 Yes. Okay. So now, for the last, for the last conference of this workshop, first we will listen to a dark and vital biological causation as teriodynamics, teriodynamics, physical work by Jose Cuenan Caravano and Susa. Something like this. Thank you. Okay. First of all, you can look at your mails that I have sent, well, they have sent a file with basically what I want to see. Okay, I can send it. So the purpose of my talk today is to present the teriodynamic as an emergent form of physical work that constitutes the proper causal regime of biological system. But behind the idea of a proper causal regime lies a specific notion of biological causation and before we start talking about the abstract logic of this theory, I would like to address this notion of biological causation. So when you talk about biological causation, even before we talk about causation, we have to understand very well what biological means. And I think there is two points of view. We can talk about biological causation in a way that biological is an adjective that really determines the causation. Or we can talk about causation in the context of biological systems. In a sense, I think that's like we're going to see biological become a superfluous notion. So causation in the context of biological systems, for me, biological has here a metaphorical meaning. There is a set of beings that are referred to be as biological and only in this sense, their causation received the same adjective. For example, when you talk about an American player or a German player or a Spanish player, the adjective that determines players don't really talk about different kinds of players, but the players in a context of context. In contrast, we can also talk about biological in what I would call an ontologically strong way as a determination of causation itself. In this sense, we assume that there is a kind of causation that is specifically biological and fundamentally distinct from other forms of causation. When you talk about soccer player or basketball player or volleyball player, these adjectives really are determining a different type or a different form of play. In this sense, biological causation as a source of causal dynamics differs fundamentally from other manifestations of causation in nature. But sure, we have a problem that is the causally closed universe. When you talk about new forms of causation, especially new form of causation that's in a specific time of the universe. It wasn't there, weren't there, so we have a hard choice to make. We can see that there is biological causation, career to biological systems, which is a little weird. Well, we could talk about biological laws, but anyway. But there isn't biological causation as a distinctive new form of causation. When you talk about biological causation as a specific kind of causation, there is a lot of other problems, but this one I used to illustrate the talk. So the possible solution that we can try is thinking of biological causation as an emerging way of physical work. We talk about causation as physical work production and we talk about biological as an emerging way of physical work. And there is the problem for this to work. We have to rethink what is physical work and we have to talk about physical work as a constrained release of energy. And we have to rethink what is emergence. Why? Because the problem with emergence is that if you stay in a myriological context, in a myriological framework, the critics of authors like Kim, in my opinion, are totally devastating for the notion of emergence. But there is a way to think about emergence, like something more in a system or something more dynamic, but as something less. Both are very hard ways of thinking. They are a little counterintuitive, but it's possible to understand with goals. Are you basically trying to present a generic theory of work and the emergence as something less? What's the problem? Both theories we can find in Deacon's book, in Complex Nature, that Victor talked earlier. And it's a really huge book. It's a really huge argument. So what I pretend to do is just take the abstract logic within the arguments of Deacon and see how that can work. Why? Because usually the most critics that Deacon has received aren't about his biochemical proposal, but about the logic within this biochemical proposal. So, physical work has contained the release of energy. The idea comes from atoms. And Kauffman utilizes atoms in Schrodinger to make what you can call an autonomous agent that is capable to do a work cycle. What is this? For Schrodinger, the special enigmatic feature of life is the capacity to avoid the rep decay in the inert state of thermodynamic equilibrium. All things that we know tend to the thermodynamic equilibrium and life in some way can avoid that. Schrodinger talks about a negative entropy or a negentropy. There is some terminology, but what Kauffman comes to say is the way to avoid the tendons of the second law of thermodynamic is making a work cycle. There is a citation for investigations, a book from Kauffman. I don't read that, but there is a scheme where we can see how a system could eventually run from the second law of thermodynamic. First, we have constraints that are required to produce physical work. At the same time that physical work is produced, these constraints are wasted. Then we know that physical work is itself able to produce new constraints. Then these additional constraints may be used to generate more physical work, which in turn could generate more constraints. If the work performer can regenerate the same set of constraints that make that work available, then we have our work cycle. From Kauffman, Deacon starts to think about work cycles and starts to think about how can we understand work. So, from Deacon's proposal, the first point to underline is his conceptualization of energy. That is to say, as a relationship between difference or asymmetries in the physical properties of concrete substrates. What does that mean? Deacon talks about energy, not like a thing in systems, but as difference between the systems and between the particles of the systems. In this view, energetic chains are redistributions of these properties. For example, heat chains can be understood as redistribution in asymmetries between vibrational intensity of particles that constitute bodies with different temperatures. So we have two bodies when they change heat. Actually, there is a body with particles with a specific vibrational intensity. Another body with other vibrational intensity difference and when they come together, they start to vibrate equally or in the same way. So, physical work can be so described as a constrained propagation of difference, since energy is difference. In a way that whatever we have a transmission of difference, there will be more or at least something analogous to it involved. What is this something analogous to it? There is a large problem in physics about with particles of a system or cannot do work, but it's not for now. So, physical work happens when the propagation of differences are constrained like the typical explosion gas. That's when the constrained explosion came with a piston. The second step from the theory of work is the relation between global level and metroscopic level. When you talk about an equilibrium thermodynamic system, we have three features. There is an spontaneous changes of absence of asymmetries. Assisting in equilibrium is all the same in all its parts. Assisting in equilibrium is totally unconstrained and have no work potential. Because there is no difference to be propagated. But if you look at the same system, at the microscopic level, we see that there is a continuous interaction between particles in a way that they are mutually constrained themselves. So, in this continuous interaction between particles, each particle undergoes changes in its properties that would not happen if they did not interact. In this sense, the propagation of differences between particles within the same system, there is a constantly mutual constraint where the states of particles are all the time non-spontaneous states. I mean, a particle in a system is being constrained in its possibility states. And the tendency is that the mutual constraint prevents the constraint interactions given rise to a prevention of multiple possible states that impose an narrow spectrum of states in which particles become totally indifferent. That means that the spontaneous tendency of second thermodynamic allowed is equal to the outcome of a probabilistic tendency of particles interactions. There is not an inner force within systems that oblige them to become in equilibrium. There is a relation between particles that, by mutual constraints, excludes a very large number of possible states and this impose a spectrum of equal particles. So, we have a spontaneous unconstructed system at global level that arises from a non-spontaneous state of constricted particles at the lower level. Then we can make some kind of scheme. In lower level L of system S, there is a spontaneous tendency of component A plus a spontaneous tendency of component B or C or D that constrains itself. This makes a non-spontaneous state in A, a non-spontaneous state in B, in C, in D, in all these particles. And then in upper level U of the same system S, the non-spontaneous states of all the particles make possible a new spontaneous tendency of S like a global system. This logic is important because what you see is that non-spontaneous interactions give a rise to spontaneous tendencies. Then we talk about emergence as something less. What I think is the most difficult part of this theory. There is a long discussion about emergence. I won't enter into that now, but despite this concept rich history, emergence, I will skip right to the organizational perspective I want to take. So, Deacon used Mark Beakhart's process philosophy and understand emergence from the conceptions of process and organizations. So, what does it mean? What does it mean that Deacon with Beakhart and other authors, they escape from the meteorological framework? When they talk about systems, they don't talk about a whole with parts. They talk about process and organizations. So, every process in Beakhart has and is defined by an organization. A process in lower dynamical level may give a rise to regularities only recognizable at a higher dynamical level. Then we can talk about a casual scale of influence. Casual influence of upper level regularities signs the causal powers of a process. It's not the process itself but its organization. Any regularity in a level once it's organized has a causal power that's founded not in the process itself but in the way that the process is organized. It means that there is a causal influence in upper level that's neither reduced nor reduced to that of the preceding one without being totally independent of it. So, what I'm saying. Particles or process in lower level they can mutual constrain themselves and give a rise to a specific spectrum of organization. That's give a rise to some regularities that's only regularities in a upper level. These regularities, not the relation, not the causal relation between particles but the regularities that emerge from the mutual constrain interaction are the new source of causal power. So, there is not that the particle calls in the hole that calls something. So, the particles together are organized to make some kind of regularity. These regularities when it's organized can be the source of new causal power but in what sense we talk about less and not about more causal power or something more in the system. So, organizations and regularities can be understood as outcomes of constraints on the process. Sometimes we think about the organization as something that is imposed on a process but we think in terms of constraints it's interesting because if a process has multiple possible pathways to go and something starts to constrain these pathways what if something starts to constrain the pathways of process development what is left is the emergence of directionality in the process. In this sense the emergence of regularities or the emergence of new organizations are not the outcome of something that comes out of the process but the way that the process constrain themselves actually emergence is less possibilities and not something more. What I think that even for a reductionist perspective this could be a little... even for a reductionist perspective this idea looks like a little more plausible. I mean, usually the problem with reductionist emergence is that it always looks like something external from the system just appear and with constraints as organization, as constraints we don't have to talk about something out of the system but only about pathways excluded that give a rise to directionality. In this sense, for production equal to organized or constrained release of energy in new forms of causation are the outcomes of a new set of constraints that is something less. In this sense, biological causation isn't an additional causation to physical causation but it is physical causation that is more and more and more constrained and to give a rise to a special kind of causation. So we have again a general scheme that two spontaneous states of a system converge in one dynamical level no spontaneous states give rise to a new spontaneous ideal per level and the new set of constraints make place to a new kind of causation. With this, we have decons, dynamical depths. Basically, we have a homodynamic work that is described as the term dynamic sitting general and this spontaneous standard is constraint elimination. Then we have morpho-dynamics that are self-organizing systems and dissipative systems and there is no simple constraint elimination but constraint propagation. And finally, we have teleodynamic systems that is what I think is an organic system and in this case, there is no constraint elimination there is not only constraint propagation but there is constraint preservation. Are you jump that? These are examples of morpho-dynamic systems they can believe that we just we can, we only can understand the biological causation we use some kinds of physical causation or thermo-dynamic causation of max entropy production to like a bridge but I will jump that and I go to teleodynamics that is what decon believe to be causal biological causation. So, there is something that decon calls hatchet effect where two different morpho-dynamic processes start to impose constraints on one another in their capacity of energy dispersion. So, dissipative systems usually are usually self undermining mechanisms there is the emergence of a local a local decrease in entropy but the system, like a whole is going fast to equilibrium state if two morpho-dynamic systems can realize work one on another to avoid or to constrain this self undermining mechanism there is a synergy between the two morpho-dynamic systems that give rise to the teodynamic systems there is an autogen that is basically the biochemical model there is two morpho-dynamic systems an autocatalysis and a self-assembly that is what I use passed by that and why we use the terminology teleo So, in a teleodynamic system the process is organized or constrained in relation to factors other than its raw materials or energy constituents the restricted integrates of the individual as a whole start to work as a legitimate beneficiary to occurrences but the beneficiary is not a thing but a dynamic form the same teleodynamics each morpho-dynamic process serves now as both end in means in a quantum terminology to one another and they are there for the benefit of the individual autogen we can claim that teleodynamics is a goal direct toward its own continuity we have a system that the way that the system constraints itself they are directed to continue to exist why is it biological? and this first because of some aspects of the system itself first there is great independence and autonomy from external constraints there is a great complexity and a significantly better utilization of a viable constraint that supports new and varied forms of activities and then with this kind of systems we have activities that's traditional have been called virtual activities like self-buff movements, feeding, reproduction and all that is founded on the constraint of the separative process in the end you can believe that our final cause a naturalized final cause is the constitutive cause that enables biological self to emerge for the first time in nature and generate a teleodynamic work with this individual as the beneficiary then there is some conclusions but with the inputs there is an end for the system he can talk about function, value and representation and for finish just for the advantages of DeComp's theory first of all the way that emergence is described it does not use emergence as a label of irreducibility but either as a physical transition in which global causal dynamics are reorganized it accepts the real existence of theological phenomena without affirming that they have always existed that is, it forces their emergence from a non-theological antecedent three, the origin of life from a particular or concrete system they talk about a general description that is applicable to any potential primitive systems and for DeComp's avoid unusual and enigmatic forces like Elan Vital or the Strangin-Pantung forces or other forces that are usually used to explain these systems Thank you for this Question, comments Thank you very much I'm still a little puzzled as to why you want to characterize emergence as something less and maybe it's just because I'm really holding on to because by definition it's something more of a thing I understand that what you want to do is say that biological comes from a limited subset of the possible internal strengths in the organization but I don't know if it's the same as saying that emergence is something less it is certainly a subset of the cases that do emerge from the physical level but the emergence phenomenon itself is something more What? The emergence phenomenon is something more Yes, there is a trick in DeComp's proposal and it's basically when he talks about something less he doesn't say that but if you read how he describes something less he talks about what in classical metaphysics is a potential passive potency So, in classical metaphysics we have, for example that the passive potency of a being in prior states are possible, are possibilities for a lot of formal causes and when it receives a specific formal cause he lost potential passive but gain potential active So, there is I think that DeComp don't have the distinction in mind DeComp is not a philosopher all his life he investigates about the brain and now he talks about semiotics and he is a little loop in his philosophical concepts but when he talks about something less I would have to ask him but I think that he only talks about something less as a directionality in causality so the emergence of causal actions are something less if understood as physical work because that's true physical work in general are less constrained than physical work in morpho-dynamic systems in dissipative systems there are more constraints and in biological systems there are more constraints so it's something less we could say that there is something less only in the thermo-dynamic constraints of the work the system is less or more but obvious looks like it's more but the way that it's produced work is more constrained what means that is less unconstrained there is less possibilities of work Thanks a lot, I think it was very very push people, did you hear me? very push people's explanation of the rendering of Terry Deacon's first part of Terry Deacon in this nature so what I was wondering what your project is what you presented in a very articulated way is essentially Deacon's account how this fits in your own project whether you are considered or planned to because there is a whole recent tradition of thinking about constraints and the idea of emergence as something less the fact that you constraint the system in a certain way and it goes back to Kaufman and more recently there is an important paper by Martel Mosto and Michael DeRio from 2015 on the journal I was just wondering how you position yourself with respect to Deacon and the more general context of people that are claiming that are defending Deacon's claim so I presented two ideas of Deacon it's his general tariff work and the emergence as something less we really want to talk about not only Deacon's first part well I would say that is the second part because before this we have the big problem that is absence causation because Deacon starts with absence causation then come to that then come to how understand the teleodynamics and development so what happened with me and Deacon is that destiny destiny I started to work on that because my test orientor Bono the professor who helped me with the thesis is a friend of Deacon and then we started to and then we saw that the big problem of Deacon isn't his biochemical description but the philosophical way that reports this biochemical for example when we talk about absence causation he utilizes some some theories about Yin and Yang that metaphysics isn't enough so the project right now is to try to give to Deacon a speculative or a metaphysical base basically is practical metaphysics is trying to make a metaphysical model that can support not his philosophy because he has not philosophy but his biochemical approach I have a very short question it's purely terminological and it's not really addressed that you I guess it's more addressed at Deacon it seems to me that he has completely changed the meaning of what physical work is and I just want to terminologically whether that's why is to take an extremely well established concept from physics and use the same word with a different meaning in a scientific context I find this an unwise strategy if he's changing, if he's introducing a new concept and it seems to have nothing to do with the physical concept of work what he's talking about then he should use a new word for it what concept? the concept of physical work but what is introduced? the way you introduced the notions of energy and work has nothing to do with their physical definitions well at least I don't see the connection in the article there is the an account of physical work as energy constraints and then I I'm sorry to interrupt it this has nothing to do with physics it's with physical it's extremely misleading here it's in this tradition you know Kauffman and the Santa Fe Institute they changed the meaning of basic physics work we can discuss with Matteo Mocio they're also in their fields and it's true that maybe they should have changed it that's all I'm saying but that's your fault no, of course not it's not the criticism of you it's the criticism of this line of research it's the study and for example if I want to compare this line with another line where I can where I can take any physics textbook but it won't help you because what is important for you it's that kind of circular system of constraint that is not in standard physics it's in all these auto-organization traditions and Santa Fe it's not in standard physics but it's inspired by Schrodinger and Kauffman was important if you want to contrast that will be interesting for you don't go to ordinary physics because ordinary physics has nothing to say about biology it goes to Prigogen so all these theories presume a certain idea of equilibrium or the biological system tampered towards equilibrium and the idea of Prigogen is that maybe their systems are never ideal equilibrium and they are interesting systems but the mathematics of Prigogen is even worse than what you are studying it's really really difficult and I don't know how it works in biology but it's not a crazy idea that biological systems are never ideal they don't even attempt maybe, I don't know I mean thermodynamic they are just very very unstable system that managed to function for a long time completely outside equilibrium which more Prigogen and it's a Belgium castle let's thank our speaker