 Being I know Kevin that you have to leave in a very short while But I do look into the room if if there are questions. I'm happy to take one or two As long as the questions are brief and so we can get Kevin out just in time. Please introduce yourself Thank you very much. Nicholas Veron at Google and the Peterson Institute. My question is a little bit nerdy, but I think it's of general interest you mentioned Deng Xiaoping as having created institutions and processes as You're well aware Prime Minister as there is a bit of a revisionist debate about this book by Joseph Torogen in particular this year, but many other scholars So can you expand a bit on it? How do you view that issue in retrospect? Haven't we overestimated the degree to which the Communist Party had committed itself even before Xi Jinping to orderly succession policies and What is the balance between Xi Jinping as an individual and the more collective body of the party on this issue going forward? Thank you Thank You Kevin. Well, thank you for the nerdy question. It's a gathering of nerds. So we're happy to deal with questions of complexity Including those of recent Chinese Communist Party history I think the starting point in terms of politics is How did Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Communist Party conclude the party's formal conclusions from the period of the Cultural Revolution and The way in which they did that as you will be aware is in the 1981 Special resolution of the party on Recent questions in party history and that was the formal summation By the party's center of what went wrong with the Cultural Revolution with the Great League forward and the anti-rightist movement all the way back to 1956 and The evaluation was as follows number one We the Chinese Communist Party must reassert the principles of collective leadership number two we cannot allow the a Principle to emerge of leadership for life Three we cannot longer afford any form of cult of personality. Those are direct quotes from the 81 document and that established the orthodoxy during the Deng Xiaoping period the We are bang period the jazi young period the junzum in period and the Hu Jintao period And it was only by the time we got to 2017 More than 35 years later that we saw the beginnings of the change of these principles We saw for example in the National People's Congress in March of 18 Decision to abolish the two-term limit which had been previously observed by and large Xi Jinping's predecessors We certainly Also have seen the emergence of new forms of the cult of personality around Xi Jinping And there is no prospect that Xi Jinping is likely to move from the stage anytime soon Opening up the question that leadership for life is once again back on the table And so I think these represent significant departures from this earlier formal resolution of the party's history and the last nerdy part of the answer to the nerdy question, which has just been asked is that on the Centenary of the party's founding which was on 1 July 2021 they produced another major Resolution reflecting on the party's history and what's fascinating about that? Is that when Xi Jinping presiding over that meeting reflected back on the 81 Parties resolution on previous party history That document produced in 2021 excluded all the references to collective leadership to avoiding leaders for life and avoiding cults of personalities So therefore there is a documentary change in the practices Reflected in these high documents of political resolve. Thank you very much. I'll be back to you. Thank you, Kevin Let's take one final question from the audience Microphone is already in your hands. Perfect. Well, Narendra Taneja from India Mr. Prime Minister, you mentioned about China could possibly be launching a new Charm offensive. Could you elaborate? Are you referring to a customized? BRI 2.0 targeting Europe Thank you Well, thank you very much A customized BRI Target on Europe. I'm not sure BRI 1.0 has proven to be very expensive for Beijing It was launched as a two to three trillion dollar initiative And after 750 billion dollars worth of expenditure Central financial authorities in Beijing have begun to trim it back to something with a cap or a ceiling of about one trillion So I don't think that is likely to be the case in terms of rolling out that type of charm offensive towards the Europeans I expect that what's more likely to be rolled out towards the Europeans is a whole series of new attractive market openings for European exports and Furthermore investment opportunities for European firms And the reason I emphasize this is because the interest which the Chinese have is as follows Looking forward to The day when they may need to mobilize Global support or at least encourage global neutrality Against a possible Chinese military action against Taiwan What China does not want to happen is to have the Europeans join in financial and economic sanctions against China at the America's request as occurred most recently over The Russian invasion of Ukraine So what is animating China here is to peel the Europeans away from the United States over time And furthermore if they can do so in the meantime on the question of technology exports And you would have seen for example the statement by the US Department of Commerce on the 7th of October for memory banning US Semiconductor Exports to China and calling upon its allies to do the same and I see the Dutch have just joined suit The effort which China will be making to provide other incentives for the Europeans in In terms of market access for goods and services and Investment access for European firms. I think is the way in which they're going to seek to ameliorate China's image in Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as To discourage the Europeans from joining the United States at some later point around Taiwan contingencies Kevin I said we are wrapping up the Q&A part, but when the host of the conference Is is reaching for the microphone? Of course, we will Allow him to do so to Terry, please Europe Well Kevin, I don't know if you see me, but I can assure you Okay, because I can assure you that this is me and No, no, no, no, no, no, no for sure. So I want to tell you I want to thank you very Very much you were excellent really The moderator was very good too, so that's a good couple I must say and I thank you Especially because I know that it was not easy for you to do it So my conclusion is that I want to book you with the World Policy Conference for the next 30 years to start with to start with and as many meetings in Paris at the free It's that clear Father program for you See I think I think Kevin I Think the invitation for 2023 has already been issued. That's for sure That's for certain and then obviously we will be more than happy to welcome you in person this time Final question before we wrap up the session You are one of the most pre eminent China experts out there. You've proven it again today You've proven it last time you and I met in Singapore at the Asia Pacific Conference of German business Not too long ago What is the biggest? Western global misconception that we have of China. What are we paying too much attention to? and not enough I think the The problem let me just speak about the United States because I'm more familiar with that Then I am necessarily the Europeans. I do spend a fair bit of time in in Brussels Berlin and and Paris these days We've just established an Asian Society Center in Paris as well I spend less time in London because I never never know who's going to be in government in London But that's a separate matter But as far as the United States is concerned, I think there is a Temptation in this country or predisposition in the United States To assume that China is somehow ten foot tall As opposed to the reality as perceived by China domestically Which is a company with which is a country replete with massive domestic challenges The number one domestic challenge actually is the economy The Achilles heel for Xi Jinping is future economic growth Particularly given his ideological reset for China has created new disincentives for the Chinese private sector To continue to vigorously invest in private fixed capital investment. Then you have the problem of demography China's got the second lowest birth rate in Asia after South Korea You have an age dependency ratio, which has now reached almost developing come developed country standards and furthermore population peaking next year as India surpasses China as the world's most populous country with 1.4 billion people and Then you throw in other factors like the impact of covert Therefore the economic headwinds bearing down on China both domestic and external are huge And so I think the misconception that I often have to deal with here in the United States is to assume that China is this Unstoppable monolith moving inexorably towards Global domination when in fact it is a much more complex reality than that And I think and as I say to the Americans if you guys are six foot two think of the Chinese as five foot nine And they're still growing and sooner or later. They're going to be six foot And you guys are still likely to be six foot two, but the assumption that China is already ten foot tall I just don't think is wise from an analytical point of view and if policy is based on analysis Then a more moderate view of China's growth trajectory should inform a more cautious approach to policy as well Back to you Ali Echoing what Terry said, I think I speak for all here in the audience that this was a very Content-rich perfect rewarding ending to a very long day day one of the world policy conference the former Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd ladies and gentlemen. Thank you so much Thanks, Ali. Thanks to you all the best to those of you in Abu Dhabi by them