 Good afternoon, welcome everybody to USIP as well as welcome to everybody watching online. My name is Nancy Lindborg and I'm the new president here at the U.S. Institute of Peace. We are honored today to host His Excellency Mohammed Ashraf Ghani. You have had an amazing visit thus far here in the United States. I don't know how you've slept. You've been absolutely tireless since you've arrived. So thank you very much. We're especially pleased that you were able to make it a priority to join us here today to speak to the American public and to take some questions. USIP is very pleased to host today's event with the Atlantic Council. It's President Ghani used to be on their board. And after the president makes his opening remarks, Fred Kemp, who is here, the president of Atlantic Council, will moderate a Q&A as well as those watching online. So please tweet with the hashtag Ask Ghani. Since his election last fall, President Ghani has repeatedly stated that peace is a key priority. That's the primary goal. And so it's therefore fitting that you are here with us today in this building which symbolizes America's commitment to peace and that this should be the venue of your conversation with the American public. I just returned from Afghanistan, where our USIP cobble team introduced me to a wide range of Afghan civil society, government, religious leaders, all of whom are working with great energy and great dedication toward the vision of reform and peace that President Ghani has outlined. And without question, this will not be easy. This will take concerted effort. But as one young civil society leader said to me, we have got to make this government work. There is no plan B. USIP has worked in Afghanistan since 2002, and Mr. President, I can assure you that USIP plans to remain fully engaged in helping to build peace in Afghanistan, both from the community up and from the top down, and especially with the new spirit of reform, of partnership, and of hope that you have brought. I want to give a special shout out to the extraordinary USIP team working on Afghanistan, many of whom are here today and led by the remarkable Andrew Wilder. And now I'm especially delighted to ask Steve Hadley to introduce President Ghani. Steve is our extraordinary chair of the USIP board. He's also the vice chair of the Atlantic Council, a former national security advisor, and an old friend of President Ghani's. Please help me welcome Steve and Hadley. Mr. President, and it is a real joy to be able to call you that. On behalf of both USIP and the Atlantic Council, it is a sincere pleasure for me to welcome you here. Our two countries reacquainted themselves with each other under the most tragic circumstances nearly 14 years ago. And who in those days of confusion and uncertainty would have imagined what Afghanistan would achieve in the intervening years? Who would have thought that Afghanistan could achieve in that relatively short period of time? What it takes many countries decades to achieve, a peaceful and democratic handover of power from one government to another. In welcoming you here as president, I don't want to overlook the significant role that you played throughout those 14 years in rebuilding Afghanistan. President Ghani was appointed in 2009 to oversee the security transition. In fulfilling those responsibilities, he visited every military command of the Afghan army, traveling to every province in the country. Between 2004 and 2008, President Ghani was chancellor of Kabul University, looking to prepare the next generation of Afghanistan's leaders. And before that, for two years, he was minister of finance. And what struck those of us who had the privilege of working with him in that period was not only his encyclopedic knowledge of Afghanistan, but his creative approach when it came to the difficult task of state building. I'm going to give you one example, reform of Afghanistan's currency in 2002. President Ghani, then minister of finance, implemented a massive nationwide currency exchange where every banknote of Afghanistan's various currencies, then in circulation, was traded in for a note of the new currency. Few people thought it could be done. Few people understood how important it was to creating a solid economic foundation for Afghanistan. And for those who understood it's important and thought it was impossible, President Ghani, then his finance minister, did it. And he did it with his trademark determination and tireless effort. He made it happen, providing the basis of years of economic growth that followed. Mr. President, your country is lucky to have you as president. On behalf of the Atlantic Council and the United States Institute of Peace, we feel very lucky indeed to have you with us here today, President Ghani. Ms. Landburg, Mr. Hadley, Steve, ladies and gentlemen, I'm humbled by the introduction. It's not the country that is lucky, it is I who am lucky to be born in Afghanistan at this moment in time. We are a country of great suffering and simultaneously of great opportunity. Our suffering is indicated by the fate of Farhunda, a woman totally innocent who went to a shrine to argue with a fortune teller, probably, as one version says, that the fortune that was written for her, the charm was without effect. She was murdered in cold blood by a mob. We have arrested 32 people in relationship to this heinous crime. We have put over 10 police officers under investigation for standing silent and doing nothing. This incident speaks for our collective trauma. 36 years of conflict have deeply traumatized us. We suffer from the post-distress order syndrome, but we don't have analysts. We must engage in collective therapy in order to deal with this unprecedented level of violence. It had no place in our culture. It had no place in our religion. Events of those type must be taken seriously because their rarity in itself is not an excuse. They speak of a tragedy and we must have the determination to overcome those kinds of tragedies. That's why I'm lucky because the people of Afghanistan, in their wisdom, accepted to place the burden of responsibility on myself in a team, Dr. Abdullah and our other colleagues, to bring fundamental change in sustainable transformation. We are a country of hope because we never give up. We are resilient people. Anyone else in our position today would have surrendered. They would have given up hope. They would have not had the determination to participate. You know, when others participate in an election, it's a picnic. For us participating in an election was to risk cutting off your fingers. And then, after the first round of the election, in Ghazni was trying to wipe off the marks, the ink marks, with a knife, so that people would not cut the fingers. That massive turnout, particularly participation of 38% of our women, speaks of our determination. Peace, I'll be extremely brief so I can allow a conversation rather than a lecture format. Lecture formats don't work. Peace is our priority, but peace is extremely difficult because peace in Afghanistan cannot be framed in terms of a classic political conflict. The drivers of conflict must be specified so that peace can be framed properly. Most of the literature in peace, with all due respect to the institute itself, is from classic perspective. Where is the discussion of criminality as a driver of conflict? We are people who have made tens of billions of dollars from conflict in order to have ungoverned spaces. We need to understand this deep criminality as a driver. The ecology of terror has changed. Terror morally is still an aberration, but sociologically it's become a system. Terror is acquired as a system characteristics that are very similar to corruption as a system. Corruption in a lot of countries is not an aberration. It is the system. The reason I highlight this is when you deal with a system, it takes very different type of efforts than when you deal with symptoms. The other, at the former life, cold nights when I was chancellor of Kabul University allowed me to read through over 100 peace agreements and classify them and write about them. I wrote a long article in 2007. So I want to highlight a couple of trends from that. In my paper on Syria that was published a couple of years back on foreign policy again, I drew some of them. 50% of peace agreements globally break down within five years. It's a very sobering fact because it means that when you begin or even when you conclude, it's not the outcome. And because of this, the agreement really needs to have been worked out and the implementation arrangements have to have been figured. A lot of peace agreements are very idealistic on paper but have very little attention to implementation arrangements. And that's when the real work begins. Second, for success of peace, regional consensus is essential. Almost all conflicts that have been enduring have involved sanctuary in a neighbor or several neighboring countries. The need of sanctuaries, determination of neighbors to be able to be willing to work together for peace is extremely important. And Central and Latin America peace broke out when the neighboring countries reached consensus that peace was essential from a regional perspective and not just from a national perspective. And then there's the very process of managing the process of peacemaking. You need national consensus, which means that in today's environment, you cannot have covert discussions. You must make peace into an overt process to build the consensus that is necessary because working in secret involves back clashes and it's extremely important. And the other, when there are major issues such as gender rights, fundamental human rights, rights to inclusion, all the more that the debate be framed properly, that the discussion be prepared thoroughly, and that the focus be maintained. One other observations and then I'd invite my very good friend and colleague, Fred Kemp, to engage in a conversation. Peace in a lot of countries does not result in security. Peace agreements bring an end to the political justification of violence, but absorption of ex-competence is a fundamental problem, reabsorption of refugees, displaced people is a phenomenon that requires enormous attention. The section of the peace agreements that are most ambitious and least paid attention to are the socioeconomic issues. And this, in our case, I just want to highlight one. When peace comes, I say when, not if, because we are determined to bring it. We will be facing absorption of two to five billion refugees back within our fabric. And we need to be very clear what this type of scale of reabsorption entails, what type of economic focus we must have, what type of governance, but particularly what kind of social policy that would ensure that people have a place, that they become stakeholders in this phenomenon. I invite you, the Institute of Peace, with your leadership, with Mr. Hadley's enormous experience and guidance, to be partners with us in this process, and I'm very much looking forward to an intense discussion over the days and months to come. Thank you. Well, Mr. President. You can call me a chef, I think it's a... Well, you know something, I like Steve, I think it just gives me so much pleasure to say Mr. President. Thank you. And I think those of us who have known you longest and have seen the integrity vision with the leadership you've shown in many aspects of your life. Sitting at the joint session of Congress today and seeing you walk down that aisle to a standing ovation of Congress was really a moment, a significant moment, a historic moment. So thank you, you've thanked us so much while you've been here, I want to thank you. For making the sacrifices you've made to do the job that you're doing, you said last night at the State Department, leadership is about sacrifice, leadership isn't about privilege, you're the epitome of that, and that's the last I'm going to say because we can talk later, but I did want to express those personal remarks, and now I'm going to grill you. Of course. I wonder if you can, I'm going to ask a couple of questions and then I'll go to the audience. Sure. Talk about peace a little bit more to the extent that you can, I realize that there may be much you can't talk about right now, but where do you think one is in a reconciliation and potential peace process with the Taliban, and what will it take, what unlocks this? Well, first we have to define the problem. The problem fundamentally is not about peace with Taliban, the problem is fundamentally about peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For 13 years we've been in an undeclared state of hostilities, and this is the definition that we offered to our Pakistani counterparts, they've accepted this definition of the problem. That's the breakthrough. First in the state of Pakistan and the state of Afghanistan as two states, sovereign, equal, independent, must reach acceptance of each other, and the necessity that we need each other to prevent the region from sinking into chaos. And the conditions have changed. In previous years we talked about the spring fighting season, and it was always Afghanistan. This year, unfortunately, the spring fighting season is going to be intensely in Pakistan. 165,000 approximately of Pakistan forces are now stationed along the Duran line. They've carried huge counterinsurgency operations resulting in displacement of approximately two and a half million people. We've had over 200,000 refugees from Pakistan come to Afghanistan. So it's a new context. The heinous attack on the Peshawar children came within days of the heinous attack on our children in Yahihil when they were playing volleyball. Terrorism is a ping-pong. It does not know innocent people or where they live. So this, if I'm correct in this, that now the new ecology of terrorism poses a threat to the entire state system of South Asia, and West Asia, and threatens China and Central Asia, then we must come together to understand that state cooperation on a regional compact on stability in prosperity is essential. In this regard, our conversations with our Pakistani counterparts, both civilian military leadership have been productive. I'm cautiously optimistic in waiting for results. The second phenomenon, of course, is Taliban, and as I remarked this morning in my address to Congress, the Taliban must be differentiated from the ecology of terror. They've been connected to it, but I hope that, as I've won patriots, they will choose to separate themselves from them. And there, it's premature to talk in public. Again, I'm cautiously optimistic. Thank you very much for that answer. Perhaps you could talk a little bit more also about the ecology of terror. When I spoke with you in Munich, you talked about Daesh and the evolution of Daesh in Afghanistan and also other groups. How are you seeing, this is a constantly moving picture, how have you seen this evolve? And will you need more outside help than you have right now to take this on? Well, first thing to realize with the ecology is that the ecology is a system, symbiotic relationships get to be established, also competitive relationships. Daesh is key characteristic. One, it focuses on its competitors and it swallows them whole. Look at its relationship with the Syrian Free Army. Like Cobra, it absorbed and the key officer corps that was the backbone of it from Syria in Iraq, the former Bates, are now working with Daesh. And if Al Qaeda was, we told you respect to Microsoft, Windows 1, Daesh is Windows 5. It's fast. It is brutal, but it's extraordinary quick. It took Al Qaeda years of planning, it took Daesh months. Three, mutation is very rapid. And we need to take account of this mutation because the other analogy is it's like a cancer. It jumps. Fourth, it's extremely well financed. The financing of the psychology of terror is unprecedented and unfortunately we've focused very little on relationship between the psychology and criminality as an inherent component of the psychology. Without the criminal networks that were available, money and people will not travel. In terms of ideas, the new technology is enabled recruitment. The first Afran to be recruited by Daesh was a woman recruited via Australia and deployed in Syria. So it gives you both speed and appeal. And then there's the narrative. The narrative is simple, straightforward, is cathological, deals with end of time. But it's appealing to certain very basic things. Now the contrast of this ecology is that states are either collapsing or they're extremely slow to respond. The governments of the region have not acknowledged the problem of exclusion. Like Afghanistan, we have 36% of our population living below poverty. For five years the poverty line hasn't moved one inch. In some places it's gotten worse. Northeastern Afghanistan is 50% poverty. Landlessness in some places is reaching 90%. Where are the egalitarian policies to make people stakeholders? It is not enough to say that you're a government. Maybe you'll be a government without a compact with your citizens. In the speed is slow. The international bureaucratic response is very slow. Our understanding analytically is slow. This combination makes the threat formidable. And a couple of other observations. One, our framework of analysis is country bound. While the ecology of terror calls the very borders into question. And we need to respond to this. We need to go prior to the age of nation state, as I was trained in medieval history or ancient history, to understand networks. Because that's, you know, while the technology is new, the techniques are not. Sufi orders, much more peaceful phenomena, spread very rapidly throughout Terworld. The levels of commerce for three millennia expanded. And related to the second point, we need regional coordination. We need coordination at the level of the government, at the level of region, at the level of the Arab Islamic world, and then global. In here is a fundamental requirement of courage. We have to be willing to speak truth to terror. Who speaks for Islam? Why are the majority of the Muslims silent? This is not your fight. It is our fight, and we must assume it and win it. How many Daesh fighters, if you can estimate it all, are there in Afghanistan and where? Well, again, I would reformulate the question. Because that's to frame it in the classic way of insurgency, counterinsurgency ratios. The Galula heritage. But Galula never commanded even a province. We were caught in a romance of the French, the way we were caught with structural reading, or deconstruction. Counterinsurgency must be viewed much more from perspective of Malaysia, the work of Thompson, or somebody else in that regard, than just this. It is who they can recruit, who do they target? So Afghanistan has no shortage of a reserve army available to be recruited. We have 1 million unemployed youth. 600,000 more are going to be added this year. There are academies that are training suicide bombers, money and ideas to recruit these and reorganize them, I think, are more important in terms of lethal impact. Daesh is four stages. Organize, orient, decide, act. This has been very well documented by a series of open source studies done for sitcom. And if you apply this phase, we saw three, we moved on the fourth to prevent them. And the action is spectacular. It is oriented towards TV, the burning of the Jordanian, the destruction of ancient cities. If you understand the pattern, then the nature of activities that must be directed against it would not be just in relationship to the numbers, but in relationship to the impact. Because the media's focus in media defines our comprehension is on dramatic action. After that, you can take the district or reorganize the city, but people will not report on this. So it's really important, I think, to understand that the threat is posed now in epistemological level, not words that I should use. It shows you my former profession as a professor. But one other story, why is Afghanistan so important for Daesh? It is because they have a narrative, a story of the end of the world. In that story, the past is important. Our ancient name of Khurasan is Khurshah. A lot of Daesh adherents have assumed the name Khurasan. Why? Because twice the caliphate was started from Afghanistan. The Abbasid caliphate was a product of the Khurasan revolt and reordering and overthrow of the Amid. And then Mamun, the one who started the golden age of science in Islam, reconquered Baghdad from the current city of Maruf in Turkmenistan and Herat was his major soon. Second, the story of the end of the world, the force that would defeat them, starts from Khurasan. And the battle that they expect will take place in Dabiq in Syria. That's the name of their magazine. It's a very small city, but they've spent unbelievable energy to consolidate this space. So hence, the problem has to be seen from their perspective. And then they expect Jesus Christ to come back, be reborn as a Muslim and bring the end of the world and defeat the Khurasan force. I think it's very important to get into that thinking. Thank you so much. Questions, please. Let me go straight to the audience. Please identify yourself, please, and ask your questions. Hi, President Ghani. And congratulations. You look much younger while I've aged. I'm Paula Bryan with Oxfam, and I'm very proud to be calling you President Ghani. I wondered if you could share some views on what you think is the role of organized civil society in Afghanistan and whether you think there's still a role for international organizations in your country. And speaking not only to your country, but you've been a voice for what we should be doing more generally. We're in a big year. We're declaring big goals about many of the things that you care about, not just MDGs, but industrialization, economic growth and so on. We don't have the financing for it, and many in organized civil society don't know what to do in the next generation of work that's coming. Do you have views on that? Yes, thank you. It's a pleasure to see you. It was my advisor when I was Minister of Finance, and it shows you I could trust a member of the civil society to be my advisor. Yes, you still need it. First thing, construction of the space of civil society in a country like Afghanistan that is witnessed the trauma and the type of tragedy of Farhunda and hundreds of other excluded persons is essential. Second, the oppositional role between government, business and civil society must end and come to a framework of creative tension rather than stalemate. Third, the local roots of civil society must be really rethought. We have over 200,000 mosques. The space of mosques as a civil space is extraordinary crucial. So, you know, there are two traditions. The English tradition of civil society that is focused on legal rights because political rights were very slow in England. You know, franchise developed very late investment in education or the Germanic tradition, which is emphasized social rights, but slowed down political rights. We must now bring this tension together organically, not to impose. Part of the external issue has been a discourse that alienates a lot of people locally, women's rights, human rights. The Constitution of Afghanistan includes everything that the Human Rights Declaration engages. Why do we need to continuously invoke the Human Rights Declaration instead of the Constitution? So, fundamental framing notions are really a display. And transparency was not invented by my former colleagues at the World Bank. Omar, the second caliph of Islam, or the fourth caliph Ali, are embodiments of this. What I'm bringing to you is that civil society must seek historical roots in the culture within which it operates. Politics is not a technical discipline. It is simultaneously a cultural arena in a field of interaction. And within this cultural arena, we have agreements and disagreements. If you just embrace what are called external notions, quote-unquote because we are engaged in a universal conversation, you surrender the space of Islam to the likes of Daesh. So the internal process of discussion, I think, is extraordinarily important. So objective in language must come to articulation. The new agenda is justification in the old agenda with the fundamental parts of it, or empowerment of the poor in their participation. And in there, I think you just need a new age of relevance, NGOs, or called non-governmental organization, which means they are confused about what they are. Another name would be Necessary to Governance. And I hope you adopt that. Trudy Rubin. This is such a pleasure, President Ghani. Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Inquirer. You spoke of the necessity of regional consensus for peace and the end of sanctuaries. Could you tell us a bit more about how far you feel you've progressed with Pakistan, moving towards that consensus and towards the end of sanctuaries? And for a broader consensus that includes all the countries in the region, including difficult actors such as Iran, including China, Russia, who is going to pull that consensus together? Can it be done just by the neighbors? Does the U.S. have a role? How can you envision that beginning to come together? Thank you. And let me just say one thing on top of Trudy's excellent question, which is the China piece of this. I was just in India last week, and they're somewhat suspicious of this move towards China. How does this fit in and how do you solve the... You have a great regional ambition, but you have some pretty significant regional problems? Well, thank you. I'll answer the second part of the question. The first one will reveal itself by results. In terms of the region, the initiative in the first place must come from the region, and I hope our practice in the last six months can show how much can be done regional. We've created the first... We've been critical in creating the first tripartite format of discussion between China, United States, and Afghanistan. China is a serious stakeholder in this. I'm fortunate that we've received more commitment of assistance from China in the economic area and security area than the last 13 years combined, because the psychology of terror and the nature of the threats allow us to form common understanding. Each one of the neighbors that you mentioned, we've engaged in deep conversation. Today, there's a broad consensus among our neighbors from India to Azerbaijan and beyond, Russia included, that a stable Afghanistan is essential to stability in the region. This is an important consensus that is being formed now from the expression of the consensus we have to go to the mechanisms. Mechanisms are going to require doing certain things bilaterally, certain things trilaterally, certain things multilaterally. The United States still remains the indispensable interlocutor within this, but managing the process and supporting the process must be differentiated. What we would like for the peace process or a mechanism such as Friends of the Peace where all parties are informed, they're engaged, but they do not mediate or manage. Afghan ownership in management of the peace process is the indispensable precondition. And I hope that we've shown that we have both the imagination and the capacity to do this, because without managing the internal dynamic, for instance, we've put and I thank Minister Stanekzai for facilitating this, we've put all key questions regarding peace to key constituencies in Afghanistan, women's groups, human rights community, the ulama, business community, the peace council, et cetera. That is given us, and he's just summed up the results of the deliberations and all the questions we'll put in writing, all the answers have been provided in writing. Writing is a very good discipline. Orally, you can change your mind and say, well, I didn't, but paper is cold. I like cold paper. That's because I'm a bookworm, I know you. I wasn't born a bookworm, I climb mountains. We have reached 90% consensus. The areas that are innovative constitute 5% that we really need to re-engage stakeholders, the areas that are different are 5%. But there are boundaries are clearly emerging from this. And mechanisms of support need to be differentiated. Question of voice need is important in this process. A lot of work on this, but there's the price. The price, peace, as it is significant and vital, next to this is economic integration. Don't forget, Asia is in the process of becoming the largest continental economy in the world. It's recapturing its position of 250 years ago. But Asia cannot be integrated without a stable Afghanistan. We are not just metaphorically the heart of Asia. Without us being stable, there would be not a single pipeline taking gas from Central Asia to Pakistan or India. Without us being stable, there cannot be a single transmission line going through. Et cetera. So our location that was a key disadvantage in the next 50 years is going to become solid gold. And I hope that I can utilize that location rather than our mineral wealth. Mineral wealth, his curse is attached to it. We need to preempt it. But location, if it's utilized for maximum purpose, can bring enormous goods to everybody. Just one illustration. Our discussions with Turkmenistan, with Azerbaijan, with Georgia and Turkey are resulting, I think very rapidly in the realization of the Lapis Lazuli corridor. I'm very confident that within a couple of years, our goods to and from Europe, from Europe to Afghanistan and then from Afghanistan, will only require five days. This will have transformational impact. But the advantage of this road again is that it's not a substitute for our relationship with South Asia. It increases South Asia's possibilities for global integration. So we are pursuing the strategy of becoming a regional platform for cooperation and an Asian roundabout. Peace on the other dimensions. I don't want to jinx our luck. And so you'll see the results. I'm going to take two questions. One, a Twitter question that we got in and the Twitter is hashtag ask Ghani. And then Harlan Olin. So it's from Jason Castillo or Castillo, associate professor at the Bush School of Government Texas A&M University. The question that he's posed is when can American soldiers come home? But let me phrase that also in a different way, which is the agreement that you've reached here, 9,500? Is this the unoptimal result for you? And what role do you see the U.S. playing going forward? Is this a satisfied result? And let me turn to Harlan for his question as well. Hi. What a pleasure. Pleasure's entirely mine. I'm Harlan Olin and Steve and Fred got it absolutely right. To say President Karzai is just really inspiring. My question. You said President Karzai. You did what President Karzai? You said you did say Karzai. Not to say President Karzai. Even academics has distinguished my apologies. Wow. My question is this. You paint a brilliant picture of opportunity in the future. But how do we get there? You've spoken with President Obama and Secretaries Kerry and Carter and other allies. What exactly do you think Afghanistan is going to need in the short term? In terms of military support, security support, financing, ideological and other sorts of support to make sure that Afghanistan is a real success. Thank you. The first part for Professor Costello. We've safely returned 100,000 of your troops. What more do you ask? No, literally. In 2013, when I was still in charge of the security transition, weren't the majority of you commentators saying Afghanistan was going to collapse as a result of the withdrawal? Ambassador Cunningham was one of the few believers. 120,000 troops who have been withdrawn, there have been no security gap to date. I think this is a tribute to our mutual plan. And to our belief. And I must say thank Mr. Hadley and a lot of other people in this room for their emphasis on training of Afghan security forces. Afghan security forces, I think, have exonerated the trust in them and the investment that has taken place. General Karimi is here. I'd like to acknowledge him for his leadership. Our chief of army staff. I am proud to be the commander in chief of a very proud force. No Americans are engaged in combat roles. On 31st of December, we met our goal that American forces are not engaged in combat. The role of the forces is advised, trained and assessed. And then we have a counter-terrorism cooperation framework. The forces will come back when your leaders decide that they come back. It's not our decision. It is the decision of your leadership. And we respect that. That's the old man's question. The first thing is it's our responsibility to get our house in order. It's not your responsibility. As proud as I am of being commander in chief, I've retired 62 generals in the last six months. Renewing of leadership. General Karimi was demanding this for three years. His request was not being complied with. I complied very quickly. We need to renew the leadership, contracting. There are allegations that there are $211 million difference in a $1 billion fuel contract. I canceled it. We've centralized the contracting process for a period that both the CEO, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, my good friend, and I would participate in a personally chair it. We are looking at forced readiness. We are looking at the nature of conflict. We are looking at the levels. This examination must be driven by us. What we need in that regard is support. Advice and assist. On enablers, we have had agreements. I hope that the delivery of those enablers will be speeded up. I'm very gratified by the decision by President Obama on providing flexibility. Instability for 2015, and the reason is that we have lost about minimally eight months of planning during 2014 because the bilateral security agreement was not signed. What we need more than anything else is a common analysis of threats and opportunities. We must create a shared universe of understanding as partners that can rely on each other that each can do his or her part as part of that division of labor. We must have clarity on this and then clarity regarding the functions that must be performed. In light of that, then the resource question can really be handled. From another perspective, we must answer the question of self-sustainability. We cannot be dependent on our security forces forever being paid or for decades being paid by your taxpayers. I've been thanking your taxpayers and I mean it from the bottom of my heart because it's your heart that earned dollars. So transparency and accountability in use of resources, leadership that is responsible, and ownership of peace. Putting an end to this conflict is necessary. I want to say this very clearly. I've run on a peace platform and so has Dr. Abdul. Our goal is very clear. The war is imposed on us. We are not seeking war but God helped the person who brings war to my children. Let them not underestimate our resolve. We've defended this country for 5,000 years. We are going to defend it if we are engaged for another 5,000 years. You help us with that. Thank you for that answer. We have four or five minutes left. I think we'll take... Let me take this question. Let's take these two questions and I think we'll make these two final questions. Thank you, Mr. President. My name is John Arga Iqbal. I'm a former Afghan diplomat. Now that the Daesh forces are gaining ground and making inroads in Afghanistan and their reality and some fear that Taliban forces are either clandestinely or openly expressed their allegiance to Daesh forces. How do you see the future of any peace deal with Taliban or for this purpose with Pakistan in the presence of such a threat to peace and security in Afghanistan? And also, do you see this as a unifying factor between Pakistan and Afghanistan since Daesh threats both countries alive? Thank you. And final question. Hi, my name is Yelda Kazimian with the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Thank you, Mr. President, for giving us this opportunity for dialogue today. As an Afghan-American who has grown up hearing stories from my parents about the war, I am encouraged by your philosophy about peace and the importance of transparency in the process. I wanted to mention an issue today that almost seems forgotten and that's transitional justice. And get your thoughts as to how transitional justice will play a role in the peace process going forward. I think we can all agree that softening people's memories about the past and addressing their grievances and allowing them to have a sense of shared grievances and solidarity is key to that process of success. So just want to get your ideas on where transitional justice will be. Thank you. Sure. Thank you. To Mr. Janogha, the diplomat. First, peace with the Taliban is essential not because of the military force they present, but because of the justification of conflict. Maulay Baluch, one of our leading religious scholars, put the issue very simply. Daesh will be criminal activity in Islamic theory of governance. They can be suppressed like mice. Taliban are a different ideological factor. They provide a level of political legitimacy that we must acknowledge that exists. And because of that, I've called them political opponents. The other is that they have legitimate, some of them have legitimate grievances. People were falsely imprisoned. People were falsely tortured. People were tortured in private homes or private prisons. The geography of injustice in Afghanistan varies a great deal and we must take account of this. Ranging from the south to the east, there's a lot of variation and it must be addressed. Without addressing the failures of our system of justice, without inhumanity that has been carried, the report that was released, the very courageous report by Senator Feinstein, that night I didn't sleep a wink. I read it cover to cover. It's shocking. It's a tribute to American democracy that can acknowledge this. But how do you tell these people that you're sorry? How is it that people that specialize in psychology devise torture devices, torturing innocent people? This is part of the syndrome that we've inherited and we must address. And that connects to your question. Transitional justice involves all of us and we must figure ways because in the methods, I think South Africa and Rwanda have been most effective in devising collective forms of therapy because peace agreements, peace means, forgiving blood. Our culture, the culture of local mediation versus both sharia that is very strict in disregard and modern justice. Modern justice kills and returned for killing. It's still based on an eye for an eye. The local customs devise ways particularly in all of our named groups but in various traditions of Jirga, in part of the Jirga is what is called putting a stone on conflict. You bring about amnesia. 20 years, 30 years or others so that society can function. From the government's perspective, dealing with the past is one dimension, dealing with today is another. I will not tolerate torture of prisoners or abuse of innocent people. That practice must stand. I will fire anybody from India's or police or the army that engages in this. And if that has destabilizing effect, let it be, we will re-stabilize in terms of legitimacy. The past is a much more complex tapestry and I do not want. Again, it's my humbleness and my limits as the leader of this beautiful but much tortured country. We cannot sacrifice the future for the sake of the past. We must bring about a balance because if we go, just looking at the past we will be destroying the future and it's really important to understand that countries, a lot of countries produce historical amnesia. Europe after World War II was not an example of transitional justice. It was an example of historical amnesia. Indonesia. Malaysia. Singapore. So, while the quest for justice is essential, the circle of justice is the critical foundational notion of Islamic theory of governance, how we balance transformation and continuity is really important. Again, I've been very transparent with Afghan electorate saying I do not want the repetition of story of a manlachan or daoutan. They did not get the balance right. They pushed too far in one direction and resulted in decades of loss. Had our urbanization program of 1920s continued or our women's rights program or education program, we would have been in a completely different world. Continuity of governance is a critical condition of being able to achieve realistically what we are seeking. And this is where we must engage in a societal dialogue and I'm very privileged and pleased to have a counterpart like Dr. Seema Samar that can hold me both honest. She can scream much louder than I can, you know that. But simultaneously is the ultimate realist in terms of the goals and it's privileged to be able to work with the human rights community and a civil rights community in Afghanistan that is goal oriented and understands how we balance opportunities and move forward without losing momentum. President Ghani, I think everyone here would probably stay for another two hours, but we know you have to move on. I'll ask people in the audience to stay in their seats while President Ghani leaves. Let me just close by saying that I think, I speak for everyone in the audience and it's been an honor working with you on this and for the Atlantic Council in saying that we're impressed by your wisdom, your clarity, the way you're looking at this series of questions. We know the obstacles you face are great. We not only wish you well, as you know there are many people in this audience that will help wherever we can to achieve success in Afghanistan. Thank you very much President Ghani. Well thank you all. We need your help. Every Afghan child you can help is a great help. Every Afghan girl you can help particularly is even a greater help. But more than anything else your advice, your engagement with Afghanistan as American citizens, as American policy makers is crucial for us. Contrary to my previous reputation I've learned to be patient and I hope that you'd help me become even more person. Thank you very much.