 Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor. Book 5. Now, therefore, let us direct our attention to justice and injustice, and consider with what kind of actions they are conversant, what kind of medium justice is, and of what things the just is the medium. But let our survey be made according to the same method as the preceding discussions. We see, therefore, that all men are willing to call that kind of habit justice through which we practice just things, or are inclined to the works of justice, and through which we act justly, and wish what is just. And, after the same manner, injustice is that habit through which men act unjustly, and wish what is unjust. Hence, these things must first be adumbrated by us, since there is not the same mode of subsistence in the sciences, in powers, and in habits. For, there is the same power, indeed, and the same science of contraries. But there is not the same habit of contraries. Thus, for instance, contrary operations are not performed by health, but those only which are salubrious, for we say that a man walks in a healthy manner, when he walks in such a way as a healthy man walks. Frequently, therefore, a contrary habit is known from a contrary habit, but frequently habits are known from their subjects. For, if a good habit of body is apparent, a bad habit of body will also be apparent. And from things which produce a good habit of body, this good habit will be known, and from this good habit, its producing causes will be known. For, if a good habit of body is a density of the flesh, a bad habit of body will necessarily be a rarity of the flesh, and that which produces a good habit of body will be productive of density in the flesh. It follows, however, for the most part that if one contrary is predicated multifariously, the other also will be multifariously predicated, as if the just so likewise the unjust. But justice and injustice are predicated multifariously. Though, through the proximity of their homonomy, this is latent, nor is it more apparent, as is the case in those things which are remote. For, the difference according to idea or form is great. Thus, for instance, clavus is predicated homonymously, for it signifies both that part which is under the neck of animals and that by which gates are shut. Vis a key. We must consider, therefore, in how many ways an unjust man is denominated, but it appears that he is an unjust man who acts illegally and he who takes to himself more of external goods than he ought, or who is avaricious, and also he who is unequal, i.e., who takes to himself less of evils than is equitable, so that it is evident that he will be a just man who acts legally and he who is equal or equitable. The just, therefore, will be both the legal and the equal, but the unjust will be the illegal and the unequal. Since, however, the unjust man is avaricious, he will be conversant with good, yet not with every kind of good, but with that in which there is prosperous and adverse fortune, and which is indeed simply always good, but to a certain person not always. But men pray for and pursue this good, though they ought not, for they should pray, indeed, that things which are simply good, such as riches, may also be good to them, but they should choose such things as are good to their possessor, such as virtue and wisdom. The unjust man, however, does not always choose that which is more, but in things which are simply evil, he chooses the less. But because the less evil appears in a certain respect to be good, and of what is good, there is a desire of possessing more of it than is equitable. On this account, the unjust man appears to be avaricious. He is also unequal and acts illegally. For this very thing, the acting illegally or in equality comprehends all injustice and is common to all injustice. Since, however, he who acts illegally is unjust, but he who acts legally is just, it is evident that everything which is legal is in a certain respect just. For the things which are defined by the legislative science are legal, and we say that each of these is just. But the laws speak about everything, looking either to that which is advantageous in common to all men, or to the best of men, or to those in authority, and this either according to virtue or some other mode. Hence, after one manner, we call those things just which are capable of producing and preserving felicity, and the parts of it by political communion. The law, however, ordains that the works of the brave man should be done, such as that a soldier shall not leave his rank, nor fly from the enemy, nor throw away his arms, and likewise that the works of the temperate man shall be done, such as not to commit adultery, nor behave with insolent wantonness, and also those of the mild man, such as not to strike another person, nor defame anyone. And the law ordains similarly with respect to the other virtues and vices, partly commanding and partly forbidding. The law, indeed, doing this rightly which is rightly framed, but that which is rashly framed erroneously. This justice, therefore, i.e., legal justice, is indeed a perfect virtue, yet not simply, but with reference to another thing. And on this account, justice frequently appears to be the best of the virtues, nor is either the evening or the morning star so admirable. We likewise say proverbially, every virtue is comprehended in justice. And legal justice is especially a perfect virtue, because it is the use of perfect virtue. But it is perfect because he who possesses it is also able to employ virtue towards another person, and not only towards himself. For many persons are indeed able to employ virtue in their own affairs, but not in the affairs of others. And on this account it appears to have been well said by bias that dominion shows the man, for he who governs has relation to another person, and is now conversant with the communion of life. For the very same reason also, justice alone of all the virtues appears to be a foreign good, because it has reference to another person. Since it performs what is advantageous to another, viz, either to a ruler, or to the community at large. He, therefore, is the worst of characters, who acts depravedly both towards himself and towards his friends. But he is the best of men, not who acts virtuously towards himself, but towards another person. For this is a difficult work. This justice, therefore, is not a part of virtue, but is universal virtue, nor is the injustice which is contrary to it a part of viz, but universal viz. What the difference, however, is between virtue and this justice is evident from what has already been said, for it is indeed the same with it, but not essentially. For so far indeed, as it has reference to another person, it is justice, but so far as it is habit of a certain description, it is simply virtue. Chapter 2 We investigate, however, the justice which is a part of virtue, for there is, as we say, such a justice, and in a similar manner, we investigate the injustice which is a part of viz. But that there is such a justice is indicated by this. The tea who energizes according to other depravities acts unjustly indeed, but does not assume to himself more of external good than he ought. Such, for instance, as the man who throws away his shield through timidity, or he who speaks ill of another from asparity, or who does not give pecuniary assistance to another through illiberality. But when he assumes to himself more than he ought, he frequently is not vicious according to any one of such vices, nor yet according to all the vices, but according to a certain depravity, for we blame him and for injustice. There is, therefore, a certain other injustice, as being a certain part of universal injustice, and a certain something unjust, which is a part of the whole of the unjust that is contrary to law. Farther still, if one person indeed should commit adultery for the sake of gain and should receive money for so doing, but another should give money and sustain an injury in his property, by doing it in consequence of being under the influence of strong desire, the latter indeed will rather appear to be intemperate than one who assumes to himself more than he ought, but the former will be unjust, but not intemperate, and it is evident that he will not because he acts with a view to gain. Again, in all other unjust deeds, there is always a reference to a certain depravity. Thus, if a man commits adultery, the reference is to intemperance. If he abandons his post in battle, the reference is to timidity, but if he strikes another person to anger. If, however, he obtains money by it, the reference is to no other depravity than to injustice. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain other injustice, which ranks as a part besides universal injustice, and which is synonymous with it, because the definition of each is in the same genus, for both possess their power in a reference to another person. But the injustice, which ranks as a part, is conversant with honor, or riches, or safety, or, if all these could be comprehended in one name, it is conversant with them, and this on account of the pleasure which results from gain. Universal injustice, however, is conversant with all such things, as a worthy man is conversant with in the exercise of justice. That there are many kinds of justice, therefore, and that there is a certain justice which is different from universal virtue is evident. What it is, however, and what kind of thing it is, must be explained. The unjust, therefore, has been distinguished by us into the illegal and the unequal, and the just into the legal and the equal. But the prior injustice of which we have spoken subsists according to the illegal. Since, however, the illegal and the unequal are not the same, but different, as a part with reference to a whole, for everything unequal is illegal, but not everything which is illegal is unequal. Hence, the unjust and injustice are not the same with these, but different from them in the same manner as parts and holes. For, this injustice is a part of the whole of injustice, and, in a similar manner, this justice is a part of the whole of justice. We must, therefore, speak concerning the justice and injustice which ranks as parts, and after the same manner concerning the partially just and unjust. The justice, therefore, and injustice which are arranged according to universal virtue, and of which the former is the use of the whole of virtue and the latter of the whole of vice with reference to another person we shall omit. It is, likewise, evident how the just and the unjust which are arranged conformably to these are to be distinguished, for nearly most of those things which are legal are ordained from universal virtue. For, the law orders men to live conformably to every virtue, and forbids them from acting conformably to any one of the vices, but the efficient causes of the whole of virtue are those legal actions which are established by the laws for the purposes of public discipline. Concerning the discipline, however, of an individual according to which he is simply a good man, whether it pertains to the political or another science will be determined hereafter. For perhaps it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen, but there is one species of the justice which subsists according to a part and of the just pertaining to it and which consists in the distributions either of honor or riches or such other things as may be divided among those who partake of the same polity. For in these it is possible that one person may share unequally and equally with another. But another species of justice is that which possesses a corrective power in contracts. Of this, however, there are two parts. Four of contracts, some are voluntary, but others are involuntary. The voluntary indeed are buying, selling, putting out money at interest, certyship, lending anything on hire, pledging and hiring a slave or an artificer. But these contracts are said to be voluntary because the principle of them is voluntary. And of involuntary contracts, some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, witchcraft, prostitution, deceiving the slave of another person, insidious murder, and bearing false witness. But the violent are such as blows, bonds, death, plunder, mutilation, slander, and contumaly. Chapter 3 Since, however, the unjust man is unequal, and also the unjust belongs to the unequal. It is evident that there is a certain medium of the unequal, but this is the equal. For in whatever action there is, the more and the less there is also the equal. If, therefore, the unjust is unequal, the just will be equal, which, indeed, without any reasoning process is manifest to all men. But since the equal is a medium, the just will be a certain medium. The equal, however, is in two things at least. It is necessary, therefore, that the just, which is a medium, and equal should be referred to a certain thing, and to certain things. And so far, indeed, as it is a medium, it is referred to certain things. But these are the more and the less. And so far, as it is equal, it is referred to two things. But so far, as it is the just, it is referred to certain things. Hence, it is necessary that the just should be in four things at least. For the persons to whom the just pertains are two, and the things in which it consists are two. And there will be the same equality between the persons to whom justice pertains, and the things in which it consists. For, as is the relation of the former to each other, such also is that of the latter. For, if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal things. Battles, however, and accusations hence originate when either equal persons do not obtain equal things, or those that are not equal have an equal distribution of things. This also is evident from distribution according to dessert. For all men acknowledge that the just in distribution should be made according to a certain dessert. All men, however, do not say that there is the same dessert. But democratic men indeed say that dessert is liberty, and of the oligarchists some say that it is wealth, but others that it is nobility, but the aristocrats say that it is virtue. The just, therefore, is something analogous. For, the analogous is not only the peculiarity of monadic number, or number consisting of units, but number universally. For analogy, or proportion is equality of ratio and consists in four things at least. That disjunct proportion, therefore, consists in four terms as evident, and this is also the case with continued proportion. For, this uses one thing as two things, as, for instance, as a is to be, so is b to c. Hence, b is twice assumed so that if b is placed twice, the analogous things will be four. But, the just also consists in four things at least, and the reason is the same. For, the persons to whom justice is distributed, and the things which are distributed are similarly divided, as the term a, therefore, is to be, so will c, b to d. And, therefore, alternately, as a is to c, so is b to d. Hence, the whole will be compared with the whole, which the distribution conjoins, and, if they are thus compounded, they will be justly conjoined. The conjunction, therefore, of the term a with c and of b with d forms the justice which is in distribution, and the just is the medium of that which is foreign from the analogous. For, the analogous is a medium and the just is analogous. Mathematicians, however, call such an analogy or proportion as this geometrical. For, in geometrical proportion it happens that the whole is to the whole as all the parts to all. But this proportion is not continued. For, the same thing is not assumed as the person to whom a distribution is made and as the thing distributed. This justice, therefore, consists in proportion, but the unjust is foreign from proportion, and hence, the person has more, but another less than he ought, which also happens to be the case in actions. For, he indeed, who does an injury has more, but he who is injured has less of good than he ought. The contrary, however, takes place in evil. For, a less evil has the relation of good with respect to a greater evil. For, a less is more eligible than a greater evil. But, the eligible is good, and that which is more eligible is a greater good. This, therefore, is one species of the just. Chapter 4 The other remaining species of justice is corrective, which is conversant both with voluntary and involuntary contracts, but the form of this justice is different from the former. For, the justice which is distributive of common things, or things of a public nature, always subsists according to the distribution proportion. For, if the distribution is made from common property, it will be according to the same ratio as the things introduced have to each other, and the unjust which is opposed to this justice is foreign from proportion. The just, however, which is in contracts, is indeed a certain equality, and the unjust is inequality, yet not according to geometrical, but as medical proportion. For it makes no difference whether a worthy deprives a bad man of his property, or a bad a worthy man, nor whether a worthy or a bad man commits adultery. But the law only looks to the difference of the injury, and uses the persons as if they were equal, though the one, indeed, should injure, but the other should be injured, and though the one should do, but the other should suffer harm. Hence, this, since it is unequal, the judge endeavors to equalize. For, when one man, indeed, inflicts a blow, but another is struck, or one man kills, but another is killed, the suffering and the action are divided into unequal parts, but the judge, by the punishment which he inflicts, endeavors to produce inequality by detracting from the game. For, in things of this kind, in short, though to some things name will not be good, the injury is denominated gain, and the endurance of the injury loss. But, when the suffering is measured, the one is called loss, but the other gain. Hence, of the more and the less, the equal is the medium. With respect to loss and gain, however, the one is more, but the other less contrarly. For, the more of good, but the less of evil is gain, and the contrary is loss, of which the equal is the medium, which we say is the just. Hence, the justice which is corrective will be the medium of loss and gain. Hence, too, when men contend with each other about legal affairs, they fly to the judge, but to go to a judge is to go to justice. For a judge is nothing else, then, as it were, animated justice. They also search for a judge who is a medium, and some persons call judges mediators, as if they should obtain justice if they obtain to the medium. The just, therefore, is a certain medium, since the judge is also, but the judge equalizes, and as if a line were cut into unequal parts, he takes away from the greater section, that by which it exceeds the half, and adds it to the less section. When, however, the whole is divided into two equal parts, then men say they have what is their own, when they obtain the equal, but the equal is the middle of the greater, and the less according to arithmetical proportion. Hence, also, the just, bracket, the can, close bracket, is denominated, because it is divided into two equal parts, bracket, odi, dicha, estin, close bracket, just as if it should be said to be dechan, and the judge is called daikeists, as if he were daicheists, or one who divides a thing into two equal parts. For, if when two things are equal, that which is taken from the one is added to the other, the latter will exceed what the former then becomes by two such parts. For, if what is taken away from one of the equal things were not added to the other, the one would exceed the other by one such part only. The thing therefore, to which something is added, exceeds the medium by one part, and the medium also exceeds by one part that from which something is taken away. By this, therefore, we may know what ought to be taken away from him who has more, and what ought to be added to him who has less. For, it is necessary to add to him who has less that by which the medium exceeds, but to take away from the greatest that by which the medium is exceeded. Let there be three lines, A A, B B, C C, equal to each other. From A A, let A E be taken and added to C C, and let that part be C D. Hence, the whole line, D C C, will exceed the line A E by the line C D, and the line F C, and therefore it will exceed the line B B by the line C D. This also takes place in other arts, for there would be subverted, unless that which suffers, suffers the same in quantity and quality as that which acts. But these appellations, loss and gain, are derived from voluntary contracts. For when a man obtains more than his own, he is said to gain, but when he has less than what he had at first, he is said to have lost, as in buying and selling, and such other law permits. When, however, men have neither more nor less, but give as much as they receive, they are said to have their own, and neither to lose nor gain. Hence, the just is the medium of a certain gain and loss in things which are not voluntary, so that each of those who form a contract may have as much afterwards as before. Chapter 5 To some persons, however, retaliation appears to be simply just, and this also was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, for they define the just to be simply retaliation. But retaliation is neither adapted to distributive nor to corrective justice, though Radamanthus in Escalus appears to assert that justice is this, quote, and that the punishment will be equitable when a man suffers the same thing as he has done, close quote. For retaliation is frequently discordant, thus for instance, if a magistrate should strike a man, it is not proper that the man should strike him in return. And if anyone strikes a magistrate, yet not only to be struck, but to be punished more severely. Again, there is a great difference between the voluntary and the involuntary, but commercial intercourse is preserved by a justice of this kind, if the retaliation is made according to proportion, and not according to equality. For, by analogous retaliation, the union of a city becomes permanent, for men either endeavour to return evil for evil, for it appears to be slavery if they cannot retaliate, or they wish when they benefit others to be themselves benefited in return, since if this does not take place there is no compensation, by which the permanent union of society is affected. Hence, the temple of the graces is built in a conspicuous part of the city, for the purpose of suppressing remuneration, for this is the peculiarity of grace or favour, for it is requisite to return a favour to him who has conferred one, and he again should begin to confer a favour. But a conjunction according to a diameter produces the retribution which is according to analogy. Thus, for instance, let the builder of a house be A, a shoemaker B, the house C, and the shoe D. It is necessary therefore that the house should receive from the shoemaker his work, and give his work to him in return. Hence, if the first equality is that which is according to analogy, and afterwards a retaliation is made, it will be that which we have mentioned. But if not, there will neither be equality nor will the bond of society remain, for nothing hinders but that the work of the one may be more excellent than the work of the other. It is necessary therefore that these should be equalised. But this also takes place in the other arts, for they would be subverted, unless that which is passive suffered the same in quantity and quality as the agent of X. For the communion of society is not produced from two physicians, but from a physician and a husbandman, and in short, from different, and not from equal characters. But it is necessary that these should be equalised. Hence, it is requisite that all things should be capable of being compared with each other of which there is an exchange, and for this purpose, money was adopted and becomes, in a certain respect, a measure. For it measures all things, so that it likewise measures excess and defect, and therefore determines how many shoes are equal to a house or to nutriment. It is necessary therefore that such as the ratio is of the builder of a house to a shoemaker, such should be the ratio of the number of shoes to a house or to nutriment. For if this does not take place, there will neither be exchange nor communion and it will not take place unless the things compared are in a certain respect equal. Hence it is necessary, as has been before observed, that all things should be measured by one certain thing, and this is, in reality, indigence, which connects all things. For if mankind were not in want of anything, or if they were not similarly in want, either there would be no exchange or not the same. But money was adopted by compact as a subsidiary exchange for indigence and on this account, money was called bracket nomisma close bracket, because it is not established by nature but by law. And it is in our power to change it and render it useless. Retaliation therefore will then take place when there is an equalization. Hence, as the husbandman is to the shoemaker, so is the work of the shoemaker to the work of the husbandman. But it is necessary to bring them to the form of proportion when an exchange takes place. For without this, one of the extremes will have both the excesses. When, however, each person has his own, they will thus be equal and communicate with each other, because this equality can be produced among them. Let the husbandman be a, the nutriment c, and the work of the shoemaker, equal to the nutriment bd. But without this retaliation, there would be no communion of society. That indigence, however, connects as being one certain thing is evident, because when men are not in want of each other, either both or one of them, no exchange takes place, as it does when one is in want of what the other possesses. As, for instance, wine, for which an exportation of corn is granted. It is necessary, therefore, that this should be equalized. In order to future exchange, however, if nothing should at present be wanted, that it may be obtained when it is wanted. Money becomes, as it were, asserted to us. For it is requisite that he who brings money should take what he wants in exchange for it. Money, therefore, also suffers this very same thing, for it does not always possess an equal power, but at the same time it is more permanent. Hence, it is necessary that all things should be estimated, for thus there will always be an exchange, and if there is an exchange, there will be a communion. Money, therefore, as a measure having made things commensurate, equalizes them. For, there would be no communion without exchange, nor exchange without equality, nor equality without commensuration. In reality, therefore, it is impossible that things which so much differ should become commensurate. But, for the purposes of indigence, this is sufficiently possible. Hence, it is necessary that there should be one certain thing as a measure, and this from assumption. Hence, it is called money. For this causes all things to be commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let a house be A, 10-minor B, and a bed C. A, therefore, will be the half of B, if the house is worth 5-minor, or is equal to the value of 5-minor. But, let the bed C be the 10th part of B. It is evident, therefore, how many beds are equal in value to the house. Viz, 5. That such, however, was the exchange before there was money is manifest. For, it makes no difference whether 5 beds, or as much as the worth of 5 beds, are given for the house. Thus, therefore, we have shown what the unjust, and also what the just is. But these things, being determined, it is evident that a just action is a medium between doing and receiving an injury. For, the former is to have more, but the latter less than is just. Justice, however, is a medium, not after the same manner with the former virtues, but because it pertains to a medium between the more and the less. But injustice pertains to extremes. And justice, indeed, is that according to which a just man is said to act justly from deliberate choice. And to distribute justice both to himself in making a compact with another person and to another who makes a compact with another. Yet, not so as to attribute more of what is eligible to himself, and less to his neighbor, and the contrary of that which is hurtful, but so as to distribute that equal to himself and others according to analogy. And he adopts the same mode of conduct towards another person who forms a compact with another. Injustice, on the contrary, is that according to which an unjust man is said to act unjustly from deliberate choice. And to distribute injustice both to himself and others. But this is the excess and deficiency of that which is beneficial or hurtful, contrary to the analogous. Hence, injustice is excess and deficiency, because it pertains to excess and deficiency. To the unjust man himself, indeed, it is an excess of that which is simply beneficial. But a deficiency of that which is hurtful. But to others it distributes in a manner wholly similar, and in whatever way the distribution may happen to be made. It is contrary to the analogous. Of an unjust action, however, the less extreme is to be injured, and the greater to injure. After this manner, therefore, we have discussed justice and injustice, and have shown what is the nature of each. And similarly, we have discussed adversely the just and the unjust. Chapter 6 Since, however, it is possible that he who acts unjustly may not yet be unjust. For what kind of iniquious deeds will a man be unjust, according to each species of injustice? For instance, will it be as a thief, or as an adulterer, or as a robber? Or thus, indeed, will the difficulty still remain? For a man may have connection with a woman, knowing he is, yet not from a principle of deliberate choice, but from passion. Hence, in this case he acts unjustly, but is not unjust, as neither is a thief, though he may have committed theft, nor an adulterer, though he may have committed adultery, and in a similar manner in other things. In what manner, therefore, retaliation subsists with reference to justice has been shown by us before. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that what we at present investigate is the simply just, and the politically just, but this justice takes place among men connected together in society, and these liberal and equal men, either according to analogy, or according to number, with a view to a sufficiency of the necessaries of life. Hence, those among whom this is not found have no political justice towards each other, but a certain justice, and which subsists according to a similitude to political justice. For there is justice among those with whom there is also law, but there is law among those with whom there is injustice. For justice is the judgment of the just, and the unjust, but with those with whom there is injustice there is also acting unjustly, but with all those with whom there is acting unjustly, there is not injustice. But injustice consists in a man distributing to himself more of what is simply good, and less of what is simply evil, than he ought. Hence, we do not suffer a man to govern, but to reason because he does this to himself, i.e. distributes to himself more of what is good, and less of what is evil, and becomes a tyrant. He, however, who governs is the guardian of justice. But, if of justice, he is also the guardian of the equal. But since if he is a just man, it does not appear that he possesses more external good than others, for he does not distribute more of what is simply good to himself, unless it belongs to him by analogy. Hence, he distributes the simply good to another, and, on this account, it is said that justice is a foreign good, as we have before observed. A certain reward, therefore, must be given to him, but this is honour and a gift. Those persons, however, to whom these are not sufficient become tyrants, but despotic and paternal justice, or the justice of a master towards his servants, and of a father towards his children, are not the same with this, but similar to it. For there is no injustice simply of a man towards his own property, but a possession, or a slave, and a child, while he is little and not yet separated from his parents, are, as it were, a part of the man, and no one deliberately chooses to injure himself. Hence, there is no injustice of a man towards himself, and consequently, neither is there injustice, nor political justice. For justice is conformable to law, and subsists among those with whom law is naturally adapted to exist, but these are persons with whom there is an equality of governing, and being governed. Hence, there is more of political justice between a man and his wife, than between a father and his children, or a master and his servants, for this latter is economical justice, but this is different from political justice. Chapter 7 With respect, however, to political justice, one kind is natural, but the other, legal. And the natural, indeed, is that which has everywhere the same power, and this is not because it appears or does not appear to be justice. But the legal is that, respecting which, from the first, it is of no consequence, whether it is established in this or in that way, but when it is established, is of consequence. Such, for instance, as that captives shall be redeemed for a mina, or that a goat shall be sacrificed, and not too sheep. And, further still, such laws as are promulgated about particulars, such as that sacrifices shall be offered to Brassidus, and whatever is established by public decrees. To some persons, however, all political justice appears to be of this kind, because that which has a natural subsistence is not mutable, and everywhere possesses the same power, just as fire burns, both here and in Perugia, but just things are seen to be mutable. This, however, is not entirely, but only partially the case, though perhaps with the gods, it is by no means to be admitted that justice is mutable. But, with us, there is something which is naturally mutable, though not everything. But, at the same time, justice is partly from nature and partly not. What, however, the justice is which is from nature is evident from contingencies, and things which have a various subsistence, and also, what the justice is which is not from nature, but is legal and established by compact, since both are similarly mutable. The same distinction, likewise, will be adapted to other things, for the right hand is naturally more excellent, i.e., is more adapted to motion, than the left, though it is possible that some persons may be ambidextrous. The justice, however, which is from compact and utility, resembles measures. For, the measures of wine and corn are not everywhere equal, but with those who buy wine and corn, they are greater, and with those who sell them less. In a similar manner, justice, which is not natural, but human, is not everywhere the same. Since neither are polities, but everywhere one polity alone is conformable by nature, viz, that which is the most excellent. Everything just, however, and everything legal are, as universals to particulars, for actions are many, but each of them is one thing, for it is a universal, but an unjust action and the unjust differ, and also a just action and the just. For, the unjust subsists, either by nature or by order, but the very same thing which when done is an unjust action is not so before it is done, but is unjust, and in a similar manner with respect to a just action, but that which is common is rather called a deed justly done, but the correction of an unjust deed a just deed. With respect to each of these, however, what the quality and number of their species are, and what the particulars are, with which they are conversant, we shall hereafter consider. Chapter 8 Since therefore, things just and unjust are those which we have enumerated, a man then indeed does an injury or acts justly when he does acts voluntarily, but when involuntarily, he neither does an injury nor acts justly, except from accident, for it happens that the things which he does are either just or unjust, but a deed unjustly done, and a just action are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary, for when an action is voluntary it is blamed, but at the same time, it is then a deed unjustly done. Hence there will be something unjust, which is not yet a deed unjustly done, unless the voluntary is added to it, but I call a voluntary deed, as has been before observed, that which man does of things which it is in his power to do, willingly, and not ignorantly, vis not being ignorant of the circumstances of the action, as for instance, who it is he strikes, and with what he strikes, and on what account, and when he does this, neither from accident, nor by compulsion, as would be the case if someone taking his hand should strike another person with it, for he would then not strike willingly because it was not in his power to avoid giving the blow. It may happen however, that he who is struck is a father, but he who strikes him may merely know that he is a man or someone of those who are present, but may be ignorant that it is his father. A similar distinction also must be made in that for the sake of which a thing is done and concerning the whole action, hence, that which is not known or which is known indeed, but is not in the power of him who acts, or which he is compelled to do, is done involuntarily. For we both do and suffer many things which have a natural subsistence knowingly, no one of which is either voluntary or involuntary, such as to grow old or to die. That which is accidental however, similarly takes place in things unjust and just, for if a man returns a deposit unwillingly, and from fear, he cannot be said either to perform a just deed or to act justly, except from accident. In a similar manner, he who, from compulsion and unwillingly does not return a deposit, must be said to be unjust, and to do an unjust deed from accident. But of voluntary actions, some indeed we perform with previous choice, and others without previous choice. With previous choice, such as have been the subjects of previous deliberation, but without it, such as have not been deliberated on previously. Since therefore, there are three kinds of harm in social communion, those which are accompanied with ignorance are errors. When a man neither apprehends who the person that is injured is, nor the mode, nor the instrument, nor that for the sake of which the harm is done. For in this case, he will think either that he has not struck the person, or not with this instrument, or not this person, or not on this account, but something else happened different Thus, one man may strike another, not for the purpose of wounding, but of stimulating him, and in so doing may accidentally wound him, or he may not strike the person whom he intended to strike, or not in the way he intended. When therefore, harm is done unintentionally, it is a misfortune, but when it is done not unintentionally, yet without vice, it is an error. For a man then errs, when the principle of the cause is in himself, but he is unfortunate when the principle is external to him. When however, harm is done knowingly, but without previous deliberation, it is a deed unjustly done. As for instance, whatever happens to men through anger, or other passions which are necessary or natural, for those who injure others, and errs through the influence of these passions, act in deed unjustly, and their deeds are unjustly done. Nevertheless, they are not yet unjust on account of these actions, nor depraved, for the harm which they did was not through depravity. But, when a man injures another from deliberate choice, he is unjust and depraved. Hence, those deeds which are the effect of anger are well judged, not to be the result of previous design. For, the principle of action is not in him who is angry, but in him who excited his anger. Again, when one man hurts another from anger, there is no controversy about the deed, as to being dead. But, about the justice of it. For, anger is excited on account of a parent injustice. For, here there is no controversy about the existence of the thing, as there is in contracts, in which it is necessary that one of the contractors should be a depraved character, unless his conduct is the effect of oblivion. But, acknowledging the fact, they controvert the justice of it. He, however, who hurts another person deliberately, is not ignorant of the deed. Hence, the one of these thinks he is injured, but the other thinks he is not. But, he who does harm to another person from deliberate choice acts unjustly. And, he who injures another according to those deeds which are done unjustly is unjust. When he acts contrary to proportion or to the equal. In a similar manner also, he is just when he acts justly from previous choice. But, he acts justly if he only acts willingly. Of involuntary actions, however, some deserve to be pardoned, but others do not. For, such involuntary errors, as are not only committed ignorantly, but also through ignorance, deserve to be pardoned, but such as are not committed through ignorance, but ignorantly, yet from passion, neither natural nor human do not deserve to be pardoned. Chapter 9 It may, however, be doubted whether a distinction has been sufficiently made by us between being injured and injuring. In the first place, indeed, if the thing is as Euripides asserts it to be, when he absurdly says, quote, to speak briefly, I may kill my mother, both of us being willing, or I being unwilling, and she willing, close quote. For, is it true or not that a person can be willingly injured, or is everyone unwillingly injured in the same manner as everyone who does an injury does it willingly? Or, do some person suffer an injury voluntarily, and others involuntarily? And, a similar inquiry may also be made with respect to obtaining justice. For, to act justly is wholly a voluntary thing. Hence, the being injured and obtaining justice are deservedly opposed in a similar manner to each other, so that they are either voluntary or involuntary. It may, however, appear to be absurd that, in obtaining justice, the whole should be voluntary, for some persons obtain justice unwillingly, and this also may be doubted, whether everyone who suffers something unjust is injured, or whether, as it is in acting, so it is in suffering. For, it is possible in both these to obtain what is just from accident, and it is evident that the like also may take place in things unjust. For, it is not the same thing to do unjust things and to do an injury, nor is it the same thing to suffer unjust things and to be injured. The like also takes place in acting justly and obtaining justice, for it is impossible to be injured unless there is someone who does the injury, or to obtain justice unless there is someone who acts justly. But, if to do an injury is simply to hurt someone willingly, and to hurt willingly is to do so knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument, and the manner in which he is hurt, but the intemperate man willingly hurts himself. If this be the case, he will be voluntarily injured, and it will be possible for a man to injure himself. This, however, is also one of the things which are dubious, whether it is possible for a man to injure himself. Further still, a man may voluntarily, through intemperance, be injured by another person, so that it will be possible for a man to be injured voluntarily, or shall we say that the definition which we have given of doing an injury is that it is to hurt someone voluntarily is not right. But, we must add the words to hurt knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument, and the manner in which he is hurt, contrary to his will. A man, therefore, may be hurt, and suffer unjust things willingly, but no one is willingly injured, for no one wishes to be injured, not even the intemperate man, but he acts contrary to his will. For neither does anyone wish for that which he does not fancy to be good, but the intemperate man does that which he does not think ought to be done, but he who gives what is his own, as Homer says, Glaucus gave to Diomed, quote, for Diomed's brass arms of mean device, for which Nine Oxen paid a vulgar price, he gave his own of gold divinely wrought, a hundred beavers the shining purchase bought, close quote, is not injured, for it is in his power to give, or not to give, but to be injured is not in his power, but it is necessary that the person should exist by whom the injury is done, concerning the being injured, therefore, it is evident that it is not voluntary. Of those things, however, which we propose to discuss, two particulars remain to be explained, whether he does an injury who distributes to another person more than he deserves, or the person who receives the distribution. Four, if what we before observed is possible, and he who distributes, but not he who possesses more, does the injury, if anyone distributes to himself knowingly and willingly, he will himself injure himself, which modest men appear to do. Four, a worthy man distributes less to himself than to others, or shall we say that neither is this thing simple. Four, he who distributes less to himself than to others, of certain good things, will vindicate to himself more of some other good, if it should so happen, as for instance, of renown, or of that which is simply unconduct. Again, the note is also dissolved from the definition of doing an injury. Four, he who does it suffers nothing contrary to his will, hence he is not, on this account, injured, but even admitting that he is, he is only hurt. It is also evident that he who distributes more than the receiver deserves does an injury, but not the receiver. Four, it is not the person in whom injustice is inherent who does the injury, but he who to do this is voluntary, but this is the man from whom the principle of the action proceeds, which is in the distributor, but not in the receiver. Father still, since to act is predicated multifariously, and things inanimate in a certain respect kill, the band as well as the servant by the command of his master, these indeed do not act injuriously, but they do unjust things. Again, if a man being indeed ignorant judges, he does not do an injury according to the legally just, nor is his judgment unjust, yet in a certain respect it is unjust. Four, the legally just differs from the first justice, or that which has a natural subsistence, but if he should judge unjustly, knowingly, he will vindicate to himself more either a favor or a vengeance. As, therefore, if someone should partake of a deed unjustly done, thus also he who on account of these things judges unjustly will possess more, for in those things, he who adjudges a field to another person receives in return not a field but money. Man, however, are of opinion that it is in their power to do an injury, and that on this account it is easy to be just, but it is not so. Four, to have connection with the wife of a neighbor, to strike another person, and to give money with the hand are things easy, and in the power of those who do them. But to do these things with a certain disposition of mind is neither easy nor in the power of those who do them. In a similar manner, also, the multitude fancy that there is no portion of wisdom in knowing what is just, and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand those things about which the laws speak. These things, however, are not just, except from accident, but they are then just, when they are performed after a certain manner and distributed after a certain manner. But this is a greater work than to know things that are salubrious. For there, indeed, it is easy to know honey and wine, and hellebore, and burning and cutting, but how it is necessary to distribute these in order to produce health, and to whom, and when they are to be distributed is as greater work as to be a physician. On this very account, the multitude fancy that it is no less the province of a just man than of an unjust man to do an injury, because the just man is no less, but is even more able to do each of these than the unjust man. For, according to them, a just man may have connection with the wife of another man, and may strike another person, and a brave man may throw away his shield, and be taking himself to flight, may run where he pleases. To act cowardly, however, and to do an injury is not merely to do these things, except from accident, but it consists in doing them with a certain disposition of mind, i.e. with promptitude and delight. Just as to perform the office of a physician, and to restore to health, does not merely consist in cutting, or not cutting, in giving or not giving medicine, but in doing these after a certain manner. But just things subsist among those with whom there is a participation of things which are simply good, and in these there is also excess and defect. For, to some beings, as perhaps to the gods, justice is not a good, because in them there is no excess or deficiency, but to others, as to men incurable and vicious, no part of things simply good is beneficial, but all of them are noxious, and to others they are useful to a certain extent, and on this account justice is a human good. Chapter 10 It now follows that we should speak concerning equity, and the equitable, and show how equity indeed subsists with reference to justice, and the equitable with reference to the just. For to those who consider rightly, the equitable appears to be neither simply the same, nor yet different in genus from the just. And, at one time indeed, we praise the equitable, and the man of equity, so that also, transferring this name to other things, we praise the man by calling him a more equitable, instead of a good man, manifesting by this, that it is a better appellation, but at another time, to those who follow reason, it appears to be absurd, that the equitable, if it is something different from the just, should be laudable. For, either the just is not a worthy thing, or the equitable is not just, if it is different from the just, or if they are both worthy things, both are the same. The doubt, therefore, concerning the equitable, nearly happens through these particulars. All these, however, are after a certain manner right, and there is nothing in them which is contrary and adverse to itself. For, the equitable, being something that is just, is a better just thing, and is not better than the just, as if it were some other genus. The just, therefore, and the equitable are the same thing, and both of them being worthy things, the equitable is the more excellent of the two. A doubt, however, still remains, that though the equitable is indeed just, yet it is not the legally just, but is a correction of it. But the cause of this is, that every law, indeed, is universal, but it cannot speak universally, with rectitude about certain particulars. In those things, therefore, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but in which this cannot be done rightly, the law assumes that which happens, for the most part, not being ignorant of the fault, which has been committed, and in thus doing, it acts no less rightly, for the fault is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing. For such directly is the matter of the thing which pertains to action. When the law, therefore, speaks universally, and something after this should happen besides, then it is right to correct what the legislator has admitted, and the error which he admitted, in speaking simply, since the legislator himself would adopt such correction, if he were present, and would have legally established this, if he had known it. Hence, the equitable is just, and is better than a certain justice. It is not, however, better than what is simply just, but it is better than the justice which errs through speaking simply, and generally. And this is the nature of the equitable, that it is a correction of law, where law is deficient on account of speaking universally. For this is the cause why all things are not according to law, that concerning certain things it is impossible to establish a law. Hence, a decree is necessary. For, of the indefinite, the rule also is indefinite. Just, as of a lesbian building, the rule is ledden, since the rule is bent conformable to the figure of the stone, and does not remain the same. Thus also a decree is adapted to things themselves. It is evident, therefore, what the equitable and the just are, and what the justice is, which the equitable excels. It is likewise manifest from this who is an equitable man, for he who deliberately chooses and practices things of this kind, and who is not an accurate distributor of justice in the rigid sense of the word, but remits something of the rigor of the law, though the law is favorable to such rigor, is an equitable man. And the habit itself is equity, being a certain justice, and not a different habit. Chapter 11. From what has been said, also it is evident whether it is possible for a man to injure himself or not, for there are some just things established by law, which pertain to the whole of virtue. Thus, for instance, the law does not order a man to destroy himself, and it forbids what it does not command. Again, when one man hurts another contrary to law, who has not hurt him, he does an injury willingly. But he does an injury willingly, who does it knowing the person whom he injures, and the instrument, and the manner in which he does it. But he who destroys himself through anger does this willingly contrary to right reason, which the law does not permit. Hence, he does an injury. But to whom? Is it not to the city, but not to himself? For he voluntarily suffers, but no one is voluntarily injured. Hence, also, the city punishes him, and a certain disgrace is attached to him who destroys himself, as one who injures the city. Farther still, it is not possible for a man to injure himself in that way in which he is unjust, who only acts unjustly, and is not entirely depraved. For this character is different from him. For the unjust man is in a certain respect so depraved as the timid man is, but not as possessing the whole of depravity. Hence, neither according to this improbability does he do himself an injury. For, if he did, the same thing might be taken away and added at the same time to the same thing. But this is impossible. It is, however, necessary that the just and the unjust should always exist in more than one person. Again, he who does an injury does it voluntarily, and from deliberate choice, and with a precedency in time. For, he who injures another because he has been injured by him does not appear to act unjustly, but he who injures himself suffers and does the same things at the same time. Farther still, a man would be injured willingly, to which may be added that no one does an injury without a particular species of injustice. But no one commits adultery with his own wife, nor does anyone dig through his own wall, nor commit a theft on his own property. In short, the impossibility that a man should injure himself is evident from the conclusions made by us respecting the being voluntarily injured. It is likewise evident that both to be injured and to injure are bad things, for the one is to have less, but the other more than the medium, in the same manner as the salubrious in medicine, and that which contributes to a good habit of body in the gymnastic art. At the same time, however, it is worse to injure than to be injured, for to do an injury is accompanied with vice, and is blamable, and with vice, which is either perfect and simply vice or nearly so. For, not everything which is voluntary is accompanied with injustice, but to be injured is without vice and injustice. Essentially, therefore, it is less bad to be injured than to do an injury, but from accident nothing prevents it from being a greater evil. Art, however, pays no attention to this, but it says that the pleurisy is a greater disease than a lame foot, though it may happen that the latter may be a greater evil than the former, if a man in consequence of being lame should fall and thus be taken by enemies and put to death. Metaphorically speaking, however, and from similitude, the whole man is not just to the whole of himself, but one part of him towards another part, yet not according to every kind of justice, but according to the despotic or economic. For in these discussions it must be admitted that the rational differs from the irrational part of the soul, and if we look to these, it appears that there is a certain injustice of a man towards himself, because it is possible in these parts for a man to suffer something adverse to his own appetites. As therefore, between a governor and him who is governed, there is a certain justice towards each other. This is also the case between these parts of the soul. After this manner, therefore, we have discussed justice and the other ethical virtues. End of Book 5 Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle translated by Thomas Taylor Book 6 Chapter 1 Since, however, we have before observed that it is necessary the medium inconduct should be chosen and neither excess nor deficiency but the medium is to act as right reason prescribes. Let us now consider what right reason is. For, in all the above mentioned habits, as in other things, there is a certain scope to which he who possesses reason, looking, acts with intention and remission. And there is a certain boundary of media which we say are situated between excess and defect and which exist conformably to right reason. Thus, to speak, however, is indeed true but is not at all clear. For, in other pursuits also, with which science is conversant, it is indeed true to say that it is not proper to labor either more or less, nor to be indolent, but to labor moderately and as right reason prescribes. He, however, who alone knows this will know nothing more, as if on inquiring what kind of things are to be administered to the body, it should be said that they are such as medicine and he who possesses the medical art prescribe. Hence, it is necessary, with respect to the habits of the soul, that this should not only be truly said, but that it should also be definitely shown what right reason is and what is the definition of it. But we have distributed the virtues of the soul and have said that some of them are ethical and others dynoetical or belonging to the discursive power of the soul. With respect to the ethical virtues, therefore, we have indeed discussed them, but with respect to the remaining virtues these we shall discuss after we have first spoken concerning the soul. It has, therefore, been before observed by us that there are two parts of the soul that which possesses reason and that which is irrational, but now we shall make a division after the same manner of the part which possesses reason, and it must be admitted that there are two parts possessing reason, one indeed by which we survey those kinds of beings, the principles of which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, and the other by which we survey things of a contingent nature. For since the objects of knowledge are specifically different, it follows that there are also different species of knowledge, for it is necessary that knowledge should be similar to the thing known, and that the knowledge of that which is necessary should be necessary, but contingent of that which is contingent. For, all knowledge subsists according to similitude and affinity. Since it is a certain adaptation and contact of that which is known, and that which knows. But, of these parts of the soul, the one is called scientific, but the other, rashiocinative. For, to consult and reason are the same thing. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, so that the rashiocinative power is one certain part of the rational part of the soul. It must, therefore, be shown what is the best habit of each of these. For this is the virtue of each, but virtue is referred to its proper work. Chapter 2 There are, however, three things in the soul which have dominion over action and truth. Viz, sense, intellect, and appetite. But, of these, sense is the principle of no one action, which is evident from this, that roots have, indeed, sense, but have no communion with action, so as to have dominion over it. What, however, affirmation and negation are in the discourse of energy of the rational part, that pursuit and avoidance are in appetite. Hence, since ethical virtue is a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, but deliberate choice is an appetite adapted to consultation. Hence, it is necessary that reason should be true, and the appetite right, if the deliberate choice is good, and that the one should assert, and the other pursue the same things. This discourse of energy of the soul, therefore, by which we judge that something is to be desired is practical reason, and practical truth. But of the discourse of energy of reason, which is contemplative, and neither practical nor effective, the good and the evil are truth and falsehood. For, this is the work of the whole of the discourse of power. The work, however, of the practical, and at the same time, discourse of energy of reason is truth subsisting in concord with right appetite. The principle, therefore, of action, whence motion is derived is deliberate choice, though this principle is not the final cause of action. But appetite, and that reason which is for the sake of something, or which is directed to the final cause, are the principles of deliberate choice. Hence, deliberate choice is not without intellect, and the discourse of energy of reason, nor is it without the ethical habit. For good conduct, and the contrary to it in action, are not without the discourse of energy of reason and manners. The discourse of energy, however, of reason itself, does not move anything, except that which is for the sake of something, and is practical, since this has dominion over that which is effective. For, everyone who affects anything does it for the sake of something, and that which is affected is not simply the end, but is a relative, and pertains to something, though this is not the case with that which is practicable. For, good conduct is the end of action, but appetite is directed to the end. Hence, deliberate choice is either erectic intellect, or appetite possessing a discourse of energy, and man is a principle of this kind. Nothing, however, that has been done is an object of deliberate choice. Thus, for instance, no one deliberately chooses to subvert Troy. For neither does anyone deliberate about what is past, but about that which is future and contingent, but it is not possible that what has been done should not be done. Hence, Agatho says rightly, quote, all things to God are possible but one, that to undo which is already done. Close quote. Of both the intellective parts, therefore, the work is truth. Hence, those habits according to which each of these parts enunciates the truth are the virtues of both. Chapter 3 Assuming, therefore, a more elevated exordium, let us again speak concerning these virtues. Let, therefore, the habits by which the soul enunciates truth in affirming or denying be five in number. But these are art, science, prudence, wisdom, and intellect. For, it is possible that both hypolepsis and opinion may assert what is false. What science, therefore, is will be from hence evident if it is necessary to investigate accurately and not to follow similitudes. For, all of us are of opinion that it is not possible for that which we know scientifically to subsist otherwise than it does. But, with respect to things which may subsist otherwise of these, when they are out of our view, we are ignorant, whether they exist or not. The object of scientific knowledge, therefore, is from necessity. Hence, it is eternal. For all beings which are simply from necessity are eternal. But things eternal are without generation and incorruptible. Again, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object of scientific knowledge may be obtained by discipline. But, all doctrine is produced from things previously known, as we have said in the analytics. For, it partly subsists through induction, and partly from syllogism. Induction, therefore, is indeed a principle, and the principle of universal, but syllogism is from universal. The principles, therefore, from which syllogism consists are things of which there is no syllogism. Hence, they are obtained by induction. Science, therefore, is indeed a demonstrative habit and such other things as we have added to the definition of it in the analytics. For, when a man believes that a thing is after a certain manner, and the principles of it are known to him, he has a scientific knowledge of that thing. For if the principles are not more known to him, then the conclusion, he will have a scientific knowledge from accident. Let these things, therefore, be admitted concerning science. Chapter 4 Of that, however, which may subsist otherwise than it does, or which has a various subsistence and is contingent, there is something which is effective and something which is practicable. But, production and action differ. Credibility, however, may be obtained concerning these things from exoteric discussions, so that the practic habit, in conjunction with reason, is different from the effective, or productive habit in conjunction with reason. And neither are they contained by each other, for neither is action affection, nor is affection action. But, since the building art is a habit effective in conjunction with reason, and neither is there any art which is not a habit effective in conjunction with reason, nor any such habit which is not art, art and habit, effective in conjunction with true reason will be the same. All art, however, is conversant with generation, and machinates, and contemplates in order that something may be produced which is capable either of existing or non-existing, and of which the principle is in the maker but not in the thing made. For art neither belongs to things which necessarily are or are necessarily generated, nor to things which have a natural subsistence, for these contain in themselves the principle. Since, however, production and action are different, it is necessary that art should pertain to production, but not to action. And, after a certain manner, fortune and art are conversant with the same things, as also Agatha says, quote, art fortune loves, and fortune art. Close quote. Art, therefore, as we have said is a certain habit, effective in conjunction with true reason, but the privation of art on the contrary, or the inartificial habit, is a habit effective in conjunction with false reason, about that which may have a various subsistence. Chapter 5 With respect to prudence, we shall apprehend what it is if we survey who those are whom we denominate prudent persons. It appears, therefore, to be the province of a prudent man to be able to consult well about things which are good and advantageous to him, not partially as about what contributes to health or strength, but about what universally contributes to a happy life. But, this is indicated by our calling men prudent about anything, when they reason well with a view to some worthy end in things in which there is no art, so that, in short, he who is adapted to consultation will be a prudent man. No one, however, consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things which it is impossible for him to perform. Hence, if science indeed subsists in conjunction with demonstration, but of those things of which the principles may have a very subsistence, of these there is no demonstration. For all these are contingent, and if it is not possible to consult about things which subsist from necessity, prudence will neither be science nor art. It will not be science because that which is practicable may have a very subsistence, and it will not be art because the genus of action is different from the genus of production. It remains, therefore, that it is a true habit in conjunction with reason, practical about human good and evil. For the end of production, indeed, is different from the production. But the end of action is not always different from action. Hence, we are of opinion that pericles and such like persons are prudent men because they are able to survey what is good for themselves and for mankind. And we also think that economists and politicians are persons of this description. Hence, also, we call temperance by this name as preserving prudence. But it preserves an opinion of this kind. For the delectable and the painful do not corrupt or distort every opinion such as that a triangle has or has not angles equal to to right, but those opinions which pertain to what is practicable. For the principles, indeed, of practicable things are those things for the sake of which they are performed. But to him who is corrupted through pleasure or pain the principle is not immediately apparent. Nor does he perceive that for the sake of this and through this it is necessary to choose and perform all things. For vice is destructive of the principle. Hence, it is necessary that prudence should be a habit in conjunction with true reason, practical about human good. Moreover, of art, indeed, there is a virtue. But of prudence, there is not. And in art, indeed, he who voluntarily errs is to be preferred to him who errs involuntarily. But in prudence, he who voluntarily errs is a subordinate character in the same manner as in the virtues. It is evident, therefore, that prudence is a certain virtue and not art. But since there are two parts of the rational soul, prudence will be the virtue of the doxastic part for both opinion and prudence are conversant with that which may have a various subsistence. Nor yet is prudence a habit alone in conjunction with reason of which this is an indication that there may be an oblivion of such a habit, i.e. it may be lost through oblivion but there cannot be of prudence. Chapter 6 Since, however, science is an assent to universals in things which have necessary subsistence. But there are principles of things demonstrable and of every science. For science is accompanied with reason. This being the case, there will neither be science nor art nor prudence of the principle of the object of science. For the object of science is demonstrable. But art and prudence are conversant with things which may have a various subsistence. Neither, therefore, will wisdom be that through which this principle is known. For it is the province of a wise man to have demonstration about certain things. Hence, if the habits by which we annunciate the truths and are never deceived about things which cannot or which can have a various subsistence, are science and prudence, wisdom and intellect but no one of these three can be the habit by which we know principles but by the three, i.e. prudence, wisdom and science it remains that intellect by which principles are known. Chapter 7 We attribute, however, wisdom in the arts to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts. Thus we say that Phidias was a wise sculptor and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here, therefore, we signify nothing else by wisdom than that it is the virtue of art. But in short we think that certain persons are wise not partially and that they are not anything else than wise men. As Homer says in his Margites quote the gods nor minor him nor ploughman made nor wise in anything beside close quote so that it is evident that wisdom will be the most accurate of the sciences. Hence it is necessary that the wise man should not only know those things which are inferred from principles or the conclusions of scientific reasoning but that he should also perceive and enunciate the truth about principles themselves. Wisdom, therefore, will be intellect and science and will possess as a head or summit the science of the most honorable things i.e. of divine natures. For it would be absurd for anyone to fancy that the political science or prudence is a thing of all others the most excellent unless man is the best thing the world contains. If, however, what is salubrious and good is to man one thing and another to fishes but that which is white and that which is straight are always the same all men will acknowledge that a wise man is the same but the prudent man is a mutable character. For they will say that the being is prudent who surveys what is excellent in particulars according to the nature of each and to him they will commit these particulars. Hence also they say that some brutes are prudent vis such as appear to have a providential power about what pertains to their life. It is evident, however, that the political science and wisdom are not the same. For, if it should be said that wisdom is that which is conversant with what is useful to mankind there will be many kinds of wisdom. Since there is not one science which is conversant with the good of all animals but a different science is conversant with a different good unless indeed there is one medical science which extends to all beings. Nor is it of any consequence if it should be said that man is the most excellent of all other animals. For there are many animals naturally more divine than man such as those most apparent beings from which the world is composed. From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that wisdom is the science and intellect of things most honorable by nature. Hence, the multitudes say that Anaxagoras and Thales and such like persons were indeed wise but not prudent men in consequence of perceiving that they were ignorant of what was advantageous to them with respect to a corporeal life. And they say that they knew indeed things superfluous and admirable, difficult and divine but which are useless because they did not investigate human good. Prudence, however, is conversant with human affairs and with those things which are the subjects of consultation. For, we say that this is especially the work of a prudent man to consult well, but no one consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things of which there is not a certain end and this practical good. He, however, simply consults well who conjectures by a reasoning process what is best to man among practicable things, nor is prudence only directed to universals but it is also necessary that it should know particulars, for it is practical, but action is conversant with particulars. Hence also, some persons who have only experimental knowledge without science are more adapted for practical affairs than those who possess a scientific knowledge without experience. For, he who knows that light flesh is easily concocted but is ignorant that flesh is light will not produce health, but he will rather produce it who knows that the flesh of birds is light and salubrious. Prudence, however, is practical so that it is necessary to possess both. Viz, a knowledge of what is to be done universally and in particular circumstances, or rather the latter than the former. But prudence here also, i.e. among the practical powers will be a certain architectonic power, or a power belonging to a master art. Chapter 8 The political science, however, and prudence are indeed the same habit, though they have not the same essence. But, of the science pertaining to a city, the one part which is legislative is, as it were, architectonic prudence, but the other in the same manner as particulars is denominated by a common name, the political science. This, however, is practical and occupied in consultation, for a decree is a thing practicable as the extreme. Hence, those alone who possess the political science are said to act in a political capacity, for they alone act in the same manner as manual artificers. That also appears to be especially prudence which a man employs about himself and about one thing, and this is called by a common name, prudence. But, of these species of prudence, the one is economy, another, legislation, and another, the political science. And, of this last, one part pertains to consultation, but another is judicial. For a man, therefore, to know his own concerns will be one species of knowledge. Nevertheless, it possesses a great difference, and he who knows things pertaining to himself and is conversant with them appears to be a prudent man, but those who apply themselves to the management of public affairs are busily employed in a multitude of concerns. Hence also, Euripides says, quote, how can the name of wise to me belong, who might have mingled in the marshals wrong, and vexed with business and exempt from care, taking of spoils my honourable share, yet chose by anxious thought to move the direful hate of all commanding Jove. Close quote. For these men explore what is good for themselves, and are of opinion that it is necessary to do this. From this opinion, therefore, it comes to pass that these men are prudent, though perhaps it is not possible for a man to know his own concerns without economic and political prudence. Again, how a man ought to manage his own affairs is a manifest, and requires consideration. But, as an indication of the truth of what has been said, a youth may become a geometrician, and a mathematician, and may be skilled in things of this kind, but it does not appear that he will be prudent. The cause, however, of this is that prudence pertains to particulars, which become known from experience, but youth is without experience, which is produced by length of time. Since this also deserves to be considered, why a boy may become a mathematician, but cannot be wise, or a physiologist? Shall we say it is because mathematical objects subsist by an ablation from matter, but the principles of the objects of wisdom and physiology are derived from experience? And with respect to metaphysical principles, indeed, youth do not believe in, but admit them. But with respect to mathematical principles, it is not a manifest what they are. Farther still, error in consultation either pertains to universals or particulars, for in order that a man may not drink heavy, and therefore bad water, it is requisite that he should know either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular water is heavy. But it is evident that prudence is not science, for it pertains to the extreme, as we have before served, since that which is practicable is a thing of this kind. It is, therefore, indeed opposed to intellect, for intellect is conversant with terms, i.e. universals, which are the extremes upward, and above which there are no other principles. But prudence is conversant with the extremes downward, which are particulars of which there is no science, but only a sensible perception, and this is not a sensible perception of peculiarities, but such as that by which we perceive in mathematics that a triangle is the extreme, for we stop there. It is, therefore, rather this sense which is prudence, but of that there is another species. Chapter 9 To investigate, however, and to consult, differ, for to consult is to investigate something, but it is necessary to discuss good consultation and show what it is, whether it is a certain science, or opinion, or good conjecture, or some other genus. It is not therefore science, for men do not investigate about things which they know, but good consultation is a certain consultation, and he who consults investigates and reasons. Neither is it good conjecture, for good conjecture is without reasoning, and is something which is accomplished with celerity, but men consult for a long time, and say that the objects of consultation ought to be performed rapidly, but that consultation should be done slowly. Again, sagacity and good consultation also differ from each other, but sagacity is a certain good conjecture. Neither, therefore, is any good consultation opinion, but since he who consults badly airs, but he who consults well consults rightly, it is evident that good consultation is a certain rectitude. Nor is good consultation either science or opinion. For of science, indeed, there is no rectitude, because there is no error. But truth is the rectitude of opinion, and at the same time, everything of which there is an opinion is definite and determined. Nevertheless, good consultation is not without reasoning. It falls short therefore, of diagnosis, or the discursive energy of reason. For this is not yet enunciation, since opinion is not investigation, but is now a certain enunciation. He, however, who consults whether he consults well or ill, investigates something, and reasons. But, good consultation is a certain rectitude of consultation. On which account, it must in the first place be inquired what consultation is, and with what it is conversant. Since, however, rectitude is multifariously predicated, it is evident that not every rectitude is good consultation. For, the incontinent and the bad man obtain from reasoning that which they propose to see, so that they will have consulted rightly, but have procured for themselves a great evil. But to have consulted well appears to be a certain good. For such a rectitude of consultation as becomes the mean of obtaining good, is good consultation. Good, however, may be obtained by false reasoning, and a man indeed may obtain that which ought to be done, yet not through a proper medium, but the middle term may be false. Hence, neither will that be good consultation according to which that is obtained which ought to be obtained, yet not through a proper medium. Further still, it is possible that one man may obtain the object of his wishes by consulting for a long time, but another by consulting rapidly. Hence, neither is that yet good consultation, but the rectitude which subsists according to utility, and to what is proper, and as and when it is proper. Again, it is possible simply to consult well, and also with a view to a certain end. Good consultation, therefore, simply is that which proceeds with rectitude to an end simply. But a certain good consultation is that which proceeds with rectitude to a certain end. Hence, if to consult well is the province of prudent men, good consultation will be a rectitude according to utility with a view to a certain end, of which prudence is the true hypothesis. Chapter 10 Intelligence, however, and the privation of intelligence according to which we denominate men intelligent or unintelligent is neither wholly the same with our opinion. For, if it were, all men would be intelligent. Nor is intelligence some one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, for it would be conversant with health, or geometry, for it would be conversant with magnitudes. For neither is intelligence conversant with things which always are, and are immovable, nor with things which are passing into existence, but with those which may be the subject of doubt and consultation. Hence, it is conversant with the same things as prudence. Yet intelligence and prudence are not the same. For prudence, indeed, is of a commanding nature. For the end of it is, what ought or what ought not to be done. But intelligence is alone of a judiciary nature. For intelligence is the same as right intelligence, since intelligent men are also rightly intelligent. Intelligence, however, is neither the possession nor the acquisition of prudence. But, as he who learns is said to understand what he learns when he uses science. The like also takes place in the use of opinion in forming a judgment of those things with which prudence is conversant, and judging of them well when another person is speaking. For what is well is the same with what is beautifully done, and hence the name intelligence was derived according to which men are said to be rightly intelligent. Viz, from intelligence in learning. For, we frequently use the verb to learn as equivalent to the verb to understand. Chapter 11 But what is called upright decision, according to which we say that men decide rightly, is the right judgment of the equitable man. As an indication of this, however, we say that the equitable man is especially inclined to pardon others, and that it is equitable to pardon certain things. But pardon is an upright judiciary decision of the equitable man, and the decision is upright, which is made by a man observant of truth. All these habits, however, reasonably tend to the same thing. For, we speak of upright decision, intelligence, prudence, and intellect with reference to the same persons when we say that they are men of upright decision, are endowed with intellect, are prudent, and intelligent. For all these powers pertain to the extremes downward, and to particulars, and an intelligent man, and one who decides rightly, or a man disposed to pardon, will be one who possesses a judiciary power about things with which the prudent man is conversant. For things of an equitable nature are common to all good men, in their intercourse with others. Everything, however, of a practicable nature pertains to particulars, and the downward extremes. For it is necessary that a prudent man should have a knowledge of these, and intelligence and equitable decision are conversant with things of a practicable nature. But these are extremes, and intellect pertains both to the upward and downward extremes. For intellect, and not the discursive energy of reason, is conversant with both first and last terms, i.e. with universal principles. The one indeed, i.e. the intellect, which is the principle of the demonstrative sciences, is conversant with immutable and first terms, but the intellect which is occupied in practical affairs, or which is the principle of prudence, is conversant with the extreme, and with that which is contingent, and the other proposition. For these are the principles of that for the sake of which a thing is done, or the final cause. For universal is from particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have a sensible perception, but this is the practical intellect. Hence, these habits appear to be natural, and no one indeed is wise by nature, but everyone possesses naturally the power of deciding rightly, together with intelligence and intellect. But, as an indication of this, we are of opinion that these habits are attendance on the ages of the life of men, and we say that this age, i.e. old age, possesses intellect and upright decision, as if nature were the cause of this. Hence, also, intellect is both the principle and the end. For, from these demonstrations are framed, and with these they are conversant. Hence, in practical affairs, it is no less necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of elderly or prudent men. Then, to demonstrations. For, in consequence of possessing an eye from experience, they perceive the principles of things of a practicable nature, and thus we have shown what wisdom and prudence are, and with what particulars each is conversant, and that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul. Chapter 12. Someone, however, may doubt concerning these in what their utility consists. For wisdom, indeed, contemplates none of those things from which man will obtain philosophy. Since it is not conversant with anything which is in generation, or which is becoming to be, or passing into existence. But prudence, indeed, does consider those things from which human felicity is derived. Yet, on what account is it necessary that it should, since prudence is conversant with just and beautiful things, and which are good to man? We do not, however, become at all more practically virtuous by these things. Since the virtues are habits, as neither are things said to be salubrious, or to conduce to a good habit of body because they have an act of power, but because they proceed from habit. For we are not at all more practical from possessing the medical or gymnastic art. But, if a man is not to be considered as prudent for the sake of these things, but for the sake of becoming worthy, they will not be at all useful to those who are worthy. Again, neither will prudence be useful to those who are not worthy for it is of no consequence whether they are prudent, or are persuaded by others that are. Since this will be sufficient in the same manner as in what pertains to health, for when we wish to be well, we do not at the same time learn the medical art. To which we may add, that it will appear to be absurd that prudence, which is subordinate to wisdom, should possess a greater authority, for that which is effective governs and presides in everything. These things, therefore, must be discussed, for now the doubt is concerning them alone. In the first place, therefore, we say that these virtues, wisdom and prudence, are necessarily eligible per se, since they are the virtues of each part of the soul, though neither of them should affect anything. In the next place, they do indeed affect something, yet not in the same manner as medicine produces health, but as health produces the energies of a good habit of body. Thus also wisdom produces felicity. For, being a part of the whole of virtue, by the possession and the energy of it, it renders a man happy. Further still, the work is accomplished by prudence and ethical virtue, for virtue renders the scope proposed by the agent right, but prudence gives rectitude to things which tend to the scope. A virtue, however, of this kind, does not belong to the fourth, or a nutritive part of the soul, because its energies are not in our power, nor irrational, either essentially or by participation. But with respect to our not being at all more adapted to the practice of things beautiful and just, through prudence, in answer to this objection, we must begin a little higher, assuming the following principle. For, as we say that certain persons who perform just things are not yet just, such as those who do what is ordered by the laws, either unwillingly, or from ignorance, or from some other cause, and not on account of the things themselves, though they do those things which ought to be done, and such as a worthy man ought to do. Thus also, as it seems, it is possible to do everything with a certain disposition of mind, so as to be a good man. I mean, for instance, that it is possible to do everything with which virtue is concerned, from deliberate choice, and for the sake of the things which are done. Virtue, therefore, produces a right deliberate choice, but it is not the business of virtue, but of some other power to render the deliberate choice disposed to embrace what truly contributes to the end. It is requisite, however, to speak more clearly on this subject. There is, therefore, a certain power which is called skill, but this is a power of such a kind that, by its assistance, those things may be performed and obtained which contribute to the proposed scope. And if, indeed, the scope is beautiful, this power is laudable. But, if the scope is bad, this power becomes craft. On which account also, we say that prudent men are skillful, and not crafty. Prudence, however, is not this power, yet does not subsist without it. But habit is not acquired by this eye of the soul without virtue. As we have said, end is evident. For, the syllogisms of practical affairs rank as a principle. Since the end is a thing of this kind, and that which is best, whatever it may be. Let the end, for instance, be something casual, but this is not apparent except to a good man. For, depravity distorts the judgment, and produces deception about the practical principles. Hence, it is evident that it is impossible for anyone to be a prudent, unless he is a good man. Chapter 13 Again, therefore, let us direct our attention to virtue. For, as prudence is not the same, indeed, but is similar to sagacity, thus also, natural virtue subsists similarly, with reference to that which is properly so called. For, the several manners appear to all men to subsist in a certain respect naturally, since we are just and temperate and brave, and possess the other virtues immediately from our birth. At the same time, however, we investigate something else, as that which is properly good, and are of opinion that such like virtues are inherent after another manner. For, the physical habits are inherent in children and brutes, but they are seen to be noxious without intellect. Thus much, indeed, is apparent that, as it happens that a strong body, which is moved without sight, very much appears in its motions, and consequence of being deprived of sight, this, likewise, is the case here, with respect to the physical virtues. But, if the possessor of these virtues obtains intellect also, he will excel in his actions. The habit, however, being similar, will then be properly virtue. Hence, as in the doxastic part of the soul, or that part which is characterized by opinion, there are two species, skill and prudence. Thus also, in the ethical part, there are two species, one of which is physical virtue, but the other is virtue properly so-called, and of these, virtue properly so-called is not without prudence. Hence, it is said that all the virtues are prudence, and Socrates, indeed, investigated partly with rectitude and partly with error. For, because he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he aired, but it is well said by him that the virtues are not without prudence. But, as an indication of this, all men now, when they define virtue, add to the definition habit, and that they energize according to right reason. And right reason is that which subsists according to prudence. All men, therefore, appear in a certain respect to prophesy that a habit of this kind which subsists according to prudence is virtue. It is necessary, however, to change in a small degree the definition for not only a habit according to right reason, but also a habit in conjunction with right reason is virtue. But prudence is right reason energizing about things of this kind. Socrates, therefore, thought that the virtues, indeed, were reasons, because all of them are sciences, but we think that they subsist in conjunction with reason. Hence, it is evident, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be a good man, properly without prudence, nor a prudent man without ethical virtue. After this manner, also, the reasoning may be dissolved, by which someone may contend that the virtues are separated from each other. For, the same person is not naturally well adapted to all the virtues. Hence, he has now obtained this, but not yet that virtue. For this may, indeed, happen according to the physical virtues, but it is not possible in those virtues according to which a man is said to be simply a good man. For all the virtues are present, at the same time that prudence, which is one virtue, is present. But it is evident that though prudence were not a practical thing, it would be necessary, because it is the virtue of a part of the soul, and because deliberate choice will not be right without prudence, nor without virtue. For one of these is the end, but the other causes us to do things which contribute to the end. Prudence, however, neither has dominion over wisdom, nor over the better part of the soul, as neither has the medical science dominion over health. For, it does not use health, but considers how it may be obtained. It prescribes, therefore, for the sake of health, but has no dominion over it. Again, to say that prudence rules over wisdom is just as if someone should say that the political science rules over the gods, because it considers everything which is done in the city. End of Book 6 Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards