 Just a word on Ireland's role, I think Ireland is punched above its weight for quite some time, and the IIEA has been part of that, as well as parliamentary scrutiny on a number of issues that are quite important and positive for the world. Frankly, I don't think Rakhom Ladic would have been arrested without your parliamentarians actually giving scrutiny to the issue of whether Serbia should get stabilization association agreement in candidacy while he was still at liberty. That was not the only factor. The stance of the prosecutor, Serge Gromertz, in his report, the last one preceding Mladic's arrest was a key factor, as well as the Dutch parliament saying, no passer-an. But the fact that Ireland was giving it scrutiny and looked like it might align with the Netherlands position, I think, was the final drop in the political calculus that President Tadec made to find Mladic so that he could facilitate further European enlargement for his country. So Ireland, even through the construct of the EU, even when it doesn't have the presidency, can carry a lot of weight if it's willing to do so, as can other members. One point that I'd like to maybe recast that Mary Ann had said earlier, the Dayton construct and the Dayton incentives are, yes, the international community midwifed them, and particularly the United States, but they were designed around the imperatives of the people who need to sign the agreement. So they built a system around themselves. So it's not at all surprising that they have a system that works for them. The problem is, and this is where the EU is having a really conceptually difficult time understanding its own predicament, is there's nothing that the EU can offer the established political elites in Bosnia, Herzegovina that's better than what they already got. You could keep what you stole, keep stealing, remain unaccountable both politically and legally, and there's nothing that trumps that. So I think that one gets the impression on the ground that the European Union delegation and the institutions in Brussels, the commission in particular, but also high representative Ashton, they're trying to prove the EU's transformative power to themselves, and Bosnia is just a stage for that, rather than actually navigating by the ground reality and the effect of their policies on the ground. So in essence, they still approach this the way EU enlargement has worked in past waves, where the partnership is between the established political elite and the EU. Now the assumption is that that political elite is democratically accountable in Bosnia, that's not true. Effectively, it's an electoral oligarchy that we all pretend is a democracy, but it doesn't operate to democratic imperatives, and that is the essence of the problem that we're dealing with here. The role of external actors in that, the best value added we have is to take fear out of the equation. It's re-entered the political bloodstream since 2006, largely because of a retreat in international posture. This assumption that soft power, the pull of Brussels could compensate for a reduction in the push of Dayton was proven wrong by the end of 2006, but we're still operating according to that flight plan, and we're on bureaucratic autopilot, because there's very little political attention in the most important member states and the other members of the Peace Implementation Council to this issue, and when there is attention, it's episodic and not very deep. I think the one thing that could help change the political dynamic more than anything else is a very clear statement in getting us out of the dead zone that we're in now, which is, so long as Dayton remains the constitutional order, and nobody as Marianne and Tio said and alluded as well, there's no appetite to even go beyond Satage Fincey. Right now we're talking about credible effort toward meeting the Satage Fincey ruling, which is pathetic. I mean, that just shows complete lack of desperation, actually, is the word I would use, desperation on the part of the international community for anything they could call progress. So they could tick their boxes on their checklist because if things aren't moving forward, they're failing too, and I think that would explain a lot. I think bureaucratic imperatives are a critical decoder ring for figuring out why the policy is what it is. The taking that fear out of the equation would be essential, and that's the dead zone we're in is that nobody's even has the appetite to talk about changing Dayton, but we're removing the Dayton enforcement instruments. So it should be logical that until Dayton is changed consensually, there shouldn't be anything imposed, and nobody's even talking about that, even if it were feasible, which it's not, it wouldn't be desirable because whatever is going to work is going to have to be organic and accepted by each self-defined group of citizens, of which there are more than three. We're in this gap. So everything is allowed now. There are no rules effectively, not because legally there are no rules, but we're not enforcing them anymore because we don't want to. And so what you end up with is every lack of progress, everything is to be blamed on the Bosnians, and this is what you hear in Sarajevo and Brussels all the time. Well, it's up to the Bosnians to do this. Okay, yeah, which ones? And the EU's constituency for a functioning state is not the established elites that already have a system that works for them, but to be found at the popular level, which I think that could be, that could coalesce, but right now what makes it very difficult is the fact that everybody's worst nightmare is at least conceivably possible under current conditions, whereas up until 2006 it wasn't. Didn't mean that you get what you want, but all the unfulfilled agendas that the war was fought over were on ice until we decided we didn't need hard power tools anymore. And that just creates, those were the guardrails. They don't need to be the driver for progress, but they need to be the safety net or the threshold beyond which people, foundation beyond which people can't fall. So I'll leave it at that. I think that sums up sort of my view. The neighbors have a role, but I think there's an overestimation of how much their forward movement will impel forward movement in Bosnia considering the political imperatives that the political actors work on there. So thanks. I look forward to our discussion.