 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. You're watching Present, Past and the Future. Recently, the Sahesarkarya Vahar or Joint General Secretary of Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh, Krishnagopal made a laudatory reference to Mughal prince and elder brother of Emperor Aurangzeb Darashuko. Krishnagopal said, Darashuko had he been the Emperor, the face of Islam in India and the story of the country would have been completely different. This was not surprising, although in the face of it, RSS praised for a Mughal prince appears odd. Krishnagopal's statement was in fact not so much about finding virtues in Mughals, but about creating a binary between the good Muslim and the bad Muslim. The bad Muslim in this case is Aurangzeb, whose public image is poles apart from the understanding of historians and other scholars who have spent decades trying to decipher its complexities. For long, the RSS has championed the view that Aurangzeb's conflict with Darashuko was essentially a battle between Islamic orthodoxy and liberalism. That, after Aurangzeb's victory and Darashuko's death, Islam in India retreated into a sectarian box because the window of pluralism which Darashuko opened was shut permanently. This is how the Hindutva narrative of 1200 years of slavery or as they say in Hindi, 1200 years of slavery came about. The Sangh Parivaar's demonization of Aurangzeb is not new. The government claimed the name of Aurangzeb Road. Initially, the road was supposed to be named after Darashuko, but because Dr. A.P.G. Abdul Kalam died around the same time it was named after him. The Sangh Parivaar now tries hard to appear reasonable when it comes to Muslims. Mohan Bhagwat made the startling statement two years ago that Hindutva minus Muslims is meaningless. Although this assertion itself made little sense. The idea is not to accept Muslims for what they are but to create an ideal role model in the present and in the past. In contemporary times, it is easy to co-opt politicians and others by offering official recognition and the lure of office. Thereafter, others can follow them. When it comes to history, the present shapes the past. History and historians are indeed unfortunate. It is presumed no scholarship is needed because folklore is mostly paraded as history. For the rest of it, there is of course the internet. We must reduce the gap between Aurangzeb and Darashikos public image and what is historically truthful. Much of our present is contested on false reading of the past especially Aurangzeb. Prof. Harman Smukhya, the renowned medieval historian who taught at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, will help me correct misconceptions on the rivalry between Darashikos and Aurangzeb. We will also talk about the false reading of the past and how it impinges on the present. Prof. Smukhya, welcome. My first question, you know always to begin to dispel the first myth or the first wrong understanding. Shikko or Shukko? Popularly, majority of the places Darashikos, Darashikos it goes on but what one understands from an historian like you is that it should actually be Darashukko. Well, it is actually Darashukko. You know when you write Shukko in Persian, you can read it in many different ways. You can read it as Shikko, Shukko, Shukoo, Shukko and so on. Now, if you put some fine sort of accentuate, finely accentuate it, you can make the difference. But that is not done, usually it is not done. And therefore, Shikko has become somehow more popularly accepted than Shukko. But you know there is a world of difference between the two terms. Shikko means terror and Shukko means glory. So the man who was such a glorious man is being reduced to... If we continue to use Shikko then it will be completely false reading and misinterpretation. It will reduce the man to a terror that or other and to the glory that. You have corrected this wrong understanding and the way this mis-built and mis-pronounced are very important. But moving on to a more important issue, which is that this existing understanding, what we call the public memory, that Shukko was the good man and Orangzeb was the bad man, that it was essentially a fight between Islamic orthodoxy and liberalism, which was at heart that essentially the conflict between the two brothers is looked through the prism of religion and understanding of religion. Well, you know two things about it. One that this contest between liberalism and orthodoxy is not reflected in the contemporary literature, historical literature or outside. In the 17th century, early 18th century, nobody looks at this contest as between Orangzeb and Laro Shukko as a contest between two competing ideologies. And these historians are Muslim historians, Hindu historians, literate or so on and so forth. They don't look at it in terms of there as a conflict between two religious ideologies. Now, it is quite true that Dara Shukko as a person, as a scholar was very different from Orangzeb. But different in terms of his understanding of religions, also in other terms, that's not the only difference. It's completely different personality altogether. Different in terms of their competence as governors, different in terms of their competence as managers of imperial finances, different in terms of as administrators, as military commanders and so on. So, there are many differences. When you look at an emperor, you don't look upon him merely as a symbol of orthodoxy or religiosity or liberalism and so on and so forth. You look at the emperor, any emperor in terms of a whole personality. So, when you contrast Dara Shukko to Orangzeb, the contrast is limited entirely to their respective views of religion, which are very radically different, true. But nonetheless, there are other differences as well. And there is a reason why this is so. The reason is that those who do so, they wish to pitch history in terms of the study of history entirely in religious terms. History is very clearly broken into phases. You have the Hindu phase of history. You have the Muslim phase of history and you have the British phase of history. Yeah, well, that's given to us actually by James Mill. And taken forward by the Hindu, right? Yeah, now it is yes. So, you know, a great problem there is that one that study of history has advanced to a great degree from this kind of binary opposites of Hindu versus Islam. You have also pointed out, you know, that when the conflict actually takes place between Orangzeb and Dara Shukko, you know, it is the very important Hindu nobleman or the Hindu general who are lined up behind Orangzeb. Yes, I was referring to it in a way indirectly, in that, you know, the contemporaries don't look upon it either contemporary historians or even contemporary dramatists' personnel. Don't look upon it in terms of either orthodox Islam or liberal Islam or Hindu versus Muslim. For example, Professor Atharalli had made this study back in 1966, I think, where he showed that of the Mansabdars or nobles from the rank of 500 onwards, 500 upwards, 24 Hindu nobles supported Dara Shukko and 21 Hindu nobles supported Orangzeb. So, it's almost like, you know, split down the middle. Absolutely, you know. And of these 21 who supported Orangzeb, two were the most outstanding generals, you know. One was General Jai Singh, Raja Jai Singh. The other was just one Singh. The other was just one Singh. The most outstanding generals of Orangzeb's time, you know. So, it would be a complete wrong, you know, to say that Orangzeb was backed mainly by Muslim orthodoxy. Far from it. It would also be wrong completely to say that had Dara Shukko become the emperor, then they would have been a much more non-centralized, you know, Mughal state. Well, you know, how Dara Shukko would have functioned, we don't know. Yes. It's like saying, you know, that had Sardar Patel been India's Prime Minister, India's future would have been completely different. Exactly, you know. We don't know that, you know. But, you know, emperors or for that matter, presidents or prime ministers don't function, don't operate things just that they want to. There are many constraints on the function, particularly as you know. Historical compulsions also. Exactly, you know. Historical structural compulsions, compulsions of what kind of ruling class you have. And alliances that you have the most important. Alliances within that, tensions within the ruling class and so on and so forth, you know. So that an emperor has to manage all of these, you know, and he just can't be unidimensional, either he's orthodox or he's liberal, you know. An emperor has to take many stances at different points of time according to the issues that he faces at that time, you know. Or for that matter, as I said, any president or prime minister today, you know. So their stances differ from time to time and from context to context. So to say that if Aurangzeb had been replaced by or if Dara Shukoh had been the emperor rather than Aurangzeb, things would have been radically different, you know. Is to say, is to go too far in your imagination, you know. It's not historically very highly valid statement. You know, you had some time ago said, you know, that in the, you know, immediately after the death of Aurangzeb at that point, you know, or even the contemporary historians when he was alive. People were not looking at him through the prism of religion and, you know, his attitude towards religion, juxtaposing it with Dara Shukoh. When does interpretation of history from what we can say the religious aspect or from what we call a communal perspective, when does it really begin, especially in the context of this period that we're talking about? Well, you know, from the late 18th century, mid or late 18th century, things begin to change in society, you know. In the sense that identity politics or identity formations begin to emerge, strong identity formation. They were there earlier, but strong assertion of identity formations begin to emerge from the mid or late 18th century, you know, on both sides. You see, Shah Waliullah, you know, asserted the Islamic identity for the Muslim community, others on the Hindu side and so on and so forth. So that once this identity becomes the sort of, becomes the entry point into the study of society and therefore of history, you know, then things begin to change. They are now being studied in terms of, you know, the religious identities of the, or religious attitudes of the rulers, this, that or the other, you know. Also that this was how the British, British administrative historians promoted it. You see, they promoted history, entire Indian history particularly elsewhere also, but Indian history particularly in terms of these identities, you see. Religious identities. Religious identities, you know. Now, you know, prior to that history was written in terms of the individual rulers will, individual rulers nature or disposition or will, you know. Skills and capacities also mean. Yes, indeed, yes. So that, you know, a great ruler like Akbar would expand the empire, establish a huge empire, efficient empire. Even Aurangzeb was, you know, he expanded considerably. Yeah, yeah. No, but I'm saying something different, you know. A very strong ruler will expand the empire, govern it very efficiently with great power and so on and so forth. A weak ruler would let it, let the empire flounder and disintegrate and so on and so forth. This is how history was studied, you know, in terms of the historical events were looked upon as the manifestation of the rulers disposition or will or nature, if you like, you know. And every ruler's disposition or nature is different from every other ruler, you see. Now, what came to be the case particularly under the British administrator and historians' guidance and the formation of these identities, as I said, was that all of these variations in the assessment of rulers came to be displaced by one single identity, one single entry point, namely religion, you know. So you study history in terms of the religious identity of the, not of one ruler, but of the entire period, you know, Muslim period, which means the rule of the Muslims, Muslim rule, Islamic rule and so on and so forth. Whereas that is not the truth. Or Hindu period earlier or so on and so forth, you know. So, you know, this is not true because one, to call it Islamic period, Islamic rule or Muslim rule is to assume that the rule of the classes came only from one particular religion. No, that one, that's one, but more important than that is that the rule was, rule was, or governance followed only the Sharia, for example, you know. Okay. If you propose that politics was primarily also to push the interest of religion and the religious state. Yes, right. The state was subservient to the two religions and the religious institutions. And therefore the state was, state existed to promote religion. Religion, the specific religion. Specific religion, its own religion. And state governed according to the Sharia. You see, there is no other, you know, there is no other possibility of any kind of jurisprudence allowed. Excuse me. Now that's not the case. You see, the Sharia was applicable only in one aspect, namely criminal law, you know. But in civil law, for example, marriages and inheritance and family, etc., these are not done, I mean, Muslims just followed the Sharia, but others didn't follow the Sharia. Naturally, they did not. Hindus didn't marry according to Sharia and inherited property according to Sharia and so on and so forth. They followed their own codes and so on and so forth. What you are saying, you know, in fact, I was reading somewhere and you have often said one sentence, you have really summarized everything. That history is very unfortunate because it is everybody's slave. Yeah, you know, that's the problem. You see, you know, Nilanjan, at a professional level, I mean, I happened to have started studying history as an undergraduate in the second half of the 1950s. Oh, then almost 60 years, if I'm not wrong. 60 years, really. Yes, 60 years, at least. Yeah, in these 60 years, when I studied, when I was a student of history, B.A. and M.A., late 1950s, history was all about kings and queens and battles and administration and this. What about the ruling class? Yes, and not even ruling classes, you know, Akbar and Jahangir and Alauddin Khulji and so on and so forth, you know. Very boring history. Since then, one doesn't have the time to go into it, but since then history has, it's a different world altogether, you know. History is the history of mentalities, history of ideas, history of personal relationships, history of disease, history of ecology, history of almost anything that you can think of. History is expansive, you know, it includes everything, you see. I can also add, you know, a very important point which you have made in one of your articles is also the history of erasing parts of history. Yes, it is, yes. You specifically referred to the Marathas in your article. Right, right, you know, right. History is constantly being, at a professional level, history is becoming very, very advanced, very sophisticated, very layered, very nuanced, you know. Right. And very sort of, you know, rational, logical, you know. Not one logic, not one reason, but nonetheless all of these, all of the different approaches are rational approaches, you know. And it's gone long way off from Akbar and Jahangir and their religious policy or that policy, et cetera, very long way off, you know. But at the popular level, partly it's ignorance, but more than ignorance, it's a perpetuated ignorance, you know, or perpetuated version of history. That history really means Hindu versus Muslim. You come to a very important point when you say that it's a perpetuated version of history, which you're saying. We began this conversation by saying, you know, as to how an RSS leader had presented that Dara Shukho was the ideal king, you know. And India's, you know, story would have been completely different had he become the emperor. When we talk about history and as to how people have actually appropriated history and presented it their version of history. You know, what do you think is the necessity, besides being a historian, you're also a very sharp political mind in today's contemporary India, you know. So where do you think does this necessity for what we can call, you know, of creating these binaries of a good Muslim and a bad Muslim? Where does it actually come from? Well, you know, it comes from the current state of politics. See, you know, one of the fascinating aspects of Indian politics is, since the constitution, since 1950, is that it's a very extraordinarily modern polity, you know, with the universal adult franchise which came to India in 1950. You know, it's a franchise. Much against the skepticism of a large number of people that such a large body of illiterate people. Indeed, yes. And think of it, you know, Indian electorate, Indian adult franchise, universal adult franchise came to India in 1950. French women got the right to vote in 1944, just six years ahead of India. Swiss women got the right to vote in 1973, nearly a quarter century after Indian women, you know. It's a very modern polity, you know. We were far ahead of time, but now we seem to be going back. Yeah, yeah. But that's one aspect of the polity, you know. The other aspect of the polity is that, contrary to Nehru's vision or expectation, who thought that, you know, these existing sort of consciousness of pre-modern consciousness of caste and community and region and such. Would go away naturally. Would go away, you know, with experience and so on and so forth. But it did not. But it's, on the contrary, with the success of these kinds of mobilizing, these are the categories with which electorate was mobilized, you know, caste and community and so on and so forth, you know. And now religion. And religion. Then also, but more so now, you know, religion. They've got consolidated rather than withering away. They've got consolidated because they were mobilized successfully, you know. So the very success of this mobilization has given them reinforce their power, you see. Therefore, there is this situation today when we are more and more falling back upon these identities as identities of political mobilization, as identities for working our polity, you see. We are getting, once in a while, you hear Vikas and Sapkasaath, etc. But, you know, we realize that the polity is really being centered on, fixated on the identity politics, you know, mainly of religion. This is where, you know, scholars like you are very important to actually present a right and a more distilled and a nuanced, you know, type or version of it. Thank you, Professor Mukhiya. It's always a great pleasure to speak with you. History and historical figures are complex and multifaceted. They cannot be reduced into linear interpretations. It is always very tough to talk about history in short videos. But I hope we have initiated you to think and read more about Aurangzeb and Dara Shukro and not get swayed by simplistic understanding of the past. Thank you.