 So, Campbell, we're here to talk a little bit about the annual Osmin talks, the Australian Ministerial Talks between, excuse me, the Ministerial Talks between Australia and the United States involving the Defence Minister, the Foreign Minister and their US counterparts, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence. These happen every year, this year, in Washington. And I thought I'd ask you, actually, try to take the perspective of a student. We have a lot of students who look at the interpreter. And I know when I was a student, I was always really curious about what actually goes on in these meetings. So, rather than getting you to be a pundit here, let me ask you about the mechanics. What actually goes on in the room? Is it very casual or is it incredibly formal? Do only the senior people speak? Does everyone sort of muck in? How does it go? Great, Sam. I appreciate the question and appreciate the opportunity to be on the interpreter. This is great. The OSMEN is one of the oldest institutions that we have for managing this complex and, I think, wonderful relationship between the United States and Australia. Every year, the Secretary of State and Defence, as you suggest, either travel to Australia or their counterparts come up to Washington or some part of the United States for these meetings. In addition, as part of OSMEN, there is a military component in which increasingly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs meets with his counterpart as part of these discussions. So there is a robust set of discussions on defence, which is really the foundation of the relationship, increasingly on intelligence and then on diplomacy going forward. I think in fact it is a mixture of both rather formalized presentations and sort of just informal discussions about either our bilateral relationship or the region as a whole. Normally we did one of our OSMENs during the four years. I was at the State Department in San Francisco and so Secretary Panetta, who is a native of Northern California, insisted on taking us to his favourite Italian restaurant down on the Wharf. It was lovely and fun and there just is a sense of camaraderie and comfort and shared values and common experience that animates the meetings between the United States and Australia that I have experienced nowhere else. So they are intense meetings but they are comfortable, they are friendly. Normally we do much of the work in advance and so it is reaffirming at the highest levels on both sides of our government, often complex, diplomatic or military arrangements that have been worked on sometimes for years. I think it is fair to say we all look forward to OSMENs. They were generally quite productive and usually the chemistry between the leaders is quite good. So when you say that a lot of the work gets done in preparation, that implies that the agenda also is set quite early on in the piece. Does that mean that OSMEN is dominated by long-term issues or does the stuff that we are reading about in the papers today, for instance, does that make it onto the agenda? Look, it will be unavoidable. Some of the challenges that are taking place with respect to the revelations about spying, those will be addressed quietly and there will be some back and forth. But basically these are planning opportunities in which both Australia and the United States really look ahead and try to guide the direction of future interactions between our two countries and the world that we live in. So I expect over the course of the coming OSMEN there will be interactions about some of our military role in the region and in Australia, some engagement about our diplomacy with China. There will be discussions about the ambitions of the new government of Australia to raise defense spending. There will be examinations of where the U.S. defense spending is going. Overall, these are comprehensive discussions. The agenda is primarily poised to reflect on strategic issues where we are heading in the future. But there will undeniably, as I said, be discussion of some of the challenges that we're facing currently. So the picture you paint is generally a very friendly atmosphere. Do these discussions ever become prickly at all? Some commentators, for instance, have argued that Australia has a right to be a little bit upset with the United States for the fact that the Snowden revelations came out at all and have put Australia in a difficult position with Indonesia right now. On the other hand, we've heard some American commentators say that Australia needs to do more on defense spending, for instance. So do the two sides? Yeah, look, the truth is we both understand the domestic constraints that each of the governments deal with. I think there is a recognition that, by and large, we are like-minded. I think it's often important in these meetings for one side of the other to lodge careful areas of concern. I can tell you that during the period of WikiLeaks, Australian counterparts were quite clear with the United States about certain aspects of our handling of it that they were uncomfortable with and thought were incorrect. And I think we've quietly asked Australia in the past about the direction of defense spending and how it sees its role in Asia. And I think there have been periods in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the Australians made clear that they needed to be consulted if there were to be any changes in strategy going forward. So yeah, there are intense interactions, but I would say that those interactions take place in a larger context of partnership and trust. Last question, you're of course closely associated with the pivot, and I've noticed in your, the discussions I've witnessed so far, you tend to say quote unquote pivot. Now I want to ask you, do you think the United States in these Osmin talks will be in a reassurance mode, if you like, because there is a perception in Australia that the pivot or the rebalance has stalled somewhat? I think that's the case, and I think you will see strong views put forward, particularly by Secretary Hagel, who I think has done a very able job in Asia about why and how the United States will go about its business in Asia. And I'm comforted by that, but I do think there is a bit of reassurance that's necessary after the unfortunate, but again, I think understandable cancellation of the President's visit to Asia during the time of the Stacia Summit and the Oceania Regional Forum. Ultimately, I think that some of those setbacks are recoverable, and I think the Osmin, which is, again, it's a full Osmin, it's our fifth year in a row, that's significant. I think can go a long way towards that kind of reassurance. Look, the reason there is always debate about the appropriate terminology, whether it's rebalance or pivot, a funny story, I think Secretary Clinton and I and others have been more associated with the term pivot and some in the White House more with the term rebalance. I think that the underlying fact is more the contents of the policy than the naming of it, but I will tell you that there was a period where our friends at the National Security Council were quite determined that everyone would use the term rebalance than we all did, only to find that the President actually prefers, in some respects, the term, the pivot. Ultimately, I think the unintended consequences of the term pivot suggested a turning away of the United States from the Middle East and Europe, and that was certainly not our intention. And some suggested that the term pivot had a harder edge and occasionally was misinterpreted by Chinese friends and that the rebalance was somehow less sharp. I'm not sure those distinctions are as accurate. The reason I kind of like rebalance, though, is that it suggests an ongoing, innovative process that requires course corrections and adaptation. And I think that is what, in fact, the policy demands going forward. But for better or for worse, I think I'm stuck with the term pivot. Good. Thanks for your talk. Sam, thank you very much. It's great to be with you.