, but for most low-income countries, I think we could take the basic assumption that the tax transfer system is neutral in its effects and all the kind of work that the CEQ kind of initiative with non-elastic is producing for different countries shows that tax transfer systems are roughly neutral basically because low-income countries don't have significant personal income tax. So basically if most of the taxes collected through consumption taxes and company taxation, corporate taxation is perhaps the only element that is more progressive. So perhaps neutral is what we should assume. We have here sort of points about whether we should worry about the specific way in which we do eligibility tests. I'm really not concerned so much about that. I think the key issue is the regularity with which this eligibility test is done because if you look at most low-income countries, you measure poverty at one point in time, one day in the year when you do a survey. But the numbers of people that pass through poverty in the course of one year are significantly higher. So if you have a method that identifies eligibility every two years, it's never going to do proper targeting. And I think that is the point that Martin Ravellian was doing in the morning. Perhaps we should worry much more about the regularity rather than finding methods of eligibility that can be implemented at much closer space in time. Finally, two things. On the integration of social insurance and social assistance, I am skeptical about that. I have a nice picture at home that I look at it every so often where this is in Brazil, in Brasilia in the federal government building. You have the federal police inside and you have the state police outside demonstrated against the change in pensions. And so you have two elements of the Brazilian police which is pretty fearsome, fighting against each other. The state police are breaking the windows and the federal police inside are trying to protect parliament. I think it's really hard to do this because you're going to have to reduce significantly the very generous benefits that go to social insurance. I'm skeptical about integration. I think it sounds better in terms of rules and regulations, but it's really hard in terms of the politics of it. Finally, on aid, I'm going to get into trouble here, but what is the role of international assistance in supporting social assistance? I think anything that has to do with public goods is helpful. For example, the rapid response initiative of the World Bank, which is rapidly improving the capacity in low-income countries for implementing social assistance is a very good thing. The protection to promotion initiative that provides information on the effectiveness of social assistance in low-income countries is also a very good thing because there are public goods who are learning how to do poverty. But I'm afraid a lot of the international efforts, particularly the UN, focuses on a policy bubble. I think we're at the point where it's really unhelpful, and I wish they took a vacation. Saving the world must be really tiring. Why don't you take a vacation for a bit? I think low-income countries are doing really well. Just leave things as they are. I know I'm going to get into trouble for that. Thank you.