 Well, thank you both for introducing me and organizing this exciting program. I'm truly honored to be part of this program and happy to share some of my thoughts about what's going on in North Korea, particularly in the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. Of course, some of you have come here this morning thanks to the dramatic remarks made by Trump and Kim Jong-un. President Trump made this statement at the U.N. General Assembly that the U.S. may not have any other option but to totally destroy North Korea. And Kim Jong-un responded this morning by saying that he may not have any other option but to respond with the strongest measure ever. And so the war of wars has escalated. And that's in a way the gist of my presentation today. That is, the U.S. and North Korea have been engaged in this tit-for-tat. And North Korean actions and wars can be better understood when they are placed in this context of a strategic interaction of a tit-for-tat. And once we understand this tit-for-tat, it's actually very easy to not only understand North Korea but also even make predictions. As a matter of fact, I made a prediction in the first class of this fourth term that the North Koreans would fire a missile before the end of the term. And of course, I was proven right. And my students were supposed to buy me pizza. I'm looking forward to my award. Thanks to a great leader, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un. And of course, the first part of my presentation, six years of challenges that have been posed by Kim Jong-un since he assumed power after Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's death, is a familiar story, a lot of nuclear tests. This kind of a threat that they will destroy White House. Kim Jong-un goes to the front line and tells the soldiers to drive the enemy into fire pit. That's exactly the words he used. They do this kind of military exercises. And they even show this map that shows the trajectories of the missiles from North Korea somewhere here to various points in the U.S. Very bombastic threats. And of course, just a few weeks ago, North Korea studied doing all sorts of provocations, missiles, hydrogen bomb tests, another round of missiles. So we are familiar with this part of the story. Kim Jong-un is very aggressive in conducting these weapons tests and saying horrendous things and refusing to engage the world. But my argument is that we need to situate these actions by the North Koreans in the context of American actions for the past six years. And this is part of the strategic interactions that's less well known. And this is what I call the unfamiliar U.S. nuclear crisis. We are much more familiar with the North Korean nuclear crisis, but there has been U.S. nuclear crisis over Korea since 1950. And we need to understand this in order to understand North Korea. And the six years crisis of American nuclear weapons started in November 1950 and has continued until today when Donald Trump came out and said the U.S. will totally destroy North Korea. On November 30, 1950, Truman came out and made this statement during the press conference that using atomic bomb was one of the options he was actually considering. And that made a big shock. This was only five years after the U.S. dropped two atomic bombs over Japan. And here, again, President Truman was saying that he might use nuclear weapons again. And so it was so shocking the British prime minister took a flight the following day to have a meeting with President Truman to bring him to senses and not to use atomic bombs. Maybe he was successful. And even though Truman did sign an authorization to release atomic warheads to the military, the weapons were not used at the time. But even after the war was over, even after the armistice was signed, the U.S. continued to develop plans to use atomic bombs over Korea. And so if you look at this document that was signed on August 20, 1953, just two weeks after the armistice agreement was signed, the strategy to command had an outline plan to use atomic bombs against China, Manchuria, and North Korea. And then this plan was further developed into a bomb target list. And so this is one of the list that were produced in 1956 and has many targets in the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. And I was able to translate these coordinates into a location in a map, thanks to Google Earth. And that number translates into Sukfung. This is Sukfung Dam, one of the largest, the largest dam in North Korea, between North Korea and China. And the bomb was supposed to be dropped right here. And then there are more than 50 targets in this list. This is another one, Shin-Eju. One of the largest cities bordering China, and the bomb was supposed to be dropped right in the middle of Shin-Eju city. And then, of course, Pyongyang was not left out of this list. And a bomb or bombs were supposed to be dropped right in front of this Chuche Tower. Some of you might have seen this. And so this was the intended target. And so the US had these targets on their list. And if bombs were dropped, something like that would have happened. There are different estimates of fatalities and casualties. This one happens to be over 100,000. And I don't know if people in the South realize this, but if the wind blows in an unfortunate direction, South Korea would not be immune from the fallouts. Even if a bomb is dropped in Pyongyang, South Korea could suffer from the fallouts. But anyhow, that was one of the plans that the military had. And in 1968, the Joint Chief of Staff developed a different kind of plan. And part of the plan, in response to North Korea's capture of American spy ship Pueblo, was a code named Freedom Drop. And I guess the American military associated freedom with atomic bombs. And this plan was to drop several atomic bombs against North Korea. And so I can go on and on about the plans. But I move forward to the Bush administration. This is a baby Bush, George W. Bush administration, who adopted the strategy of unilateralism and a preemptive strike. And the goal of unilateralism and the preemption was regime change and occupation. And of course, this strategy was applied to Iraq. And we are still seeing consequences of this action. And of course, Iraq was not the only target, as we know. George W. Bush listed Iraq, Iran, and North Korea on the axis of evil. And North Korea could be a target of this strategy also. And there are many indications that North Koreans actually accelerated their nuclear weapons program in response to this. And we see that the first nuclear test was conducted after this. And then many others were conducted under the Obama administration. And you might ask, why? Obama is a good guy. If Bush is not such a good guy. Well, when it comes to Korea, particularly nuclear strategy, Obama was not so different from George W. Bush. I may surprise you, Obama did the reverse unilateralism. Obama did reverse preemptive strike doctrine. But he chose to remove North Korea from negative security assurance. He chose to deny the North Koreans from a guarantee that they would not be attacked with an American nuclear weapon first. And then he further refined and developed American nuclear strategies targeting North Koreans. And so if the U.S. had a large deterrence strategy, Obama came up with a tailored deterrence strategy that was really targeted at North Korea. And North Koreans responded to this by conducting a few more nuclear tests. And Trump created an uproar with this remark about fire and fury. And then he even raised the stakes higher by saying that he has no choice but to totally destroy North Korea. And so the larger point that I'm making this part of the presentation is that the Korean Peninsula has had this nuclear crisis for over 60 years. And North Korean nuclear missile programs and their strategic behavior in general can be better understood when they are seen in this strategic context. And since the 1990s, North Koreans have responded to Americans, American actions in terms of a tit for tat tactic. So if Americans take an action, North Koreans would respond in kind. And that's exactly what has been happening. And it only accelerated under Kim Jong-un's rule, but the nature of a tit for tat has not changed a single bit. And just to illustrate the tit for tat, I could just quickly go through some pictures that show what happened in 2013. And here you see some of the photos that I showed at the outset as part of my argument about Kim Jong-un's aggressive behavior, but Kim Jong-un's aggressive actions should be seen in this context. So joint military exercise between the U.S. and South Korea began on March 1st, and then this came. And then there was a joint military exercise again, and then this came, a bomber or two bombers from Gwang, and then this, a stealth bomber from the U.S. continent, and then this one. And what we just saw in August and September of this year shows the exact same pattern. So late August saw the beginning of military exercise, and this was North Korean response. This was a U.S. and this was a North Korean response, U.N. sanctions, and this was a North Korean response. I have fun with the PowerPoint. And this is the latest American response, and I'm actually holding my breath because I am afraid that North Koreans would respond in kind again. What Kim Jong-un said this morning is response in kind. Donald Trump said something, and so North Korean leader said something in return. But North Koreans have not responded to this action in kind yet, and I wouldn't be surprised if they do soon. Having said that, having said that North Koreans have been responding to American actions in kind, I would like to end with a more optimistic note by showing that North Koreans have responded to engagement, with engagement. And that's an important part of a tit for tat that we should not forget. Although it is largely forgotten. There were agreements, and these agreements succeeded first in freezing North Korean nuclear programs. And so the nuclear reactor and reprocessing facilities were frozen, and the inspectors put seals on the doors and put, you know, monitoring cameras and ensured that there were no activities while the Geneva grid framework was in place. And then later, when the six-party talks were going on, North Koreans disabled. This was a step further than freezing. So North Koreans, for example, took out some pipes from its nuclear reactors. North Koreans took out some pieces from a glove compartment of reprocessing facilities. So it's not just freezing, but it's actually taking out some pieces and parts from the facilities. And North Koreans even destroyed a cooling tower. So these are important measures that really disabled the nuclear facilities in this period. And so if you look at the 20 years record in total, you see a tit for tat. If there was an engagement, North Korea responded with a freeze. Engagement during the six-party talks disabled. But if there was a military pressure sanctions or military actions, then North Koreans responded with its own military actions. And so the record is, I think, quite clear. As a social scientist, one cannot really have a better empirical evidence of strategic interaction, where one responds to another in kind. And so one would think policymakers and the general public would understand this pattern. This is a very, very consistent pattern for the past 20 years. So consistent, I was even able to make a prediction and win pizza. But somehow many policymakers don't seem to see this clear pattern. And I think part of the problem is media. I hope there is no media today. And the media tends to forget important parts of the reality. That is, for example, Pyongyang made a proposal in July 2016 last year to denuclearize. Pyongyang wanted to have a dialogue about denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. But Washington and Seoul rejected that proposal right out of the hand. And then North Koreans began its nuclear activities and missile activities. And these two, North Korean proposal and Washington and Seoul's rejection, are not usually part of public discourse. And what usually gets included is North Korea's nuclear activities and missile activities. I think that's unfortunate reality of what the way the policy discourse is made. And again, earlier this year, in June of 2017, North Koreans made a proposal for a freeze for freeze. And so the proposal was that if the U.S. stops a military exercise, then the North Koreans would stop missile and nuclear tests. And the North Korean proposal was actually an improved one, improved over the last proposal. The proposal that they made two years ago was that if the U.S. stops military exercise, the North would stop nuclear tests only. And this time, this guy came out, a North Korean ambassador to India, came out and sweetened the deal by saying that the North Korea would stop both nuclear and missile tests in return for American stopping of its military exercise. But again, this proposal came and went and I was not much notice. And it came and went because Washington and Seoul rejected this right out of the hand the next day. And then Pyongyang began its nasty, it was like almost Kim Jong-un throwing temper tantrums. Anyhow, part of the problem is that these kind of proposals are not registered and reputable newspapers like the New York Times and Dave Sand, he's been with the New York Times forever and he's the main guy who writes about American voting policies and security issues. And this is how he wrote. So the North Korea will never put the nuclear difference for self-defense on the negotiating table and flinch even an inch from the road of bothering the state, nuclear force, unquote. So this part is a quotation of a North Korean statement made by the Korean Minister. And Dave Sand wrote the period right here. But the whole sentence did not end there. The whole sentence had a conditional clause. North Korea will never put this on the negotiating table unless the US removes its hostile policies and nuclear threats. And the partial sentence and the whole sentence are very different. And I think we should pay attention to the whole sentence, not the partial sentence. And yet even someone like Dave Sand forgets to include this important conditional clause. And I suspect this is what the North Koreans wanted to highlight. But this part unfortunately gets left out. And I talked about tit for tat in terms of actions and words. And I didn't put these in a somewhat theoretical way. And I'm not going to do that, but let me just say that in our International Relations Scholarship there is a well-established body of literature that the tit for tat is the best tactic for cooperation. And so Robert Axel wrote this influential book that uses computer simulation to show that the tit for tat is really the best way to produce international cooperation. But here in the relationship between the US and North Korea tit for tat did not produce cooperation, rather has exacerbated the situation. And so one asks why. And my answer is that many scholars like Axel wrote forgot to include social dimension of international relations. And US and North Korea are engaged in a social relationship that is characterized by social enmity. They are in a state of war. And their tit for tat exacerbates social enmity. Condition of enmity gets consolidated and strengthened by their tits and tats. And as a result the situation gets even more tense and more dangerous. And I have this whole model of how this works and this model works really well to explain nuclear tests in 2009, 2013 and so forth. But this is mainly for those who are more theoretically inclined. But if you are concerned about the situation and if you are concerned about the news, I think the moral of my lecture, my presentation today is that you need to put North Korea in the context of its strategic interactions with the US. And once you do that, you too can make predictions of North Korea. Thank you. Fascinating. Thank you. Next speaker, Andrew Jackson from Monash, senior lecturer and convener of Korean studies. He's a historian by training and has developed a keen interest also in popular culture in North Korea. He's the author of the 1728 Mushing Rebellion Politics and Plotting in 18th Century Korea and he's co-editor of Korean Screen Cultures interrogating cinema, TV, music and online games. Please, I think you've already welcomed him perhaps but if you haven't please join me in welcoming him. Thank you very much for all. And A&U for inviting me here today from Melbourne. It's a lot warmer here and it was in Melbourne, a lot less rainy as well. I'd like to start off by saying, Professor Sartre, I've got a bone to pick with you. I thought you were going to talk about the imminent collapse of North Korea when you talked in your title. It's a bit misleading but you didn't. So I'm going to have to fill that in. Over the years there's almost a virtual industry growing up in the prediction of the imminent collapse of North Korea. I remember it from when I was at university in the 1990s. You know, Eastern Europe's gone, North Korea's next. I remember it after 1994 when Kim Il-sung died. I remember it after the famine. I remember it after 2011. North Korea is just about to go and we're still getting these predictions right now. It hasn't gone and remarkable as it may seem. It's still there. What I'm going to talk about today is one of the scenarios for potential collapse of North Korea and that is by popular uprising or what you might call revolution. I'll talk about a lot of theory of revolution and they always talk about revolution. I prefer mass rebellion but we can talk about that after if you're interested in the theory. But the image we should have in mind is of something like the events of 1989 in East Germany or Romania or maybe in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia of something like a mass demonstration, explosion of anger, of popular anger. Elites may be joining in the demonstration, military refusing to crush the demonstration and then eventually the regime is overthrown. So this is the kind of rebellion we're talking about. And there are many, several researchers who have predicted this kind of event occurring in North Korea. Now I should say first, from the back, I'm kind of a bit uncomfortable giving this talk because I'm not really a scholar of researcher into North Korea so much as a historian of rebellion in Korea. And as a historian I like to look at events that have happened, not events that haven't happened and may never happen. And also a lot of the information I'm going to be using is rather speculative, especially about the political institution, military institutions in North Korea. There's a lot of conflicting evidence simply because researchers don't seem to know exactly what's going on. And another thing I should say unlike predicting missile launches in North Korea, predicting revolutions is incredibly difficult. Jack Goldstone calls it the paradox of revolutions. In hindsight it seems so obvious that something's going to happen in Egypt or in Tunisia, but no one ever predicts these things are about to occur. So what I'm going to talk about then is this imminent collapse of the DPRK through some kind of explosion of anger. And I think this is quite a timely discussion or topic because of the question of economic sanctions. A journalist last week asked me, look do you think if we tighten the sanctions enough in North Korea then there will be this explosion of anger. Now if a journalist is working this out maybe some of our political colleagues in Washington or elsewhere have got the same thought in mind. One researcher who looked at this question in particular is Victor Cha. You may have heard of him. He's probably about to become the U.S. ambassador to Seoul. And he wrote a book Impossible State a few years ago. It's very interesting. And he argued that we're likely to see very shortly a Ceausescu moment in North Korea. And North Korea is actually a train wrecking motion. It's about to collapse, a ticking time bomb. And Ceausescu, as you remember, is the Romanian dictator. And there was a moment when he addressed crowds, a stage-managed crowd event, and the crowds, many of the crowds turned upon him and this set in motion a chain of events that led to his overthrow. And Victor Cha says, the evidence for this train wrecking slow motion was ticking time bomb. Incidents occurred all over North Korea. Some are clashes, riots, food riots. Some are clashes with security services between people and the military. Some are coups, attempted military coups. Some are just simply illegal posters or examples of seditious graffiti. All sorts of events are thrown in here by Cha. But I would argue it is a very significant list of events and he's really tried to get all this information together. But he says this is evidence of this ticking time bomb that this anger is about to explode. He argues that what's led to this state of affairs is actually the 1990s economic failure that collapsed the public distribution system, the famine. And also this combined with increasing amounts of marketization from below. So people engaging in trade, ordinary people in North Korea, engaging in trade, crossing the border into China, picking up goods, bringing them back, selling them, engaging in sort of market activities. In addition to this is a certain amount of heterodox ideology, so information about the reality of life in South Korea that actually is quite prosperous and it's not the horrible place that the leadership claims it is. So this leads to this kind of ideological gap and this gap between what the regime, the official discourses of the regime and what people see is actually going on through these DVDs or smuggled information about South Korea. So this is gap occurring and this will lead to this explosion of anger. He also argues that some catalyst, for example, a crackdown on markets, which is what occurred in 2009 and there was a spike in these events around that period. This would be the catalyst for this revolution, he argues. Now in theoretical terms what he's arguing is quite sound. If you look at research on rebellion, he identifies a transient cause of rebellion which is quite frequent occurrence. He also identifies a society in unstable equilibrium which is a society ripe for rebellion using Chalmers Johnson's expression. There are some problems with his assumptions and this is what I'm going to look at today, really. First, is North Korea in a state of unstable equilibrium? Here's a very interesting picture. This is taken maybe last week in North Korea and you can see this is a rural community and you can see these farmers plots which are overflowing with vegetables and things to be produced wide. These are going to be taken to market and sold as surplus to make a bit of extra money for local people. This is a very interesting manifestation of this marketization from below that a lot of researchers are talking about in North Korea. If we talk about this marketization from below and people engaging in this kind of market activities, are we actually witnessing a society in this unstable equilibrium or are we seeing something quite a lot more stable? Che Yong Sog has written a very interesting article where he looks at exactly the same data as Victor Cha. He looks at the influx of heterodox information coming in through smuggled DVDs, through information about reality of life in the Republic of Korea. And he also looks at the marketization from below that Victor Cha also looks at. But he says that actually this has led to complete opposite of what Victor Cha is saying. He's saying, look, the regime in Pyongyang is actually able to rule using Gromsky's idea maintaining a system of domination without hegemony. In other words, people will go along, they'll tow the line, they'll go along with what Che Yong Yang is saying as long as they don't attempt too many structural changes, i.e. they don't interfere with market activities. They don't try to plant down the markets like they did in 2009. This is a very persuasive argument, so that's one question we can ask about Victor Cha's argument. Is it actually a society in unstable equilibrium? Another problem with his argument is he actually identifies a kind of revolution that we would call central collapse, and this is what happened in Egypt, in Tunisia, in East Germany, in Romania, where demonstrations broke out in the capital city, also like Professor Kim talked about this morning, but instead of it going to being dealt with problems, structural problems being dealt with from constitutional means, it escalates, the crisis escalates, and maybe the military joins with the demonstrators, and being in the centre of power, being close to political institutions, the government's much more vulnerable to any kind of mass demonstrations. This is what we saw in these countries, and if you look at the evidence of what Victor Cha finds, these violent incidents, these seditious posters and all this, none of them happened, actually very few of them happened in the capital tour, most of them are happening in different parts of the countries, far away from the capital, Chongjin, Shiniju, that we mentioned before, Hamun, Enson, so these are happening at the far extremities of the country, these large scale clashes, and actually what Victor Cha is, by pointing this out, what Victor Cha is actually identifying, fails to identify an important feature of revolutions that we know as researchers about revolutions, they tend to happen in the same places again and again, and researchers looking at pre-modern and modern China and Japan have found consistent patterns of rebellious activity, they tend to occur in certain areas over and over again, almost and very often impervious to any kind of political change, so in China we saw changes in government from a feudal, more feudal system to a capitalist system to communism, and yet rebellions would occur in the same locations over and over again. Why is this? Well certain areas tend to develop cultures of contention, that doesn't mean people are more rebellious than in other areas, but there is sort of a precedent for them, often certain areas are more susceptible to food crisis, food shortages, also logistically it's more difficult for governments to crush rebellions which are far away. So the pattern of rebellions that actually Victor Cha's data points to is not central collapse, which tends to be quite rapid generally, but actually what we call peripheral advanced revolution. And we saw this kind of revolution in various countries around the world, Cuba, in Nicaragua, we see it, we also saw it in Libya and we saw a variety of it in Syria, and often this kind of revolution tends to be rather more protracted and also it's far more susceptible to external influences, particularly changing sort of international relations situations. And we saw that very clearly in Libya and also in Syria that how external governments intervened into these problems affected the outcome of the revolution. So in Libya, British, Italians and French troops or the military forces joined with the rebels against the Giddafi regime and it felt quite rapidly. In Syria you've got a very different outcome, you had superpowers joining the government side and also helping the rebels and the result is as you see a sort of protracted bloody mess and a civil war. So it's very important when we talk about revolutions, how they occur and where they occur to consider these different patterns. Ominously for the North Korean case, in one of the statistics that Victor Cha, one of the cases, one of the incidents is one in 1999 in Onseng County in the far north of the country on the Chinese border and this was an incident involving border crossers where people attempting to cross the border were probably to pick up goods, engage in some kind of market activity and this was allegedly crushed by elite border guard units with the approval of the Chinese authorities. In other words, they didn't want these problems as violence spreading into China. So this is kind of, if some kind of event, some kind of violence occurs on the borders, it's uncertain which way China would intervene and that's what... So what Victor Cha is saying is kind of... I've got to be a little bit careful about this assumption of the regime collapsing in the centre. Now I've just got to move on because I've only got five minutes left but I'll get to my main point and my main point is really about the presence of elites in the Revolution or in the rebellion. Now, elite groups, either second society, distant groups or some kind of intellectual fringe groups or even members of the government, disenfranchised members often play a very important role in the outcome of revolutions. And one elite group that plays a particularly important role is the military. And as Trotsky said, there's no doubt in the fate of every revolution is decided by the disposition of the army. So national crisis will impact members of the army but the going over of the army to the revolution doesn't happen of its own accord or through mere agitation. So can we ask a question? What variables will influence the going over of the military to a potential revolution or rebellion? And can we speculate about whether these conditions are in place in the DPRK? Well, to do this I'm going to use some ideas by Terence Lee. He's a researcher in Singapore and he looked at the outcome of different rebellions, mass rebellions that I've been describing in different Asian countries. And he looked at cases where the military defected and joined the rebels and the regime was overthrown. For example, in the Philippines in 1986 and also in Indonesia in 1998. And he also looked at cases where the military defended the regime and crushed the demonstrations. He looked at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and also Burma in 2007. And this gives us a very interesting picture of how to assess this problem. And what he argued was very convincingly that a lot of this was dependent upon the degree of personalism in the military. In other words, if it was very top down, if the dictator was dictating a lot of the promotions and making the key decisions, military decisions within the military hierarchy. And this overrode the sort of general patterns of military hierarchy. If he created a sort of parallel military structure to not actually not trusting his own military but created a sort of elite corpse on top of his own military to protect his own rule. This would lead to sort of lone morale in a split military. And then on the other hand, in cases where the military tended to stay loyal to the regime, tended to be where there was more power sharing within military institutions. Sort of institutions that mitigated this level of personalism. So what can we see in North Korea? Well, I've got to admit, I've looked at a lot of... Yeah, it's a funny picture. I take it you're not laughing at the dogs but the medals there. What can we see in North Korea? And this is where it gets a little bit difficult telling how these institutions work. There is a lot of information but it tends to be very conflicting and that's a problem with the information we have about or I can find about the institution in North Korea. But Ken Gores, who's an American military scientist I'd say has looked at the state of the military and he argues that actually in many ways it's a very personalized system. There's also a crumbling sort of economy retaining the loyalty of elite military units and officers. Plus there's also this separate military structure within the military there to protect the regime in case of problems. And there's also high evidence of low morale amongst conventional forces which is generally conscripted. Now we've got all this information but on the other hand a lot of evidence actually points to the opposite. Actually under Kim Jong-un you've got a far more sort of level of power sharing amongst military units and that's quite problematic because it means that this prediction of military collapse probably wouldn't happen. Also you've got a very large number of special forces many of which are around the capital I've seen some of them with my own eyes protecting elite groups within the capital and the actions of groups like this would be very difficult to predict in the event of some kind of crisis in the emergency. Anyway I've got to finish so just to sum up I don't think you can assume any kind of link between popular anger and a rebellion occurring a popular uprising occurring in North Korea. You certainly shouldn't link that to economic sanctions and policy I think it would be very risky to try and link economic sanctions to some kind of longer term strategy of starving a population into rising up against the regime. It's not as simple as that. Regional factors have to be considered like I mentioned the different patterns of revolution that we've seen but also what the military would do in the event of a crisis also has to be considered and that is I would argue very unpredictable in North Korea. Thank you. Thanks so much. I'm sure there are many questions so I would like to invite the audience to ask questions. Thank you for the two papers. I have just two questions for each one. One for each one. Professor Jay Song. I was very wondering you mentioned about the 60 years of North Korea crisis but as you come to the very recent times around 2016, July 2016 and then June 2017 the Washington and Seoul refused North Korea's proposal but at the time 2016 and 2017 I wonder why they refused because South Korea in 2016 is Park Geun-hae's government period and Moon Jae-in is more liberal to North Korea but Park Geun-hae is a very anti-North Koreans and one question for Professor Jay Song and therefore Andrew I was thinking about you talking about rebellions especially on the North side of the Korean monsoon you mentioned that one area with the elite groups but you were talking about in relation to China but monsoon is more close to Russia is there any connection with Russia as well as China? Thank you for the very good question well 2016 had President Obama as American president and Park Geun-hae as a South Korean president and both of them were taking a more conservative North Korean policy orientation and so it doesn't take a lot of imagination to see why they would have turned down the proposal from the North and 2017 is a more complicated one because South Korea now and a more liberal president and to me the rationale was the same so 2016 Park Geun-hae and Obama government turned down the proposal because they North Korean proposal as a trait of a liberal action for