 Quite numerous and interesting. So a little bit about me, I guess. I've been doing something called Signals Intelligence or Cyber Intelligence, it's like 93. So similar to DEFCON, right? It's for Mead and NATO and NCIS like the TV show. Couple things, I was in Estonia for the 2007 events. I was in Ukraine. I got to teach a computer security class at the Red University, if you've ever been there. I was there in 2014 and taught a class until 2017. So during the time, I did a book for NATO. I edited a book, had 20 authors, 20 chapters, some of you are probably in the audience today. And we looked at events around the Euromaidan and hacks at that time. And there was so many to look at, right? So the thing was, it was none of them were decisive. It's computer network operations, cyber war, are probably not, just because you look at one of them and it's not overwhelming, doesn't mean all of them together collectively aren't quite important to look at. Anyway, there was military attacks, cutting cables, commandeering satellites. One of the chapters was written by the Ukraine cert. And they said that the attack on the election in 2014 against the presidential election in Ukraine was the most sophisticated thing it had ever unraveled. Infrastructure, of course, the hackers turned out the lights on Christmas in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016. In advertising, so in TVs and e-billboards in both Ukraine and Russia were hacked and used for propaganda purposes. I got to teach at the university there. And so I used to always ask my students, do you feel like Kremlin propaganda has invaded your personal social media space? In each class I would ask that for two and a half years and every hand would go up every time. In the diplomatic space, this is interesting. US diplomats had their communications captured via traditional SIGINT and then uploaded to YouTube and announced on Twitter. So multifaceted operation which shows forethought and goal-oriented behavior among hackers. So in this case, in this particular further invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the top bullet is from Microsoft. But Microsoft said they had been watching six Russian APTs, which is synonymous a nation state group, right? That is professional and focused on hacking in eight malware families. That for a year before the invasion were conducting intelligence to support the invasion, right? So these things don't happen overnight. I mean, they are serious investments. And then if you watch them, you can actually see them and see how they fit into a bigger picture. So February 24th was the invasion day. In January, we saw at least 70 defacements of Ukrainian government agencies with threatening messages, right? About what was to come. Whispergate occurred in January and that's basically wiper malware targeted against Ukrainian government agencies. You'll see two examples here of GRU and these are both from the White House. So these are the White House saying these are GRU or Russian military hackers doing this activity. In January already, there were attacks against liquefied natural gas companies both in Ukraine and in the West. And the hackers were paying $15,000 per account on the dark web to gain access to usernames and passwords at LNG companies and then using them to backdoor into the firms. And the reason this is important and it shows nation state behavior is because after the war started, LNG went through the roof. And so somebody was anticipating that, right? Okay, so for 10 days prior to February 24th, the invasion, things turn and whatever analogy you wanna use in traditional military space, the weapons shifted to DDoS attacks against the Ukraine government and the Ukraine government said that they were the largest it had ever seen for 10 days prior to February 24th. So if we look at February 24th, things change again. So the day before the invasion, wipers became to predominate, right? In place of DDoS. And so these are the weapons. These are cyber weapons. If you want to fire a code that is going to help you achieve some kind of strategic effect or you hope it will, a wiper is a good candidate, right? It's, you know, you delete all the data, you destroy the bootloader and then somebody has bricks to deal with. And so this is a shift, right? Just the day before the war, SMS messages. So civilians would get messages kind of like the ATMs are not working, right? Trying to create panic in the population and soldiers would get an SMS message that said lay down your arms, right? And surrender to the invasion force. New wiper, February 24th, and then targeting the ISP in the national ISP in Ukraine to try and take comms offline. Social media, the Facebook accounts of Ukrainian officers were hacked, taken over and then used to try and tell the troops not to show up for work, right? To go home or to surrender. And then the big VESAT attack and that occurred one hour before the invasion force crossed the border. And that was, you know, targeting internet satellite communications. And according to the Ukrainian government had an immediate and substantial impact because the Ukrainian military and law enforcement used VESAT. So there's lots of examples, chiefly in March, of how the evolution of pro-Russia attacks. Sometimes they tell you exactly what they're gonna do. On March 1st, the Russian government said we're gonna go after Ukrainian lies and propaganda. And not only did wiper code take out Ukrainian media firms, but a missile took out the TV tower on the same day. So sometimes you have to listen to people and just take what they're saying at face value. And March 3rd, there was in Sumi, the town in northeast Ukraine that Russia absolutely thought because very Russian language speaking would be an easy win. Microsoft said that the nation state hackers were in at least a month before there was a blackout and explosions in critical infrastructure in that town. So March 19th, in Destroyer 2, we saw again, right? And again, the White House says this is GRU. And it was a failed attempt, but they said if it had succeeded, the deletion of data and the manipulation of critical infrastructure, it would have affected 2 million Ukrainian citizens. And so that's already getting into strategic territory. I'll just skip down to June 27th, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, right? Lithuania said we're gonna stop, we're gonna enforce sanctions and we're gonna prevent goods and material from moving through what is the Baltic territories, the countries, into Kaliningrad. And so Kilnett came out and they said, no, no, no, we're gonna target Lithuania. And it's not just a random DDoS. In fact, there is an emergency system in Lithuania that's designed for communications during crises. And that was also taken offline. So somebody knew about that and knew where to target it. These three are all candidates for the biggest event of the war, I think in terms of cyber. Anonymous declares it's at war with the Russian government on February 24th. And why is that so important? Well, it's because anybody can be anonymous, right? And so what do you think? Are there nation-state hackers acting as anonymous almost certainly? On February 26th, so the Belarusian Railways hack, this is fascinating, still using Windows XP. But some hackers, maybe from, with intelligence-informed information, went after the logistics because if you see, here's Moscow, here's Minsk, here's Kiev. I mean, there's only so many railways, right? And so Russia really needed to move troops and war material through Belarus. But evidently, the train traffic was paralyzed, according to the Washington Post, for days. And this contributed to the infamous 40-mile convoy north of Kiev, which became sitting ducks, right? For javelins and other weapons. And then the Ukrainian SIM cards. So the Russian strategy failed, right? To take Kiev, for example, in the beginning of the war. And their communications were all messed up. They may have expected to take Kharkiv and Kiev and then have those resources available, but they didn't, right? So they had to use Ukrainian SIM cards which were almost certainly a massive honeypot that led to the assassination of senior Russian officers. I think this is one of the big stories here, is that cyber power looks a lot more like what's called soft power in the international relation space. And soft power is not forcing somebody to help you, but they help you because they want to, right? And so if you look at everything from IT firms to the nations, including Sweden and Finland, joining up to NATO, it's been quite incredible. I mean, the FBI is providing intelligence. USAID has provided thousands of emergency devices for communication during the war. DOE is helping Ukraine to reorient its entire infrastructure away from Russia and toward Europe. So it's gonna be a strategic failure, right? For Moscow, in that sense. The Shields Up website from CISA, Cyber Command, in fact, Ukraine said last week that there are Cyber Camp Command personnel helping them on a daily basis on the ground in Ukraine. The White House announced the preemptive removal of Russian malware around the world before it could be used. The distributed denial of secrets, this is gonna take years to sort through. At least 6 million documents have been stolen from Russian networks and uploaded, including all kinds of Russian government agencies. So I don't think that Russia is getting the same kind of, if you were at Black Hat yesterday, there was one talk about Chinese APTs, and in one slice of it was Chinese APTs that are focused specifically on targeting Russia. And so that's not the kind of comradeship that you want, I think, over time in a strategic sense. So connectivity, I think the biggest single event so far was Zelensky State in Kiev. Not only that, but he has been such a charismatic genius, going out in the middle of the night, right? And saying, I'm here, the defense minister's here, et cetera. So this connectivity has been incredible. And Starlink, if you talk to any Ukrainian thinker, well credit that almost first, right? So there's a Ukrainian equivalent to CISA, SSS-CIP, and their chief just gave a talk in which he said this was, in terms of digital help, this was the single biggest thing, to keep Zelensky communicating with outside leaders and to keep the military still able to conduct artillery strikes. And so it's been used for everything. It's high bandwidth, it's low orbit satellites that are difficult to find and to hack for the adversary. There's always something to hack, right? So Putin on June 17th was gonna give a speech on Russian resilience in the face of western sanctions, and the speech was delayed for 100 minutes by a DDoS attack in St. Petersburg. So if you wonder what DEF CON does, does it affect the highest levels? It absolutely does. So anybody now writing in universities or indeed advising the White House or the Kremlin on strategy is absolutely going to take IT and IT security and computer hacking into effect. It has the most profound effect on deterrence, arms control, these big issues. So both the United States and Russia, and this is interesting because there's at least one person who said we should just knock Russia offline, a well-known computer security expert. But both Russia and the United States have said, look, if you touch my NC3, we're gonna come after you. So NC3, nuclear command and control. So it's bad enough to have nuclear weapons is worse to lose them or feel like you don't have control of them. And so some of these things are really quite strategic at the highest level. Mid-war assessment, I think from javelins to drones, the decentralized networked aspect of warfare couldn't be overstated. There's a 15-year-old kid on those first days when the Russian tanks were bearing down on Kiev and he uploaded what his drone found and it led to the destruction of 20 Russian military vehicles. So it provides enormous opportunity to the attacker and to the defender, I think. And so it gives more power to people who have IT skills, IT security skills, hacking skills. CNA, computer network attack, you see it. Just like the book that we published at NATO in 2015, which is a free download, and then I think also I wrote a paper for this conference and it might already be on the website. I think it might be. There's 85 sources or so, so I tried to pull everything together from the last few months. There's plenty of examples of CNA and I would say it depends on who, if you're the one being attacked, it is a very big deal. If you're a colonial pipeline, it's a very big deal. If you're the United States of America or if you're Ukraine, you'll survive it, but it depends on your perspective. And so I think bigger story than CNA in this particular war is C and D, computer network defense, because one of the things that Russia did over the last eight years was prepare for this war, and I think one of the things that Ukraine and NATO did over the past eight years is prepare for this war. And so from traditional political, probably not enough traditional military hardware, but in terms of getting the hackers ready, I think it was probably done. Yeah, so the European Union had a crisis team. We've seen cybercom on the ground there, et cetera. So I think that one of the ways you can see is attribution. It's so much quicker and more accurate than some people have been surprised by that, I think. But actually, I think attribution, while I was at the Pentagon 20 years ago, we're starting to putting everything in all these attribution buckets, right? And so there was already some sense that you knew who the bad guys were because they're going after torpedoes or they're going after submarines. But it's sort of a political question of whether or not you want to release this information. Of course, the White House has been very proactive at releasing information to harm Russian strategy to some serious effect. The cloud, so I have also spent a lot of time in Estonia and all of Estonia is backed up in the United Kingdom. And I know that the Ukrainians have been asking the Estonians over the past some years for a lot of help. And so the head of the SSS CIP said that backing up the country has been critical. He said our agencies are backed up in safe locations. And so this was what he pointed to as key to getting through the war. And then not only has the war been a disaster for Ukraine, it's a disaster for Russia. So even the coolest company in Russia, Yandex, has lost thousands of employees, including its CEO, to the war. So in terms of hackers, Russia is gonna be bleeding hackers right now and it's gonna take years to replace that talent. So some final questions, I think, one of the big questions that all the analysts are asking is have we seen cyber war in its fullest form in this case? I think probably because of the defensive efforts of the West, maybe not, but the question is out there, why if Russia has more in terms of cyber firepower, why wouldn't they use it? I mean, their backs are against the wall, their strategy's failed, Putin's trying to hang on to power and why wouldn't they fire any cyber weapons they have now? It's a very good question. So maybe we've seen the extent of cyber war, at least for now. And of course, China, Beijing is watching this very closely because they're trying to take lessons for Taiwan. For Ukraine, I think connectivity and the soft power nature has been more important than C&O or computer network operations. Just Zelensky staying in Kiev and communicating with the parliaments of the world has been key at the strategic level and at the tactical level. You saw that even in the as of stall steel plant, even in the darkest days of the attacks on the plant, the troops there were still in contact with their families. How is that possible? That's incredible. So connectivity has proven surprisingly resilient. So if you wanna prepare for you or your enterprise or your country, you can make investments in connectivity redundancy, out of band communications, that sort of thing. And then I think that's the end of my talk and all of us are wondering is, well, the diplomacy hold and that's to include digital, right? I think over time, will attention get diverted from Ukraine? And I think one of the reasons it won't is because the Ukrainians are fighting for their very lives. And so there's no choice. There's no question about what they're gonna do. And I think Zelensky is a once in a generation communicator and we're gonna see more of him and that Ukraine is benefiting immensely from that. Thank you so much for your time and I'm willing to take any questions, I think outside.