 You're all very welcome for a start. Maybe you would like to do what I do, and that is switch your mobile phone off, so as to avoid any possible embarrassment later. We are very lucky today to have one of the most competent speakers on any subject in relation to Russia to talk about Russia and Europe, redefining the relationship. Russia and Europe is a very interesting subject historically. You could say that Russia sometimes is considered as of Europe, but not in Europe, and sometimes also considered in Europe, but not of Europe. And you could say that the history goes back maybe to the 17th century with Peter the Great opening a window onto Europe, and Peter the Great himself, of course, became a factor in European history and was active in changing the political formation of part of Europe, and you could go on to Alexander the Emperor, who outdid Stalin when he was congratulated in 1945 on reaching Berlin, pointed out that a solid example reached Paris. We all know the history of the period after 1945 when Russia of the Soviet Union was involved right up to the central line, dividing Europe into two. Since then, there have been various efforts to define Russia's relations with Europe. I think President Yeltsin at the beginning wanted Russia to be part of Europe, and indeed President Putin at the beginning, very beginning of his period of office, expressed a wish for Russia to be a full part of Europe. We go from that to today, where I read in the newspaper today that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has warned everybody of the dangers of a rucksit along with a Brexit. That's to say that Russia might be suspended from the Council of Europe, where it hasn't had a vote since 2014, and as far as I know, hasn't paid its dues to the Council of Europe since 2014. So the question of Russia and Europe is a perpetually exercising one. We could have no better speaker to talk to us today than Dr. Mitzit Sreenin, who's the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. As I was saying earlier, the Carnegie Moscow Center is an absolutely indispensable resource for anybody who wants to read reasonable views, objective views about the problems faced by Russia and faced by the rest of us because of Russia. So we are very glad to have you, Dr. Sreenin, and we look forward to your presentation. Well, if I may. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Murphy, for these warm words of welcome. It gives me a special pleasure to address you this afternoon. It's been a long coming to Ireland. For me and my wife, we attempted several times, but for various reasons under different circumstances, we could not make it. We're so happy that this time we actually made it. I will talk for maybe 25, 20 minutes. I really look forward, maybe less than that, I hope less, so that we can have more of a discussion. And I really look forward to discussing those things with you. I think that I would start with... There are several things I will offer to you as just broad thoughts that we can elaborate on later. I will start with what happened in 2014. Of course, that was the year of the Crimea crisis, the Ukraine crisis, and that was the year when Russia's unique quest for Western integration, becoming part of Europe, however defined, that came to an abrupt halt. At the same time, another major pillar of Russia's foreign... Or the other major pillar of Russia's foreign policy was equally destroyed, and that was Russia's attempt to reintegrate the former republics of the Soviet Union into a new construct with Russia as a center. So come 2014, the two main pillars of Russian foreign policy, its attempt at integration into the West slash Europe, and its attempt to reintegrate the former republics of the Soviet Union, they both became history. At least for... I think that as far as the former republics are concerned, that's history full stop with regard to Europe and the West. This is certainly something that is at least suspended, but also maybe likely over for the foreseeable future. When Russia or Russians look at Europe, they see triple. They see, of course, the European Union, but the European Union to them is largely a powerful economic block without a strategic dimension, a geopolitical dimension. This dimension is represented by what they see in NATO. This is the other thing that they see when they look at Europe. But NATO is perceived to be, as it was perceived during the Cold War, as essentially a platform for US foreign policy, US forces in Europe. And then, and that's the most important bit, they see the various European countries, some of which have been Russia's neighbors for hundreds of years and others have just emerged on the map of Europe and some of them are actually former provinces of Russia itself. These are either as an empire or as the Soviet Union. And I would say that Russia basically lays emphasis on the states of Europe for most things and only in the second instance on the European Union as an economic powerhouse, as the economic regulator. And as far as the third thing, the NATO thing is concerned, this is not about Europe at all. My next point is that relations with the European Union, which Ambassador Murphy mentioned that, looked so promising to many Russians in the early 2000s and in the 1990s, so that Mr. Putin in his famous address to the German parliament, the Bundestag, back in October 2001, talked about Russia's European choice. The European Union is not seen right now as a strategic partner that it was, at least it was called for many years prior to the Ukraine crisis. And due to the sanctions imposed by the Union, the relationship is essentially frozen. NATO is seen as essentially an anti-Russian organization led by the United States, not as threatening as NATO was during the Cold War. And yet something that is seen as enemic to Russia's core security interests. And it's only the bilateral relations, it's the economic ties to individual countries, it's about trade and investment and technology, those things are considered to be of real value. So Europe, my conclusion here would be that Europe to Russians is mostly about the economy, it's mostly about investment, it's mostly about many social things, people come here for medical treatment, people come here for recreation, some people keep their money, other people keep their families and still others send their children to Europe, but it's not about the grand strategic issues. Does Russia want to split the European Union? This is something I hear very often from my European friends. To which I would answer that Russia does not see the European Union as a big problem for itself, it sees NATO as a big problem. But splitting NATO is something that is considered to be, I think, pretty difficult or frankly impossible. Russia is not so much engaged in splitting the European Union in the divide and rule formula as trying to calibrate its approach to the various European countries to ease, either ease economic pressure on Russia, sanctions pressure, or to go around the sanctions. And engage in economic projects that would make sense for Russia. And again, you see so many examples of that with the North Stream with Germany and various other economic engagements with countries such as Italy and Austria and France and even Hungary. There are different countries in Europe, they have different interests in Russia with Russia and they have very different historical experience with Russia, which helps Russia and which makes it more difficult for the European Union to establish a common denominator for its policy toward Russia. Which I think is more of an objective fact than a result of Russian scheming. Not that Russia is not scheming, I think it is clearly trying to make the most of, in many ways, unfavorable situation. But it's essentially about those larger reasons that make some countries more open to engagement with Russia than others. Does Russia threaten Europe? I think this is something that I often hear again from my European friends. Whether what happened in Crimea in 2014, Donbass, does that presage reconquist an attempt by Russia to reconquer the territories lost as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of the Warsaw Pact. I think that for some people, this is such a view is essentially born out of their own country's experience or their interpretation of their own country's experience with Russia, you hear it from the Baltic states, you hear it in Poland, you hear it in Romania and in a number of other countries. And I don't think that there is a chance of Russia persuading those countries or convincing those countries that it does not covet their territories now. I think the chance of Russia invading any of the Baltic states is just not just slim, it's zero, zero full stop. And yet, you will never be able to convince the people who will continue to look at Russia through the Prism of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Act and the deportations of the 1940s and other things. The Russia threat, however, is the glue that essentially keeps NATO focused on Russia. If you have a military alliance, it is not enough to have common values. A military alliance is not about common values. Common values may be very important or an important factor, but NATO was born when it included a number of dictatorships within its midst, and it was not about democracy. It was about standing up to the Soviet Union, standing up to communism, and that was what NATO was all about. And that's why when the Soviet Union disappeared, NATO entered immediately into a crisis before it found new threats to focus on new areas of engagement where it might be useful out of area or out of business. That kind of thing. But with the Ukraine crisis, NATO has rediscovered its original mission, and I think it will stick to that mission because it's so useful. And the Russia threat, to me, nonexistent as it is. And you look at the balance of power, the balance of forces, the balance of financial resources, any kind of balance, which is clearly eschewed in the West's favor. The Russia threat is not there, and it's not, frankly, in my own experience, it's not really believed anywhere east of Berlin, but, excuse me, west of Berlin. But east of Berlin, this is a different story. Russia is often accused of interfering in European domestic politics. And I think there is some validity to those claims. In today's world, borderless, essentially borderless world, you are essentially free to operate. And I can imagine Mr. Putin somewhere around 2012 after the Moscow protests that were very much supported, if not politically, if not financially, as Putin accused the organizers of those protests, but at least there was emotional sympathy for those protests in the Western media. Putin may have resolved that Russia would strike back and would do to others that the others were doing to him. Of course, the others were trying to promote democracy, promote human rights to Putin that was trying to sap at the foundation of the regime, of the system, of Russian statehood. And he is pushing back. Essentially, what happened to Russia after 20, Russian policy after 2012, was Putin lifting the restrictions on dealing with other political forces than governments or established political, let's say, governing parties in various countries. It's for two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia stayed back from, even within the post-Soviet Commonwealth, the CIS stood back from actively engaging with opposition forces. You only deal with the government of the day. After 2012, that was lifted. Not only for the CIS, it was lifted for the entire world. So when Russia reaches out to the Alternativa für Deutschland, well, they are a party that exists. And if there is something that Russians can learn from them or to whatever, they go for it. And I think this is unlikely to stop. I find much of that to be, frankly, devoid of a strategic of a strategy. It's one thing to invite Marine Le Pen to the Kremlin a couple of days before the French presidential election. But what's the strategy behind it? What is the message that you are trying to send? Have you thought it through? And I'm not sure that it was. Otherwise, I wouldn't find it strange or objectionable when Macron, who was, of course, Le Pen's opponent in the 2017 elections traveled to Berlin. That was nice. That was fine. That was within Europe, within the European Union. It's almost domestic, domestic affair. When Le Pen, at the same time traveled to Moscow, that was different. Now, it's difficult to argue that you can only go to certain countries, not to other countries, or meet certain people, not other people. I think what Russia is trying to do now, not just in Europe but more globally, is trying to establish contacts with all relevant parties, whoever they may be. If you are relevant, then you are on Russia's contact list. Look at the Middle East. Look at Syria. Russia can be, well, on very good terms with Israel and Iran at the same time, with Iran and the Saudis, with the Turks and the Kurds. So if you are relevant, then you can be contacted by Russia. And I think in the Middle East, they've been doing it rather effectively. Of course, there's another kind of relevance that makes you Russia's enemy, such as ISIS or some other people. But even the Syrian opposition, Russia was bombing them. Bombing them, essentially, to nudge them to the negotiating table with Damascus. You soften them up from the air, and you bring them to them. It's, you may say, cynical, and it is. But this is the policy. So to the extent that Russia is interfering in Europe, I think there's a lot of, much of that, in my view, lacks strategic thinking. I don't believe that there's a strategy in Russia, a good strategy for dealing with Europe and this new environment. But certainly restrictions on all sorts of contacts have been lifted. There is, I think, a degree of interference. But to Putin, this is nothing more, actually, much less than what he sees as Western interference in Russia through various NGOs, through various meetings between Western officials and Russian opposition people, not to speak of Western interference in countries such as Ukraine or other countries, including some of Russia's own allies and partners in the, such as Belarus and others. I can, we can talk about the Skripal case, if you want, later on. I noted it here, but I really want to keep my remarks to the barest minimum. So we have, and I'm coming to some sort of a conclusion, we find ourselves in a difficult situation vis-à-vis Europe. As Ambassador Murphy said, Russia has had a very complex relationship with Europe through the ages. Peter the Great was the one who started Russia's modernization, taking Europe as a model. Boris Yeltsin looked or accepted Europe as a mentor. Now by now, both the model and the mentor no longer apply. Europe is neither for Russia, neither a mentor nor model. I think that what happened in 2014 reverses not only the trend toward a common European home that Gorbachev initiated 30 years ago in his speech to the Council of Europe, and Russia's membership in the Council is in danger right now, but also the 300-plus year-old trend started by Peter the Great, with Europe being the place where Russia would want to be. I think the new mentality that is spreading within the political class in Russia is that Russia stands apart from Europe. In fact, it stands apart everyone in this world. You live in a grand Eurasian neighborhood with Europe to the west, with China and Japan to the east and the southeast, India and the Muslim world to the south, and you are in the north of this grand Eurasian landmass. You are, as Russia, a global country, a global player, but you are not part of anything. You're not part of Europe, you're not part of Asia, you're not part of the American Empire. You don't want to be part of the Chinese Empire if it takes shape. So you are a country that is not a superpower. It does not want to be a superpower. It's not in the running with China for the primacy in Eurasia. It's not running against the United States for any superpower rivalry in the world. It sees itself as a great power, but the meaning of a great power is different from what it used to be. It's no longer a power that dictates to others. It's a power that does not allow anyone to dictate to itself. And that's the subtle change. And Europe is a close neighbor, it's a near neighbor, just like China, it's another neighbor. Of course, there's so much more affinity toward Europe and Russians are and have been and will be primarily Europeans of European stock. Originally with essentially European background and of course culturally part of a large European civilization that includes also the Americas. But politically and strategically, they will be apart from Europe. And at the same time, the empire is also being written off, more or less, it's being rather converted in the Russian mind into new neighborhoods. There's a new Central Asian neighborhood, there's a Caucasus neighborhood, but it's not that you somehow regard those countries as not exactly foreign. I think we are growing away of that togetherness with the former borderlands. The central issue between Russia and Europe today, of course, is Ukraine. I don't think that the election that's taking place right now, the second round will be in three weeks, less than two weeks time. Or the elections that will follow in October, I don't think it will change the situation very much. I think we will more or less be where we are today going forward. I don't think it would be productive to think of a solution to the Ukraine crisis in terms of essentially Russia surrendering itself to the demands of Ukraine and its Western backers. I don't think either that Ukraine or the countries in the West are open to some kind of a compromise on Ukraine, which would meet Western and Russian and Ukrainian interests. I think we're very far away from that. So the best we can hope for is that the situation does not, continues to be under control more or less, does not explode into our faces, that we do not see a degeneration of the conflict into an open war. And I think that there's a good chance that we can achieve that. Beyond that, after the United States and Russia somehow reach a new equilibrium in their relations, there may be a new equilibrium also regarding Ukraine. But with regard to Europe, I think we need to start thinking seriously about a new compact between Russia and Europe. No longer placed or founded on the idea of Russia europeanizing itself, becoming more like Europe. Because I think we've traveled a little bit along that road and I don't think we will hit that road again, not in the foreseeable future. Not that Russia will not modernize, not that Russia will be inimical to things European. But Russia becoming just another European country within the framework of norms and rules established by the European Union to me looks very, very unlikely. So we need to find a new equilibrium on a new idea. And this new idea could be, well, neighborhood, good neighborhood, mutual recognition of diversity. Russians will be unlike Europeans. Europeans will be very different from Russians and there's a lot of Russian narrative about how Europeans have lost their way and all that, to me, nonsense. Europe is entitled to its own devices and Europe is entitled to go in the way that Europe chooses to go and it's not for Russia to decide what is truly European, what is not truly European, who has lost their way, who has not lost their way. So there must be, in my view, a mutual recognition of that diversity between Russia and Europe. And then a lot will depend on what kind of Russia and what kind of Europe will emerge in, let's say, the next 15 to 20 years. Russia faces enormous challenges, enormous economic, social, political. There's a very difficult transition ahead, political transition away from Putin. It will take much time and it may come, it may result in many surprises, some pleasant, some unpleasant. There needs to be a new system of governance, there needs to be a new economic model for Russia that would allow it, finally, to start developing, start growing. And of course, the future of Europe is also, when you look ahead now, is not very certain what happens to the European Union. But after a period of time, I think we will have a better understanding of which way we're heading and that would allow us to come to, as I said, a new compact, which will be based not so much on expectations as the 1990s compact was, or ideology, but on the realities that make Europe and Russia, perhaps, the closest neighbors to each other. Of all the neighbors, all the physical neighbors of Europe, Russia could be the closest one. Of all the physical neighbors of Russia, Europe could be the closest. And that's a good basis, as good a basis as any, to build a solid relationship on. Thank you very much.