 And so if you say it's alphabetical, you can start with, you can start reverse alphabet, you say Z, or you can start forward alphabet and B. So I think it's gonna be you, it's big. So why don't we start with you and then I'll turn to Brett. Just to give you a reaction to this, and you've been watching this region for so many years, you've talked about the arc of instability, you've looked at the geopolitics of this region coming together, just your insights at this point. Well, what we see here is obviously a series of potentially important geopolitical rivalries developing. It's not, in my view, so much a matter of connectivity between the Far East and the West, sort of one new entity emerging because of the Silk Route, but it's more a matter of determining which way that central space between contemporary Russia and China evolves. And the early indications, I think, are meaningful. They suggest to me that what we are witnessing is, in fact, the progressive expansion of Chinese influence, benign, cooperative, but obviously self-serving. It is also interesting to note that that occurs in a context in which the current Russian leadership under Mr. Putin has very vigorously embraced the idea of the Eurasian Union, Eurasian Union into which he's trying to engage not only the Central Asian states, but the newly independent post-Soviet states in the West, notably Belarus and Ukraine, neither of which wants to be part of that union because they understand what it means. The Central Asians are more vulnerable because they're much more still dependent on Russian support economically, but it's rather striking that the very imaginative and skillful political leader of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, has recently come out with a very subtle suggestion by the meaningful one, that the Eurasian Union, which he favors, he said, be called the economic Eurasian Union. Very subtle, but rather important difference. And I don't see yet any sign that Putin is embracing it with great enthusiasm. This very interesting presentation showed us how the president of China, President Xi, has recently become engaged in this process. And it's interesting that there is now a series of Chinese statements, which I brought with me, but I wasn't quite sure how it went up right here, that indicate that this is explicitly a strategy of theirs. The Westward movement is a Chinese strategy, and the Chinese rationalize it by the argument one. It is good for everyone concerned. The new Central Asian countries can develop more stably. That's good for Russia. It avoids problems for the Russians. It helps China, obviously, because it expands its scope of access to natural resources. And, of course, it establishes a Chinese presence. In addition to that, they say, it avoids a head-on rivalry with the United States. China cannot compete with the United States strategically, pointing towards the sea, because the United States is too well entrenched through alliances and Navy presence and so forth to permit that to happen. The West for China is open for a policy of friendship, accommodation, expansion, growing influence, and, of course, that means strategic preponderance eventually. However, they add in their statements quite explicitly that this strategy avoids a collision with Russia, because China is not competing with Russia for political influence. China is simply expanding its economic ties with Central Asia, and they leave the rest of the sentence unstated, which, of course, means, yes, we are going to be preeminent economically in the relationship. We will be the clearly decisive partner for these states, but we will avoid a head-on collision with the Russians. So it's a win-win situation from their point of view, and they're quite explicit on that. I think in these circumstances, the odds favor the Chinese, clearly. The Russian economy is not in a position to compete. It cannot engage in the kind of contractual relationships with the Central Asian countries. It still has some advantage over the Chinese in that it provides more employment for surplus labor from Central Asia, which goes to Moscow and some other centers, urban centers in Russia, but there's a downside to that. That breeds social tensions, and a phobia among the Russians, and creates complications of a political sort with the Central Asian countries, which in turn benefits, so to speak, indirectly the Chinese. So I see this presentation less as kind of reconnecting Eurasia as a whole, but more as a regional shift in which the Chinese now can use the assets that they possess, peacefully, non-violently, in a manner which makes it difficult to oppose them, and their strategic significance. Brent, let me turn to you. As usual, I agree with most everything that's big as head. I think the notion of the New Silk Road is quite an exaggeration, but it's understandable. There is a reopening of sorts of the greater economies now from rail routes than before, and so they are sort of economically competitive, but the notion that the Silk Road is still driven by the things that it was a thousand years ago, or 2,000 years ago, I think it's a mistake. But I think we have to look at the motives of China and Russia to see what is really driving this, and it's not really silk-oriented. The Chinese, it is raw materials. The Chinese are almost paranoid about the sudden shift, in historical terms, sudden shift from being self-sufficient in almost everything, including petroleum, iron, or all of these things, to being importers, and it frightens them because they have this instinct for self-sufficiency. And so the Central Asian countries are not first. Look at Africa. Look at what China has been doing in Africa. Building plantations, doing this, doing the other. What for? To occupy it? No. Raw materials. And that's what I think their goal is, and it's primarily, it's Silk Road in the sense that initially one of the biggest raw material providers was Kazakhstan, which is on the west side of it. And so China has been interested in oil pipelines and so on there to make Kazakhstan dependent on China, I think, much less than China looking for self-sufficiency again or secure sufficiency in its raw materials. Russia is almost the polar opposite. Russia controlled this territory for a long, long time. And there are really two potential Silk Roads. One is the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the other is through the south. Now, the Russians have never been much interested in opening either one of them to world trade. And that's one of the reasons it's never developed. They have not, the Trans-Siberian has been there forever. It still is a rickety old transportation system which could have been modernized and built into an efficient system a long time ago. They weren't interested in that because they didn't want, on my senses, they didn't want that kind of penetration inside the old Soviet Union that would have entailed. Then the Soviet Union breaks up under Yeltsin. Now, the instinct of Putin is to recreate that unit in whatever ways he can. Again, it's not basically economically driven. To me, it is he thinks it was a real mistake to let the Soviet Union collapse. It should have been kept together and he is doing whatever he can, as Big says, not only here but in Eastern Europe, to strengthen the bonds and to try to hold the system together. He is a reactionary leader in the sense that he, he knows he can't recreate the Soviet Union but he is doing what he can to keep it the way it is. Therefore, he is not interested in the Silk Road. He is interested in the kind of control that an economic union would give him. And the rudiments are there because all of the routes for centuries have gone from Central Asia into Russia, not East and West. So, to me, that's the kind of struggle now to put a Silk Road name on it is taking an interesting and, to me, very attractive, just the history of the Silk Road under all of its different manifestations, whether it's the Mongol invasion, which made it all possible, the rise of the Persian Empire, the rise of the Ottoman Empire, all these things have transformed it over and over again. But I think the Russian attitude and the Chinese attitude are very, very different. Now, to me, one of the best examples is Nazarbayev. I first met Nazarbayev when he was the chairman of the Kazakhstan People's Republic of the Soviet Union. And he came to visit me and he was extolling at that time when the Soviet Union was still the Soviet Union, the raw materials advantages of better contact with Kazakhstan. And he's an entrepreneur in his own distorted sort of way. And that's what he is trying to develop. Kazakhstan is rich in raw materials from petroleum resources to nuclear resources. And it makes it very attractive for him to market. But I think we need to be, we need to look at the broader sense, the historic interest of these countries. And it's not simply to who gets more trade or who gets more political influence. It's both. And the driving factors are different from Moscow to Beijing. Okay, thank you. That's how I thought it was going to be just terrific. Now, everybody grab your little clicker because we're going to test out the system. I'm going to ask a couple of questions and to see if you can read. We're going to ask a couple of questions. Let's go to the first. Have you personally visited China? Yes or no? And if somebody hits D, E, or F, then we'll go out to remedial camp outside. So just give us a good vote. So we just have a sense. Which is yes. Okay, roughly half and half. Which is yes and which is yes. The first one is yes. So about 49% have been to China? That's not 50. No, not. Okay, let's hear it. Not 51. Okay, people. All right. Okay. So you couldn't get more evenly divided than that. Okay, let's go to the next chart. Who has personally visited the Russia Far East? Not Russia, but the Russia Far East. Where's my clicker? Okay, that doesn't surprise me either. That's overwhelmingly people know maybe Russia in the European Russia, but they don't know the Asian Russia. Okay, let's go to the next chart. How many of you personally visited any of the Central Asian Republics? Any. That's interesting. That's really interesting. I hadn't thought that we would have a third. This is an interesting change. That's a surprise. Good, okay. Earlier in the presentation, Andy mentioned the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I don't know how many people here know about it. Chris, let me ask you just to say a word about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Just so we all get grounded on it. Yeah, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was initially founded as the Shanghai Five in 1996 where we had all the Central Asian Republics, Russia and China participating except for Uzbekistan. And then in 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group in 2002. They met in St. Petersburg, Russia and signed the charter. And since then, of course, they've been having the annual meetings. I think from a Chinese perspective, what has been one of the strong limitations of the scope thus far has been the heavy emphasis on security, anti-terrorism, that sort of element to the relationship. And I just want to echo what both Dr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft said with regard to how China, what we're seeing in the last month or two and certainly from Xi Jinping's visit is a real reorientation of at least the rhetoric of what China is looking to do out there. And I think to some degree we're seeing this across the board from the Chinese perspective as well in that what they're doing is taking advantage of Chinese companies that have been operating in the region for some time and trying to apply some grand strategic design to it. Obviously implementation and follow-through will be the key there. And Andy, you mentioned in the presentation that Russia has been trying to organize some economic unions. So it started back in 2003. Do you just want to give a little summary for everyone here? Sure. Maybe just another word about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I mean, it grew out of the border discussions between the three Central Asian Republics Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia and China that were involved in the final resolution of that long Sino-Soviet border. And I think that Russia and China have had different visions with the organization with Russia emphasizing more security issues and China emphasizing more economic issues within the organization. And I think it's the differences in their visions that have prevented the organization maybe from developing and doing as much as it could possibly be doing. Now, John's absolutely right. The Russians have had a number of different projects over the last decade or so to promote economic integration in the region. There was the Eurasian Economic Community, which was what spawned from that then was the common economic space and more importantly the Customs Union. The Customs Union was established in July of 2010 and the founding three members are Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. And Mr. Putin and the Russians have been trying to recruit, seduce, convince, intimidate others to have an interest in joining. An interesting development for example was in September Armenian leader Sarkisian went to Moscow and after Armenia really hadn't expressed much of an interest in being a member of the Customs Union and suddenly it was announced that they did want to become a member of the Customs Union after that visit. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two of the smaller countries in Central Asia have also expressed an interest. The big prize of course is Ukraine and we have a big meeting for the EU and Vilnius coming up later this month and it's likely that Ukraine will sign an association agreement with the EU and will preference the European Union over the Customs Union and that will be a big blow to the Customs Union. I'd say that there are, one hears different kind of visions of the Customs Union. One, well Hillary Clinton described it as an effort to sort of re-Sovietize the region. It's not really that but I think it is an effort led by the Russians to try to take advantage of the economic links that broke down after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now one of the problems with that is that those economic links were all made under non-market conditions so actually how viable are those links under market conditions is a question. It's also been described as an effort to actually raise the norms and standards of all of the members of the Customs Union actually to European levels or to promote their accession to the WTO. There may be an element to that. We'll see how it develops in the future. I think there's a lot of bargaining going on between the members and potential members of the Union and it's not, if Russia tries to use excessive sticks as opposed to carrots in the development of the Union it's really not going to work I think. Let me just so that people have heard this. This is a region that's been caught between two big countries with very different imperial traditions and the Russian imperial tradition is trying to create a structure and the Chinese imperial tradition is really creating transactional engagement. It's very profoundly diverse. I'm going to ask a couple of questions here and again get your clickers. Let's go to question number Okay. How do you think the current economic and political trends will contribute to Asian integration? Economic integration continues. Political integration is resisted. B. Economic integration leads to political integration or economic integration falters. Everybody kind of cast your vote here. Let me ask you to be the first react to this. You see about well now it's about two-thirds of the big sink that economic integration will continue but it will foster resistance to political integration. I agree with that one. I'm just looking by list which I checked out this morning for these questions. That's one I checked out too. So everybody got it right? No. You know when I was a student I would have liked to have been right. Congratulations two-thirds of you. Well the others are a little more kind of catastrophic so I think A is more sensible. Brent where are you? I think A is more sensible. I'm not sure it's going to happen. I'm not sure economic integration will necessarily increase because the states of Central Asia if that's what you mean by economic integration are not drawn necessarily closer to each other but they're drawn either to Moscow or Beijing. I'm not sure any of those answers is the best one. Okay. I didn't give you a choice. So if anybody wants to be a friend of Brent's put D. Let's go to the next chart and this is which of the following do you think represents Russia's primary interest in Central Asia? Energy resources geopolitical balance offering radical Islamic forces counter-balancing China. Now obviously you'd like to push D which is all the above but I'm not going to let you. I need to get some differential. Well somebody hit D. Okay geopolitical balance as big is that your view about Russia's interests in Central Asia? Well I have to say I don't understand that point actually. Geopolitical balance between Russia and China. That doesn't make much sense to me or the geopolitical balance between Russia and China. I think it's Russia and China. Well I think that's part of it but it's also very much like D counter-balancing the influence of China. So ultimately do you want it clear and simple? I would say it's D. Everybody want to change their votes now that you've heard about it? Well there's no political control rather than balance. I don't think the Russians want balance. You've got to balance with somebody and I don't think they want balance with China. They don't want China in there. So in a sense it's D but I don't think the Russians look at it that way. They're trying to keep China out not counter-balancing. As I said and I think it tells us a great deal about his worldview that the greatest historical calamity of the 20th century was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Just think of what that sentence means. We need to remember that. World War I World War II the Cold War the horrible crimes committed and millions of people killed. No, it's the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a economic enterprise. It was a political enterprise. Ideological enterprise. Okay, let's go to the next chart which you will recognize the answers. Let's see if you have a question. The question is which do you think represents China's primary interest? Expanding markets creating favorable geopolitical balance. In other words, they'd control I guess would be the day creating a buffer against radical Islam counter-balancing the influence of Russia. None of the above. Access to raw materials. Access to raw materials? Okay, if anyone wants that, hit E. I feel like I'm at a telethon. Okay, we can get over the top. Well, you can't vote twice because it cancels your other one. Somebody's trying to cheat. Okay, that's interesting. I'll ask Ed to react to this on the energy front. Brent, do you start? Well, I think A is not generally a Chinese goal. They're not seeking moral markets. They're importers. They've got the market they want. They're not out driving to sell things around the world. And so I think A is really not an alternative. If you watch when you put an E in there it drew some from A. So I think it's access to raw materials that they're after. Ed, do you want to just say you've been in the oil business a long time and you know Central Asia better than anybody? It's all about oil and gas, according to that. Yes. I think we need a little bit more perspective than just to look at the Russia-China angle, it seems to me. I think it's a much more multifaceted game. I think we perhaps overlooked the fact that in the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed at least in the energy sphere it was Western oil companies that first went to places like Kazakhstan. And it was because at that time the West and the United States included were the ones desperately needing access to incremental supplies of oil and gas into the world market. It didn't really matter whether that oil and gas flowed to the United States or not as the major importer it was in our interest to create more supply. Well, just two months ago China replaced the United States as the largest oil importer in the world. In the in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed I was working and living in Beijing at the time China, as General Skolcroft mentioned, was still a net oil exporter at the time. Well, since 1992-1993 China has become the largest oil importer in the world and it's increasing relying on imported gas as well to supply their needs. So they have basically replaced what was our position in the 1990s in the global oil and gas world. The other factor that we should keep in mind is that unlike the old Silk Road days the Central Asian countries themselves are no longer the objects only of policy and interest but also they are themselves the subjects that can guide their own destiny. So it's really a question of in this multifaceted world and we might include India and Iran as part of that equation as well how will business be done in the oil and gas world? I think it's very interesting as part of Xi Jinping's visit President Xi Jinping's visit to Kazakhstan it was announced that a company the China National Petroleum Corporation bought into one-twelfth equity interest in the largest, at least most expensive oil field development in the world that is namely Kazigan in Kazakhstan where they will be partners with the Exxon Mobiles and the Shells and the ENIs and the totals of the world. Will business be done according to international practices? Will business be done in a peculiar Chinese way? Will all business be done in the old fashioned Russian way in this part of the world is something that's very watching. Clearly it's in our interest that it's be done with modern business practice and under international standards as I believe is in the interest of the countries of Central Asia as well, but we'll have to see and we have a stake in that game as well. Okay, let's go to the next question Will and that is, who do you think is winning the competition for influence in Central Asia? E? Help me with that one folks. It's big, I think this got to what you were saying earlier, is it? Well, I think this shows the audience is very well informed to be confident and they did listen to you. Okay, let's go to the next set of charts and this is, what do you think let's go to the next one here. What are the factors that constitute the biggest obstacles for Central Asia interior playing greater roles? Is it physical infrastructure? Human resources? Internal political institutional bureaucratic problems or security challenges? That shows the wisdom of this audience. Yeah. That's an obvious guess. I don't know what E is all the above. I think that's probably all the above people all the above here. And again, you travel a lot there and then I like each of our three experts to make a commentary about this here from your different perspectives from energy perspective, from a China perspective I think in terms of intra-regional trade, General Scowcroft is absolutely correct. The OSOVS system has collapsed and nothing has replaced it. So the kind of relationships that, for example, that Tajikistan with Uzbekistan on trading water for electricity, that system has collapsed and in some ways that's good because that was done in a very non-transparent way but nothing has been built to replace that and it really is the barriers and the tensions within the region that's causing it not to happen and anything we can do to help that regional intra-regional integration would also allow the region to play a larger role in international commerce as well. Chris? Let me make one comment on the previous question. I mean, I absolutely agree obviously that the raw materials issue is the driver but I do think it's interesting to see that we might be seeing a bit of a shift here with the new policies that we see Xi Jinping taking on. There's been a real debate in China's strategic community about whether all that economic activity needs to be nested in some sort of a larger strategic design and I think that line of thinking is starting to catch on within their system so I guess I would just temper the idea that it will remain forever solely about resources. I mean, I would just pick up on what Dr. Brzezinski said earlier with regard to the idea that they have seen that in the eastern region and toward the sea they are handicapped by U.S. alliances pre-existing conditions there and so on and it will always be difficult to the west they have a wide open playing field where the U.S. is not as highly regarded as it is to the east and so on so I think that's what's shaping and guiding their view. I think the restriction is always going to be a strong desire to kind of put their own emphasis or spin over the collective. You know, that's going to be a real limitation I think because we have all these other contrasting points of view. Andy? Well, first of all, let me say what a brilliant audience we have. You know, we did some studies here a few years ago looking at the Northern Distribution Network, new transit corridors to supply non-lethal equipment to our forces in Afghanistan. About 85 plus percent of what is supplied is non-lethal materials and it's all done through commercial carriers and one of the surprising findings I found was that you know, what was the biggest obstacle to getting material into Afghanistan? Was it the lack of physical infrastructure? There actually are no railroads, at least at that time into Afghanistan. Now there's one. No. Was it the security problems? No. What a great statistic that Transcom told me that the the loss rate of material going into Afghanistan was lower than loss rates in Bayon County, New Jersey. Now you could have selected a number of other different counties in the United States and I mean to pick on New Jersey but that's the case. It's by far in a way the internal political institutional bureaucratic problems and there are scads of reports done by the UN, the Asian Development Bank the European Bank on Reconstruction Development other institutions that this is by far in a way the biggest obstacle to materials moving and it kind of boils down to borders acting like toll booths. The problem is the question of cost and also the unpredictability of time and that's the biggest obstacle to the land transit really getting more momentum and here I think what Ed was pointing to the intraragional cooperation in Central Asia and also in the South Caucasus that is going to be so important so you see a number of states like Kazakhstan Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus even Turkmenistan kind of thinking of themselves as transit hubs partially as a way to diversify their economy over the long term and be less dependent upon the oil and gas resources. Spick, do either of the two of you want to comment on what you've just heard about this question of how the Central Asian states are themselves thinking it's kind of prejudging. Well let's go to the next chart. Isn't that the next question? Let's ask the next chart here. So where does the Central Asian states this is assuming that they're wanting to preserve political maneuver room and still take advantage of economic development where do they turn to increase their independence and autonomy? Is it possible to say to none of the above? It is. We'll let them finish voting until they find out how wrong they are. You can correct this here. Go ahead Spick, why don't you... None of the above. Look, if you are a part of the Central Asian political elite and you have been quote unquote independent now for 25 years what do you enjoy the most? Will you enjoy the most first of all the sense of independence and the perks that goes with it. You're a president, you're general, you're a minister, you're an ambassador. How many of them really want to be employees of some sort of Eurasian union with the capital in Moscow? Zilch. Secondly, you want your country to be prosperous. Well, where is the nearest source of prosperity for them? It's inevitably China. India may enter and play the role but that's going to take a long time with their geographical handicaps Iran up to a point if it rehabilitates itself and its relationship with us of some sort that's also a long road. China is there and China is being extremely careful not to give its presence a political cast a political cast. But nonetheless that presence is mounting. I went to Kyrgyzstan for the first time in my life in the 50s when I was a graduate student at Harvard. The capital of that country was not today, it's now called Bishkek. It was then called Frunze in honor of a Soviet general. And the chief, the main street in Frunze, the capital of Kyrgyzstan was called the Lengin Prospect. I was in Kyrgyzstan when I became independent the capital was called Bishkek. That street was now called the Deng Xiaoping Prospect. Tell you something. I wonder how the Russians feel when they drive on that prospect. I think that the Turks would like it to be A. They have made a major effort to try to be the presence in the region not tied to either China or Russia or the U.S. necessarily but to be an independent sort of Central Asian kind of thing. It's not working all that well. You are as knowledgeable and as close to Turkey as anybody I know. Why have they not been more successful? I think you can't reconstruct the old Ottoman Empire and that's sort of what they've been trying to do as an economic goal. There just aren't the ties left and there's not Turkey is not a commanding enough economic or geopolitical entity to make it work. That's my sense. But the Turks have been trying very hard. Yes they have. Let's make a comment about Iran in this respect. I think if we look at Iran in this equation simply from the standpoint of transit for Central Asia Iran in that regard I think is rather attractive. The straight is shot to get to the port of Chabahar, to get to the sea and get things out. And in fact actually I remember four years ago when we went down the Central Command in Tampa to talk to them about the various routes they were thinking about for the Northern Distribution Network the one that they really got a gleam in their eye about was actually going through Iran because it is the shortest route and there's actually a fair amount of infrastructure there. But of course for political reasons it wasn't really a viable option. It became less viable shortly. So I think that's something to keep in mind and I think actually on this you know the United States has a certain vision of the quote unquote Silk Road that we've been promoting and it's primarily linking Central Asia through Afghanistan Pakistan and India. Which is important for Afghan strategic reasons but I think it may be not so attractive for some reasons particularly to Central Asians you know given their experience in Afghanistan. Going back to the Soviet-Afghan war and then looking at Afghanistan they're concerned about security there. The only problem with Iran from an oil and gas standpoint for the Central Asian countries is do you really want to transit your oil and gas through a country that has even more oil and gas than you do? So it's a little bit like no, transiting all your oil and gas through Russia. So I think the answer at least in oil and gas terms for the Central Asian countries is maybe not none of the above but all of the above. As many directions for oil and gas flows that can be economically viable and there are reasons to be skeptical about the Turkmenistan Afghanistan-Pakistan-India route but at the end of the day a policy needs to be supported by real projects that are viable and can't just be a slogan. And I think this is where the United States if it really wants to build be part of building a new Silk Road or regional integration or whatever have to really focus and concentrate on economically viable project and agree that India is in very long run an end market that we should not ignore, it will take time but it is possible that we will get there if the economics are there and commercial companies are interested in pursuing them. I think if the United States was really smart we would be supporting a pipeline under the Caspian Sea to bring the oil of Central Asia through without Iran being able to block. Ambassador Umaroff, we've been talking about you all morning. Would you like to say just a word about this at this time? We've got a microphone. Very interesting discussion actually and what I think is missing here is the US policy towards the Eurasia because we are talking about other countries but what US is doing and what US are thinking about it this is one. The second thing I think I very much support the project which right now is in conceiving stage what Central Asian countries themselves think what will be their future and how they build their perspective in the future. I think this is very important and that will show probably different charts and different ways how people think in Central Asia what will be their doing. I would be very much interested in having the same kind of discussion after this kind of project will be done and then we can analyze and say what is going to be in Central Asia and Eurasia as a whole because at this point of time I think some of the charts misses some of the points and in most of them I would go for E saying that all of the issues can be critical for Central Asia and the rest of the countries. Thank you. Thank you, Baster. That wasn't scripted. He didn't know I was going to do that. But if we put E on there all the above every answer would have been all the above. So we're just trying to get a little bit of diversity of this. Well let's skip the next one and then just go to the last one. Can you do that? Is that possible? Just skip this one because I think we've basically hit this. Okay, so you asked Baster what is America's policy here so let's ask people to vote. Stay out since we don't know what the hell we're doing. Find allies and try to grow our presence. Actively promote commercial activity but keep out of politics and stay cool and let nature take its course. Well, that's interesting. I'm making you choose. That's right. I'm just trying to get a little bit of play. This is interesting. Okay. It's big. Let me start with you. Are you surprised by this? Yeah, I'm a little surprised that there are as many for B as there are on this on the screen. I thought the probability was that C and D either actively promote commercial activity for American companies which is kind of in the American spirit let's make money, let's do business and D, keep cool and let nature take its course that would be the predominant answers. Well, you know I think that C probably is the most sensible answer actually as a practical matter. We're not going to be the decisive geopolitical influence in Central Asia and in the region immediately around it. That's going to be determined by what happens in China, what happens in Russia what happens in these countries. So I think in that sense C is probably the best answer. Where would you be? D sounds pretty good to me. Which way? You know, we almost never do that. It's not our nature. Well, we never do that. And that's the course of action which usually succeeds. Nature is going to take its course anyway. So, no, but I think basically C is if we can help if we can help American business if we can do something useful I think we should. But I don't think we ought to start to mine that region for geopolitical or economic rewards. That would be a formula for failure if we were to try to pretend that we had a role in that regard. But letting our companies lead the way and help create opportunities would be a good thing for everybody. That's what we're about. We'll get some wrap up here. Andy, we'll start with you and then I'll come back to our principles here. Well, I'd like to take this question to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and hear what their response is. And my suspicion is that it's some kind of combination of B and C as well. I think we're talking about 22 years now of independence for these states in Central Asia until 9-11 for the first 10 years or so our policy was basically we tell you what we think is right for your development domestically, economically and politically and we want you to do that and we're going to help you to do that. And then 9-11 happened and our policy was basically the war in Afghanistan. Now we're pulling out of Afghanistan and so it is an opportunity to go back to the region itself and say actually what would you like to see the American role to be. I think there is a demand for some kind of role for us there. I think my suspicion is it may be more heavily economically weighted as to security weighted but I think we have to go there with very open minds what they have to say. The other thing I would conclude with is that so we talk about the pivot to Asia that we're undergoing. Well for understandable historical and cultural reasons Americans think of Asia as the Asia Pacific. Well if the Asia pivot is supposedly mostly about managing the rise of China we should keep in mind that the Chinese don't think of Asia in those terms. I mean they think about what's north of them they think about what's west of them they think about what's southwest of them and of course what's east of them what's east is probably the higher priority for sure but still it's in this kind of more 19th century British continental sense that I think the China views views its Asia and I think that it behooves us to think in terms in those terms as well. Chris? I would just like to say that I'm pleased from the China perspective I'm pleased at how balanced the discussion has been today when Xi Jinping took his trip to the region all the headlines of course were they're destroying the United States and Central Asia and so on not to speak of the Russian this is the Chinese word coming so I'm encouraged by the fact that people understand the incentives for the Chinese to move in this direction but I think there's also a good appreciation for the limits and you know a lot of what they've done out there so far is still quite aspirational and I think it will probably stay that way for some period of time because they largely understand that time is on their side with this one. Yeah? Well as a sometimes industry practitioner I'm really pleased that Xi came out ahead on this. The only thing I would say is that even Xi on the part of the US government requires an action plan. It cannot just be limited to talk of strategy of nice slogans but it actually requires identifying strategic project that would advance that policy goal and how to work with the private sector in close coordination in order to make it happen whether it's the Transcaspian pipeline that General Skograv mentioned or the TAPI pipeline that I talked about it's insufficient to give it only rhetorical support and we have to work closely with the governments in the region as well to make it happen and in fact just before I came to this meeting I had a meeting with the an official in the National Security Council staff on precisely that point of how do you actually have action steps that lead to the policy goal that the United States seem to want to have in the region? Okay we're really kind of at the end for some larger framing thoughts and Brett let me start with you how you would choose to help us think about this morning here. Well on this question if I were one of the Central Asian republics I would choose option C because it seems to me they're uneasy with an overwhelming Chinese president, they're uneasy with an overwhelming Russian president we're far enough away distant enough in every respect we'd be a nice counterbalancing entity I think that I think that's been a good discussion today I think it clarifies what a lot of people think in general terms but without really penetrating what are the elements here in the future and I would say in general I think the U.S. fundamental interest in this region is continued geopolitical independence but in making the resources of the region available for world commerce Dr. B I think what we have been talking about is on the whole positive from the U.S. point of view I think the increasing influence of China is having essentially a stabilizing effect on the region I think that will help Russia accommodate itself to these realities even though the present leadership may feel uneasy about them in some way to reverse them I think it may help to create wider economic independence because of the access, the silk route and so forth but we also have to take into account one unpredictable kind of dynamic factor which looms on the horizon as a potential reality and a disturbing one namely whether in the wake of the American disengagement from Afghanistan there isn't going to be an intensification of social political conflicts within the region particularly because of the sectarian dynamics I don't want to give it a particular label I think we, the United States made a terrible mistake by calling the war on terror a war on jihadist terror because jihad is a whole war in Islamic concepts so we have to be very careful about the language we use but some sort of sectarian violence is quite likely in the region given the inherent vulnerability some of these governments and they're becoming more and more concerned about that and here it is also quite possible that in some other issues we find it more possible to work more closely with the Chinese and work more closely with the Russians I particularly in mind the problems we face in Syria especially in Iran we may be in a better position after our disengagement to collaborate together in trying to contrive some arrangements that are stabilizing to Central Asia because otherwise a number of Central Asian governments I'm not going to single them out but at least three or four are potentially quite vulnerable right now to any sudden outburst of sectarian violence and even the Chinese would not have a problem with Islam internally the Islamic presence in China is minuscule are very worried about it spilling over into China, Xinjiang obviously and this could have also implications for southern Russia so in a sense there is the possibility of some geopolitical collaboration if we in the meantime are somewhat successful in being jointly with the more immediate problems that we face in Syria and in Iran which if badly handled is a terrifying dynamic on what is likely in any case to be a rather complicated phase after we disengage from Afghanistan Okay, I've got just a few minutes where we can take some questions from the floor we've got people with microphones and so just put your hand up if you want to ask something and yeah, right behind you Thank you My name is Batu Kutelya I'm from Georgia, I represent McCain Institute just brief comment on the Russians attempt to balance and who's trying to balance in Central Asia I think the only country Russia is trying to balance in Central Asia or anywhere else is US whether US is present there or not detectively and my question is that in late 90s there was a quite visible strategy towards Central Asia from the US side there was a Silk Road New Silk Road Strategy Act Senator Brownbeck if I'm not mistaken there was a big military exercise under the PFP umbrella called the Central Asian Battalion with the US military lead and now we had a question what should be the American policy or strategy towards region and my question is what is today US strategy or policy towards Central Asia because it's not quite visible the question is what is America's strategy to Central Asia do you feel we have one I believe no I don't think we have a collective strategy towards Central Asia we have one toward individual countries like Georgia especially but I don't think we have a general one if we were to develop one or if circumstances forces develop one I agree with Big that it is likely to be Islamist oriented in some way right now I think that's a potential not a serious actual threat but it could develop into one right down here Colin Clark breaking defense John congratulations on a fabulous building I'm the one piece of all this that I haven't discussed a lot is the balancing act that China is going to have to do between Japan on its one side and all our other allies and this group yes to some degree the Wild West is open to them but can they deploy enough resources to really make a large difference or not Doctor do you want to take that to just trying to have the capacity to manage both an eastward and a westward engagement well the one we're talking about today doesn't really involve enormous commitments they're dealing with players that are very much in need of foreign investment and of course we find it useful to have Chinese involvement for other reasons as we discussed so I don't think at this stage the Chinese face any fundamental Jewish strategic either or decisions in the long run a great deal depends on whether the American-Chinese relationship remains stable and cooperative and they're countervading pressures very countervading pressures on the one hand initially both sides are making a lot of noise about establishing a new type of relationship between two sort of major powers that attempts to stabilize the dynamics of that relationship on the other hand the fact is that anti-Chinese sentiments in our press mass media are becoming more widespread in particular also in Congress and the fact is that surprisingly in the Chinese mass media which our government controlled there are more and more scathing articles about America's world role really scathing very sharp and one has to sort of ask oneself what is more the official policy the statements about the partnership and accommodation a new type of a relationship or they really straighten condemnations of America's world role as being negative, destructive, selfish irresponsible I hope it's a former but it obviously is a sign of some internal hesitations and uncertainties about the dynamics of this relationship Chris did you want to jump in? I just would amplify that by agreeing with all and also just suggesting too that we not lose sight of the fact that economic development in China is increasingly moving out toward the West and so that will create its own realities for how that balancing act gets sorted out between Andy did you want to jump in? Any questions down here? I just want to respond to Ambassador Utelius question he's very modest from a Georgian ambassador to the United States I agree I don't think there is a U.S. policy toward Central Asia right now we have a strategic goal I think that is how to best promote the independence and sovereignty of these states that has always been the number one strategic goal but then with the goal there has to be a way to execute it and we got away from that frankly for the last 12 years since the policy was derivative to the war in Afghanistan we have an opportunity now to review that but the world has changed a lot in the last 12 years China is in a much stronger position actually Russia is in a stronger position than it was 12 years ago there are other rising powers in the region and that's why I think it's important now for us to actually take the time and try to get a sense of what the region is looking for from us and particularly what we want to do with the region okay right down in the front I've got one and then one right behind okay you stole the microphone you go first and then we'll come down the fact and then it'll be over Steve Wenders, local researcher in terms of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO the Chinese has state that they see this as a new style of regional alliances the Chinese state has a no alliance policy does their view CO is some kind of innovative new direction in regional organizations make any sense or is it just a propaganda well first of all I don't think they see it as an alliance my sense is that they see it as an opportunity to they certainly was a flavoring to it when it was initially created of being some sort of a counterbalance to other organizations but I think as they've watched it evolve over time they've understood it can't possibly function that way what's been really interesting to watch is how the Chinese have reacted to the various proposals to bring some of the observers as formal members they've been quite hostile to that and so I think that tells you a lot about the limitations of it acting as some sort of alliance relationship and the last question right in the very front and then thank you I think the last weeks we heard a lot about the transatlantic relationship but today I'm a bit disappointed not in this context of this discussion today but when we think about Central Asia wouldn't it be worthwhile to develop a common strategy with Europe for Central Asia what's your sense about this to do this to find common ground with Europe and to develop a common project for Central Asia I think the answer is clearly yes yes is there a longer answer no do you want to Dr. B, do you want to get into some more we have a number of opportunities of working more closely with Europe but we're not addressing the ones that are more urgent which pertain to our transatlantic relationship the possibility of a trade pact the enhancement of security cooperation the stabilization of various problems that haunt them and us including in recent times sure of course but it's not a priority item it's not a rejection but it's a not now okay I guess fair question I've got a couple of just short announcements before I let you thank these people with your applause the first is again remember that these little clickers have an explosive charge you will regret walking out with them so leave them on your chair that's just a joke second they're all saying you get what you pay for well since you're all here and you didn't pay you're not getting much for lunch but we do have lunch outside we got some sandwiches you can grab a bite to eat and then we will come back we're going to break into our four parallel seminars in this room right here we're going to do the question can a U.S. Iran deal work right next door up here is going to be what battlefield lessons have we learned from 12 years of war on the first floor it's new energy it works and down on the concourse level what role should financial power play in national security now would you please thank with these people with your applause