 Time is so precious. Sorry, but it's me again. I'm chairing the second panel. We have two presenters. The first is Mr. Dr. Juan Weixiu, who is a visiting faculty member at the Taiwan Research Institute of Vasude University. So because of lack of time, without further ado, can we first hear from Dr. Juan, please. The floor is, the microphone is yours. Thank you, Professor Takahara, for your kind introduction. And let me express my deep appreciation for Miss Bonnie Greiser and CSIS for giving me such a great opportunity for my presentation today. And please allow me to introduce myself first. My name is Weixiu Huang. I'm from Taiwan. I have been studying in Japan since 2003, but studying Japanese since five years ago. My research specialty is the Made in Policy Decision-making process of Taiwan. I published my own works in Japan in the past. Today is my first time to present my work in English. Will you give me some comments? Next, please. My topics is Made in Policy Decision-making process and the party ordination in Taiwan, especially focus on the operation of National Security Council, or NSC. In the introduction, I explained by purpose and hypothesis. I visited the US United States in 1995, but Mellon thought that the visit was this effort for Taiwan independence, so conduct military exercise to intimidate Taiwan. After the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the cross-strait relations to once again become a significant security crisis that could potentially involve the United States and Japan for the first time since the Cold War. However, after Chen Shui-bian, who supports Taiwan independence, won the presentation election, he promoted several provocative Mellon policies but did not declare Taiwan independence. Therefore, the party ordination in Taiwan is an important research topic for international politics in eastern Asia. Next, please. And my hypothesis of this paper proposes that during the party ordination, the NSC operations maintain the stability of Taiwan's Mellon policy to a certain extent. NSC not only play a key advisory and lateral communications role in Mellon policy, but also an important channel for the president to make decisions. And because not only the government operational but also the quality and quantity of personnel in the Chen Shui-bian administration were far from those of the lead administration, it would be difficult for Chen Shui-bian to continue with the turn-based operation model. Although Ma Ying-jeou retained lead and Chen staffs, we can enable to observe continuity in his policy and personnel through his public statement because Ma criticized Chen Shui-bian continuously. Next, please. I have announced the operation of Taiwan's Mellon policy decision-making process in my book. The first chapter of my paper is a simple summary of my book. Next, please. And please see the figure one. AUC has stopped it from functioning in 2006. But since 1990, it is the official framework of Taiwan's Mellon policy decision-making process. However, this framework encountered the problem of ambiguous inter-organizational relations and resulted in conflicts between SEF and MAC. And next, please. And Li Deng-hui considered that those problems should be solved through the coordination and integration in higher level. Therefore, he started to operation NSC since 1996. But there are also many problems about the decision-making process in NSC. For example, many researchers think that the president cannot involve in the decision-making process by NSC because according to the constitution, the premier is the head of government in AUC. Finally, Li Deng-hui made some informal meetings instead of the formal NSC meeting. Next, please. And I have turned this formula, the NSC formula, in my book and conduct some case studies. The relation between Li Deng-hui and all meetings are shown in figure two and figure three. And next, please. The Go slow, be patient. The Gu Wang meeting in 1998 and the special state to stay relationship and related management actions after this declaration were all the outcomes from this formula. But the decision-making process for mainland policy still costs confusion from time to time. For example, Li Deng-hui announced the Go slow, be patient and the special state to stay relationship without consulting the executive in. The main cost was that the NSC formula relied on Li Deng-hui's personal relationship to come present for the defects of the decision-making framework. Therefore, after Chen Xiebian winning the election, he had had to convert the operation formula relay on Li Deng-hui's personal leadership. Next, please. In chapter two, I have now analyzed in Chen Xiebian's administration. Please see the table one and table two in my handouts because the table is too long. I cannot write it in my PPT. And from the personnel affairs of Chen Xiebian administration, we can found that not only Chen Xiebian administration, but also from Li to Chen administration, the personnel affairs of mainland policy maintain a certain stability. I also analyzed the operation of Chen Xiebian administration's mainland policy decision-making process. The NSC advisory system and operation formula of mainland policy decision-making in Chen administration was finally completed in the terms of Kangning Xiang and Chou Yi Ren. Next, please. And Kangning Xiang not only forbade advisory members from bypassing the secretary general to report the president directly. Next, please. But also consolidated policy recommendations with his amendments. Next, please. And actually, Kangning Xiang also established the coordination mechanism. Next, please. And finally, Chou Yi Ren continued the adopt this system after 2004. And I also make case study about the long-term policy and provocative policy. And K&T always criticized the economic exchange policy between Taiwan and the mainland during Chen administration is closed-door policy. However, provocative open-up, effective management policy was in fact more open policy than gold and slow detention. The Chen administration also continued to hold secret talks with the mainland to further promote the three links. And second is the amendment of the NSC organic law. This is a long-term issue since the administration. Eventually, the amendments were passed by way of proposal from the opposition parties. Next, please. And the announcement of the one country on each side, the announcement of the 2004 referendum in 2003 and ceasing function of NUC in 2006 were all regarded as enforced policy that President Chen's attempts to change the study to go between Taiwan and the mainland. However, these three cases were not entirely similar. One country on each side was announced by Chen Xiebin. You later, Roli, with prior consultation with the NSC. Whereas for the announcement of the implementation of the 2004 referendum and a bleached NUC, President Chen had consulted the view of the NSC but did not accept the objection. Next, please. This case could be seen not as the long functioning of the NSC during the Chen administration. But rather as President Chen broke the decision-making formula by himself. Next, please. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the Ma Yingzhou administration and please see Table 4 in my handout. Ma Yingzhou retained several staff members from the Li and Chen administration in his first term. And Ma Yingzhou also successfully promoted the three links and signed ECFA, Economic Exchange ECFA. The mainland policy promoted by Ma did not deviate from the past direction. Next, please. However, most policies in the Ma administration were promoted by a few of Ma's confidants called Ma Group. This formula has resulted in poor internal coordination. In the case study of the signing of the Cross-Trade Service Trend Agreement, Ma administration did not do enough internal coordination in the administration but also did not perform an assessment of the overall impact in the advance. The Ma administration even had to communicate with the printing, traditional medicine, and beauty salon industrialists before negotiating and signing the CSSA. So the CSSA could not secure the mixed trust. Next, please. My conclusion in this paper is simple. In terms of establishing the institution for exchange between Taiwan and the mainland, there were many similarities in the overall policy in Li Teng Hui, Chen Xiebian, and Ma Yingzhou administration. However, the operation of the NSC is dependent on the president's personal qualities which led the instability in the mainland policy decision-making process. Any party or even for a new president from the same party comes to the power. The parity has always been to adjust the operation formula of the decision-making process and has no time to change the policy. You made the policy first. So the most pressing matter for any new president is not to change or promote made-up policy but rather to building a stable decision-making operation formula. And thank you for your attention and listening my poor English. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Huang. I would say that was a good debut in Washington, D.C. And now we turn to our distinguished commentator, Mr. David Brown, whom I'm sure you are very much familiar with. He's now our adjunct professor at the Paul Nietzsche School of Bound International Studies. Please. Thank you, Professor. And I'd like to thank the sponsors for giving me an opportunity to participate in this panel, particularly Bonnie Glazer. Professor Wong is a very careful and thorough student of the role of the National Security Council and other bureaucratic structures in Taiwan's policy-making. And since that is not my personal endeavor, I have benefited a great deal from reading his paper. And I have read the draft of his paper, which has not been available to you. It's more complex and sophisticated than he has been able to present in a few minutes of oral presentation. His paper looks very deeply into the legal basis of the NSC, how that has changed over time, its internal structure. He talks a great deal about the personnel who have been in it at different times and the procedures under which they work and their relationship to other agencies in a quite sophisticated fashion. And he digs deeper into trying to understand within these structures how the individual personal relationships between people in the NSC and the president and other players have affected policy makers and has managed to do this over the course of about 20 years of modern Taiwan history, bridging three very different presidents, Lee, Chun and Ma. His paper also talks about the role of the MAC and the F and the Straits Exchange Foundation analyzes some of the difficulties, as he says, on how coordination of the Services Trade Agreement ran into problems and even talks to a certain extent about how the current National Security Council, Secretary General Jin Pusong's individual activities have sort of gone beyond the normal mandate of that office. So it's a quite detailed exploration of the NSC as an institution, as I said from which I learned. Now, his basic thesis he did put up on a slide and that is that the NSC as an institution helped maintain stability in cross-strait policy during these two very important transfers of political leadership in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian took office and in 2008 when President Ma Ying-jo came into office. And he is trying to evaluate the role of the NSC in maintaining stability and his conclusion in the way he framed the question was that it did provide stability to a certain extent, i.e. a limited role. The evidence he presents to support this conclusion is partly the overall institutional structure of the way mainland policy is made and with the NSC as a coordinating body at the top, the mainland affairs council within the Executive Yuan and the Straits Exchange Foundation as an implementing body at an unofficial level. The other evidence he presents is to look carefully at what people were put in place at the beginning of President Chen's first administration and the people that President Ma used at the beginning of his first term as well. And he sees a degree of continuity in these people and believes that that continuity of personnel was what contributed to this certain degree of role that the NSC played in maintaining stability. Now I have a few comments on this and the first is that he's tackling a very complicated question. Complicated in the sense that there was in some ways a bit of continuity between Li Dengwei's policies at the end of his administration and Chen Shuiyan's policies in the first few years. And there was a bit of continuity in terms of the first things the Ma administration did when it came into office. It picked up on some of the discussions that had been held informally at the end of the Chen administration on tourism and on expanding the very limited number of cross-strait flights that existed. And those were the first things that Ma was able to implement. So he is correct in saying that there is some continuity there. But broadly speaking the Chen administration represented a very significant break in policy particularly after 2002 when Chen got over the doubts that existed about how he could manage cross-strait relations in his first year in office. And there very clearly was a break in policy between the end of Chen Shuiyan's administration and the policies that President Ma has pursued. So trying to sort out in this complex picture of some limited continuity but major change what role the NSC as a bureaucracy played I think was a challenging undertaking for Mr. Wang. My personal perspective on this is that his paper and in fact his research area places more weight on the institutional factors influencing policy than is warranted. I tend to look at these issues in terms of political dynamics that examines a range of factors and not to place the institutional emphasis on it that he does. From my perspective the major thing that maintained a degree of stability in 2000 when Chen took office was the fact that in his first inaugural address he enunciated the four no policy which was designed to reassure Beijing, Washington and his domestic audiences that his ascension to the presidency was not going to produce confrontation, conflict almost immediately. How did that four noes come about? It was primarily a matter of negotiation between the campaign staff around President Chun and the Americans as to what could be put in there that would be reassuring and to the extent that I understand it, the NSC as an institution did not play a role in this. And secondly, if I look at the transition in 2008 and try and understand why stability came about after a period of considerable tension, I would say that the most important factor was the election in 2008. The voters of Taiwan made two important decisions. They decided not to approve Chen Shui-bian's proposed referendum on joining the UN as Taiwan and that was very reassuring to Beijing. And secondly, they elected a president who had a dramatically different policy encapsulated in Ma's three noes, no unification, no independence and no use in cross-strait relations. So I think that the these political factors were more important than the institutional. I'm not saying the institution had nothing to do with it, but it had, I think, a quite limited role. Professor Huang is quite straightforward in saying that each of the presidents he looked at was responsible for making cross-strait policy and exercise that in a individual, personal way that often particularly in Lida Wei's administration and in Chen Shui-bian's administration used groups outside the National Security Council as the vehicles for coordinating policy and that just is a reality. Now in his paper, Professor Huang also advocates that Taiwan would be better off if the institution of the National Security Council was stronger. And I certainly agree with that. I think that countries that have a well-established policymaking process can help leaders make decisions that reduce risk and lead to better results. The reality in Taiwan, however, has been that Taiwan has had three very strong-minded presidents. And that even if the National Security Council as an institution were to be strengthened, it would only be effective if the gentlemen or women who become the future presidents of China were willing to subordinate their strong personalities and decision-making styles to a process of bureaucratic decision-making. And that is not part of the political culture of Taiwan that we have seen up to now. I would certainly think Taiwan would be better off with more of it, but one has to deal with reality as you find it. Finally, I have one other question of interest that I think might contribute to helping explain what role the NSC has played and could play in the future. And that has to do with the fact that in Taiwan there is always a period between the election of a new president and his assumption of office. This is a period of three or four months, much like we have in the United States, quite unlike the experience in Japan and other parliamentary democracies where there is no such transition period. But in Taiwan, you have that built into the political structure. So if a pattern could develop in Taiwan where the incoming administration and the outgoing administration could have transition teams work closely with the NSC, I think this would be very helpful. In making this comment I would say that it is probably also unlikely that this is going to happen because of how bitterly divided the parties in Taiwan are and the lack of trust that goes across the green-blue spectrum. But nevertheless I do recall that when Chen Shui-bian came to office, you did have some members of the outgoing administration who have been in the United States and understood the role that transition transition cooperation between an outgoing administration and incoming administration can be helpful to the incoming administration. I'm thinking here particularly Chen Zhen-ren who was the foreign minister at that time who went out of his way to brief the people that Chen had formed. And I think more of this would be helpful, but it only is going to come about if there is a sort of shift in the political culture on Taiwan in the direction of recognizing that these kinds of informal arrangements which cannot be written into law can only come about as a result of habits of political activity within a society are adapted. And with that I thank you for your attention. Thank you very much for a very succinct somebody and a presentation of very good questions. I'm looking forward to the answers coming from Dr. Wan. Let's now move on to the second presentation by Yasuhiro Matsuda-sensei. Thank you, Takahara-san. Thank you again, Boni. Before I get into my own topic, I have to answer the question about the relationship between the collective self-defense right and Taiwan because Takahara-san assigned to me. And I have to say that what I'm going to say is not interesting at all. It does not deserve to be posted on the front page of the Taiwanese newspapers. So please relax and forget it quickly. The lifting the ban of the collective self-defense right in Japan was just recently decided by the other cabinet. And the legislation process will have to follow. But based on the political calculation because Japan will have local elections next year, early next year. And this agenda is not welcomed by the public. So the other cabinet decided to postpone the legislative process to next year. So the concrete possible actions or behavior toward the Taiwan contingency is still unclear. So my brief answer is I don't know. But there are three things I can say. The first the collective self-defense right is adopted to state, state-to-state relationship. Taiwan is not a state in the Japanese legal system. Taiwan is not a state. So theoretically in international law Taiwan is not the the object to be for using the exercising the collective self-defense force. The second Japan's role to defend U.S. military in cases of contingencies near Japan Japan can defend U.S. forces. And in that situation U.S.-Japan alliance will be largely enhanced. And Taiwan's security is dependent on U.S.-Japan security alliance. So it naturally makes a kind of effect. But what is the concrete effect that is still to say? We have to wait until next year. And the third one thing is that the lifting of this right is not an all-out lifting. It's a very limited lifting. So a lot of Japanese security specialists are dissatisfied by the decision by the Abe cabinet. When the one country is very close with Japan is attacked by somebody else that attack is wrong and imminent and no other option. There are no other options and Japan can take minimum needed actions. That's very, very limited. And the purpose of exercising the collective self-defense of Japan. These discourses are very much limited. So, I don't know. So as I said, it's not interesting at all. Okay, let's get into my... Yes, this presentation is going to be very interesting. Okay, let's start. Yeah. Yeah. My presentation, topic is cross-strait relations and the Mind Joe administration from economic to political dependence. Question mark, please. Next. I introduced the project of my team earlier. The keyword is actually this. The dilemma between prosperity and self-reliance in Taiwan. If Taiwan pursues prosperity, Taiwan has to be dependent on China to some extent. If Japan... Yes, I'm sorry, if Taiwan... Actually, Japan is the same. If Taiwan seeks independence and self-reliance, then it has to sacrifice the prosperity to some extent. So this is a dilemma. There is a small economy and outward economy and there are interactions, economic interactions with the main in China is so important. And the China administration allowed being dependent on China economically and on the other hand tried to seek independence, political independence from China. And that was that policy line was denied by the public and the party alternation occurred. And the Mao administration began to promote institutionalization. But my question is is that going to lead a political dependency as well. And this is going to be very interesting. The answer is going to be a very interesting implication for the post-Mao administration after 2016. Figure one shows that the Taiwan's economic dependence on China has heightened during the Chen Shui-Pien administration period from 2000 to 2008 around 2010. The dependence is really, really high. And but still the relations between the Taiwan and the Main in China was not institutionalized. So it was a very unstable relationship. Next please. So the Mao administration hammered out series of new policies and that was based on 1992 consensus. It takes time to understand what is 1992 and consensus. Because the definitions are different for different parties. Taiwan has its own version, the Main in China has its own version, but it is a consensus mentioning One China. So this can be called One China Magic. Based on this magic we can see the relationship promoted a lot of items. And Main China also stated its status orientation. No unification, no independence, no use of force. And not only these words, these words he set up the KMT CPC platform. That's for political negotiation or political communication. And also in the working level he resumed SEF-ARATS platform and he welcomed tourists from the Main in China. It's 3 million every year. It's a huge number. And he also promoted diplomatic truce. Don't fight over picking up the diplomatic relations with China between China and Taiwan. And also he promoted a lot of efforts to have FDA with other nations. Next, please. In response with President Ma's policies, Hu Jintao also released so-called six points. And I would like to read this. If Main in China and Taiwan were to reach agreement, it would also be beneficial for Taiwan to enter the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation mechanism which includes the United States. So TPP is also theoretically included. A positive response to the diplomatic truce which would mean an end to China's use of diplomatic aid as a way to convince other countries to not recognize Taiwan. It also suggests that China is willing to recognize Taiwan's activities involving international organizations to some extent, which is assumption that there will be no compromise regarding sovereignty. A strong intention to reach a peace accord under the One China principle. So these are the contents of the Hu Jintao Six Point. Next, please. The result is a remarkable outcome. There have been 21 agreements between CAF and ARATS and they signed ECFA and other framework. They can promote a lot of trace and investment and because welcoming the tourism from the Main in China, there is comprehensive social interactions and in international area as well Taiwan has made limited achievement. For example, participating into the Beijing Olympic game with Zhonghua Taipei which is totally impossible to understand for only English speakers. What is the difference between Zhonghua Taipei and Zhonghua Taipei? Those are all Chinese Taipei, but anyway that means that important for Chinese living world. So that's a small step but still a big step forward. Participation of Taiwanese representatives at the annual meeting of the IKO and WHO and the FDA with New Zealand and Singapore and Japan and Taiwan signed a fishery agreement. These are a remarkable achievement. But what happened based on these policy changes and the social changes? Please look at this. The blue line reveals that Taiwanese travelers to China Taiwanese travelers to China were quite limited. There are repeaters. Businessmen and there are some tourists but businessmen were the majority. So it's more than 5 million people now. But the Chinese travelers to Taiwan was relatively small number and the change started in 2008 and now it's around 3 million people are visiting Taiwan every year. That's a huge change. If you go to Taipei, you can hear Mandarin accent mainland accent of Mandarin. Next please. Interesting thing is that as the interaction social interaction grows the Taiwanese identity also grows. Please look at this chart. Those who think that they're Taiwanese, not Chinese began to grow around 2008. So there may be an interaction between two phenomena but this may be a coincidence. Then let's take a look at another chart. Next please. This is also a very famous chart asking which do you prefer status quo, independence or unification of Taiwan? Recent change is unclear by this chart. The highest figure is maintaining the status quo. Decide later and the status quo indefinitely and then unification as soon as possible, I'm sorry, status quo now, independence later. These are in the category of the pro status quo people. But people could be intimidated if someone tells you that we will see the change of status quo tomorrow and there will be a war or something. So actually this is not a good example. Next please. So if you remove the question of status quo, asking the status quo there are only two choices, independence or unification. Look at this. Look at blue line. The people those who support independence increased and those who support unification decreased and those who have no opinion also decreased. So this means that identity and independence orientation also increased as well. The problem is that the cross-strait interaction and the growth of the Taiwanese identity and pro independence orientation whether they have cause-and-effect relations or not. Next please. Then there is Taiwanese political scientists Lin Chun-Chu she made a remarkable study, empirical study from 2004 to 2008. The result is this until 2008 the only Taiwanese who visited men in China were those who transferred by their companies or those who had a high level of income or education and could afford to travel to a foreign country quote-unquote. However, it is possible that Taiwanese people from all social classes even those with low levels of education have had more contact with Chinese visitors to Taiwanese travelers between the two has increased. This contact has highlighted the differences between them and the visitors from men in China and stirred their Taiwanese identity. This hypothesis holds that people with experience with the men in China have identities that are not easily swayed. The trend toward increasing Taiwanese identity is irreversible. This is a very bad news for China. They didn't expect that after the increase of the cross-strait interaction, this kind of phenomenon happened. The policies or political choice for Taiwanese government is very difficult. The mind-gear approach started from the easier one and stepping toward the less easier one from the shallow water to the deep water. The category C is a relatively easier one such as welcoming Chinese tourism or diplomatic truce. It can be done unilaterally and China just doing nothing then they can enjoy diplomatic truce. Taiwan's participation of the NGOs these are easy things. Now mind-gear administration is struggling in the difficult ones relatively difficult ones in the category B that's called in deep water. If he gets into the category A the change of the legal status quo of the cross-strait relations that's not deep water it's a black hole it's important to survive for Taiwanese people. These are level of difficulties but please next please I'm almost done mind-gear approval rating is very low disapproval rating is very high more than 70% and approval rating is almost 10% in this situation mind-gear surprisingly chose to get into the close to the black hole the deeper water next please. He has made numerous efforts to Mashi summit meeting it started last year. He hammered out new words like one channel framework yes yes I will wrap up very quickly. One channel framework and three nodes which is almost the same as what China wants and so on. So there was a huge repercussion from the Taiwanese society next please. That is a movement which we witnessed in last March through April time. There are many many oppositions against mind-gear. He is very unpopular now but he tries to promote a summit meeting with Xi Jinping. So this structure as long as this structure exists I think that one who takes leadership after 2016 will have a very difficult time very difficult time. Dilemma between prosperity and self-reliance will further be deepened. So mind-gear these are my conclusions. Mind-gear administrations consider three policies toward China promoted the stabilization of the relations. Yes, that's right. But China has not compromised its core principles with regard to Taiwan, with regard to its sovereignty. Dilemma itself identity has grown due to increased social contact between the peoples of China. Economic changes inevitably cause political changes and economic dependence can create political dependence. The results of the policy shifts of the Mind-gear administration have made a summit meeting Beijing and Taipei a possibility, just a possibility. And lastly, opposition against political dependence on China in the Taiwanese public is extremely strong and it will change the color of the 2016. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Matsuda-san for a very clear presentation and thanks also for answering the question that was carried out from the previous session. I think we are a bit pressed with time, so without a due discussion this morning, laser who doesn't need any introduction, please morning. This was a terrific paper by Matsuda-sensei. A very good analysis of developments in cross-strait relations and I had mostly questions that came to mind after reading his analysis. What will be the direction of cross-strait relations in the future? What will be the implications for Japan? For the United States? Will there be a complete convergence between the U.S. and Japan in our interests and our reactions depending on that variable of how cross-strait relations developed? So certainly President Ma Ying-jeo has achieved a great deal. The easy things have been accomplished and the hard things remain. So I would say even if the KMT remains in power in 2016, cross-strait relations will not be easy. If the DPP returns to power then there will be even greater uncertainty. So far, the only point of agreement I think in the DPP is that policy toward the mainland should be based on a consensus in Taiwan. A process has been created that is vetting ideas within the party, but so far that process has not yielded any new policy proposals. Importantly, the DPP has not adopted a clear stance on one China and it may not. But this is Beijing's bottom line nonetheless. There is I think no consensus for example on whether to freeze the Taiwan Independence Plank in the 1991 party platform. Now Matsuda sensei points out that China has left the door open to reversing course in the future. Presumably if a future government in Taiwan does not act in accordance with Beijing's wishes. Now that is more likely if there is a strongly pro-independence government in power. But there's also the possibility that economic pressure could be used if China becomes impatient for political progress. Matsuda-san discusses Taiwan's reliance on mainland China economically and the vulnerability that arises from this dependence. China indeed has used so far economic incentives toward Taiwan and those incentives under certain circumstances could be turned into punitive measures and we have seen China use economic pressure and coercion against some of its neighbors particularly against Japan and the Philippines more recently in 2012. Matsuda-san notes the example of tourists could be limited that are sent or permitted to go to Taiwan. Matsuda-san also says China could use its leverage to make political demands but I think we do have to draw a distinction between deterring independence and compelling unification. Indeed it is probably easier to deter independence and mainland pressure to deter independence has worked to some extent but the mainland has not been successful so far in compelling Taiwan to reunify or compelling the Taiwan people to support reunification and this is evidenced in the data that Matsuda-san presented on self-identity which has strengthened on the islands. Some American observers have been expressing concerns about Taiwan's growing economic dependence on mainland China about 40% of Taiwan's exports go to the mainland this has been true for a number of years and about 80% of Taiwan's overall investment goes to the mainland our former secretary of state Hillary Clinton raised this concern very explicitly in an interview this past June and she warned Taiwan of the linkage between economic independence and political independence citing the faith that Ukraine suffered at the hands of Russia now what can Japan and the U.S. do in this regard is there a role for our two countries to play and I would certainly put on the table that we should be doing as much as we can to promote Taiwan's participation in the regional economic integration process although Taiwan has its own homework to do in that regard too there was a question that was raised in the first panel that I would like to pose to Professor Matsuda is Japan worried about closer mainland China Taiwan ties what are the specific developments between the two sides of the strait that might be viewed as harmful to Japanese interests and again is there a do you see a convergence between the U.S. and Japan on this point or a potential divergence and then the last point that I'd like to make is about international space it's probably only one piece of your analysis that I somewhat disagree with I think that you are more sanguine about China's willingness to provide Taiwan with greater international space than I am this is a subject I've done a great deal of work on over the past year last year we published a report on Taiwan's international space that included an examination of China's policy and we will be publishing yet another one later this year specifically on Taiwan's role in international security organizations and groupings and regional mechanisms I think that Beijing is holding hostage its support for allowing Taiwan to sign additional FTAs with other nations to the ratification of the TISO agreement by Taiwan's legislative UN and indeed recently China's ambassador to Malaysia very explicitly and publicly said that Beijing would oppose an FTA between Malaysia and Taiwan now if he is simply opposing the name free trade agreement then that won't be an issue because that's not the name that was used in Taiwan's agreement with Singapore or with New Zealand but the question remains is China opposing new free trade type agreements between Taiwan and other nations you mentioned Ikea this is of course the second UN affiliated organization that the mainland has allowed Taiwan to play a role in I raised the possibility that this is a one-off deal by the way this was not an annual meeting that Taiwan participated in it's held once every three years it's a general meeting there is a council that Taiwan might apply to be an observer to that holds four times he holds meetings four times a year there are many technical meetings Taiwan is not included in any of these so I would say really I'm not sure that that problem has been resolved the WHA example I think is a better example and it may be the only really good example of the mainland allowing Taiwan greater international space of course under the great against the background of the SARS epidemic that broke out in 2003 even in NGOs China has tried to constrain Taiwan's participation in the international community or has tried to change the name of Taipei's delegation from Chinese Taipei to Taiwan comma China so I would say China views Taiwan's participation in international organizations as a political issue that must be addressed through political talks which President Ma is as yet unwilling to undertake and so I see this as a big question mark going forward so I will close my comments with that and look forward to your responses thank you thank you for once again very intriguing questions so now I would like to present us to provide the response to the questions and comments being raised by the discussants Dr. Wan first please maybe I cannot do best answer by English but I try to do it the most research about mainland policy decision making always focus on personal network with USA and China or focus on the personal quality about the leader but I think this situation is the cost by the government institute is too many problems of ambiguous organizational relations and this is not illegal governments is human governments so but NSC is the most important channel for president to make decision my concept about the decision making process is that institution is important and how to use the institution is also important and if the institution has too many problems of ambiguous inter-organizational relations we should the administration operation is dependent on the president president's quality or staff's quality and needs some human personal network to do the decision making I think this is not a good institution so I try to study the institution about policy decision making thank you thank you for giving me such an important questions yes I would like to talk about Japan's various views on the close relations between China and Taiwan this is a very sensitive issue you know this is a triangle relationship so I have to be very careful and I tend to use this way of explanation there are three different national interests for Japan over the cross-regulations one is crisis management so no war that's the first national interest the second is power balance in this region and the third national interest is economic interest comparing Chen Shui-pian administration and Mainjou administration I think that in the first category the crisis management I think Mainjou is much more comfortable for Japan because it doesn't seem like war is happening so in terms of the stability you know the close and stable cross-regulations Japan's national interest but in the second category the power balance if you talk about the power balance in this region I think that there are a lot of Japanese really worried about whether Taiwan is leaning toward China or not and some extreme people think that Taiwan is over it's already over something like this anyway some people may say that way so in terms of power balance I think that close and stable relations or even much more for example much more extreme case unification that's that's a nightmare for some Japanese people who extremely care about the power balance of this region but in the third category so in this meaning the Chen Shui Ping administration was much more comfortable for Japan but in the third category economic interest I think Japan is enjoying my ingenious new policy because it's much more stable much stabbler and much more institutionalized and there are many many cases of Japan and Taiwan alliance to do investment on China there are a lot of cases and we one of our team one member of our team is doing this kind of research and this is really remarkable our result and so Japan's views on close and stable relations between Taiwan and Taiwan is different for different people or different for different national interests it's like university professors answer but anyway this is not interesting but please forgive me in the second question you're yes you're right and whether China allows much more wider international space for Taiwan is a bit questionable yes I think that the situation become much more subtler than before during the Chen Shui Ping's period any acts to promote or cultivate international space for Taiwan was blocked by China by any means but in my ingenious era the two parties are good so it is not politically correct to block Taiwan's effort to cultivate international space every time in a very seeable way because it will invoke pan green people and the DPP and they may become much more powerful in Taiwan so China's is playing a very subtle game much subtler game than before that's my explanation for example the Chinese ambassador to Malaysia publicly opposed the possible FDA between Taiwan and Malaysia he's not politically incorrect he's politically correct but maybe slightly different from China's policy toward Taiwan but since he is not politically incorrect he will not be punished that happens everywhere in the Chinese political figures can smash Japan publicly that that may be a bit different from China's present policy toward Japan but that action is politically correct so he that person will not be punished so this kind of I think this kind of a deviation of the national policy from the national policy this kind of thing happens sometimes so yes you're right but there are much subtler changes and especially in terms of the bilateral economic agreement for example there is a rule hidden rule if China hasn't signed an FDA or other economic agreement with a certain country Taiwan cannot sign an agreement with that country that's a hidden rule like Japan or India but Japan signed investment protection agreement with Taiwan before China and China I think China was really upset inside the country but didn't explode it because if China does so it will help DPP to criticize my NGO and criticize my NGO's so it's the situation very subtle now thank you thank you very much now the floor is open so please raise your hand for questions yes thank you I appreciate professor yeah right your comment and also Bonnie's comment you mentioned there are three levels of Japanese national interest the third level looks like the first level economic policy economic interest but I remember Secretary of State Carrie mentioned several times repeatedly he says foreign policy is economic policy economic policy is foreign policy so Taiwan's over dependence on one single market looks like it's economic policy but actually it's foreign policy it has strategic implication for the time being there are 21 agreement signed between cross-strait but if Taiwan's continuing depend on Chinese market I think Taiwan's negotiating and bargaining leverage will be less and less so Bonnie mentioned about the US role and Japanese role to help Taiwan to bring Taiwan out of this I think should have more important element in the future I think Taiwan's over dependence on China market should be considered by the US Japanese as well as all the Asian country Taiwan is now an interesting joint TPP RCEP so even if we continue to depend on Chinese market there's no guarantee Taiwan will continue enjoy the prosperity because China is now engaging more FTA for example hopefully China would like to reach agreement with South Korean so no warranty Taiwan will continue to prosper so if we consider this as a strategic issue in Taiwan of course we have our own homework as Bonnie mentioned so we have to do this and we have to reform our systems to accommodate to open more markets so that's it thank you you don't have a question just comment next person please here we go can someone bring the microphone to this lady hi Nadia I have a question for a professor both of you from Japan I remember in the past policy toward Taiwan was strictly wouldn't say dominate but strictly steered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and bureaucrats people always said there's no flexibility in your bureaucrat but we see that recently the relationship has changed some people even comment that the fishery agreement between Taiwan and Japan was driven by Abe himself so is there a change in Japan's politics I mean the politician has now more room to maneuver the foreign relationship or the relationship with the Taiwan one thank you thank you let's collect some more yes the gentleman at the back there Scott Harold from RAND I have a question for Dr. Matsuda and also Bonnie if you want to answer I wonder if you could comment on the impact of the Senkaku's challenge that China is posing to Japan for the possibility of Japan's relationship with Taiwan in other words after 2016 if the DPP were to come back to office and China were to decide to reverse what it has been doing which has been kind of downgrading the pressure it's putting on Japan on the Senkaku's if they were to ramp back up or even take the Senkaku's physically away from Japan occupy them would that carry implications for Japan recognizing Taipei and if not or if so does that carry any implications for deterring China from trying to take the Senkaku's away from Japan thanks the possibility of a DPP come back is a big question here we go let's take one more and then I'll ask you to respond hi thank you for all the presentations especially thank you Professor Matsuda for taking the questions from the last panel that's a very very interesting answer and I really appreciate it I have a question directed well mostly to Professor Matsuda or if Ms. Glazer would like to answer it what is the signal that's been sent out by the sunflower movement that Professor Matsuda has showed in his presentation to the international society about the directions that Taiwan is moving because I know a lot of commentators on especially talking about sunflower movements saying that Taiwan is moving on after this movement well Taiwan is having that kind of synophobia or whatever that is called so afraid of China so that this kind of movement is held but it also has implication I think personally I think it there has an implication on Taiwan is not actually moving that close to China you are trying to separate from China I'll bait the economic dependence so my question is what what kind of symbolic meaning did the sunflower movement show to the world and especially to the scholars or specialists I have a professional on this issue thank you thank you for all the stimulating questions I'll first ask the presenters to respond and I'm sure the discussions would like to respond to some of them so I'll give some time Mr. Brown and Bonnie which one would you like would you like to go first thank you thank you for many precious questions the first question is that is the decision making or foreign policy in Japan are politician led more and more politician led the answer is yes you know the Prime Minister Abe posted his picture taken with Vincent Xiao when the impact meeting was held last year in his Facebook and that was very popular and unprecedented unprecedented situation in the past all those Japan-Taiwan interactions are very very low key don't open up but this time is quite different I think that there are initiative driven by Prime Minister Abe there is initiative and not only Taiwan policy of Japan but other fields as well Japan is now facing tremendous change of society and the political leadership is more important as a whole the second question is that's a very provocative question thank you Harold and my answer is I don't know I don't know because those two questions are separate questions whether to you know recognize Taiwan or not or how to deal with the Senka contingency are different things that it might be connected but it's far beyond my imagination so far I'm sorry I don't know the third question sunflower movement is a very interesting movement and it is still very early for us to draw a conclusion about that but maybe the much more universal not only specifically Taiwan oriented but much more universal implication is that this is one of the reactions to the way of the rise of China for the people surrounding in China even the people in Hong Kong are now you know protesting against China's so called election package that's not an election for our standard but anyway Japan, Vietnam the Philippines and even Malaysia there are some repercussions against China is rising so I think that this is a kind of wake up call for China to review its policy you know but actually this may be politically incorrect but Beijing's policy toward Tibet and the Xinjiang also have to be reviewed it's not China's foreign policy but Beijing's policy toward these people should be seriously reviewed that's my version of the implication to the world thank you I think this is a difficult question but I think I think there is an important message in sunflower student movement when the government want to promote the policy about the free change they should do the protest communication with all industries and all people if they cannot do it maybe there is some protest movement happen everywhere thank you I'm sorry the time is limited just one word on the sunflower student movement I think one of the important questions is whether this was a one-off event reflecting attitudes of a certain segment of Taiwan society at one point in time or is this going to have some staying power and I think that depends to a large extent on how successful the student leaders are in continuing their activities and mobilizing public support to find various activities they conduct and on that question I think the answer is far from clear at this point I'd like to just add one brief thing about the sunflower movement I think it's very important to try to understand the causes in Taiwan the concerns in Taiwan it's very difficult to separate out the many factors that are shaping the attitudes of young people especially since mainland China is related to all of them but if young people are having difficulty getting a job mainland China is one of the factors but there are also others so I think it's really difficult to tease out but what I'm really interested in is how the mainland perceives the sunflower movement and I think at the beginning there was really no understanding and there was a knee jerk reaction to see this as being driven by the DPP the question I think after examining this sunflower movement for some time now and I have talked to different analysts and officials in China about this there are really I think two different interpretations one is that sees the roots of it that China has some in China's responsibility to some extent and how it has treated Taiwan but there is another view that it is really the designification movement in Taiwan that is primarily responsible for shaping the attitudes of the students who are involved in the sunflower movement and those who support them that latter view really absolves the mainland of really any responsibility it's all the fault of Taiwan's government and it's the Taiwan government that has to change the designification movement so I think that this is something really interesting to watch going forward Thank you so much for all the comments and questions one word on the sunflower movement from me I do research into China and I sense that besides all these issues in cross straight relations I did sense this common what's the word anxiety and dissatisfaction between young people not only in Taiwan but in mainland China and in Japan as well so if the insight of the Chinese leadership was deep enough they would sense that it may come to mainland China and that's a very dangerous situation for them sorry about the extra intervention from me but I hope you had a good time and thank you very much for joining again and to David and please join me in thanking all the presenters and the discussions on the panel thank you very much