 Yn iawn, dweud o'r cyffredin iawn. Mae yna esbygfa ar y cyfeirio ar y dyma yng Nghymru, y ddefnyddio annual meeting 2018, yna yng nghymru annual meeting 48. Mae'n bwrth yn ni'n byw gyd, ac mae'n cymhwylliannol yn baut yn bwysigio'r iechyd ffaith energig o'r 30-minute-seshwns. Mae'r chweil o'r ffordd o'n gwrs. Mae'r prosesion i'r cyffredin iawn o'r prosesion bod yna'r prosesion i'r prosesion i'r prosesion i'r prosesion ..a cyfleoedd ffordd, y cyfleoedd Cymru, roeddwn ni'n dweud am ymweld i'r hynny yw'r cyflwyts.. ..ym ni'n dweud am ydych chi'n bwyd yn ei gweithio'r dystopion. Yn oed yn digwydd i gael ei gweithio. Ymlaen i gymryd i gweithio'r chlas oherwydd mae'r dyw'r gweithio'r hefyd yn y dweud anul. Mae'r ddweud wedi'u ddigwydd o chymlu ynwysgol yn y gweithio'r economi... Felly, fyddwn yn cysylltu'r anodd ac gyflymddiol gyda Gŵr anodd a'r amddiffanol y listog honno, ddim yn cysylltu'r anodd a'r anodd y gallwn esbu mewn gwaholygiadol yn gwybod, ac yn司 yn bwysigon y Llyfr Genedlenau Gŵr llythes i'r anodd a'r anodd a'r anodd, ac yn lleiolol o casod llythedd Gŵr y mynd. Roedd o'r llwyddon'r rhaglaeth, oherwydd yn dylai'r ddefnyddio swyddi, oherwydd ddim yn cysylltiadau cyfryd dwyaf, those prospects are still there. So we would like to keep an eye on the risks that are presented to us. This particular session is about global security. In particular what could trigger a major security crisis in 2018. Just to reinforce the fact we don't want one but we have to kind of discuss these things. Very happy to be joined by an esteemed panel of experts. To my right, Professor Lee Gwent Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, Vice president of Dean, Office of Interest and Diversity Ministerial Affairs at Soul National University. To my left Professor Louise Richardson, Vice-Chancellor of University of Oxford in the United Kingdom previously to that political scientist specialising in the field of terrorism. I am mosead mlynedd, a distinguished fellow Conegee Endowment for International Peace USA and distinguished writer and author. Let's start with Professor Lee yourself and I'm doing that maybe in timeliness Mae'r bwysigol yw'r ffordd a'r ystod y gallwn i'r ysgrifennu ymddangos, yn ddech chi'n gweld y pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn y sgol yw'r hyn yn y agendaeth. Ie, mae'r pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn digwyddol y pryd yn dweud unrhyw ar gyfer pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn y pryd yn yr hyn yn y pryd. Mae'n ddweud, mae'n ddynamig, mae'n ddyn nhw'n ddwynt yn y ddweud. Well, last year North Korea declared that it has completed its nuclear program that means they are going to freeze its further tests of missile tests and nuclear tests. But at the same time we cannot believe 100 percent that North Korea has actually completed its nuclear program. But if that is true to a certain extent, then there is going to be a strategic stability and balance on the Korean Peninsula between North Korea and the USA. And as long as there is a strategic stability of balance in the minds of the leaders of the nations over there, I think the security situation in Northeast Asia will be temporarily quite stable. But as the title of this session tells, what could trigger a major strategic crisis in the Korean Peninsula, I think that would be the miscommunication and miscalculation and misperception, particularly when the USA and North Korea are deciphering the signals rather than directly engaging in dialogues among the leaders or negotiators. It's going to be very, very likely that some of the leaders might decipher the signals very wrongly and also given President Trump's tendency to say something very interesting, using very dangerous rhetorics, there might be the exchange of strange words like little rocket man or fire and fury, then they would again escalate the tension. Therefore, I think the direct dialogue between the leaders in Northeast Asia is one of the most effective means to avoid the major crisis in Northeast Asia. And there's been a thawing there clearly in this month, month of January, and we have the Winter Olympics looming, and that could be a catalyst for further thawing of relations, or it could be a ploy by North Korea to buy time or to divert the counterparts in the south. So there's lots of moving parts still, and we have, as you say, you have the influence of President Trump as well. What's your prognosis on the effectiveness of direct dialogue? We all think it's a good thing, talk is good, as well as action, but how effective can it really be when you have such divergent ideologies between these two countries? I think to maintain the momentum of dialogue after the Pyongchang Winter Olympic is very important, and at the same time it's going to be very, very difficult to maintain the momentum of dialogue because what North Korea wants is very, very different from what the USA and what South Korea want. Therefore, in order to maintain the dialogue, not only North Korea, but also South Korea, USA, Japan, and China, we have to come up with a very clear vision of the end state of the dialogue. That means we need to come up with a road map, and we need to come up with a timetable, and we need to come up with the end result, which can be mutually acceptable by North Korea and also by South Korea and the USA, as well as China. I was talking to a social media professor in London last week, and one of the theories that he put forward was that President Trump often uses his tweets as a way of crowdsourcing and testing public opinion. Do you think there is really fire and fury in those words, or do you think it's something that could be downplayed in terms of severity? I do think that President Trump's tweets and his words are actually more toward his own base in the USA, and at the same time nothing really serious happened after his words, but really after the false alert incident in Hawaii, it's going to be even more difficult for President Trump to, in fact, exploit and deploy the real dangerous measures, because a lot of people in Hawaii panicked, and I think a lot of people in Washington DC and Los Angeles, they would also panic if there was going to be a false alert. Just to reiterate the format of this session, we'll have a brief round of questions, and then we'll jump in with questions from yourselves, hopefully, and also encourage my esteemed panellists to disagree and interject at every opportunity. But let's just stay on the subject one more time, because I'm worried about these controls. You mentioned yourself, the Hawaii control, as human error was involved there. We have missile defenses being installed. There's a lot of things that could go wrong, and that wouldn't be too difficult for those to go wrong and maybe trigger something quite serious. Right. I should say that North Korea has been deterred quite effectively by U.S.-South Korea alliance, as well as our conventional and nuclear weapons. North Korea has been deterred for the past century, and I think it's going to be deterred, because they know that the chance of winning a war on the Korean Peninsula is zero. But people are not very comfortable seeing North Korea having nuclear weapons, so there is going to be a lot of pressure to bring in missile defense system. At the same time, people are not very good at distinguishing between deterrence and defense. If the missile defense system is coming in on the Korean Peninsula, then it may disrupt the strategic stability, not only between North Korea and the USA, but also between China and the USA. Then China is going to develop more nuclear weapons. Then it's going to give up perhaps its minimum deterrence strategy. Then China would look very aggressive, and some of the hawkish people in the USA, in Washington DC, they would say, see China is going to be very aggressive. Then we are going to develop more weapons. So there is going to be a spiral of escalation of tension because of the missile defense system. Before we get further into this spiral, Les White is a very good point that you mentioned China as well. Moses, you wrote the end of power in 2015. It seems like a long time ago, I imagine for you now. Are you surprised at the speed at which superpowers have declined and the emergence of the multipolar, or as Professor Schwab of the Forum calls a multi-conceptual world, has emerged? Yes, both things are happening. Power continues to spread and decay and degrade, and people can do less with the power than before. But at the same time, you have countervailing forces of institutions and individuals trying to retain control, concentrate power in the business sector, in security and in politics. So what we're witnessing in a lot of the security crisis we're going to witness is the clash between the forces that are spreading power, that are diluting it, that are fragmenting it, and the attempts of those who have power to retain it and to counter that. One interesting example of that in terms of our conversation here has to do with cyber attacks. A few years ago, Leon Panetta in the United States was the Secretary of Defense, and he said that the world should be bracing for what he called cyber 9-11, which is a massive cyber attack that had the kinds of consequences that the 9-11 had. And if you think about that, we have witnessed a lot of its incipients, cyber 9-11. We have seen in the past years so attacks, and North Korea was behind one against Sony, which was an interesting case, and we have seen others. But we have not seen the massive one that Leon Panetta had anticipated or predicted or worried about, and that is in the cards. That one should have that in mind when thinking about security emergencies, accidents, threats in 2019. Why have we not seen such an attack of that scale? Yes. Do we have the capability? What we have seen and that has to do with the end of power is the proliferation of new actors. It used to be in the past that the big weapons of war were normally under the control of governments and armies. Now, if you think about what are the most often used weapons in the 21st century, there are drones, cyber and suicidal terrorists. And neither of these depend on the, you know, you can have individuals. You don't need nation states. They are not necessarily under the control of nation states. So it is a change in which the power to conduct war or having the weapons of war has shifted from militaries and governments to organizations and individuals even. Which brings us perfectly, Professor Richter, to your expertise in terror and to answer maybe a question of whether threats from within societies are more likely to lead to a global security crisis than those between states. Well, I think it's really the biggest threat is likely to come from the interaction between the external and the internal. And in a venue like this and a setting like this, one is inclined to think of high tech problems, not for a moment to suggest that cyber attack, major cyber attack is impossible or major state conflict. But actually, it's important to think about the much easier and I would argue more likely low tech attacks. So imagine what might happen and it's eminently conceivable if one were to have in a western country say half a dozen small scale attacks in sporting venues, shopping malls, whatever, simultaneously. And then the same again a week later or two weeks later. And there you'd have a leader who's first responsibility to protect the population. He was unable to fulfill and therefore weak. You would have especially in this age of populism an aroused population demanding a reaction. So let's imagine it turned out that one or two of these perpetrators shared a nationality. It was found that they were from a particular country. There would be enormous pressure and in some instances a desire to react against that state. The whole genius of terrorism is that it is designed to provoke an overreaction and most countries obliged by overreacting. So one could imagine then a country overreacting against a state which they believed was responsible for all these attacks. And in fact, as we've just heard, often the state doesn't orchestrate these attacks. And that so that you'd have an escalating they would overreact. The state would see this as an act of war. And that would given especially in an environment in which the infrastructure of diplomacy has been degraded over the past couple of years. That's more likely outcome fewer and quite a few inexperienced leaders and a degraded diplomatic infrastructure could easily see a situation deteriorating or indeed escalating. Let me continue. I have a few gather your thoughts. Let's move on to some other parts of the world. Venezuela, for example, we're seeing a deterioration in these right now. Moses, it's from your part of the world. What's your take on that situation? Venezuela is going in 2018. Venezuela is going to provide one of some of the most harrowing headlines in that you're going to see in the news. Venezuela is undergoing a massive, massive humanitarian crisis that is going to get worse. We also will see a major displacement of people. 4 million people have already left from Venezuela as estimated. And this year is going to continue. This is a country that cannot feed itself, cannot feed its population. It doesn't have the resources to import food. It doesn't have the domestic capacity to produce food has been devastated. And so we are going to see a country going starving and desperate people walking or finding any way possible to leave the country in search of food. We will see a crisis in Venezuela, the likes that we have never seen in the Western Hemisphere, not even in Haiti. Which brings me to mind of other areas of the world which are perhaps underplayed. But when I was thinking more about Asia and the ethnic cleansing as the UN describes what's going on in Myanmar, we're seeing Buddhism and Muslim nationalism emerge as well as a global threat. And what do we think the impact of these movements, of the mobilisation of groups of people, whether it's via religion or whether it's via any other class or any other collection, and what kind of impact they could have in terms of spilling over and causing a wider catastrophe? One of the perplexities and difficulties of our time is how there is consensus on what to do and inability to do it in a variety of areas, from climate change to refugees to containing war and so on. So the number of problems that require collective action, meaning more than one country acting together, the requirement for that, the demand for that is mounting, the supply for that, the response, the capacity of the world's institutions to act effectively in a coordinated multilateral way is either stagnant or declining. That deficit between a soaring demand for collective action internationally and a stagnant capacity to respond creates one of the most dangerous deficits of our times. In economics, that kind of deficit creates inflation when you have a lot of demand and no supply result is inflation. In geopolitics and security, that kind of deficit creates a lot of victims. How do you create that supply? How do you improve the ability to cooperate? Of course, it's the theme of this meeting. Of course, it's not as easy as getting people around the table, but what are the prospects for that happening? It's issue specific. It depends. What we have seen is that the most effective reaction is to move from multilateralism in which you expect 180 countries to agree in a like of a Paris-like environmental deal and moving from that to mini-lateralism, not multilateralism, mini-lateralism, just the minimum amount of countries and minimum number of countries that you need to make a dent on the problem. Perhaps not solve it, but put in a room the number of countries that have a say in the problem that are a cause of the problem or that can help with the solution. Try to keep it small and try to make them work together. That is a far more effective pragmatic way of acting than just hoping for the very large multilateral efforts that involve hundreds of governments. I was going to add that particularly in the area of security affairs, one of the dangers is that people do not really listen to experts and elites. They have their own opinions always. It's very difficult to persuade the people. As long as people do not listen to the ideas of experts who can come up with the most effective solutions, it's very difficult to make them co-operate with others. Not only within the nation to co-operate with the government, but also to co-operate with other governments as well. Can the panel comment on the European theatre? Perhaps we're not used to thinking security issues in Europe, but there are increasingly signs there's an election in Russia, a UK general recently commented on that. Maybe you've followed that. NATO is certainly not becoming stronger, doubt is being thrown in. Is this a long-term issue perhaps? Or is this even have the possibility for something short-term? He wants to take that one. Louise, you're based in Europe. You're a European. It's not one of the things that I worry most about. I have to say yes, NATO is becoming weaker. Yes, we have had unusually British generals criticizing a Conservative government for not funding the military adequately. I see that as more of a reflection of the fragility of British politics at the moment than anything else. Military of course always want more funding. And part of the argument of the military actually is that the funding is, and this is a real issue for Britain, whether the funding reflects the changing security realities. In the case of Britain, the trident is enormously expensive. It's not going to be of enormous use to most security scenarios in which Britain is likely to find itself. So I see that more as the issue. So Europe itself, where there's likely to be conflict, it's much more likely to be as a result of terrorist attacks and overreaction to them, or social dislocation caused by mass migration, rather than, I don't perceive, but who knows, a military threat there from the east. How about a breakup of the multilateral institutions such as NATO? We've seen the WTO kind of creaking. Secretary Mnuchin, this morning in the media briefing, talked about how on a panel of the Director General of the WTO acknowledged there needs to be a rebalancing. So we've seen multilateral institutions creaking and coming under pressure, maybe something like NATO as well, and maybe Turkey could leave or another country could leave or it could collapse. Before President Trump was elected and before NATO was in very, very bad shape in terms of support, enthusiasm for it, but Putin who hates NATO did NATO a wonderful favour as a result of what happened in Crimea and what's happening in Ukraine. And all that, it showed that there is a need for an organisation like NATO and perhaps an intended consequence of the Crimea takeover, the Crimea grab, and the Ukrainian situation is that it gave NATO a second wind. And then there was the election of President Trump who clearly started by saying that he had no use for NATO and all that, but it's very interesting to see how his position has been softening on that. Could I just comment on Turkey though? I mean one could argue that NATO would be stronger if Turkey were to leave. If we want to have popular support for multilateral institutions, the multilateral institutions must be seen to abide by the principles they espouse. And when a country behaves as Turkey has and when a government like the Erdogan government behaves as it does, and I'm not very comfortable being a party to the behaviour of a state like that and yet we're wedded to Turkey and it's some of its appalling behaviour by virtue of shared membership of NATO. I've got a whole list of questions I'd like to ask, but first of all a gentleman in the front row, wait for the mic, please give us your name and tell us where you're from, who you represent. Pekas Goldschmidt, I'm the President of the Conference of European Rabbis. Following on your question, if push comes to shove and Russia would attack the Baltic countries, would NATO come through or not? Question number two, would the EU new strategic defence alliance replace or whatever the EU is doing internally in terms of aligning its outside borders and they've done in terms of security much more in the last two years than they've done in the 40s before, would this eventually replace NATO? Some areas of St Petersburg I believe they were once referred to, somebody quite well known, the Baltic states, how safe are they? So that's a conversation that nobody, that's a question that no one has an answer, no one can guarantee you that if Russia attacks NATO will come through. That's the hope, that's the design, that's the stated policy, that's what I hope it happens. But I'm not sure that there's 100% guarantee that that will happen. And I don't think you will find anyone can give you that guarantee or can be sure of that. As for what you call the new security arrangements in Europe, those have a lot to do with border, fortifying borders. They have to do, they're more national guard police kind of immigration policies that are armed forces policies. You have not seen a lot of redeployment of weapons acquisitions or major military redeployments as a result of that. You have seen efforts to fortify borders to make them harder, but not in a massive military way. And the European Strategic Defence Alliance and its prospects? I think it was not born. Do we have anything to add to that? Well, we just haven't seen any evidence that European governments are willing to commit the kind of resources that would be necessary to build economic resources to build a realistic substitute for NATO. Probably for me to agree with President Trump on much of anything, but actually we all know that the Europeans have been free riding on the Americans throughout the post war period. When it comes to supporting NATO and they haven't been willing to even meet their stated commitments much less significantly increase them. But it's difficult isn't it? We talk about the need for greater cooperation, probably bigger budgets and the demands on resources is so acute when you have to reskill for the fourth industrial revolution. You have to find green growth to replace our kind of legacy infrastructure. It's difficult. So we're looking at a diffused set of threats now from a wider range of people, less resources to cope. It sounds quite difficult. Moving back to the terror field. Are we winning the war on terror? We've seen ISIS in decline over the past 18 months, at least territorially. But what is that dynamic and how is it changing? Well, first of all, terror is an emotion, so one can't sensibly wage war on an emotion. Terrorism is a tactic and again I don't think one can sensibly wage war on a tactic. A tactic will be used as long as it proves effective. And terrorism historically and particularly recently has proven enormously effective in achieving certain goals. It has proved singularly unsuccessful in achieving the broad political change that many terrorist groups aspire to achieve. But they have been extremely successful in achieving near-term goals. For example, exacting revenge on the states that they believe have committed atrocities against them. They have been extremely successful in promoting overreaction by states and thereby demonstrating their importance. And they have proven very successful in gaining renown and glory for themselves and their cause. So they haven't affected political change in the sense of acquiring statehood or in the case of ISIS. I mean ISIS's brief strength was its greatest weakness is the fact that it actually did control territory unlike most terrorist groups. That was an enormous strength for a short period of time because it proved such a magnet for recruiting disaffected people from all over the world to join in the war that appeared to be winning. But it was also, of course, its greatest weakness because as soon as it had space, the conventional armies were always going to be able to defeat them. So the whole concept of a war on terrorism I think is a mistaken one. And I think what we should be trying to do is address the political, the underlying causes that cause people to resort to terror. And that the most we can aspire to do is contain the threat from groups who are prepared to use terrorist tactics. But a war on terrorism I think is just a silly concept. What would happen in 2011 when the Washington consensus was hegemonic, global cooperation and trade were growing away quite nicely. And things were okay in 9-11 happened and we're in a different world today. What about a super event such as 9-11? If it happens today in the US or maybe in Beijing or another major centre, how would we cope? What would the reaction be? Well, if you look historically, the reaction has always been the same. Well, I'm just talking about countries which is to say the immediate response is a draconian one. And when liberal democracies forget their commitment to human rights and civil rights and all the things that liberal democracies espouse. And then that's the immediate reaction. And then there tends to be after a space of time some more considered approach to say is this the right approach or not. And eventually you get to a more reason to counterterrorism policy. So the iron law of counterterrorism policy I think if you look historically is that it improves with time. But the second iron law is that countries never learn from the experience of other countries. They do learn from their own. So one would love to think that if there were a 9-11 event in another country other countries would learn from the American experience and not respond as America did. And odds are they wouldn't. And odds are they would repeat the American mistakes just as America repeated the mistakes of the British military in Northern Ireland. American policy I think is much more sophisticated, much wiser now than it was because they've learned as indeed British policy before and so on. But sadly, I say this as an educator, the willingness of people to learn from other mistakes, the willingness of governments to learn from other mistakes is as staggeringly known. Time march is on and we do need to respect timing of the break because we're all busy on this third day. Before we leave, the global risk report published last week and apologies for the over branding. But the majority of experts polled in this report suggested and believed that the prospects for war between a major power was greater in 2018 than it was in 2017. Do you all agree it's my final question to you? Yes or no? No from Professor Lee. I'm an academic, I don't go for a yes and no's. John Kenneth Galbraith once said there's two kind of forecasters, ones who don't know and ones who know they don't know and I know I don't know. I was going to answer but after that I'm not saying anything. I don't believe that, I share his view. That's a relief. Thank you very much. I feel it's covered a lot of ground and I feel heartened by the contributions you've all made. Thank you so much for joining us here. Thank you for watching Live Online. This is now over.