 6 The strategy of the Battle of Manassas On May 24, 1861, the day after Virginia ratified the secession ordinance, MacDell's army crossed the Potomac on three bridges. MacDell made his headquarters at Arlington, General Lee's home, and it should be recorded to his credit that he showed the highest respect for persons and property. One regiment of the New York Zoos, commanded by Colonel Ellsworth, went on a steamer to Alexandria and landed under the guns of the Pawnee. A Confederate flag was flying from the top of a house which was owned by a citizen named Jackson. Ellsworth went up and pulled down the flag. As he descended the stairs, Jackson shot him, and was himself shot by a Union soldier. On June 26, MacDell's total strength present for duty was 153,682 men and 12 guns. Patterson's was 14,344 men. Of MacDell's twenty regiments, seventeen were three-months men. With the exception of one infantry regiment, four companies of cavalry, and three artillery companies, Patterson's force was composed of three-months men. Johnston's force at the same time was 10,654 men and five or six batteries. General Lee had selected Manassas Junction as the point for the concentration of the Confederate troops on account of its being in connection with the valley. Beauregard was in command here, while Jackson and Johnston with their forces were across the Blue Ridge in the Shenandoah Valley. On June 15, Johnston retired towards Winchester because, as he said, Patterson's army had reached the Potomac twenty miles above, and he wanted to be in a position to repel an invasion of the valley or quickly to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Johnston thought, so he said, that Patterson was making a combined movement with MacDell, who was expected to move from Washington on Richmond. If so, Johnston at Harper's Ferry had the interior line and the choice of reinforcing Beauregard or striking Patterson. As Patterson hesitated, it showed that he was afraid to cross the Potomac with Johnston on his flank. Johnston's movement to Winchester, which, as I have said, was really a retreat, about doubled the distance between him and Beauregard. If he had really wanted to join Beauregard, his quickest way to do it would have been to march directly from Harper's Ferry to Bull Run. The distance would have been shorter than his march from Winchester to the railroad station on his way to Manassas. There he left nearly half of his army for want of transportation. It is remarkable, however, that Jackson's biographers, Dabney, Cook, and Henderson, wanted the retreat to Winchester as only a strategic move. Jackson did not think so. Jackson's brigade and Stuart's regiment of cavalry were sent to observe Patterson on the Upper Potomac. Patterson had no cavalry for outpost duty, while Johnston had the regiments of Stuart and Ashby. Jackson's orders were to feel out the enemy, but to avoid an engagement. On July 2 Patterson crossed the Potomac, and Jackson showed sufficient resistance to compel him to display his force and retired as his orders required. He was sure that Patterson had no aggressive purpose but was only making a faint to create a diversion and retain Johnston in the valley when McDowell moved against Beauregard at Manassas. Jackson thought that a blow at Patterson would have been the best way to cooperate with Beauregard. As Jackson had strict ideas of military discipline, he would not criticize his superiors, and although the order to fall back was a disappointment, he did not, like Achilles, sulk in his tent. But a letter he wrote at the time to his wife, read between the lines, shows the chagrin he felt. Colonel Henderson in his Life of Jackson said, The Federal Army crawled on to Martinsburg, holding seven miles southwest. Jackson was reinforced by Johnston's whole command, and here for four days the Confederates drawn up in line of battle awaited attack. But the Federal stood fast in Martinsburg, and on the fourth day, Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied. At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for action. His experience at Falling Waters had given him no exalted notion of the enemy's prowess, and he was ready to engage them single-handed. I want my brigade, he said, to feel that it can itself whip Patterson's whole army, and I believe that we can do it. The truth is that the numerical difference in the strength of the two armies was inconsiderable, but Johnston's had a great advantage in morale and a superior force of cavalry. On July 15, in obedience to General Scott's orders, Patterson moved up the valley, threw some shells at Stuart's regiment, and then turned squarely around and retreated towards Harper's Ferry. The movement was so timid that it was more a farce than a faint. Patterson was not seeking a fight, his movement was only a blind. If the Confederates had then taken the offensive, there would have been a foot-race towards the Potomac, and MacDowell would not have moved against the troops at Manassas. The most effective way to aid Beauregard was to strike Patterson. The next year Jackson did what should have been done in 1861. He turned on banks and swept him out of this Shenandoah Valley, creating such alarm in Washington that MacDowell, who was moving from Fredericksburg to join McClellan at Richmond, was recalled to save the capital. The following dispatch to McClellan from Mr. Lincoln shows what Jackson did in 1862, and what he would have done in 1861 if he had been in command. May 24, 1862. In consequence of General Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General MacDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force on a part of MacDowell's and their rear. The next that was heard of Jackson, he had defeated Fremont and Shields in the Valley, and then turned off on McClellan's flank at Cold Harbor. In July 1861 the larger part of the troops at Manassas should have gone to Johnston instead of his reinforcing Beauregard, that is, if Johnston was willing to take the offensive and cross the Potomac. That was the best way to defend Richmond. On July 17 MacDowell began his movement towards the Confederate capital. Mr. Davis telegraphed to Johnston at Winchester to join Beauregard if practicable. He said, General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy at a decisive blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Courthouse, either by Railroad or by Warrenton. In all arrangements exercise your discretion. President Davis endorsed on Johnston's report of the battle that his order, or rather request to Johnston to join Beauregard, gave him discretion because Johnston's letters of July 12 and 13 made it doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to affect the movement. In the letters Johnston said that he had to defeat Patterson or elude him. It would have been impossible for him to defeat Patterson as the latter was running, as Patterson was trying to elude Johnston, the latter had no trouble in eluding Patterson. On July 13 General Johnston telegraphed to President Davis. Unless he, Patterson, prevents it, we shall move toward Beauregard today. Up to that time, Johnston does not seem to have contemplated, nor was there any plan for any concerted action between Johnston and Beauregard. The march to Manassas did not begin until noon of the 18th. Jackson's brigade was in the advance. It waded the Shenandoah, climbed the Blue Ridge, and arrived at Manassas by rail on the next day. When the troops left Winchester they could not have been expected to join Beauregard at Manassas before a battle, because McDowell's delay of three days at Centerville could not have been anticipated. On the 17th General Scott telegraphed Patterson that McDowell would take Manassas the next day, which probably would have been done if Scott's programed across the Acoquan and turned the Confederate right had been carried out. But McDowell changed the plan, waited to make a reconnaissance on the Confederate left, and decided to cross Bull Run and Sudley. Beauregard was not expecting aid from Johnston, for in a telegram to the War Department he said, I believe this proposed movement of General Johnston is too late, enemy will attack me in force tomorrow morning. When Johnston left the valley, Patterson was in camp at Charlestown. As late as the nineteenth, Patterson insisted that Johnston was at Winchester receiving reinforcements, but on the twentieth he acknowledged that Johnston had gone. It was then too late for him to give assistance to McDowell in the battle the next day. When Patterson was reproached for what he had not done, he consoled Scott by telling him that if he had attacked Joe Johnston, he, Scott, would have had to mourn the loss of two battles instead of one. Johnston arrived at Beauregard's headquarters at Manassas at noon on July twenty, but nearly half of his army was left behind him. Beauregard's army was posted on Bull Run at five or six forwards, stretching from Stonebridge to Union Mills, a distance of eight miles. Bull Run is a creek running through a largely wooded country and is passable anywhere but for its steep banks. Johnston's troops were posted behind Beauregard's at the fords and Jackson was placed in the rear of Bonham. McDowell's headquarters were in plain view six miles distant at Centerville, and also in view of the signal station Captain Alexander had established on the Manassas plain. They proposed an offensive plan which Johnston approved, but no attempt was made to execute it. The battle was defensive on the Confederate side. Early on the morning of the twenty-first the signal officers discovered McDowell's column marching towards Sudley to turn our left at Stonebridge. They reported the movement to General Evans, who commanded there, and to headquarters. Johnston's brigades were in the rear of the fords as reserves, ready to be moved to any point on the line. As Bull Run presented no defensive advantages, it is hard to discover why that line was selected. No matter whether Beauregard intended to act on the offensive or defensive, his army should have been concentrated at one or two fords instead of being distributed at several. Going afterwards, Beauregard claimed that Johnston accepted his plan of battle, waived his rank, and consented to act as his chief of staff. As there was no emergency that required such an abdication of authority, and as there was ample time for Johnston to learn the conditions and get all the topographical knowledge necessary, it would have been shirking responsibility for him to have done so. His objective, McDowell's army, was in sight. He was near Bull Run, and he could easily learn from maps where the fords were and the roads that led to them. Beauregard and his staff officers could have easily told him how the troops were disposed. With such explanation Johnston might, in an hour or so, have taken in the whole situation. Very few commanders were ever on the ground more than a few hours before a battle. It is not their business to act as guides. The country furnishes plenty of them. Of course generals must utilize other men's knowledge. But the inconsistency is that Beauregard claims the credit as commander in chief for winning the victory, but makes Johnston responsible for the failure to reap the fruit of it. He contradicts his own report, written a few days after the battle, which says that the army, after the hard days fighting, was in no condition to pursue. He did not seem to know that he had fifteen thousand fresh men on the field, and that the remainder of Johnston's men arrived next morning. In his military memoirs, General Alexander, who was chief signal officer and also in the evening carried orders on the field, said, Not far off Stonewall Jackson, who had been shot through the hand but had disregarded it until victory was assured, was now having his hand dressed by Dr. Hunter McGuire. Jackson did not catch the Presidents, Davis, words, and Dr. McGuire repeated them to him. Jackson quickly shouted, We have whipped them. They ran like sheep. Give me five thousand men and I will be in Washington City to-morrow morning. Officer Edward Campbell, a surgeon in Jackson's Brigade, told me soon after the war that he heard Jackson make that speech. But Johnson's endorsement on Beauregard's order of battle shows that so far from waving he asserted his rank as commander. Here it is, 4.30 a.m., July 21st. The plan of battle given by General Beauregard in the above order is approved and will be executed accordingly, signed J. E. Johnston, General C. S. Army. As Beauregard submitted his program to Johnson's approval, he recognized Johnson as his superior officer. Orders are not submitted to the approval of subordinates. As a worse plan of operations could hardly have been devised, Johnston might have given Beauregard credit for it if he had adopted it. As there was no attempt to execute it, however, it is immaterial who was the author. The battle was fought on McDowell's plan. What was most remarkable was that instead of directing its immediate execution by an advance of his columns on Centerville, it instructed brigade commanders to hold themselves in readiness to advance but to await orders. None but D. R. Jones received such an order to cross the run that morning, and his was soon revoked. As the enemy was in their front, old soldiers like Jackson, Longstreet, and Ewell ought to have been presumed to be ready for combat without instructions. If the Confederates were to assume the offensive to term McDowell, their movement should have been begun, as McDowell's was, before daybreak, and as they would have had to move through a wooded country, their column should have been as much as possible in sight of and in supporting distance of each other. But what is stranger still is that Beauregard's order of battle, though it contemplated the offensive, is dated at 4.30 a.m. July 21, long after McDowell's army was in motion. McDowell issued his order of battle on the 20th. McDowell saw the danger of keeping the wings of his army so far apart, and said, I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centerville along this ridge, fearing that while we should be enforced to the front and endeavouring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west, to the foot of the spurs to the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position. The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which was to be expected at this season. If the Confederates had moved in two columns from the lower Fords, while Evans and Cock attracted the attention of the enemy above, they would have reached Centerville before McDowell reached Sudley, and they would have been between McDowell and Washington. In that event McDowell said his army would have been destroyed. McDowell saw more clearly than the Confederate generals what they ought to do, but he trusted to they're not doing it. Beauregard's first plan for a simultaneous advance from all the Bull Run Fords to Centerville was impracticable in the wooded country, and it was well that no attempt was made to execute it. His line of battle would have been several miles long. Beauregard commanded that day under Johnston, as me commanded the army of the Potomac under Grant. Beauregard's report said, General Johnston arrived here about noon of the twentieth of July, and being my senior in rank he necessarily assumed command of the forces of the Confederate states, then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously directed their execution under my command. Beauregard must have forgotten, when he wrote afterwards and claimed that he was commander in chief at Bull Run, that he had ever written that Johnston was. Beauregard said that, being informed at 5.30 a.m. that a strong force was deployed in front of Stone Bridge, he ordered Evans and Coch to maintain their positions to the last extremity, and that he thought the most effective method of relieving his left was by making a determined attack by his right. No doubt that was so. He knew, long before MacDowell reached Sudley, that Ewell, Holmes, Jones, and Early had not advanced on Centerville, and there was then abundance of time for them to have reached Centerville before MacDowell reached Sudley. But he said that the noose from the left afterwards changed his plan. As it was clear that MacDowell was making only a feeble demonstration in our front and none on our right, he must have known early in the morning that the main portion of his army was moving against our left. He could not have expected MacDowell to stand still, nor does he give a satisfactory reason for a change of plan, but the reverse. MacDowell was doing what he ought to have wanted him to do. At 7.10 a.m. D. R. Jones, whose brigade was at McLean's Ford near headquarters, he received the following order. Brigadier General D. R. Jones. General. General Ewell has been ordered to take the offence of a pun Centerville. You will follow the movement at once by attacking him in your front. July 21st, 1861, signed GT Beauregard Brigadier. Ewell was at the next Ford below, with Holmes's brigade in support. It was not pretended that any such orders were sent to the brigades at the Fords above. Longstreet, who was at Blackburn's Ford, with early in support, said that in obedience to orders of the 20th to assume the offensive, he crossed Bull Run early on the morning of the 21st. But as he immediately came in contact with the enemy and ordered his men to lie down under cover from the artillery fire, he does not seem to have been ordered to move on Centerville, and does not refer to any such order. He must have been waiting for further orders. It is clear that Bonham received no orders to cross the run, as he did not attempt it, although the enemy opened fire on him early in the morning. He said that even before Daylight, one of his aides, General McGowan, brought intelligence that the enemy was moving on his left, and that he arose and with a field-glass discovered the enemy moving on the Pike to Stone Bridge. He said that he immediately communicated the news to headquarters and directed his command to prepare for action, as he supposed, quote, an assault would be made early along our whole line, end quote. But no such assault was ordered. Early, who was near McLean's Farm in support of Longstreet, did not mention receiving any order to move on Centerville. Neither did Jackson, who was supporting Bonham at Mitchell's Ford. He simply got an order to place himself in position where he could reinforce either cock or Bonham. In the meantime Jackson ascertained that B., who had been sent with his own and Bartow's brigades to reinforce Evans, was hard-pressed. He seemed to have moved in the exercise of his own discretion where the sound of the cannon indicated that the real conflict was. When he reached the plateau where the Henry House stood, he met the shattered brigades of B. and Bartow retreating. Jackson formed his brigade on the crest of the ridge, which will forever be associated with his name. General Alexander described the scene as follows. A fresh brigade was drawn up in line on the elevated ground known as Henry House Hill, and its commander, till then unknown, was henceforth to be called Stonewall. B. wrote up to him and said, General, they are driving us. Then, sir, said Jackson, we must give them the bayonet. B. galloped among his retreating men and called out to them. See Jackson standing like a Stonewall, rally behind the Virginians. It was at this moment when Jackson's and Hampton's were the only organized troops opposing the Federal advance, and B. and Bartow were attempting to rally their broken forces that Johnston and Beauregard reached the field. This was the crisis of the battle, as Jackson's heroic bearing electrified the troops and saved the day. Jackson selected this place as a battleground, and the great struggle was for the possession of the plateau. This was crescent-shaped, the ridge forming a cover which protected his men from artillery fire. Jones said that after getting the order from Beauregard to cross the run and follow Ewell, he sent a message to Ewell, but crossed and took a position on the road from Union Mills to Centerville and waited for Ewell. In the meantime he received the following order directing him to return. 10.30 a.m. General Jones. On account of the difficulties in our front it is thought preferable to counterman the advance of the right wing. Resume your position. Beauregard said that as early as 5.30 a.m. the enemy opened fire on Evans at Stone Bridge, and that by 8.30 a.m. he discovered that it was a mask to cover a movement around his flank, and Evans promptly moved to meet it. So it was then clear that the enemy would be on the left. Instead of a change of plans and a retrograde movement when this was discovered, it was the opportune moment to order our right to advance. Only four companies were left to hold Stone Bridge against Tyler's division. They held it all day. The sound of the battle will now inform our generals where the main effort of the enemy would be made. The difficulties in his front, of which Beauregard spoke in his note to Jones as the cause for revoking the order to advance, instead of deterring should have encouraged him to take the offensive. It was now clear that there was only a small force between him and the enemy's rear at Centerville. Hunters and Heinzelman's divisions reached subtly forward at least eight miles away about 9.30 a.m. They hauled it for rest and for the men to fill their canteens from the stream. The main body of the Confederate Army was then about half the distance from Centerville that subtly is. The three brigades of miles that were in reserve on the road to Blackburns and McLean's Fords could easily have been brushed aside before any reinforcements could have reached them. Then one of his brigade commanders, Richardson, reported that Colonel Stevens, who commanded a regiment there, said, We have no confidence in Colonel Miles because Colonel Miles is drunk, all of which was in our favor. It was much better for the Confederates if Ewells and Jones's forward movements were delayed until 9.00 by a miscarriage of orders, for by that time McDowell had progressed too far to turn back when he heard of it. When at Austerlitz Napoleon saw the Allies marching towards his rear, he told his marshals to be quiet, not to interrupt them. After their movement had developed sufficiently he struck such a blow as Johnston and Beauregard might have repeated at Centerville. McDowell dreaded such a counterstroke, and in the morning on the road to Sudley he halted Howard and kept his brigade in reserve near the pike until noon to meet such a contingency. On the field McDowell saw what he might do, and reports from the signal stations and heavy firing told Johnston and Beauregard what they could do, that the enemy had exposed his rear. But, in my judgment, said Beauregard, it was now 10.30 a.m., too late for the contemplated movement. Napoleon would have thought it was the hour for it to begin. It is a mystery why the Confederate generals abandoned their plan, if they ever had such a plan. Alexander said, about 8.00 a.m. Johnston and Beauregard, accompanied by their staffs and couriers, rode to the vicinity of Mitchell's Ford where they left their party under cover and took position on an open hill some two hundred yards to the left of the road. Richardson was in their front, making a faint by shelling the woods. If he had intended a real attack he would not have halted. The resistance made by Evans's small force on the Sudley Road showed that, with reinforcement of Cox Brigade at the ford below, McDowell's turning column could have been held in check until ours took Centerville. The fact is that the roaring guns and the despairing cry for help from Centerville would have stampeded McDowell. General Johnston said the news from our left made their plan impracticable. I think it showed not only that it was practicable, but a dead sure thing if they had attempted to execute it. McDowell thought so, too. I am not judging the Confederate generals by the lights that are now before me, but by what their reports say was before them, then. Again, quoting Alexander. As he rode out in the morning, Beauregard directed me to go with a courier to the Whitehawkson signal station and remain in general observation of the field, sending messages of all I could discover. I went reluctantly as the opportunities seemed very slight of rendering any service. There were but two signal stations on our battle, one in rear of McLean's Ford and one near Van Pelt's House on a bluff a few hundred yards to the left and rear of Stone Bridge. Beyond the latter the broad-level valley of Bull Run for some miles with its fields and pastures as seen through the glass was foreshortened into a narrow band of green. While watching the flag of this station with a good glass, when I had been there about half an hour, the sun being in the east behind me, my eye was caught by a glitter in this narrow band of green. I recognized it at once as the reflection of the morning sun from a brass field-piece. Closer scrutiny soon revealed the glittering of bayonets and masked barrels. It was about 8.45 a.m. and I had discovered, McDowell's turning column, the head of which at this hour was just arriving at Sudley eight miles away. I appreciated how much it might mean and thought it best to give Evans immediate notice, even before sending word to Beauregard. So I signaled Evans quickly, Look out for your left, you are turned. Evans afterwards told me that a picket, which he had at Sudley, being driven in by the enemy's advance guard, had sent a courier and the two couriers, one with my signal message and one with the report of the picket, reached him together. The simultaneous reports from different sources impressed him and he acted at once with sound judgment. He left four companies of his command to watch the bridge and the enemy in his front, Tyler and his three brigades. With the remainder of his force, six companies of the fourth South Carolina and Wheats, Louisiana Battalion, he marched to oppose and delay the turning column, at the same time notifying Coch, next on his right, of his movement. Having sent Evans notice of his danger, I next wrote to Beauregard as follows, I see a body of troops crossing Bull Run about two miles above the Stone Bridge. The head of the column is in the woods on this side. The rear of the column is in the woods on the other side. About half a mile of its length is visible in the open ground between. I can see both infantry and artillery. This message reached Beauregard in a few minutes. Johnston's report said, About eight o'clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a commanding hill in rear of General Bonham's left, Mitchell's Ford. Near nine o'clock, the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the bridge. General Bea, who had been placed near Colonel Coch's position, Colonel Hampton with his legion, and Colonel Jackson from a point near General Bonham's left, were ordered to hasten to the left flank. Alexander continued his account. For a long time there was little change and the battle seemed to stand still. When Evans and Beauregard were broken by Sherman's attack on the flank, their retreat was specially pressed by the Federal artillery. On reaching the warrants in Pike they were met by the Hampton legion and Hampton made an earnest effort to rally the retreating force upon his command. The ground, however, was unfavorable and though Hampton made a stubborn fight, losing 121 out of 600 men and delaying the advance near two hours before leaving the Pike, our whole line then fell back under the enemy's fire. Jackson now came to the rescue. He had 2,611 men and with the remnants of Hampton's 600 they were the only organized troops opposing the enemy's advance. Bea, Bartow, and Evans were engaged in rallying their troops as Johnston and Beauregard appeared. Johnston took up his headquarters a short distance in the rear to direct reinforcements while the immediate conduct of the battle was left to Beauregard. His task was to hold the line until fresh troops could be brought upon the scene. McDowell's last chance was to crush Beauregard's line at once before any reinforcements arrived. Some of his brigades were absent. Burnsides had drawn off for rest and ammunition and his partial attacks only consumed time. About three o'clock Kirby Smith's brigade arrived and it was closely followed by Earley's brigade and Beckham's battery. Kirby Smith was severely wounded just as he was extending his line on our left, and Elsie took command. Kirby Smith was the first man I ever saw carried from the field on a stretcher. About four o'clock Beauregard advanced his whole line and the 18th Virginia under Colonel Withers, the 8th Virginia under Colonel Hunton, and the Hampton Legion with Jackson's brigade swept the field and turned the enemy's guns on them. Earley, with Beckham's battery and Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Warrenton Pike and opened on the flanking rear of a new line which McDowell had formed. This force had no artillery to reply to ours and it soon broke. McDowell said, The retreat soon became a rout and this soon degenerated into a panic. Heinzelman said, Such a rout I never witnessed before. Stuart's cavalry had charged and routed the Ellsworth Zoos on the subway road as they were coming to the support of the Federal Batteries. Heinzelman led the Zoos. His account of this was as follows. In the meantime I sent orders for the Zoos to move forward to support Rickard's battery on its right. As soon as they came up I led them forward against an Alabama regiment partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke and the greater portion fled to the rear, keeping up a disultery fire over the heads of their comrades in front. At the same time they were charged by a company of secession cavalry on their rear who had come by a road through two strips of woods on our extreme right. Stuart's charge was not on the rear of the Zoos but on their front when they were advancing to the support of the batteries. Heinzelman said the regiment dispersed and did not appear on the field again. The greater portion kept on to New York. Porter said, The evanescent courage of the Zoos prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy's cavalry which took place immediately. Soon the slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces whilst riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. As McDowell, with the larger part of his army, had moved in a circle by suddenly, and as they retreated by the same route, if our troops on the field had moved on the straight line on the pike leading over Stonebridge to Centerville they would have cut off their retreat. This is what Jackson wanted to do. After the battle had shifted, Alexander joined Beauregard. He said that Jackson alone of the Confederate leaders on the field gave any evidence of his appreciation of the victory. After the war Dr. Edward Campbell, a surgeon of Jackson's brigade, told me that Jackson said to him, I wonder if General Johnston and General Beauregard know how badly they, the enemy, are whipped. If they will let me I will march my brigade into Washington to-night. Alexander said he heard Jackson tell President Davis the same thing. His account concludes, Jackson's offer to take Washington City the next morning with five thousand men had been made to the President as he arrived upon the field, probably about five o'clock. It was not sunset until 7.15 and there was nearly a full moon. But the President himself and both generals spent these precious hours in riding over the field where the conflict had taken place. Johnston and Beauregard both sent orders to different commands to make such advances, but neither went in person to supervise or urge forward the execution of the order, though time was of the essence. Kershaw with two South Carolina regiments, Kemper with two guns, and some cavalry were all the troops that pursued over Stonebridge, although there were several brigades near that that had not been much engaged, some not at all. Alexander carried the first order from Beauregard about 6 p.m. in checking pursuit. It directed Kershaw to advance over Bull Run carefully, but not to attack. Alexander, surprised at his ill-timed caution, asked if he forbade any attack. Beauregard replied that Kershaw must wait for Kemper and pursue cautiously. It would have been as easy to send half a dozen batteries as one. Alexander overtook Kershaw, just as Kemper's two guns opened on the retreating column, and upset a wagon on Cub Run Bridge that created a blockade by which a good deal of artillery was lost. On his way back to Beauregard, Alexander met a staff officer carrying an order for all the troops to return. Alexander was at the council of Mr. Davis and the generals that night at Manassas. The conclusion was reached to make a reconnaissance the next morning. Some cavalry scouting parties were sent, who saw nothing but the wreck of McDowell's army. It would have been as easy to have found that out before midnight as in the morning, if they had tried, as no attempt was made to rally the retreating army. McDowell sent a dispatch from Fairfax Courthouse. The larger part of the men were a confused mob, entirely demoralized. It was the opinion of all the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac. They are now passing through this place in a state of utter disorganization. Edwin M. Stanton, afterwards secretary of war, on July 26, five days after the battle, wrote to ex-president Buchanan. The capture of Washington now seems to be inevitable. During the whole of Monday and Tuesday it might have been taken without resistance. The rout, overthrow, and demoralization of the army is complete. General Johnson afterwards said as an excuse for not pursuing that his army was as much demoralized by victory as the enemies by defeat. Nobody suspected it then. We had about fifteen thousand troops on the field, who had not been engaged, and a good many arrived the next morning. On the case on attached to one of Kemper's guns, when it swept over Bull Run, was an old Virginian whose long white hair hung on his shoulders and gave him the look of a patriarch. When Kemper unlimbered near Cub Run he claimed the privilege of firing the first gun. He had done the same when Beauregard opened his batteries on Sumter. When the curtain was let down on the last scene at Appomattox he blew out his brains and ended life's fitful fever. In his report General Johnson said that our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be. He took no account of Stuart's charge at a critical moment when the Zoos were coming upon Jackson's flank, nor of the fact that his army exceeded McDowell's in numbers and had three or four times as much cavalry. The returns show that in Beauregard's army that day there were fourteen hundred and sixty-eight cavalry, and that Stuart, who had come from the Shenandoah Valley, had twelve companies. Besides, Ashby arrived the day after the battle with a cavalry regiment. Johnson and Beauregard had a total of effectives that day of thirty-one thousand nine hundred eighty-two men and fifty-five guns, although they sent only two guns over the run in pursuit. McDowell's total was twenty-nine thousand eight hundred sixty-two men, and but seven companies of cavalry. Cavalry is needed as much to cover a retreat as to pursue. We had enough cavalry to have taken Washington. It is true, as General Johnson said, that the city is situated on an unfortable river, but less than twenty miles above is afford at Seneca where Stuart crossed going to Gettysburg, and it often afterwards crossed there. Our cavalry was nearer Seneca than McDowell's army was to Washington when the retreat began, and ought to have crossed the Potomac that night. The next day it could have easily moved around towards Baltimore, broken communications, and isolated Washington. It is paradoxical but true that the Confederate cause was lost at Bull Run. Yet the victory reflected on those who wanted all the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome, and no matter now what men may speculate as to what might have been. Cold must be the heart that can read that glorious record and not feel sympathy with sons that sent. Chapter 7 About Fairfax Courthouse Until the spring of 1862 we did picket duty on the Potomac, a more agreeable duty than the routine of a camp. There were some skirmishes and many false alarms. A hog-rooting or an old hare on its nocturnal rounds would often draw the fire of a vedette. My company went three times a week on picket and remained twenty-four hours when we were relieved by another company. The following letters from Colonel Mosby to his wife and his sister give the most interesting events of the time between the Battle of Manassas and the Campaign of 1862. Fairfax Courthouse, July 29, 1861. Dearest Pauline, we have made no further advance and I know no more of contemplative movements than you do. A few nights ago we went down near Alexandria to stand as a picket advanced guard. It was after dark. When riding along the road of volley was suddenly poured into us from a thick clump of pines, the balls whistled round us and Captain Jodes's horse fell, shot through the head. We were perfectly helpless as it was dark and they were concealed in the bushes. The best of it was that the Yankees shot three of their own men, thought they were ours. Beauregard has no idea of attacking Alexandria. When he attacks Washington he will go about Alexandria to attack Washington. No other news. For one week before the battle we had an awful time. Had about two meals during the whole time. Marched two days and one night on one meal in the rain in order to arrive in time for the fight. We captured a great quantity of baggage left here by the Yankees with orders for it to be forwarded to Richmond. Fairfax Courthouse, August 18, 1861. My dearest Pauline, I was in a little brush with them one day last week. A party of ten of us came upon about a hundred and fifty. We fired on them and of course retreated before such superior numbers. We jumped into the bushes to reload and give it to them again when they came up. But instead of pursuing us they put back to their own cap. When I was last on picket I was within about four miles of Georgetown and could distinctly hear the enemy's morning drumbeat. Some of the Yankees came to my post under a flag of truce, stayed all night, ate supper with me, and we treated each other with as much courtesy as did Richard and Saladin when they met by the Diamond of the Desert. Our blister plaster doctor affords us a good deal of fun. He is one of the most pompous fellows you ever saw. He went with us on picket one night, got scared, ran to us and swore he had ridden through a whole regiment of the enemy's infantry. The whole truth was there was not a Yankee in three miles of him. Fairfax Courthouse, September 2, 1861. My dearest Pauline, I received a fall from my horse one day last week down at Falls Church which came near killing me. I have now entirely recovered and will return to camp this morning. I was out on picket one dark rainy night. There were only three of us at our post. A large body of cavalry came dashing down towards us from the direction of the enemy. Our orders were to fire on all. I fired my gun, started back toward where our main body was, my horse slipped down, fell on me and galloped off, leaving me in a senseless condition in the road. Fortunately the body of cavalry turned out to be a company of our own men who had gone out after night to arrest a spy. When they started they promised Captain Jones to go by our post and inform us of the fact in order to prevent confusion. This they failed to do and their own culpable neglect came near getting some of them killed. Our troops are gradually encroaching on the Federals, now occupying a position in full view of Washington. A brush is looked for there today. I rode out one day about a week ago with our wagon after hay, came to where our pickets were stationed. They were in full view of the Yankees a few hundred yards off on the opposite hill. The Yankees were firing at our men with long-range guns but ours could not return it as they have only old muskets. I have a splendid sharps carbine which will kill at a thousand yards. I dismounted and turned loose on them. I had to fire at them most of the time in a thick field of corn, of course could not tell the effect, but once when a fellow ran out into the road, in which I stood to shoot at me, it took several to carry him back. Camp near Fairfax Courthouse, September 17, 1861 Dear Liz, Mosby's sister. Beauregard and Johnston are expected to move their headquarters up to Fairfax today. Although Captain Jones is a strict officer, he is very indulgent to me, and never refuses me any favour, I ask him. I think he will be made a colonel very soon. Aaron, Mosby's servant, considers himself next in command of Captain Jones. Nobody thinks the war will continue longer than a few months. We will clean them out in two more battles. Camp near Fairfax Courthouse, September 14, 1861 My dearest Pauline. Today we go unpick it at the big falls on the Potomac. One hill we occupy commands a full view of the capital. I went to take a view of it with Lloyd. We could see it distinctly with all their fortifications and the stars and stripes floating over it. I thought of the last time I had seen it, for you were there with me and I could not but feel some regrets that it was no longer the capital of my country, but that of a foreign foe. Camp near Fairfax, September 1861 My dearest Pauline. The enemy had come up with three thousand men, artillery, etc., to Louisville, one of our picket stations. When we got there they were still there. Three men of our company, including myself, were detached to go forward to Reconoiter. Colonel Stewart was with us. While standing near the opening of a wood, a whole regiment of Yankees came up in full view within a hundred yards of me. Their Colonel was mounted on a splendid horse and was very gaily dressed. I was in the act of shooting him, which I could have done with ease with my carbine, when Colonel Stewart told me not to shoot, fearing they were our men. I never regretted anything so much in my life as the glorious opportunity I missed of winging their Colonel. We went back and brought up our artillery, which scattered them at the first shot. I never enjoyed anything so much in my life as standing by the cannon and watching our shells when they burst over them. Camp Cooper, November 21, 1861 My dearest Pauline. On Monday I participated in what is admitted to have been the most dashing feat of the war. Colonel Lee took about eighty men out on a scout. Hearing where a company of about the same number of Yankees were on picket, we went down and attacked. They were concealed in a pine-thicket, where one man ought to have been equal to ten outside. We charged right into them, and they poured a raking fire into our ranks. Fount Beatty and myself, in the ardour of pursuit, had gotten separated some distance from our main body when we came upon two Yankees in the woods. We ordered them to surrender, but they replied by firing on us. One of the Yankees jumped behind a tree and was taking aim at Fount when I leveled my pistol at him, but missed him. He also fired, but missed Fount, though within a few feet of him. I then jumped down from my horse and as the fellow turned to me, I rested my carbine against a tree and shot him dead. He never knew what struck him. Fount fired at one with his pistol, but missed. A South Carolinian came up and killed the other. The man I killed had a letter in his pocket from his sweetheart Clara. They were of the Brooklyn Zoabs and fought at Manassas. 1862 My dearest Pauline, get Aaron to give you a full account of his adventure, his memorable retreat from Bunker Hill, his dockering the sick men during the battle he is a good deal thought of in the company. Footnote. The story of the sick men concerns the battle of Manassas. They covered themselves with heavy blankets and shivered when the shells were flying. When they were not, they would recover and raise up and ask Aaron, haven't you got a few more of those corncakes? End of footnote. At the end of 1861 occurred an event which greatly disappointed Southern hopes. Mason and Slidle had been sent as ambassadors to England and France. They escaped through the blockading fleet at Charleston and arrived at Nassau where they took passage on the English steamer Trent. The vessel was stopped on the high seas by Captain Wilkes of the San Jacinto and the ambassadors were taken off and confined in Fort Warren, Boston. This action was hailed with as much joy in the South as in the North. The Confederates thought their ambassadors would be held as prisoners and conceived it to be impossible that they would be surrendered on the demand of England after the Secretary of the Navy had approved the conduct of Wilkes and Congress had given him a vote of thanks. Fortunately for the Union cause neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Seward had committed himself to an approval of it but both had kept a judicious silence until they could hear from England. In the South we all felt sure that England would never submit to such an indignity and breach of neutrality. War between England and the United States was considered inevitable and we could almost hear the roar of English guns dispersing the fleets which were blockading our coasts. With England as an ally of the South our success was certain but the administration wisely yielded to England's demand and surrendered the captives. Mr. Seward in a letter to Lord Lyons ingeniously maintained that he was consistent in so doing and that in demanding their release England had at last claimed for neutrals the rights for which the United States had always contended. Mason and Slidle were transferred to an English gunboat lying off Cape Cod and thus withered our hopes of having England as an ally. There was no longer a Cossus belly. The Richmond Examiner, January 1st, 1862, said of this affair, The year which has just begun opens with evil tidings. We fear there is no doubt of the fact that the Northern Union has consented to the surrender of Mason and Slidle and with that event all hopes of an immediate alliance between the Southern Confederacy and Great Britain must cease. It happened that I brought to the camps in Fairfax the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidle. Fitzhugh Lee took a part of my regiment on a scout and we came upon the Brooklyn Fourteenth that was doing picket duty. They wore red breeches so we called them the red-legged Yankees. As soon as we got inside of them we charged. A portion of them were in a dense thicket which we couldn't penetrate on horseback and so a few of us dismounted and charged on foot with carbines to the point where the reserve had a fire. We took a number of prisoners and I picked up a newspaper. It was about sundown. The paper was a copy of the Washington Star of that evening and had an account of the capture of Mason and Slidle. When we brought the prisoners to Fitzhugh Lee I said, Colonel, here's a copy of today's paper. Fitzhugh Lee replied, The ruling passion strong in death, referring to my reputation of always being the first man in the company to get hold of a newspaper. Colonel Jones sent the paper to General Johnson's headquarters at Centerville. A popular notion has prevailed that a great benefit would have resulted to the South if England and France had received our ministers and established diplomatic relations with the Southern Confederacy. I never thought so, unless they had gone further and intervened in our behalf, as France did with the colonies and sent their fleets to break the blockade. In that event they would have become parties to the war. When they proclaimed their neutrality and accorded us belligerent rights and the hospitality of their ports to Confederate cruisers they just as much recognized the independence of the South as if they had officially received its ministers. The human mind cannot conceive of belligerent rights except as attached to a supreme independent power. There was a great deal of complaint against England for her haste and proclaiming neutrality and thus recognizing the belligerent character of the contest. But the Congress called by Mr. Lincoln in July 1861 before Bull Run had been fought as Webster'd said about Bunker Hill, elevated an insurrection into a public war. It passed an act forbidding commercial intercourse between persons living North and South of the Potomac and declaring the forfeiture of goods caught in transit and also the seizure of vessels on the high seas as enemy property if the owners lived in the South. It also declared that such seizures and intercourse should be governed not by the municipal law of the country but by the law of nations. It thus recognized our sectional conflict as a public territorial war and not, like the Wars of the Roses, a contest of factions. The law of nations regulates the relations of alien enemies in war and can have no application to citizens of the same country. This act of Congress was a declaration of a war intergentes, as much so as that between France and Prussia. The Amy Warwick, owned in Richmond, sailed from Rio without notice of the blockade. She was seized on the voyage and condemned as a prize of war. It was contented that there was no proof that her owner was in rebellion, but the Supreme Court held that international law took no notice of the personal sentiments of individuals but that their domicile determined their legal status. In the opening of the year 1862 there was a great deal of depression in the Southern Confederacy. A considerable amount of this was due to the failure of our hopes of having England as an immediate ally, but most of it was on account of the expiration in the coming spring of the terms of enlistment of most of the regiments and the reluctance of the men to re-enlist before going to their homes. General Joe Johnston issued an address urging the twelve months volunteers to re-enlist, but it had little or no effect. He said, the commanding general calls upon the twelve months men to stand by their brave comrades who have volunteered for the war, to re-volunteer at once and thus show the world that the patriots who engaged in this struggle do not swerve from the bloodiest path they may be called to tread. The fear that the army would disappear like a morning mist is shown in the farewell address of General Beauregard dated January 30, 1862, when he was about to leave to take command in the West. He said, Above all I am anxious that my brave countrymen here in arms fronting the haughtily arrayed master of northern mercenaries should thoroughly appreciate the exigency and hence comprehend that this is no time for the army of the Potomac, the men of Manassas, to stack their arms and quit, even for a brief period the standards they have made glorious by their manhood. The fact that Beauregard italicized the latter part of the sentence was a moment of impending danger. Mr. Davis also sent a message to Congress in which he said, I therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all persons residing within the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to be in the military service of the Confederate States. The conscription law increased the numbers but impaired the pretty core of the volunteer army that won the victory of Manassas. The flower of southern manhood had been gathered there, but the law saved the Confederacy from the danger of collapse without another battle through the disbandment of its army. After the war I heard severe criticism of the conscription act, which in fact saved the Confederacy for a time. CHAPTER VIII. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. This recording is by Mark Smith of Simpsonville, South Carolina. Mosby's Memoirs by Colonel John Singleton Mosby. CHAPTER VIII. The last time I went on picket was on the 12th of February, 1862. By this time Stuart had been made a Brigadier General, and Jones was Colonel of the Regiment. The road from our camp to the outposts passed through Centerville, where General Joe Johnston and Stuart had their headquarters. On that February day Stuart joined us, and I observed that an empty carriage was following, though I did not understand the reason. When we arrived at Fairfax Courthouse, Stuart asked Captain Blackford to detail a man to go in the carriage with some ladies. There was a fine family in the place, who always gave me my breakfast when I was on picket, and, as one of the ladies in the party was a member of the family, I was detailed to go as an escort several miles inside our lines. They did not like being on the picket line where there were frequent skirmishes. So I left my horse for my messmate, Fount Beatty, to bring back to camp the next day, and took my seat in the carriage with the ladies. It was a raw cold morning, and it soon began to snow. We arrived at our journey's end in the evening, and I then started for Stuart's headquarters. When I reached there it was dark, and the snow was still falling. Although I had been in Stuart's regiment from the beginning of the war, I had no acquaintance with him, and no reason to suppose that he had ever heard of me. So I went into the house, reported to him that I had left the ladies at their destination, and asked him for a pass, as my camp on the bull run was several miles away. The sentinels would not let me go back without one. Now the weather would not have been any more severe on me if I had walked back to camp that night than if I had stayed on picket. I never dreamed of Stuart's inviting me to spend the night at headquarters, or that I should ever rise to intimacy with him. There could have been nothing prepossessing in my general appearance to induce him to make an exception of me, for I was as roughly dressed as any common soldier. But he told me the weather was too bad and to stay there that night. Of course I obeyed, took my seat before a big blazing fire. Both of the generals were sitting there, but I felt so small in their presence that I looked straight into the fire and never dared to raise my head. I would have felt far more comfortable trudging back to camp through the snow. Presently a boy announced that supper was ready. The generals arose, and as Stuart walked into the supper room he told me to come in and get some supper. I was astonished and kept my seat. Stuart observed my absence from the table and sent for me. So I obeyed, went in, and took a seat with the generals. I do not think I raised my eyes from my plate although they chatted freely. When it was time to go to sleep Stuart had some blankets spread on the floor, and I was soon snoring. The same thing happened in the morning. A boy announced breakfast. Stuart told me to come in, and I again stayed behind, and he had to send for me. It has always been a mystery to me why Stuart made me his guest that night and did not put me with his couriers, which would have been more agreeable to me. After breakfast Stuart sent me, mounted to my camp, with a courier to bring back the horse I rode. So here began my friendship for Stuart which lasted as long as he lived. It is a coincidence that it began on the very day I received my first promotion. I had scarcely reached our camp when a message came from Commander of the Regiment, Colonel Jones, to come to his tent. I went and he offered me the position of adjutant. I was as much astonished as I had been the night before to be asked to sit at the table with the generals. Of course I was glad to accept it, and Jones wrote to the War Department requesting my appointment. The Journal of the Confederate Senate shows that I was confirmed to take rank from February 17, 1862. I have always had repugnance to ceremonials, and was not half so much frightened in the Battle of Buran as I was on the first dress parade I conducted. On such occasions the adjutant is the most conspicuous figure. I never could repeat the formulas of the regulations, and for this reason I remember the few weeks I served as an adjutant with less satisfaction than any other portion of my life as a soldier. Undated fragment of a letter to Mrs. Mosby. We are suffering the most intense anxiety to hear the final result from Donaldson. If we are defeated there it will prolong the war, I fear, but the idea of giving up or abandoning the field now should never enter a southern man's head. To be sure there must be a costly sacrifice of our best blood, but the coward dies a thousand deaths, the brave man dies but one. End of Letter When news came to Richmond that Grant's attack on Fort Donaldson had been repulsed Confederate hopes of final success were raised to a high pitch, but they sank to zero the next day when a dispatch came announcing the fall of Donaldson and the surrender of most of the garrison. Kentucky was now lost to us and most of Middle Tennessee. A greater blunder was never committed in war than when General Albert Sidney Johnston sent Floyd, Buckner and Pillow down the Cumberland River with about seventeen thousand troops to hold a fort situated in the angle made by the confluence of the Cumberland and a deep, unfortable creek. There was no line of retreat open by land and no transportation provided for escape by water in case of defeat. The Confederates were caught in a trap and their surrender was of course inevitable. The first attacks of the gun-boats under Commodore Foote were repulsed and in the evening the situation was about the same as it had been in the morning. But Buckner and Pillow seemed to think that their men would not fight any longer, although they had an abundance of rations and Floyd swore that he would not surrender either himself or his brigade. Floyd was the senior officer and it was agreed that he should turn over the command to Pillow, who was next in rank, and that he in turn should turn it over to Buckner. Floyd with his brigade escaped at night on two steamboats that happened to come down with supplies from Nashville that evening. Pillow in some way got to the opposite bank of the river and left his troops behind him. It has never been explained why a few boats were not on hand to set the Confederates over the river when resistance became hopeless or why the two which Floyd took were not used during the night to convey the army to the other bank. At daybreak Buckner ordered a parley to be sounded and capitulated to Grant without conditions. He did not even get as good terms as General Lee got for the fragment of his army at Appomattox. Mr. Davis relieved both Floyd and Pillow of command, but with strange inconsistency he praised General Johnston for putting them in a hole where they fought for two days to get out. The affair of Donaldson was a most discreditable thing to our side of the war. Camp of First Cavalry, March 1st, 1862. Dear Pauline. Nobody here is the least discouraged at our late reverses that they will prolong the war I have no doubt, but they have not made the first step towards subjugation. Nothing can reverse my own decision to stay in the foremost ranks where life is lost or freedom won. I want to see in southern women some of that Spartan heroism of the mother who said to her son when she buckled on his armor, return with your shield or return upon it. Our army is now falling back from Centerville, but whether to Manassas or Gordonsville I don't know. We haven't moved our camp. End of Letter. When Johnston retired from Centerville in the spring of 1862, our regiment was the rearguard of the army. Johnston fell back leisurely, first to the Rappahannock and then to the Rappadan, where he waited for McClellan to develop his campaign. In December 1864 I had dinner with General Lee at his headquarters near Petersburg and he told me that Johnston should never have moved from the Rappadan to Richmond, that when it was discovered that McClellan was moving down the Potomac, he wrote Johnston and urged him to move back against Washington. Lee was confident that such a menace of the capital would recall McClellan to defend it. A considerable Union force followed our regiment, as we withdrew along the railroad, and when it got near our picket line on Cedar Run it deployed in an open field and made a great display. Jones was on the picket line that day and I was with him and witnessed the exhibition. The pickets withdrew and the enemy occupied the ground on which we had been for several days. That night my regiment camped near Belton Station. The next morning I rode there and met Stuart. The enemy was already in sight and advancing. I had become pretty well acquainted with Stuart after I became an adjutant and had already conducted several scouting expeditions for him. As we met that morning he said to me very earnestly and he seemed puzzled. General Johnston wants to know if McClellan's army is following us or if this is only a faint he is making. Evidently Stuart wanted me to find out for him but did not like to order me. I saw the opportunity for which I had longed and said in a self-confident tone, I will find out for you if you will give me a guide. He gave me one who knew the road and with two others of my party I started around the flank of the hostile column and got in its rear while it was advancing to the Rappahannock. As the enemy moved south and we went north my party was in its rear when the Union column reached the Rappahannock and began shelling the Confederates who had just crossed. As we were behind the enemy we soon discovered that an isolated body was following Johnston and that it kept up no line of communication with Washington. It was clear that the movement was a mask to create a diversion and cover some operation. Of course I was proud to have made the discovery and I rode nearly all night to report it to Stuart. When we got near the river we halted at a farmhouse for there was danger of being shot by our own pickets if we attempted to cross the river in the dark. As soon as it was daylight I started leaving my companions asleep. A picket halted me when I got halfway across the river and it was with great difficulty that I could persuade him not to fire. At last I made him ashamed of himself when I told him I was only one man and asked him if he was afraid of one Yankee. He told me to come on but he kept his gun leveled at me. I went on at a gallop and found Stuart with General Ewell whose division was in line of battle expecting the enemy to attempt to cross the river. A heavy fog concealed their backward movement. I told Stuart that there was no support behind the force in front and that it was falling back. A curtain of cavalry had been left behind to cover the retreat. Our cavalry was immediately ordered in pursuit and I went with it. In the rapture of the moment Stuart told me I could get any reward I wanted. His report confirms this statement about the information that was obtained but I got no reward. Culpeper County, April 1st, 1862 My dearest Pauline Although I do not belong to that company, Blackford's, being on the regimental staff, I went with them into the fight. The appearance of the enemy when they crossed Cedar Run was the most magnificent sight I ever beheld. We let them, the advance guard of cavalry, cross when dismounting we delivered a volley with our carbines which sent them back across the deep stream in the wildest confusion. One fellow was thrown into the water over his head and scrambling out ran off and left his horse. Another horse fell, rose, and fell again, bearing his rider with him under the water. We ceased firing, threw up our caps and indulged in the most boisterous laughter. Colonel Jones speaks of some service I have recently rendered. At one time with four men I passed around, got to the rear of the enemy, discovered that they were making a faint movement on the railroad while they were really moving in another direction. I rode nearly all night to give the information which resulted in General Stewart's ordering our regiment in pursuit and the capture of about thirty prisoners, sixteen horses, arms, etc. General Stewart was so much pleased with my conduct that he wrote a report to General Johnston commending me very highly and also recommending my promotion. When our regiment got to the vicinity of Yorktown it was reorganized and Fitz Lee, who had been a lieutenant colonel, was elected colonel. Stewart invited me to come to his headquarters and act as a scout. I got no commission and stayed with his couriers. In this ambiguous condition I remained for a year or until I took up my independent command. April 25, 1862 My dearest Pauline Our regiment was reorganized day before yesterday. Colonel Fitz-Hugh Lee was elected over Colonel Jones. Colonel Jones left immediately for Richmond. He expects to be a brigadier general. Immediately after the election I handed in my resignation of my commission. The president had commissioned me for the war but I would not be adjutant of a colonel against his wishes or if I were not his first choice. General Stewart told me yesterday that he would see that I had a commission. Richmond, June 2, 1862 My dearest Pauline The papers will give you about as much as I know of the fight, the Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. I went down over the battlefield yesterday. Our men were all among the enemy's tents which were still standing, their camp kettles on the fire, etc. We whipped them in their fortifications. General Lee is now in command. General Johnston being wounded. There is so much confusion in Richmond that I do not know whether I can get your memorandum filled today. There is nothing like a panic. Everybody being engaged in preparing to take care of the wounded. In June, 1862, McClellan was a straddle of the Chickahominy. His right rested on the Pamunkey but there was a gap of several miles between his left and the James. The two armies were so close to each other that the cavalry was of little use and it was therefore kept in the rear. One morning I was at breakfast with Stewart and he said that he wanted to find out if McClellan was fortifying on the Tata Potomy, a creek that empties into the Pamunkey. I was glad to go for him and started off with three men. But we found a flag of truce on the road and turned off to scout in another direction. I did not want to go back without doing something. We did not get the information for which we were sent, but we did get intelligence of even more value. We penetrated McClellan's lines and discovered that for several miles his right flank had only cavalry pickets to guard his line of communication with his depot at the White House on the Pamunkey. Here it seemed to me was an opportunity to strike a blow. McClellan had not anticipated any such move and had made no provision against it. On discovering the conditions I hastened back to Stewart and found him sitting in the front yard. It was a hot day. I was tired and lay down on the grass to tell him what I had learned. A Martinette would have ordered me to stand in his presence. He listened to my story and when I had finished told me to go to the adjutant's office and write it down. At the same time he ordered a courier to get ready to go with him to General Lee's headquarters. I did as he requested and brought him a sheet of paper with what I had written. After reading it Stewart called my attention to it's not being signed. I signed it though I had thought he only wanted a memorandum of what I had said. General Lee had never heard of me. Stewart took the paper and went off with a courier at a gallop. As soon as he returned orders were issued to the cavalry to be ready. General Lee's instructions authorizing the expedition were dated June 11. I had reported the day before. On the morning of the 12th with 1200 cavalry and two pieces of artillery Stewart passed through Richmond and took the road towards Ashland. I was at headquarters when Stewart was leaving. The officer in charge asked him when he would be back. His answer was it may be for years, it may be forever. His spirits were buoyant. The column moved on to Old Church in Hanover where two squadrons of U.S. regular cavalry were stationed under the command of Captain Royal. When the pickets were chased in Royal heard the firing and went to their support. He had no cause to suspect the numbers he was meeting for McClellan had never even considered the possibility of a force breaking through his lines and passing around him. A squadron of the 9th Virginia cavalry led our column. Captain Latine was in command. A charge was ordered and in the combat Royal was wounded and routed and Latine was killed. We could not stay to give him even a hasty burial. Our forces soon had possession of the abandoned camp and as the enemy had had no time to pack up there was a festival. We were now on the flank of the enemy but nine miles from the railroad which was his line of communication. The question which Stewart had to determine was whether to go on or turn back. We were near the Pamunkey and if we kept on the road would soon be closed behind us. The only way of return would then be to pass around McClellan. I felt great anxiety for fear that Stewart would halt for I realized that there was a chance for him to do something that had never been done. His decision to go on showed that he possessed true military genius. Just before Stewart gave the order for us to move he turned to me and said I want you to go on some distance ahead. Very well said I but give me a guide. Two soldiers who knew the roads were ordered to go with me. I was proud to be selected for such a duty and was full of enthusiasm. We had not gone far before Stewart sent one of his staff to tell me to go faster and increase the distance between us. As we jogged along two miles in advance of the column we came upon a Suttler's wagon. It was filled with so many tempting things which we had not seen for nearly two years that we felt as if the blockade had been raised. We exercised the belligerent right of search. At the same time I could see about a mile away in the Pamunkey River a forest of masts of schooners which were unloading supplies into a train of wagons ready to carry them to the army. So I sent one man back to tell Stewart to hurry and capture the prizes and put the other as a guard over the Suttler. I then went on alone. When Stewart came up he sent a squadron to burn the schooners and the wagon train. Capturing Watercraft was a novel experiment in cavalry tactics. At a bend in the road I came upon a vedette and a Suttler's wagon. They submitted quietly. Just then a bugle sounded and I saw a body of cavalry a few hundred yards away. Fugitives from the camp we had captured had given the alarm and the second troop was getting ready to leave. As soon as the head of our column appeared the enemy's force at once disappeared. A Confederate newspaper described my part as follows. Approaching the public interest and the recital of everything connected with the recent exploit of General Stewart's cavalry in his reconnaissance through the enemy's lines we have gathered from reliable participants in the affair these additional particulars. After destroying the enemy's camp near the old church Lieutenant John S. Mosby, aide to General Stewart and who had been most daring and successful as a scout was sent on in advance with a single guide towards Tunstall Station to reconnoitre and ascertain the position and force of the enemy. On his way he met two Yankees whom he took prisoners and sent to the rear in charge of his guide. Alone he pushed on and overtook a cavalryman and an artilleryman of the enemy's forces having in charge a quartermaster's wagon and stores. Lieutenant Mosby dashed up and drawing his pistols demanded their surrender. The New Yorker surrendered at once but the Pennsylvanian, beginning to fumble for his pistol the Lieutenant made a more emphatic demand for his surrender and at the same moment compelled him to look quite closely into the muzzle of his pistol. All this time there were drawn up not four hundred yards distant from the company of Yankee cavalry in line of battle. In a moment a bugle sounded as for a movement on him when anxious to secure his prisoners and stores Lieutenant Mosby put spurs and galloped across the field at the same time shouting to his imaginary men to follow him when none of the Confederate cavalry were in sight and the swiftness more than a mile in the rear. The cavalry's hearing the word of command and apprehending the dissent of an avalanche of Confederate cavalry upon them broke line each man galloping off to take care of himself. The wagon, prisoners, and stores were then secured and among them were found forty splendid Colt's pistols with holsters besides boots, shoes, blankets, et cetera, et cetera. About sundown we reached the York River Railroad and the column still went on. The only way to get back to Richmond was now to recross the Chickahominy near its mouth and pass my McClellan's left flank. As some evidence of the consternation that prevailed among the Union troops I remember that after we left the camp a sergeant and twenty-five men of the regular cavalry followed on under a flag of truce and surrendered to the rear guard. That night was a feast for Stuart's cavalry. On all the roads were burning trains with supplies and subtler's goods. Champagne and rind wine flowed copiously. A force was sent in pursuit of us under the command of General St. George Cook, Stuart's father-in-law. Although the march of our column was slow we never saw an armed foe after we left Royal's camp except a small guard at the railroad. General Warren, who commanded a brigade behind us, said it was impossible for the infantry to overtake him and as the cavalry did not move without us it was impossible for them to overtake him. Fitz John Porter regretted that when General Cook did pursue he should have tied his legs with the infantry command. As there were six cavalry regiments including all the regulars with a battery on our track it is hard to see why they wanted infantry. Although more than forty-eight hours elapsed between the time when we passed McClellan's right flank and back around his left he made no attempt to intercept us. In making the circuit of his army the Confederate column was at all times within five or six miles of his headquarters with two navigable rivers enclosing it and another river over which we had to build a bridge in order to cross. McClellan was a soldier of great organizing ability and trained in the science of war I mean in those operations that can be regulated by rules but he had none of the inspiration that decides and acts instantly and he was now confronted by a condition without a precedent so he was helpless. About daylight we reached a fort of the Chickahominy a narrow crooked stream which meanders between the Pomunkey and the James we had crossed it on the morning before Stuart had expected to be able to forward this stream but at this point it was overflowing a guide told us of a bridge a mile below or where one had been so the column was headed for that point when we got there we found that the bridge was gone although the piles were standing nearby were the remains of an old warehouse which furnished material for building another it was soon constructed it seemed to rise out of the water by magic it may not have been so good a bridge a Caesar might throw over the Rhine but it answered our purpose while the bridge was building Stuart showed no anxiety and was in as gay a humor as ever I saw him during the night I had provided for our commissary department a lot of stores from the Suttler's wagons and these were soon spread about on the grass we had not been disturbed on the night march but just as the bridge was finished the body of Lancers came in sight and halted they had captured one of our men a German whom we had to leave behind as he was too full of Rhine wine to travel when we reached west over the command was halted to rest and get forage for we knew that the road to Richmond was open Stuart now left Fitzley in command and rode on to report to General Lee the column moved on by moonlight and a daybreak was in sight of Richmond the game was won I had ridden several miles ahead of the column and met Stuart returning of course he was delighted to hear that the cavalry was safe to excuse himself for what he had not done McClellan in a dispatch tried to belittle this affair by saying that Stuart's cavalry did nothing but gain a little a clot but it can be said with more truth that he himself lost a good deal it was the first blow at his reputation the Compte de Paris one of McClellan's staff officers said with more truth they had in point of fact created a great commotion shaken the confidence of the North in McClellan and made the first experiment in those great cavalry expeditions which subsequently played so novel and important a part during the war Richmond, Monday, June 16, 1862 my dearest Pauline I have just received your letter this morning I returned yesterday with General Stuart from the grandest scout of the war I not only helped to execute it but was the first one who conceived and demonstrated that it was practicable I took four men several days ago and went down among the Yankees and found out how it could be done the Yankees gave us a chase but we escaped I reported to General Stuart suggested his going down he approved asked me to give him a written statement of the facts and went immediately to see General Lee who also approved it we were out nearly four days rode continuously four days and nights found among the Yankee camps and settler stores every luxury of which you could ever conceived I had no way of bringing off anything General Stuart gave me the horses and equipments I captured what little I brought off is worth at least $350 Stuart does not want me to go with Floyd told me before this affair that I should have a commission on returning yesterday he told me that I would have no difficulty in doing so now I met Wyndham Robertson on the street today he congratulated me on the success of the exploit and said I was the hero and that he intended to write an account of it for the papers made me promise to dine with him today I send you some captured things the carpet was in an officer's tent there is no prospect of a battle here heavy reinforcements have been going to Jackson I got two splendid army pistols Stuart's name is in everyone's mouth now I was in both cavalry charges they were magnificent I have been staying with General Stuart at his headquarters the whole heavens were illuminated by the flames of the burning wagons etc. of the Yankees a good many ludicrous scenes I will narrate when I get home Richmond in fine spirits everybody says it is the greatest feat of the war I never enjoyed myself so much in my life Headquarters, Cavalry Brigade, June 20, 1862 Honourable George W. Randolph, Secretary of War General, permit me to present to you John S. Mosby who for months past has rendered time and again services of the most important and valuable nature exposing himself regardless of danger and, in my estimation, fairly one promotion I am anxious that he should get the captaincy of a company of sharpshooters in my brigade but the muster rolls have not yet been sent in I commend him to your notice most respectfully, General your obedient servant J. E. B. Stuart Brigadier General, commanding, Cavalry