 Well, ladies and gentlemen, just one announcement before we begin our panel with such a distinguished list of speakers today. It was inevitable that we'd lose somebody. And indeed, Senator Hagel has been called back to the Hill for the hearings regarding Secretary of State Designee Colin Powell. So we regret very much. We will not hear his remarks now, but we are forwarding ahead with the making it stick panel, the second thematic panel for today's program, and really the centerpiece of the work of the Institute of Peace. And we're privileged to call upon another distinguished member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Peace to moderate. He's the former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, an accomplished lawyer and negotiator, and he's the president of his own investment advisory firm. Please welcome Mark Leland. Thank you. I'll kind of try to follow Steve Hadley model and be there so much to cover that not speak too long. I would like to take the opportunity for this particular panel, which is the making peace, which is the overall topic. And since I go on the board of the Institute tomorrow, I feel it that I can still give a few plugs for the Institute as of tomorrow morning. I wouldn't want to do that anymore as a board member. But I would want to say this panel really deals very much with what the Institute is involved in, which is peaceful methods of resolving disputes, of recognizing problems before they turn into warfare or if they do what can you do about them in a peaceful means. The gentlemen on both sides of me are people who were really experienced in this area. I might add that this topic could really easily be, and I guess has been and I hope will be, and you'll all come back a topic for a two day conference or three day conference because the subject matter that we're covering is probably one of the most important. And I, who I have to confess as a good Republican, was somewhat skeptical when I first learned about the Institute, came to know that really this, for what you want to call bang for the buck, the amount of money spent on the Institute really trying to resolve disputes without having to use military force is really invaluable. The Institute is, to me, is an institution that if it did not exist, somebody today, even in any new administration, would create, I suppose I might add, as an ex-treasurer person, they might put ex-officio, some of them the treasury on, as well as some of them from defense and the State Department. But that's simply an evolution of the world since 1984. But other than that, I think it's really an outstanding institution. And I hope that from what you'll hear from these three eminent speakers, you'll get a flavor for what goes on. But I just have to assure you that they've all been given very, very long, difficult issues to deal with. And all you really will get is a flavor. But hopefully you will be interested enough to read some of the material and learn more about the Institute because of what they said. But I will make some apologies for them because no matter what they say, they can't possibly cover this topic in the 12 to 15 minutes that we've allotted to them. Our first speaker, Alan Weinstein, is a professor. He's been a member of the Institute Board since 1985, at which time he also started the Washington Basis Center for Democracy. And he's been an active board member and probably knows more about the Institute or as much as anybody possibly does. And I think he's been asked generally to just tell you what lessons he's learned over the period of time, which is a long time he's been on the board and what the United States can do to bring about peace. And so I don't think I need to add any more. His biography is in there and it goes on for a very long time because he's really done a lot of things. Alan? Thank you, Mark. Ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate, Mark's, those of us who are on the founding directors of the Institute, I believe Dennis Barker is here as well, somewhere in the room, and Scott Thompson, the three of us, I think, are all that's left of the original board of directors of the Institute and good riddance to all of us after tomorrow. And welcome aboard, Mark. And obviously, there's our leader, one of our two fearless leaders. I'm glad, Mark, pointed out that this is an impossible assignment. I received it late last week and I'll do my best here, but we are trying to give you a flavor and I think, Shetman, Peter probably feel the same way about their assignments. Although in historian by profession, for almost two decades, I've been a member of the growing NGO community concerned with national security issues related to democratization and conflict resolution. Available time does not allow me to make even 14 points to re-coin a phrase or a dozen, so I will try instead to address six or seven lessons in response to Dick Solomon's charge, beginning with one that proceeds by only a year or two, Bill Clinton's tenure, the dramatic concluding years of the Cold War and the Bush presidency. While in no sense minimizing the contribution of American statesmanship to the collapse of communist rule first in the Warsaw Pact countries and then in the Soviet Union itself, much of which I witnessed a close at first hand, the entire process reminded me then and now of a fundamental truth about negotiating peace, the subject of our session, which deserves to be underscored today, namely first lesson, not all conflicts which conclude peacefully and with a negotiated peace. Some just end. The Cold War was one of these, and the triumphal we won they lost Western rhetoric that its conclusion inspired, especially in this country, did not encourage clear, long-term post-Cola war strategic thinking, which brings me to another reality of negotiating peace in U.S. foreign policy, especially when viewed as viewed by many ordinary Americans. Let my second lesson is that most ordinary Americans believe that foreign entanglements should have a clear beginning, middle, and end. This was true about World War One, World War Two, the Cold War, and even the brief or Gulf War, all of which we won. But today what confronts the United States without a designated single enemy nation, as in the past, is a complex of threats, challenges, and many adversaries, none offering the clear prospect of a victorious ending. Nevertheless, as Chet Crocker and Dick Solomon correctly and superbly noted today in today's Washington Post, today U.S. diplomacy and defense posture must adapt to the challenges posed by ethnic and religious conflict, political destabilization caused by rapid economic change, humanitarian crises, and failed states, security threats from rogue states, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Although the reality, this is, let us be candid about it, a very difficult sell to make to the American public for either party in power. With these two contextual lessons kept firmly in mind, another important, if perhaps obvious lesson should be made on the subject, which is not my third lesson, which is that peace negotiations rarely respect electoral or any other presidential timetable. A cursory scan of some 20th century presidents demonstrates the poignant reality of this. Woodrow Wilson, stricken by illness, plagued by an inability to construct bipartisan support in the Congress, could not achieve U.S. entrance into the League of Nations, and a generation later Franklin Roosevelt died, leaving key decisions, including the peace negotiations with Germany and Japan, and the fragile post war settlement with the Soviet Union, who was untested successor, Harry Truman. Truman, in turn, left Korea for Ike to settle, and the Eisenhower administration, in turn, left a confused policy toward revolutionary Cuba for John F. Kennedy to further muddle, with potentially catastrophic consequences during the missile crisis. Ike also left Indochina to Kennedy, who, in turn, left it to Johnson, whose presidency had destroyed before he left the process of extricating U.S. forces from Vietnam to Richard Nixon. Jimmy Carter left Iran to Ronald Reagan and all subsequent U.S. presidents. George Bush had the benefit of Ronald Reagan's major initiatives with the Soviets, though Bush, in turn, left Sodom, Hussein's post Gulf War future to his successor's hands. And Bill Clinton, despite often significant progress on various peace initiatives, he has left Israeli, Palestinian, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo negotiations to the incoming president, along with a still ambivalent U.S. perspective on North Korea, South Korea peace negotiations, and, oh yes, Sodom, Hussein, and Castro. What needs to be noted at this point is the distinction between presidential involvement in national security negotiations, a vital indeed priority concern to the United States, for example, Soviet U.S. arms control talks during the Cold War decades, and third-party mediation by the American president in peace negotiations not related to direct priority U.S. national security interests. It could be argued that President Carter's decisive role at Camp David in the accords between Egypt and Israel fit this latter model, as would the interlocutors role played by this country under the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations in moving this process along. Unique to our current administration has been President Clinton's virtually omnipresent personal engagement in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations about which fierce debate continues in this community. Under what condition should an American president act to quote a Bush advisor's recent critique as his own Secretary of State? It might be helpful for those seeking usable lessons from the recent experience of making global peace to recognize another important truth. Not all peace negotiations involve the American government or should, whether or not we want them to. Examples, Russia's foolishly tragic war to reconquer Chechnya and China's cross-straights and potentially tragic efforts to win Taiwanese submission by intimidation and threats. Whatever the new administration's views on these issues, which are critical to Russian-American and Sino-American relations, no one has asked the United States to serve as an interlocutor in either dispute. Which brings us to a parallel lesson of American peace mediation, mainly lesson number five. All peace negotiations with which the U.S. becomes involved are not necessarily equal in importance to American national security. Regarding the actions of the past administration, this maxim is surely the most politically charged and debatable since it raises the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention and negotiation. Could urgent and earlier U.S. attention, for example, to the violence in Rwanda have mitigated the genocide which occurred there? I leave the answer to my friend Shett Crocker who follows me on this platform. Briefly, I want to touch on the Bosnian agreement. Finally, reached the Dayton after years of unsuccessful negotiations. The Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland reached with the good offices of British, Irish and U.S. government officials with personal intervention by President Clinton and his mediator, Senator Mitchell. The Kosovo situation which has yet to see a peace agreement conclude this conflict and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations also spearheaded by President Clinton. Of these, the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts in the Middle Eastern negotiations all have had the potential for spreading into greater regional conflicts and therefore surely deserves significant attention from peacemakers. But which peacemakers? In the end, Ambassador Holbrook and his team helped steer the Dayton process toward a successful conclusion where U.N. and European negotiators had previously failed. Holbrook deserves great credit for this. Here and later in Kosovo, it was only U.S. leadership and intervention, diplomatic, military and political, which hastened the defeat of local aggressors, a lesson our European allies remain keenly aware of. As for Northern Ireland, whether President-Elect Bush will take its personal interest in the situation as did President Clinton is questionable. I don't think he will. And the peace process there would then receive to a strategically more appropriate level as a predominantly Anglo-Irish issue. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are another matter, however, considering the potential for unleashing a regional war involving American allies on both sides. Here, as Sandy Berger said last week, it would be very dangerous for a peace process presumably involving the U.S. as chief negotiator not to continue. One is either moving toward consensual agreement there or the situation will continue to unravel. Now, this does not mean that the new president and his team need blindly pick up the Clinton negotiating brief and move on from there. What may be required is the price for continuing U.S. engagement in the process is a period of calm and patience on both sides while a new American negotiating team works the issues and prepares briefings for the new president on approaches to the negotiation on which he may have his own ideas to inject. This brings us to another sometimes forgotten truism related to making peace or for that matter to succeeding in any negotiation, namely my sixth lesson. Getting a yes on terms acceptable to the United States may not always be possible in the short term, in which case getting no agreement may be far preferable to getting a flawed one. That lesson was brought home to me and to others by a great American who's in this room, Ambassador Max Campbellman, who's five years of leadership of the western group of countries at the First Helsinki Review Meeting in Madrid during the 1980s, taught all of us lessons in the effectiveness of careful preparation on ending patience and devotion to principle in such negotiations, whether for human rights in Max's case or for peace. Turning through the Balkans again, there is not time enough today to describe the twists and turns of American policy over the past eight years, sometimes in concert with our NATO allies, sometimes not, which produced eventually and after much tragic loss of life, the made in Washington Dayton agreement that ended the war in Bosnia, and more recently the NATO-led bombing campaign that brought syrup aggression in Kosovo to an end. The questions of whether, when, and how to remove American troops in their current post in the Balkans, as a component of largely European forces, was highlighted by Condoleezza Rice's statements on such withdrawals, as we all know. Her comments in turn produced serious expressions of concern from our European allies. Add to the agitation, European skepticism concerning the new administration's centerpiece national missile defense proposals, and a crisis in the alliance over alleged American arrogance and unilateralism may soon be upon us. It could be argued, in fact, that the first major peace negotiation of the incoming Bush administration may well be with our NATO partners over these two troublesome issues, lest the alliance, which has undergirded world peace and stability for 50 years, be jeopardized by serious tactical disagreements among its members. One part of my assignment was to speak to new possibilities for international conflict management using private sector personages and non-governmental organizations. That's the phrase that Dick used in his memo to me. That such people and organizations have played an often pivotal role in mediating a variety of efforts at conflict resolution in recent years is indisputable. Even the briefest scan of the important collection edited by Professor Crocker and his colleagues with the wonderful title, Herding Katz, Multi-Party Mediation in a Complex World documents this phenomena, and I have no time in the few minutes left to me to outline all of those organizations which have been working in this area. You know most of them. I remain doubtful, however, that at least in its early years, the new Bush administration will find such initiatives by NGOs and distinguished global figures much to its liking, especially given the idiosyncratic independence with which such private efforts, my own centers included, proceed. Nevertheless, such initiatives will continue to play an increasingly important role in pre-negotiation and peace mediations in cells. Whatever the views of a particular U.S. administration, for one thing because of the close ties such groups and individuals often have with the media, with influential members of Congress, and with prominent foreign leaders. At the least, then, administration policymakers and the NGO community in a conflict resolution area should try to remain in respectful, if wary, communication while they test each other's sincerity and effectiveness. A seventh and final lesson related to negotiating peace and then a brief story, and I conclude. Lesson number seven, perhaps the most important lesson of all, beware of the law of unintended consequences. Historians of civilizations older than our own are well aware of the inexorable manner in which the resolution of one major conflict often sows the seeds of subsequent ones. Two decades ago, U.S. policymakers viewed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confidently as an opportunity to undermine Soviet power in that Vietnam-style war by arming and training Afghan guerrillas and supporters in other Muslim countries. Today, we know that the Osama bin Laden's who terrorized Western interests worldwide often had the benefit of the best training and equipment America could provide in Afghanistan at the time. Whether this will be the case in the future with the Iraqi opposition leaders, and we are now funding to help overthrow Saddam Hussein remains to be seen. Similarly, in the Balkans, NATO power and mediation in which the American role was instrumental combined to reverse Serbian expulsion of the Kosovo Albanians and now promises to help a new beginning for Yugoslav democratization. But would the departure of U.S. troops from the region, even if reluctantly accepted by our NATO allies, stimulate a resurgence of these ethnic conflicts while jeopardizing the future viability of NATO itself. This last unintended consequence, no matter what the provocation, would have said earlier tear apart the very fabric of global peace for the past half century and therefore must be assigned at least for now to the realm of the unthinkable. What is clear to me at this point is that I failed in my assignment to provide plain and precise lessons for policy makers and others from the experience of negotiating peace over the past eight years. Unfortunately, most available evidence seems to me to shed often oblique, contradictory and uncertain lessons, cautionary, cautionary more than auditory for those who shepherd our foreign policy. In defense of this conclusion finally I offer one bit of anecdotal evidence about any such lessons. A story told by the president of Teachers College at the time, George Counts, about a conversation he held with his friend, the great American historian Charles A. Beard. The two men were walking along Riverside Drive one Sunday afternoon when Counts asked Beard, what lessons have you learned from history? Beard thought the question was ridiculous and at first he said he'd need months to answer it and as they walked months became weeks, weeks became days, days became hours, hours became minutes until Beard sighed and responded, all right then three things. I've learned three things. First, those whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad. Then the mills of the gods grind slowly but they grind exceedingly small and third the bee fertilizes the flower, it robs. There, that's it Counts. A very profoundly dissatisfied Counts soon said his goodbyes and went home where at 2 a.m. the following morning he was awakened by a ringing telephone. Oh yes, the date. January 8th, 1941 Monday, the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Counts, an agitated Beard shouted into the phone. I realized just now that I've learned a fourth lesson from history but when it gets dark enough you can see the dawn. With that I leave all subsequent lessons to my fellow panelists and I thank you. Thank you Alan. I'm sure that our next speaker who is the eminent chairman of the board of the Institute of Peace as well as a professor at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and served as assistant secretary state for Africa for years from 81 to 89. I'm sure we'll be able to answer all these questions. I don't know if Chet would mind that he and Dick Solomon really work closely together. I think the success of the Institute over the past years has really been come from their hard labors and meeting like this is a great one but I can tell you they're just a numeral number of meetings on all the problems that we're hearing discuss today. I mean every part of the world it seems that they've managed to get the Institute in. So I don't know why. Dick I think gave Chet a bit of just a few little questions to answer which I if he doesn't mind I just might read to you. He wants to know what instruments of state craft are most needed to avert conflict and produce durable negotiated settlements. How well is the Clinton administration done in negotiating lasting political settlements to international disputes around the world. In which cases are ways should the incoming Bush administration emulate or divert from Washington's recent policy approaches. How should the new president proceed with building a restoring international political coalition in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. Similarly how can the United States provide international leadership without encouraging nations to form counter coalitions against America's preponderance of power. How can senior officials ensure that the process of diplomacy is not overwhelm the substantive goals to which it is directed. And what are the chief impediments to the successful implementation of peace treaties and important international accords. You have 12 minutes. But you'll give you 15. Chet. Thank you very much Mark for that very nice send-off that you've given me. And of course you left off the one point that Dick also added at the very end which is keep it non-partisan. No cheap shot. So I'll keep my cheap shots to no more than a handful. And since this is the third lecture I've given in the last 24 hours and those two were about two and a half hours each. This one will be very short indeed. The place to start of course is to identify the environment in which the new incoming administration will be facing the challenges of modern peacemaking. Our lunchtime keynoter Sandy Berger has said a lot about this. I'll just give you my quick take with a few points about the character of the environment that we're dealing with as it affects peacemakers. First as has been said by Alan Weinstein the threats are generic and we have to keep reminding ourselves of that time and again while there while geopolitics is not dead most of the major challenges and threats we face are generic. They have to do with warlordism, barbarism, weapons diffusion, state collapse, things of this kind. Secondly there are so many more actors on the stage than were the case before and I think the incoming administration having since republicans have been out of power for eight years now is going to be quite interested and quite stunned initially to find out how many actors there are on the stage many of which were never elected by anybody but believe me they know where a microphone is and they know how to mobilize a microphone and that's an influence for both good and for sometimes not so good. What this really means is that there's a decline in governmental dominance of the peacemaking process there's a reduction in discipline in the peacemaking process there's a kind of natural incoherence which is both exciting uplifting amazing to behold and can also make it very difficult in fact to establish the kind of coherence which sometimes is called for in peacemaking. Now a fourth aspect of the current system is that there is a great divergence of political capacity for solving the problems of societies in different lands and in different cultures and so there is no cookie cutter that works on peacemaking it really depends where we're talking about if the people of Kosovo had one tenth the capacity for self dealing with their own problems for management of their own problems of the people of South Africa have you would not have seen the Kosovo conflict unfold the way the way that it has a fifth characteristic of the current system and it's nothing new it's as old as can be as it vacuums still exist and they still get filled whether it's in Tajikistan or in Indonesia or in Central Africa so inaction has consequences as well as action and then finally I would underscore this one that global and regional security continue to depend on the action and the leadership of really very few nations and very few organizations which I will call the security exporters and there's lots and lots of security importers or as General Zinni put it in a recent meeting in Washington there's lots of self licking ice cream cones out there in the international system and so there really is a limited number of places capable of organizing leadership on these problems having described the situation like that now let me say a word about some of the instruments and institutions that give peacemakers influence that can be the sources of our influence I would submit that we have often acted and behaved in recent years as if the world's leading nation derives its primary influence from its access to microphones and sermons on the one hand and tangible coercive clout or the threat of coercive clout on the other hand military threats threats or the action of air strikes economic sanctions and what have you we do wag our finger and stamp our feet a lot these days and I'm on this one I'm with Sandy Berger when he says let's carry our weight and not just throw it around in fact American leadership potential comes from other sources than our coercive clout and our access to microphones yes having a predominance of power is central and important in peacemaking but there are lots of other things that are too and I will identify a few of those my hope is that under a Bush administration the United States will lead when the following factors are present when our interests are affected as Sandy Berger has said by the conflict secondly when our relevance to the conflict is clear and strong thirdly when our role is welcomed or irresistible take your choice and fourthly when it's likely that we can develop some real serious traction some leverage in other words in that given conflict situation when those conditions do not exist and here I'm completely with my board colleague Alan Weinstein we shouldn't pretend we should let others lead we should back others when they do lead now let me move on and say a word about the sources of leadership the sources the tools of leadership for peacemaking a lot has been said and I think it's important about the new actors that are emerging on the global stage in peacemaking NGOs are playing a very important role in the contemporary international system and that's destined I think to increase NGOs when they are coherent or when they're on the same page are like a good string section in an orchestra there's nothing better and the reverse is also true that is to say they can be like a bad string section if there is just a multiplicity of initiative without a focus and I would add to that point that some regions respond to string sections better than others some societies respond to string sections better than others some require brass bands in addition to string sections so I think again it's case by case the tools of the peacemaker in some cases will relate more centrally to what the NGOs can bring to the table we have so many tools available to us we have our unique intelligence assets we have our matchless diplomatic reach and communications capacity we have our military potential and our military capacity building we have our soft power assets we have our enabling technologies it's so much more than pure coercion and threat and lecturing and hectoring from public platforms we have our special reputation as peacemakers through our expertise there is no country in the world that has higher standing as peacemakers than this country there may be countries that are very good at it besides our own and we should respect that and we should be humble occasionally but we are we are matchless in terms of that reputation and then I would add and this is what Dick asked me to talk about I'm finally getting there and Mr. President we have unmatched capacity to organize and sustain coalitions not just military ones but diplomatic ones look what we have achieved when we've done it right in containing North Korea in steering India and Pakistan away from the abyss in diffusing the Peru-Equador boundary conflict and eventually after many false starts in getting Eritrea and Ethiopia to wind down their pathetic but hugely bloody conflict now that's under the Clinton administration I can find examples from other administrations obviously so I look at this experience and I sum up with some best practice principles on peacemaking and I recommend them commend them to the incoming administration kind of as follows first listen more and preach less second create facts because when you do create facts others will join that coalition that you're trying to put together I recall the time when the issue was how to assemble a coalition to do peacemaking and peace enforcement on the ground in Somalia and there was a huge debate an inter-allied debate until the decision was made in Washington that we're putting some force on the ground to do the Lord's work and then before you knew it there were advanced parties of French marines arriving on the scene to get in that photograph before we got there so create facts and others will join share the credit as well as the burdens and that means obviously cutting other people in and borrowing leverage not just imagining that we have it all to start with let others lead occasionally and then back them to the hilt as we have done unevenly I would submit in recent years we have failed to work with the Europeans and a number of African conflicts where it could have made a big difference we worked well with the Australians and East Timor so the record obviously is a mixed one and we I think need above all to recognize that peacemaking is not unlike war fighting in that if you're serious about it and not just going through the motions but serious about it it is as they say today a job that is 24, 7, 365 it is around the clock it is for people and organizations and task forces that are capable of generating a relentless intensity to get the job done as if life and death depended upon it just like you do when you fight a war and that's what peacemaking is really all about now Dick also asked me to say a word and I've only got one minute left Marcus about how to make peace stick how to how to make peace get implemented how to be effective in bringing a settlement to the point of the point of implementation I think one of our hang-ups here and this is by no means a partisan observation is that we tend very much to think we have we have a fascination with signatures in our in our public life in our public discourse about peacemaking we think that the the thing you're going for is that piece of paper when in fact the piece of paper is often the beginning of the next round of negotiation and it's a very important thing to look forward and to think before you write the piece of paper about how implementation will work in practice so somehow we we think about the strategic impact of our intervention as being how to get to that point of signature and then we then we sort of like to move on to the next new new thing well that attitude leads to surprises it leads to the solution of conflicts that then rapidly become unsolved it leads to settlements that become destabilized and reversed as we have seen time after time just think in the 90s about the number of accords that have had backsliding we had Rambouillet we had we had Dayton we had the Lusaka accords on the Congo we had the Lomae accords on Sierra Leone and and one could go on we had the Arusha accords which led directly within months to the Rwanda genocide and this isn't to blame anybody except to point out that the implementation phase of peacemaking is at least as important as the negotiation phase leading up to the settlement so we need to make some choices here the choices are what is your strategic impact on the conflict and do you really mean it are we going to in fact see the process through and I would just hope that we do a little less pretending and that when we are going to get engaged that we do see it through not just to be seen doing something but to actually bring about a fundamental change in the circumstances of the conflict that we're dealing with the peacemaker and this is my final point needs to remain apparent throughout the implementation phase needs to remain apparent of the process that he or she has given birth to those who are best placed to lead are those who have the interest the commitment the staying power to care about the final result and that means they'll make the resources available to see it through thank you thanks Chad now you see what I meant at the beginning that you could just get a little taste for what goes on at the Institute of Peace on each of those negotiations and each of those issues you could hear Chad for three hours not on or more and go really into great detail on them but I think it gave you a flavor for the kind of issues that the Institute has to deal with