 Okay, so today's roundtable is about stalled engagement on the Korean Peninsula. And over the last few months, the Biden administration has rolled out a calibrated, practical approach to North Korea, and even stated its willingness to meet with Pyongyang anywhere, anytime without preconditions. North Korea has rejected these requests for engagement. And instead, Pyongyang has gone into complete lockdown mode against COVID and has turned to Beijing to help mitigate the impact of COVID, the impact of sanctions, as well as an overall crippled economy. So we're in this ambiguous phase where North Korea's unwillingness to meet with the United States raises questions about the Kim government's motivations, their fears, their concerns, and whether our best approach would be greater outreach, pressure, patience, or something else. And then, of course, North Korea's willingness to resume hotline channels also raises questions about whether North Korea is now trying to change the status quo in some way. So today, we're going to talk about the stalemate, what factors are constraining the potential for engagement, what realistic steps can be taken to minimize those factors and increase the likelihood of productive engagement. And does COVID mean that there's nothing we can do until North Korea decides that it wants to reemerge or feels confident enough to reemerge? And then are there risks to not engaging and simply being patient? And to address these questions, we have a great lineup of experts who will provide their thoughts over the next 45 minutes or so. And then we'll open up to Q&A. And let me just quickly introduce each of our speakers in the order that they will be speaking. First we have President Kim Ki Jung, who is from the Institute of National Security Strategy in South Korea, and he will provide opening remarks. And then we'll turn to Ambassador Joseph Yoon, who is Senior Advisor at USIP, who also provide opening remarks as well. And then we have our panelists, who will each have about six minutes each to provide their thoughts, starting with Lee Gi-dong, who is Senior Research Fellow at INSS, Ambassador Kathy Stevens, who is President and CEO of the Korea Economic Institute of America. Then we have Yang Mun-su, who is Vice President for Academic Affairs and a professor at the University of North Korean Studies. And then next is Marcus Garlaskas, who is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. And then last is Nahee Sung, who is the former president of the Korea Railroad Research Institute. So with that, let me turn it over to President Kim. Thank you, Frank. It's been two years since I visited D.C. if there was some time in 2019, I guess, that I'm very glad to be back to D.C. One of all the friends in D.C. asked me, why all of a sudden do you decide to visit D.C.? That reminds me, the question reminds me of the one thing, in our hotel here, it's not far from the Lincoln Memorial. Fifty-eight years ago, that Martin Luther King and his people visited D.C. that he said that he came to Washington to cash a check, a kind of a promissory note that the Founding Founders of the United States has promised to the black people. We came here not to cash a check, but we came back to Washington to share the information of our Korean Peninsula. Maybe I would like to point out three things, that I'd like to share our understanding about what kind of stage of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, this is the South Korean view. And the second is we'd like to share some kind of assumptions and interpretation about inside North Korea, not only in North Korean politics, but North Korean economy. And third part, we remember that on last May that our president visited Washington, D.C., that a long and great joint statement he made with the president Biden, that in one sentence that the South Koreans are very impressed, that United States is going to support the South Koreans' dialogue cooperation and engagement with North Korea. So I'd like, maybe this is the time to initiate, to design and initiate and practice the so-called joint engagement toward North Korea. In terms of engagement, that before the, when we look back the history of bilateral talk with, between Washington and Pyongyang, we believe that it's still engagement, it is not a matter of, it is not a matter of rewording something to North Korea. We believe that engagement is something framework, that we try to make North Korea stay within the frame of a certain commitment. So how to design and how to initiate the so-called joint engagement toward North Korea. Maybe South Korea's role would be one and maybe full coordination with Washington from Seoul in the second one. First of all, the current stage of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Let me say in this way that when we look back the last four years under President Moon Jae-in, when he announced that this is a time to begin a new stage of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. But in a full year, right after he was empowered in May in 2019, 2017, that year was full of a crisis because of North Korea's provocations, launching missiles and nuclear tests. But in 2018, we like to call that year was a year of hope, you know, some people described it as springtime is calm. But in 2019, when we look back, there was two South Koreans that year was a year of patience. We have waited and waited until the outcome of the bilateral talk between Pyongyang and Washington. But it did not produce any, you know, any proof for result of the bilateral talk. So in the last year, we tried to search for some kind of a breakthrough because of, you know, the structure of the Korean peace process. It is, you know, there are two dimensions. One is international relations, you know, dimensions. And another is international, you know, inter-Korean relations and other ones. So South Korea was actually searching for the new breakthrough in 2020, but it was aborted because of COVID-19. This year, even though this is the last year of the President Moon Jae-in's term, but we believe that this is, maybe this is a good time to regenerate or reactivate the peace process under Korean Peninsula, not like, not as high as the, you know, as in 2018. So this is the time to talk. And maybe this is, maybe Washington, it is very much important to move, you know, to talk in more precise way to North Korea. The date when we departed Seoul, both North and South Korea, the government declared that the restoration of the communication lines in inter-Korean relations, that is very much a symbolic, you know. We interpreted in, you know, North Korea's acceptance, our proposal to restore the communication line is that this is a signal to Washington. They are ready to talk, but they're waiting some more specific, you know, stance or attitude from Washington. So we brought, you know, the expert on North Korean politics and the economy and the rail loading, you know, construction from South Korea. So I like to, I like to share some kind of information and interpretation and even assumptions about what is going on in North Korea. So I like to conclude my short remarks that probably the coming two weeks, just before the mid-August, would be very much important, not only for the South Korea, but also for the, you know, the Washington because of many, you know, since the, you know, North Korea showed its intention to resume the talk with Washington. So it is a signal not only to South Korea, but also to the United States. So we came here to share the information, share the assumptions about North Korea. So I like to, you know, introduce the, my members of delegation, Dr. Lee, as you said, Dr. Lee, he is the expert on North Korean politics as well as he is going to talk about the North Korean-Chinese relations and Professor Yang is a well-known expert on North Korean economy and Dr. Na is the former president of the Korean Railroad Research Institute. Railroad is very much important items to talk about and to initiate. So that is my remarks. Thank you. Thank you very much, President Kim and I think you make some excellent points about how the, interesting factors, things that are going on in North Korea, COVID, the economy, things that are happening in the U.S. that can always change our best intentions. Let me turn now over to Ambassador Yoon who is calling in from Oregon. Please go ahead. Thank you very much, Frank. And thank you, Frank, for putting a great panel together in such a short notice. A big welcome to, of course, our Korean colleagues. I'm sorry I could not be there in person, but the next best thing is to be linked via video. And as Dr. Kim mentioned, I see that our Korean delegation has brought with them an important piece of news, you know, which could be very relevant to our panel today. And that's the provocative question of whose call is the ball in. Of course, the news is that over the past few months, at least, there has been exchange of letters between President Moon and Kim Jong-un. And that at least we have first piece of news as Dr. Kim just mentioned, that the hotlines between the two countries will be reestablished. What is, of course, much more significant is what comes after the hotlines. And there seems to be some chatter among the circles that what could be next is perhaps an announcement that there will be a virtual summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in, which would indeed be a very significant development, in my view, and probably the most likely the best chance for President Moon to keep alive his very own initiative of 2018, resulting in, of course, the Pan Moon Jong Declaration and the Singapore joint statement between Trump and Kim Jong-un. I think that would be quite significant for his own legacy to stay alive. My own view is I very much agree with Dr. Kim that this is an excellent time for renewed diplomacy between North and South Korea. Suddenly, there will be plenty of naysayers in Washington. I have no doubt about that. And their knee-juck reaction is that, you know, there is nothing to be gained in another round of diplomacy. There is certainly no significant denuclearization that North Korea is prepared to do, and that another round would be only giving more legitimacy and more bargaining power to Kim Jong-un. And they would be very much worried that U.S. and South Korea will be forced to give, you know, the leverages that we have so far kept fairly intact, namely the sanctions. My own view is these pessimistic kind of outlook are quite mistaken. And let me give you four reasons why they are mistaken. The first is that in the absence of any serious diplomacy, I have no doubt we will have provocations from North Korea. I think they are now getting their capabilities in SLBM, Summary Launch Double Listing Missiles. They are also getting their technologies on, you know, multiple independent re-entry vehicles, so-called MRFs, and very soon they will have to test them, and we will be back to Obama years or the first year of Trump, Trump administration very unstable situation, unpredictability, on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. My second point is we now need to admit among ourselves that the challenge of North Korea is now more about how to manage a nuclear North Korea than finding an immediate solution. Of course, the solution we all know is to denuclearize North Korea, but we're not going to arrive there quickly or persuasively, and we can simply cannot get there. So I think the first step must be to seek North Korean behavior, to shape North Korean behavior, and the only way to do it is through engagement. And we've learned from, you know, past experience, pressure alone simply does not work. And we've seen plenty of data, I think Victor Cha and CSIS keep that data that when we do engage North Korea, at least there is less chance of major nuclear device testing or ICBM big missile testing. My third point is my own suspicion that North Korea might just be ready to talk. You know, you know, Frank has mentioned three enormous problems they have, COVID. I just simply don't believe they don't have any COVID. Their reaction, you know, trying to keep it away has been so dramatic and so extreme. I think they're seriously facing COVID problem. They're natural disasters that have led to shortage in food, and of course, sanctions. It's also binding in a very big way. And I'm looking forward to our colleagues talking about North Korean economy, but I would imagine there have been significant economic fallout last two years. So maybe something akin to desperation is beginning to set in in North Korea. And in these moments, you know, Pyongyang is likely to consider both provocation and engagement as a breakout tactic. And we should make sure that North Korea chooses engagement rather than provocation. My last point is I do believe Biden administration is well qualified. More than that, they are prepared to engage North Korea, but that engagement has to be somewhat shaped by South Korea, and that shaping I think is quite important. You know, of course, ultimately, a lot of the decisions will be on Biden himself to me, it's clear Biden has tremendous experience in foreign policy. In fact, I think the last time the US had a president as qualified in foreign policy, as Joe Biden, I have to look back to George Bush senior. This would be the mid 80s or so. I think he has learned his lessons throughout the years. And now you see him using those lessons in getting troops out of Afghanistan in how to manage China. And in that sense, I do imagine he himself will want to engage North Korea. But there has to be a strong case because they realize that engagement does have costs. And I think the job of convincing Biden was quite well done by President Moon persuading Biden's team to recognize palm moon jump declaration persuading Biden team to acknowledge Singapore joint statement. I mean, you know, for Biden team to say Trump did something right, that was a difficult step. So I do think the challenge is there, but I do think the team is ready. So I wish you good luck. And I hope our experts can show us how we can get to a significant engagement path again. Thank you very much. And over to you, Frank. Thank you very much, Joe. Now we'll turn to Dr. Lee Gidong, who will provide his assessments about the North Korean political state of play. I should also note that there are headsets available. So please use them for translation. I believe, can we speak in Korean? Okay, yes. I'm not sure about the right channel, so you may have to toggle with it a little bit. But Dr. Lee, please go ahead. This is Hello. I am Lee Gidong. I'm the senior research fellow from INSS. And my research area is the elite structure and the power structure of North Korea. The political situation in North Korea is my area of interest. And I will be talking about how the North Korea's national security strategy under Kim Jong-un regime changed over the last 10 years. Because I don't have much time, I will go over them briefly. And during the panel discussion, I'm hoping that I can give you more detail. So during the past 10 years, we can say that they went through four stages. First stage was the building of nuclear arsenal period. The second period was a period of creating friendly external conditions. So the external friendly external conditions that was created from 2018 to 2019. So during those periods, they focused on creating friendly external conditions. And from 2019 until the eighth party congress, they focused on safeguarding their peaceful environment. And right now, they're currently in the phase of trying to create favorable external climate. So this wasn't coined up by myself. But I tried to divide these four phases based on my study of what North Korea has been announcing. And as you know, from in 2017, November, they tested the Hwasong-15. And they declared that their nuclear arsenal had been completed. And during this period, people were questioning whether technically they were really completed with their nuclear arsenal. However, that is what North Korea announced. And some offer suggestions that North Korea has prematurely declared completion of its nuclear arsenal in order to concentrate all efforts on economic construction. So maybe most people offer these suggestions behind their announcement. And after they've completed the building of the nuclear arsenal, they believe that they needed to have friendly external conditions for themselves to build their economy. So they went through the North Korea and South Korea joint summit and the summit between the United States and North Korea. And the third period was safeguarding peaceful environment. I think this period is very important. So after the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, in December of 2019, they held a central committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and they proclaimed the head-on breakthrough strategy. And they said that they will be helping themselves. They will not depend on other countries. They will be self-reliant and to do so, they will strengthen their internal strength. So that was what they said during this third phase, say, announced to strengthen their nuclear capability and advance their military power and focus all on efforts on building their economy on their own, which is also reaffirmed at the Eighth Party Congress. And they said that they will safeguard a peaceful environment. What this means is that North Korea is expressing its determination to maintain peace through their own nuclear capability and advanced military power. And based on those power, they will focus their efforts on building their economy. So after the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit, this is sort of the North-style isolationist stance, in my view. What I want to pay attention to is that within only six months, last June, during the third plenary meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the WPK, North Korea declared that it will proactively create a favorable external climate for them. And we need to pay attention to this because this seemed to be heading toward strengthening North Korea's relationship with China. So what favorable means here is some are different from friendly environment and peaceful environment. I think this is somewhat different from that they're using the expression favorable. So that means they're willing to be more agile and flexible. And it may suggest that it will utilize its allies such as China and Russia to gain leverage with Washington going forward. And they also use the expression proactive and responsible. And this is a slight step back from its power for power and goodwill for goodwill principle, which was mentioned in the Eighth Party Congress. Power for power, goodwill for goodwill principle is sort of a tit for tat strategy. So, but when they say proactive and responsible, that means that they will not wait for anyone to act first. But it means that they will try to do something in order to induce change from the counterparty. So therefore, this flexibility and a retreat from the power for power, goodwill principle implies change. So we believe that North Korea will pay close attention to whether combined military exercises take place and decide how to engage with the US Washington going forward. So I think that North Korea's relations with China is very important. The two countries seem to be aligned in their strategic interests. In case of Li Zhenjing, Chinese ambassador to DPRK, stated that, quote, building on the traditional China DPRK friendship is aligned with our mutual interests and is our joint strategic choice. And Xi Jinping, president of China, said, quote, we will strengthen the strategic communication with my comrades and I will continue to control the future direction of China DPRK relations. So this means that North Korea can get economic support and it means that North Korea can have a strong ally and they can gain leverage in their relationship with Washington. So at the same time, in case of China, China has been very reactive in denuclearization. So now with the closer relationship, China can gain leverage with its relations with the United States. So I'm sorry. Nevertheless, North Korea is well aware of being over dependent on China. And so they are wary of that. For example, in the New Long newspaper, there is an editorial section and they said that even though their bilateral exchanges increase, they will continue to be self-reliant and focus on self-rehabilitation. So they believe that they are aware of the fact that they shouldn't be reliant too much on China. So due to time constraints, I will wrap up here and give you more details during the discussion session. Thank you. Thank you. And you make a great point that both sides really are strengthening their leverage and trying to create or safeguard a peaceful environment. And you can also argue that both sides have a calibrated approach. North Korea is acting on the principle of power for power or engagement. Good will for good will will. And the U.S. side is also embarking on a calibrated approach, which is essentially the same thing. Sorry, I was having reverb in my ear, so I couldn't hear myself. Let me turn it over to Ambassador Stevens for her comments. Well, Frank, thank you very much. And hello to everybody. Thank you so much for inviting me to join this very distinguished and timely gathering. I want to in particular add my welcome, although I'm sitting here in Western Montana, to my Korean friends who have come to Washington. I think now more than ever it's important that we have these face-to-face meetings. And I really appreciate the effort and the inconvenience still of travel like this, but of coming. You know, I know that the title of this seminar was set up as something like whose which court is the ball in. I'm not sure what sport we're playing. I have tennis in my mind, but that's just because I play tennis rather badly. But I thought I focused my comments on this week's announcement by the DPRK of the joint restoration of the hotline and some of the signs we see coming from Pyongyang. Because I think that's there, since it was the U.S. who introduced this metaphor of the ball is in North Korea's court. I take this as Pyongyang's answer. We can see what kind of shot they've hit. But if it's doubles tennis on the other side, I think they've they've hit it to South Korea. So anyway, not to belabor that metaphor too much. I want to say that I certainly welcome the fact that this hotline has been restored. I appreciate Professor Kim's and Professor Lee's observations and Professor Kim's that this is important, very important symbolically and does suggest readiness for outreach to Washington as well. Certainly, I think that if it comes out of North Korea's difficult situation, that seems pretty clear. But I think it's also coming in the context of what has been a very careful and quiet approach by Seoul and also by Washington. And so if we look forward to what should we be doing, I think I wanted to take a moment to say I think over the last couple of months, to some extent, as a result of some careful work that needs to continue seeking out channels of communication and persisting in those of being very restrained in what is said publicly. And as others have mentioned, and I would underscore, I think the fact that the the summit that President Moon had with President Biden in May was not only successful by any measure. But I think it's sent a very strong message about the strength of the overall alliance of the relationship of the commitment to work together that is at odds with with the message that was coming in earlier years, which was certainly a commitment from the previous administration with respect to engagement with North Korea, but rather jarringly set at a time of a very explicit express doubts about the strength of the alliance itself. So I think all of this has been important in setting the stage for what I hope will be some possibilities going forward. So just to be brief, and I think I've heard a lot of great ideas already and I want to be brief so I can hear some more. I mean, in the short term, I do think that the inter-Korean Avenue is the is the avenue that makes the most sense, whether it's with respect to global health work, vaccines, building on the 2018 Pomunjum Agreement. Of course, all of those things will, as it already been suggested, lead to some important and and subtle decisions that will have to be made about things like upcoming military exercises about sanctions, waivers, and others. But I think we need to be prepared to try to engage on those things, first between Washington and Seoul and more broadly, but also with North Korea. And longer term, I just wanted to reinforce again what President Kim has already mentioned. And this is a process and I appreciate him using the word peace process. I think that however we go forward, we have to have a long-term strategy. Sometimes we've used the word roadmap. I would stick with kind of process and I think there are several strands to it. Because again, as Ambassador Yoon said, this is not an issue, the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the issue of a lasting peace. These issues are not going to be resolved quickly, but there can be a sustainable process and it has to have the strands of peace, including the inter-Korean as well as the international, as well as that of denuclearization and reduction of tensions. So how do you come up with those processes? Well, we've been through some of this before and the problem has been not so much getting started, but sustaining it. And of course, there are problems sustaining it when we find a Pyongyang that is not ready to go forward with the agreements that have been made. But we've also had difficulty sustaining those processes and political consensus within the United States because of our own political process and indeed within South Korea. So I would just point out that the other thing I think is going to be very important is to try to come up with a sustainable process. It's going to see us through South Korea's own political season coming up and just going to be capable of getting the kind of support. And here I'm actually, even in our very polarized environment, in somewhat optimistic that we can have some broad support in the United States, notwithstanding the naysayers, which Ambassador Yoon mentioned, for a sustainable process working closely with South Korea and our other allies and partners going forward. So my final thought, I guess, is I would, I give up on the sports metaphor, but I was actually thinking today that in Montana, I've got more time to think about two games, neither of which I know very well, but one, of course, is Western chess and the other is Paduk. And how would that fit in? And I was thinking about the fact that, as I understand it, well, in chess, the opening move is very, very important, but you only have 20 choices, but it really can sometimes set the whole game. And in Paduk, my understanding is there are 361 possible opening moves, but the opening move matters a lot less. What matters more is what happens in the middle of the game. So I say that to say maybe this is going to be a little bit more like a game of Paduk, and that we have to be in there for the long haul, but I would take North Korea and South Korea's announcement as hotline as an excellent opening move, but we are into a very complex set of variables and circumstances that we're going to have to work together closely on in the weeks and months to come. Thank you, Ambassador Steven, for the very concise prescription of the way forward. Let's turn to Dr. Yang now for his assessment. I believe more on the economic side. And the 35-year economic plan for the 35-year economic plan was announced. There were several tasks that they announced, and first is to diversify their trading partners. And according to the internal documents that was not disclosed at the time, it said that we need to be vigilant of being overly dependent on China. And they come up with this statistics. In 2014, North Korea is doing 71.6% of its trade with China, and this is not desirable at all. And at the time, the Korean government was forecasting that its dependency was actually about 90%. We don't know which statistics is more accurate. However, it is meaningful that North Korea was aware of being overly dependent on the Chinese market. And now since then, five years have passed. What has happened since then? Let's go over the past five years. There are sanctions and COVID. Due to COVID, there is a border lockdown. And as you can see from the graph, North Korea is recording negative economic growth. In 17, 18, 19 to 2020, they are recording negative economic growth. And due to the border closed down caused by COVID, you can see that North Korea's import and export against China is declining. The orange line shows import and blue line shows export. And after COVID, you can see that the import is declining very sharply. And next is the financial situation of North Korea. You can see the budget income. Until 2020, it was maintaining status quo. But this is the budget plan. And the budget plan is receiving pressure. And you can see that it is going toward a downward direction. And let's look at the agriculture. North Korea's agriculture situation has always been difficult. But in 2017 and on, you can see it is recording minus 2.5 by minus 3.0. And it went up 1.8. Then last year, it recorded minus 5.2. So you can see that during the COVID situation, their food production is declining very sharply. So the overall economic sanction and due to COVID, North Korea's economic situation is in more difficulty. And like Dr. Lee mentioned, they are at a standpoint where they need to decide whether to depend on China or not. Five years ago, they were willing to reduce their dependency on China. That is the only way to survive. But they are now going, coming back to that strategy of depending on China because they have no choice. So they are now at a point where they need to decide whether to turn to China or not. So on the outside, when we look at the two countries, you think that North Korea is very friendly with China, but actually it's a very dilemma for North Korea because being overly dependent on one country is not desirable for any country. And North Korea is not exception. And in terms, so regarding North Korea's dependency on China, North Korea is very concerned, is what ISS? Thank you. Thank you very much, Dr. Yang, for that overview of the economic situation. And of course, the question that we'll get to later on in Q&A is, what does that mean for North Korea's calculus, right? Let me turn it over to Mr. Marcus Garlaskis. So I'll begin with the idea that yes, I think applying game theory as Ambassador Stevens mentioned to the situation we're facing with North Korea is probably a reasonable approach. It's a helpful frame. And so I was struck by her comments among others. And so it's given me a lot to think about and respond to. The way, and though I think we need to see this differently, is that the game is far more complex. And the game, by the way, is not just starting. This is a game that's been going on for a very long period of time. And what we are seeing right now is just a tactical change, a single move, perhaps, in the midst of the game. And so thinking about what North Korea is hoping to accomplish and what it is doing in the context of reopening the lines of North-South communication, I think is really critical. And the larger context here is that North Korea has successfully reset the bar over and over again. To use the expression, reset the bar, North Korea is changing the parameters of each time there's a re-engage, and each time there's a new conversation in the background so much has changed. And so, Doctor, your point on the North Korean economy is spot on. And so there are some things that have not changed, and I would argue in North Korea's favor. But there are a number of things that have changed in North Korea's favor in this longer-term game that they are playing. And I think, in particular, viewing North Korea as my friend Jo Yoon mentioned as desperate, I think is perhaps the wrong way to think about it. If I can say so with all due love and respect for Ambassador Yoon. The North Korean people may be desperate. There may be North Korean party officials, frankly, that are desperate right now because their very lives and livelihoods probably hang in the balance of how North Korea is going to manage the situation. But if we think that Kim Jong-un is desperate, I think we are sadly mistaken and we're proceeding from a faulty assumption. I believe, as difficult as some of the challenges that he's dealing with economically and dealing with COVID, I think there's good reason to believe that Kim Jong-un believes his position is growing stronger and not weaker. And I think if we don't consider that at least as a possibility going into this conversation, whether it's a bilateral conversation between the ROK and North Korea, it's a trilateral conversation, or it's setting the stage for a bilateral conversation between the U.S. and North Korea, I think whatever one of those three possibilities is what's coming in future moves, if we don't approach it with that premise that Kim Jong-un thinks he's got the upper hand, then I think we're not going to be prepared for what's to come. I think when you look at, and there was a reference to Hanoi earlier, when you look at what transpired there and why things to use the term broke down, it was not a condition where you can necessarily blame the United States, you can blame President Trump. I think first and foremost we have to consider the blame lies squarely on Kim Jong-un who overplayed his hand, who believed that he had the advantage and he could force the issue and that ultimately he believed that if it didn't work this time or if he didn't get when he wanted at Hanoi that ultimately he would get future opportunities to get to his same goal perhaps in a different way. It was not an act of desperation, it was not Kim Jong-un coming to Hanoi from a position of weakness but it was because he felt that he was in a position of strength despite all these other matters I think that drove the way that things unfold. So I could respond to some of the things that came before and expand on some of these points but I'll only hit on a few. I think this whole idea of the fact that China and North Korea are now in a new place because of US China strategic competition is really a critical element. North Korea doesn't necessarily have to rely on China so much as all they have to do is rely on China acting in its own interest. It is in China's interest unfortunately in the context of US China strategic competition to not necessarily cooperate with the United States to support North Korea to underwrite the Kim Jong-un regime and to make denuclearization such a secondary issue that in the end North Korea is not really going to feel significant pressure from China to make progress on denuclearization. So what does this mean? We need to have realistic expectations going into any dialogue with North Korea and we have to think about what Ambassador Yoon said were the costs of engagement and how do we minimize those costs, right? I'm not advocating for not engaging with North Korea for stonewalling North Korea, quite the opposite. As those of you who read some of my writing know, I actually am very much in favor of engaging with North Korea on issues even other than denuclearization but you have to do so in a way that advances the goals of the alliance and advances a longer term plan rather than just reacting to the way North Korea has reset the table and certainly without in a way where you're paying a major cost in a larger game just to get to a conversation with North Korea. The very idea that we would consider canceling an ROK-US alliance exercise of any scale simply to get North Korea to talk to us I would suggest is simply playing into Kim Jong-un's hands, right? He can use any level of ROK-US alliance military activity now as a justification for not talking, as a justification for why he has his nuclear weapons. He has reset the bar so much that just a simple computer assisted exercise in which there are no movement of strategic platforms, there's no nuclear capable systems involved, it's just a bunch of people sitting behind computers now is considered to be something that we might want to hold off on because it could provoke the North Koreans to the point where they won't come to talks. That shows you how much that Kim Jong-un has reset the bar. Another way in which we have to manage our expectations and think about how the bar has been reset is about the type of weapons testing that North Korea has been undertaking, the type of development they've been undertaking. The upside, the positive side is that North Korea has not done an underground nuclear test in 2017 that they haven't fired at ICBM since 2017, since they declared complete their program, which of course is not complete, they keep talking about all the other things that they're going to do. Those things haven't happened, but let's look at what has happened, right? They continue to test ballistic missiles of increasing capability on the solid fuel front, weapons that can be used for a whole variety of purposes, conventional and potentially to advance North Korea's capability to deliver nuclear weapons. And ultimately, these systems provide Kim Jong-un over the long term potentially an option to conduct limited military strikes against very discrete targets with his nuclear capability and deterrent in the background to prevent a major regime ending response from the alliance. So I see my time is growing short, so I'll try and be respectful here and recognize that ultimately the most important takeaway though that I want everyone in this room to think about in the terms of this conversation is as we are going through trying to determine what North Korea had in mind by restoring North-South communications, let's remember how they ended. It was because North Korea blew up a liaison office and engaged in a level of threats and coercion that really should be completely unacceptable to achieve an end in terms of changing the policy of the Republic of Korea toward informational efforts on North Korea. Resulted, let's be fair, in the inaction of a new law, a domestic change in South Korea was achieved through coercion against the Republic of Korea. And I'm an American, so I can't walk in President Moon's shoes. There are reasons why he supported that approach. There's reasons why the National Assembly supported that approach. And we don't need to go into them here, but ultimately it was a success. And having had that success now a year later, North Korea reopens the lines of communication and has reset the bar now to a new place and has advanced their longer term game of getting acceptance for their nuclear and missile programs. And I think that's what we have to keep in mind. Thanks, Marcus. I think your comments really highlight the question of how we escape this dilemma, where both the United States and North Korea feel that they have the upper hand at the same time they're trying to increase their leverage and maximize their security, and yet they're both calibrating their policies based on their response to the other. We're in this, again, what we call the vicious cycle, right? Hopefully we can get to that in the Q&A. Let's go to our last speaker now, Dr. Na, from the Railroad Research Institute. Hello, my name is Na Hee-seung. I am former President of the Korean Railroad Research Institute. So as an expert of train, I'll be talking about train. So before we headed to the United States, we I heard and used that the communication line was back and the restoration of the communication line, I believe, is that a green light for both the United States and South Korea. And along with the restoration of the communication line, in the midst of such a situation, we'll be talking about the joint engagement or for the resume of the talks between the different countries. We believe that I want to start from the agreement that they North Korea will have to agree to their commitments. There were some summits held between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the United States, and there were some progress made in the railroad projects. So I wanted to propose implementing the agreements made by the two Koreas through railroad projects. So in the early administration of Trump, we were at the height of tension at the time. And at the time, the two Koreas participated in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, and we were heading toward peace, and the peaceful atmosphere was created. And for April 27th, the Panmunjom Joint Statement and the September 19th Pyeongyang Joint Statement was announced, and the Hanoi Summit was broken up, and then COVID pandemic followed, so we were not getting anywhere since then. So in order for us not to retreat further, but to turn the tables, the two heads of state of the United States and Korea met, and President Biden supported Koreas, the two countries intention to have a dialogue. And in case of North Korea, they believe we believe that North Korea responded with the reconnection of the communication line, and I believe that the train, the peace train is now starting, it's starting to move and we believe that it is now the golden time to implement what has been agreed in the joint statement between the two countries. So I want to suggest to start with the railroad projects in order to implement the joint agreements. Three years ago, the two leaders from the two Koreas met, and they have reached agreement for permanent peace, and in order to do a joint economic development, they did a groundbreaking ceremony to start the railroad projects. In order to implement the joint agreements, we believe that starting these railroad projects should be done as fast as possible, and I believe the sanctions against North Korea can be relieved somewhat so that these projects can take place. And if the international train can be linked between Seoul and Pyongyang, we believe that peace can be achieved earlier than we expect. And right now, due to COVID, North Korea is now secluded, and due to these projects, the Busan will be linked to on North Korea, and North Korea's market opening will be expended. These are some of the expectations that we have from the results of the train project. I forgot to turn the slide, sorry about that. And we believe that the logistics infrastructure can be shared with other countries, and through these efforts, we believe that the mutual trust and cooperation can be enhanced going forward. And the joint engagement and multilateral engagement, the achievements of these engagement can be shared amongst the different countries who are participating in this train project. I will go skip the statistics. I believe that peace leads to building economy, and economy leads to building peace, and eventually leading to virtuous cycle. And so, as was mentioned, the communication line was restored, and if we were able to link the train, we believe that sustainable peace can be established going forward. So we hope that more creative, flexible cooperation framework is needed. I hope that through the peace train, we can bring about a peaceful Korean peninsula going forward. With this, I would like to close my presentation and go to go to the discussion session. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Nye. And I agree that inter-Korean cooperation on railroads and other areas is a promising line of effort to pursue. The question, of course, is how we address the specific needs that of both the United States and North Korea, the U.S. in terms of denuclearization measures, and then for North Korea, the end to what they call the hostile U.S. policy, right? This type of cooperation may be a catalyst, but I think ultimately we need to address the primary interests of the two main countries in the engagement process. So I want to thank the panelists for the remarks. We're at 4.13 now, and we started maybe 10 minutes late, so I hope it's okay if we go over 10 minutes. I want to make sure that we make this a true roundtable and get questions and comments from people here today. That being said, I will start us off because it's sort of a cold call, and I want to make sure that people can have some time to think about a question or a comment. And I'll lead us off by returning back to the original question about whose court the ball is in, right? Because I think both sides believe that they have provided their response. Secretary Blinken has basically said that the ball is now in North Korea's court, and of course North Korea has responded with their, basically their rejection of the U.S. offers. And so we're continuing to be in the stalemate, and there's, of course, the promising signs about the opening of the hotline channels, but again, we're in a stalemate. Our own situation where there's nothing we can do because North Korea is still locked down due to COVID, or is there more that we can do, whether in terms of pressure or outreach to jumpstart diplomacy? So let me start with that question. If any of the panelists have any quick responses to that question? So, Frank, you think that you agree with that ball is on the North Korean court still? I don't know if I have a thought on that only because I feel like North Korea has responded. So in that sense, there was an offer by the U.S. to the U.S. I responded. There is a very small scale of a behavior that we can watch. Sometimes South Korea is in a position to watch the both sides in which court the ball is in or not. But I don't have any intention to speak on behalf of North Korea or something. But in North Korea, we live in a big picture. In 2019, they show their intention to give up the young men. Then what would be the Washington's response? They're waiting for that. So in that sense, North Korea believes that this ball is on the U.S. side. I'll just wait to see if any other panelists have a response and then I'll turn to Dr. Lee. Well, the ball is in whose hand or whose court? Well, I'm not sure if I can respond to that metaphor. But I think we have to think as follows. When we say engagement, we have to follow certain rules of engagement. Engagement requires respect for the other. And also, they try at least to understand the other side's perspectives. And this is a relationship that you must work on. And once there's a certain understanding of one another, perhaps there could be a better confidence amongst the participants. You know, you say engagement, but you don't do any engaging activities. You say like Mr. Glaucus, you say engagement is needed, but it should not be a tit for tat for every action that they make. I don't actually agree with that because when you say engagement and you are not willing to engage in a tit for tat, then you're not really engaging the other. You are actually not really responding to their actions. And when you give no response to whatever action that they take and say that you're still trying to engage, I don't think that is logical in terms of the approach that you're taking with North Korea. And you have also mentioned that the provocation with North Korea will continue. Well, ever since 2018, North Korea has followed their emiratorium. They have not provoked to the level that is of concern. And there had been also a reduction in the military exercises between the US and Korea, of course. So when you look at North Korea's actions, I can only say that they have tried what they can to not to provoke outside. And the sanctioning regime has worked. It has had effect on North Korea, the North Korean regime and also on the people of North Korea. And so there are certain changes that have taken place internally in North Korea. And before they do any type of provocation, for example, a testing of certain types of weapons, they have not done it. I mean, for example, solid fuels, they have not prepared these solid fuels for testing of their missiles. So I would say they are actually holding off. They are trying not to provoke. So I don't agree. And I cannot agree that they will continue to provoke. I think the momentum is on the side of non provocation, although it could be proven wrong eventually. If people who are Ambassador Stevenson, Ambassador Yoon, if you have anything add, I don't have any way to know other than just if you raise your hand. So, okay, it looks like Ambassador Yoon has a comment. And then I will, I'm just looking at the fingers here. Okay. So let me start with the lady here. Please introduce yourself when you speak. I want to get some comments and questions from the people who have attended today, but I haven't forgotten Ambassador Yoon. So we'll get to you eventually. Please go ahead. Hello. My name is Contessa Bourbon. I'm a freelance journalist. I'd like to ask the panelists how worse is the food crisis or hunger in North Korea? Is it possible for U.S. and South Korea to help in giving food or helping in vaccines diplomacy as incentives to encourage North Korea to engage with U.S. and South Korea? What is your view? Thank you. Let's just hold off on that question, but it's basically a question about the food crisis in North Korea and using nutritional assistance, but also the broader COVID assistance as well to engage with North Korea. There are some hands here, Bruce, and then Mark. Thanks very much, Bruce Clinger from the Heritage Foundation. You know, we were using the sports analogy of what court the ball is in, which makes us think of tennis, and other sports analogy is football with Charlie Brown and Lucy and kicking the football one more time. But as I think Mark has said, we want to try engagement. There's this dichotomy of sanctions or engagement, and I think as Ambassador Yoon said that pressure alone didn't work. I don't think anyone is advocating pressure alone. It's all part of a comprehensive, integrated strategy using all the instruments and national power, but the U.S., I mean, Ambassador Yoon, when he was in office, was trying to get engagement with the North. Song Kim was when he was in that position and all the other ones, representatives before and after. So the U.S. is trying to have engagement, Steve Beegan, et cetera. So right now North Korea has been willing to pick up the phone at a bureaucratic level. We've had some exchanges of letters between the leaders. We don't know about what. The Blue House disputed the Reuters and Jungong articles that there was talking about a virtual summit. But we're trying to have dialogue. Now, because North Korea has not responded, there's often that tendency of what can we offer them as a door prize to get them in the room. I'd like to hear what North Korea would be willing to offer, since they're the ones that have been breaking the UN sanctions, et cetera, or UN resolution. And on the moratorium, the self-professed moratorium against ICBMs and nukes is pretty immaterial, because they were already precluded from doing that under 11 UN resolutions. And in the last two years, they have broken those UN resolutions 35 times at a short and medium-range level. They haven't done an ICBM and nuke, but they have been repeatedly violating. And then one last point is on engaging with North Korea economically, we've tried railroads under Kim Dae-jung, and I think he even rode the train to the North after he left office. We've offered and provided humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, et cetera, et cetera. It didn't change North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons and missiles. That's not to say we don't try it again, but I think we do need to have any economic provisions or benefits provided to them in the context of progress towards denuclearization. So certainly humanitarian assistance, it should be separate from the negotiations. But large-scale economic benefits, I think, should be tied to progress towards denuclearization. Thank you. Thanks, Frank. A technical question. It may be a naive one. The talk of the possibility of a virtual summit made me wonder how much COVID is really a hindrance to North Korea engaging. And I'm just wondering, and I'm not sure if anyone on the panel is qualified to answer this, maybe you, Ambassador Yoon. But what are North Korea's technical capabilities in arranging sort of creative workarounds for not having diplomats being able to travel, you know, would that be telephonically or virtually, you know, would a virtual capacity be limited basically to the leader or a low level below, you know, or how far down would that go? So just a question if anyone knows about the technical barriers that not being able to travel would pose. Let me turn to Ambassador Yoon to provide any previous comment he may have had, but also to address the question about food assistance. And then the potential for alternative means of engagement. So we know that North Korea has been conducting virtual meetings certainly through the Chosun Exchange, but also at PUSS as well. So Ambassador Yoon, if you could address all of those questions. That's a lot of questions, Frank. Frank, if this were a tennis match, it would be someone like Djokovic versus Jo Yoon. Okay, so it is, it is absolutely certain who would win, whether I would get one more one point if that's the question. And I mean, I think that speaks to we should not set up North Korea and Kim Jong-un as this larger than life regime, you know, let's call it what it is. It's a failed state. It cannot feed its own people and only thing it's got going for it, it's nuclear weapons. Okay, let's just make that clear. And to continue with this games analogy between North Korea and United States, it's quite frankly, very, very misleading. And who has the upper hand, who doesn't have the upper hand? I think that gets away from the point. And I really like Dr. Lee's comment. We have to understand the background they're coming from. And the background they're coming from is they cannot feed their own people. There's no question in my mind that COVID is there. And they have suffered tremendously on the natural disasters and climate change, which has led to food shortages. So for us to insist, you know, you do this, we do that, we will not, you know, talk to you under certain conditions. I mean, it really does remind me, and I worry quite frankly, whether we are back to, you know, at the end of Obama era, where we had so many conditions to talk to them that nothing gets started. So I do think, you know, it is a joke of it to say, okay, you want to play tennis, come on, go ahead, you know, to tell me that. So I do really do think the ball is in Washington. And so far, I am a little bit disappointed that we've made, we've not made a serious attempt to engage North Korea. I mean, sure, these are talking points we've used, we're ready anytime, any place, but without any content. And it reminds me, you know, of, you know, someone who is not interested in talking, but want to just keep the problem away, you know, keep it in a box. And my own fear is if we try to keep it in a box, that sooner or later the problem is going to come out, as it surely did in 2017. And the last thing we want to do is go back to 2017 situation. Now COVID makes it very difficult. And, and, but I think our diplomats can find a way out of that. And I have tremendous faith in the current lot who have so much experience in dealing with North Korea. And so I think they need some very strong marching orders. They need collaboration with South Korea to make sure we're managing the problem. You know, so, so thank you very much. And, and I found discussions very useful today. Thank you. Thank you. We had a bunch of hands down here. Let's start with this gentleman right there. And then Yan Ho. Stanley Kober, you might have seen, I'm sure people have seen the reports of China building more silos for their ICBM forces. So the question, how do we get China to cooperate with us on denuclearization of North Korea when the Chinese are themselves significantly increasing their strategic nuclear forces because they perceive a growing threat from the United States? Yan Ho Kim with Georgia Washington University. I have a one question for Dr. Lee Gidong and another question for Marcus. So the Moon Jae-in administration is in a situation where as Ambassador Yoon pointed out, they have to make a strong case for engagement to the Biden administration. But from North Korea's point of view, you know, they must know that the Moon Jae-in administration has a really long bucket list while, you know, they're going to have another presidential election early next year. So from North Korea's point of view, they would be wondering whether the next South Korean administration will keep trying to make a goal if I use the sports analogy or trying to move the goalpost instead, goalpost. So whichever the administration we're going to have, whether liberal or conservative, that's a big question North Korea might have. And my quick question for Marcus is this, I agree that in Washington we have a very deep-rooted skepticism and in a way North Korea fatigue, if you will, in Washington. And I also agree that we don't have to respond to North Korea's single and short-term tactics. Having said that, I wonder if Marcus, you have found any indications that you can share with us that the Biden administration has a long-term plan to deal with North Korea? Thank you. Okay, so we're running out of time here so unfortunately we can only take a couple more questions. So what I think I'll do is there was a question on this end down here and then I think Darcy had a question. We'll let them ask their two questions and then I think some of them were addressed at specific panelists. So after they asked their two questions, I'll return back to the panelists, including Ambassador Stevens for their final remarks, but hopefully in their final remarks also addressing any questions that were addressed to them. So let's start on this side. Yeah, just a quick question. It may sound academic but actually has serious implications both for Kim Jong-un's approach and for future broader U.S. policy. Would any of the panelists care to comment on the question of whether Kim Jong-un has been a student of what's called the Qaddafi lesson when Qaddafi gave up his weapons of mass destruction? It is widely reported that he wound up in a ditch with no way to defend himself and if Kim Jong-un believes that and does this also have obvious implications for policy killing with North Korea and other despots in the future. Thank you. Hi, I'm Darcy Drow and as of Monday I'll be at George Washington University. My question is for Mr. Garlasquez and perhaps Dr. Lee might also chime in on this. I was really struck by your analysis of thinking of how desperation motivates different actors within North Korea particularly with party members perhaps the military versus Kim Jong-un not feeling desperate and so I wonder is there something to be done in targeting or the tactics that we would use for diplomatic engagement with North Korea with that being the case particularly since we have been focused so much on you know sustained mid-level negotiations. Is there something with thinking about their desperation differently and then secondly relatedly what lessons would we have learned from past negotiations that might build on those or what may we have learned from different negotiations in the 90s in the 2000s? All right and with apologies for those who had additional questions again I'm just concerned about being respectful of people's time so I'm going to go back to the panelists and I'm going to go in reverse order starting with Dr. Na and then we'll end with President Kim to provide any additional comment or to address a question that was addressed to you and please if you can limit your comment to two minutes maximum thank you Dr. Na please. In regards to the railroads nobody's asking me so I want to say however that we are at a very critical juncture when it comes to North Korea and the restoration of communications line I hope that also transcends sends into the reconnection of the railroads as well and I think this is an important opportunity for us thank you. First thing I'd like to address is the Libya example and I think it's a powerful one and I think it's one that's resonated with the regime and one that's frankly that they've actually cited among many others and so yes I think that is part of the calculus that leads North Korea to clean and clear up and Kim Jong-un personally not to give them up. As to the question about the the Biden administration's policy I'm not in the Biden administration I think they should speak for themselves on this question of desperation I think it's a it's a fascinating one but I would argue in the professional diplomats may correct me on this you can't have a negotiation when you're negotiating part is desperate I think what you're doing at that point is you're just dictating terms that's like unconditional surrender I think expecting Kim Jong-un to be desperate is a very very dangerous thing we don't want him to be desperate because we don't know what he will do if he is truly desperate and so as far as the lessons learned we can have a whole nother probably conference on that it's a great question but I think the number one lesson learned is we have to think of each of these negotiations in the context of not trying to achieve a particular result in that negotiation but how it advances the longer game in a longer interest and I think North Korea has been more effective in that way and I I take the whole game theory maybe we could go too far with that but I think we need to think of this very iteratively and not in the context of just a short few set of moves but how does this unfold over the course of decades and I think that's the big lesson from the negotiations is North Korea has taken a longer view I think we're at least no more more realistic longer view than we have maybe we've been too optimistic so thank you thank you Marcus Dr. Young when it comes to the economies of North Korea whether the desperation is amongst the actual population of North Korea and also whether the bureaucrats are desperate well when we talk about dictators and despots we talk in terms of the people suffering and that they are always destitute and are suffering greatly under the despot however I beg to differ however in that description in the case of Kim Jong-un's grandfather there was a certain authority coming from the fact that Kim Il-sung was who he was however since then coming down to Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un there were certain expectations that people had in North Korea of their leader and people are not that's destitute they're not really that desperate there had been times when their economies were doing better they're not doing as well now but there had been periods in the North Korean people's lives when they were doing well so they have actually gotten into a relative destitution compared to the past and when you start losing compared to before you have people with the discontention that's been building up and the biggest failure for Kim Jong-un from the Hanoi meeting was that Kim Jong-un was spearheading the negotiation and he had busted that he will bring back certain fruits of the negotiation but he came back empty handed and he was humiliated in the eyes of his people this was a major failure on his part and so he's not the dictator as a strong man as he was before thank you Ambassador Stevens oh well gosh thank you i've enjoyed the discussion um you know i'm struck by how we you know over the years and now many years i've been following this i i feel like we constantly kind of go back and forth between and some someone's overestimating or underestimating the stability the capability of the North Korean regime and the Kim dynasty um and that's maybe not surprising for a whole lot of reasons but it is indeed a regime that has proved very resilient beyond most most assessments but also we know it's very brittle and it's probably more brittle now because or in some ways because of the the pressures on it but maybe it's making it more resilient too so this argument will continue but i i think that i think we should just try to get somewhere in the middle there saying there are elements of weaknesses but also to to use another metaphor that's overused and another but Kim Jong-un and and and his father and grandfather played weekends very well i would even say this is something Koreans have learned to do and the very difficult positions they've been in over the centuries um but let's not overestimate or underestimate um and on on the issue of just how do you yeah how do you engage in a negotiation process and where are we in this yeah i do kind of reject this idea that well we put out a proposal they didn't answer therefore they they always an answer now i have never seen a diplomatic process that works that way ever i mean even with there i say our allies you know this again whether i call it game theory or just a game you know people are making their moves and you know sometimes our our partners or our adversaries they're thinking through what the history of this too is they're thinking about what the next move is you know we do need to be i think a little bit more strategic about that but we also shouldn't be surprised when the same issues come up over and over again it doesn't distress me that we're talking about uh uh you know the North South uh element is the one that Kim Jong-un has seized on to uh to try to move forward that makes a lot of sense he's done it before but my view would be okay let's see where we go with it not say well they haven't answered our mail so let's you know this must be very nefarious and we've seen this all before of course we've seen it all before but we saw it all before and every in northern Ireland and the Balkans and Iran i mean the issues don't change but the circumstances shape and that's when we get into these issues of shaping not just behavior but shaping the context and seeing what opportunities there are and that's what i hope we can do thank you ambassador let me turn to dr lee thank you uh first of all regarding the possibility of the shifting the goalpost my comment is this let's say there is a 50 to 50 possibility i think it will be better to go for it rather than not do anything i think that will be a more responsible way i'm not sure which country is willing to initiate the shift of the goalpost but anyways that's my view north korea uh and i am i another question is is uh by the administration changing its north korean policy depending on how which administration or assumes office in the next presidential election i think and uh there can be two ways north korea respond diplomatically they can first lean toward china and be dependent on china and second way is to have internally full control of their regime and become secluded and i think the sanctions against north korea is effective in hindering north kim jong-un's trying to do however it shouldn't spill over so much that i think it's a different matter for getting the giving up its politics surrendering its politics they will be iso they will resort to isolation rather than try to find the other way out so this is my personal view even though the online summit occurs i don't think it will lead to a tangible result the inter korean summit at the end of an administration is very burdensome for the moon administration there was one experiment there was an experience in 2017 and there can be positive and negative uh aspects to that so there are risks so they have experienced a failure two years ago i'm not sure if the moon administration will try something and uh they will not risk another failure so i don't think the moon zane administration is foolish and i think after uh the hanoi uh the two countries have come to a deadlock but we can see that there are some agreements that they were reached and what are some of the sustainable and attainable things that were agreed upon in the agreements between the the parties and can north korea if north korea has the determination to implement what they agreed upon i think there is a possibility of the inter korean summit but if that is not certain i'm i don't think the moon administration will go through uh the summit at the end of his administration this is uh what i have to say thank you thank you dr lee uh let me turn to ambassador you any final comments i was going to yield my time since i've spoken twice already to you and uh dr dr kim but let me just make one point if i may sorry to take time again uh that is uh you know for the past few months i've heard from our south korean friends a very strong argument that north korea and china uh their relationship is becoming very close and in fact creating a lot of dependency on the part of north korea and of course that's not in the interest of south korea but i'm not sure that same argument works in washington to try to convince uh american policymakers listen these two guys are very getting very close i kind of imagine that many in washington would say that's great news let it be their problem let it be chinese problems so just to point out this is where washington and sol's interest might not be the exactly the same thank you thank you and um let's have dr kim wrap it up yes uh let's wrap it up well in the beginning i forgot to say that thank you for you know hosting us i especially thanks to the usip as ambassador yoon said that uh sometimes you i mean you know we have to ask ourselves what is the eventual goal how to deal with north korea and at this moment we can say that our eventual goal to you know vis-a-vis north korea and the united states and even to china is that we try to establish a workable sustainable you know peaceful environment peaceful co-existence maybe you know the euro unification in the near future is not it's not an eventual goal maybe there was very much remote goal so you know how to coexist peacefully way the neighbor countries including north korea would be you know south korea's you know at this moment south korea's goal not only to this mun jane government but also in the you know the whoever comes and after the mun jane i think i think that in our generation we believe that you know antagonistic confrontation with north korea we are familiar with that mode but in that we believe that that is not an only answer that is not the answer to solve the problem of the divided states of korea well sometimes you're losing in you know whenever i visited washington that i understand the north korea fatigue uh you know it is understandable uh but in pyeongyang has maybe us fatigue but in we uh but sometimes i can i can witness that not only a fatigue but in the you know in some cases maybe you are or all you can say is that you know north korea hatred you know looking back the you know recent ten or more years of what would the washington's respond you know uh stands for north korea maybe the three types one is inactive no idea even though they you know you use the beautiful term strategic patience strategic and patience it's not easily combined these two words so it is inactive no idea no actions during that period north korea developed it's uh you know nuclear capability and another is uh reactive reactive with only five young fury i understand you are angry with north korea but it is only the reactive you have no idea about how to deal with north korea we need proactive and creative stance from washington not only to deal with north korea but to deal with you know korean peninsular korean peninsular is like a heartland you know north east asia if you lose uh ideas a commitment how to look how to deal with that you know the how to manage the korean peninsular maybe you were losing your ground in the north east asia you know so uh i think it is time to think about the grand political game from the united states creative game you know productive game so in that sense you need to see the north korea how to handle north korea it is not a matter of hatred it's not a matter of uh you know the fatigue problems and one more thing that uh everybody's trying to get some lessons from what we did in the past uh 2019 no deal in hanoi south korea is trying to get some lessons from why this kind of uh unhappy things happened uh maybe one of the lessons that south korea learned during the stalemate is that full coordination with the united states is very much important and persuading washington is more important than ever i think the north korea is also getting some lessons from what what they did in hanoi but and i think washington do you have any lessons during the stalemate i think you have no interest to getting lessons so i think it is very it is it is it is a minor things you might consider restoration of communication lines but i think it is a big signal even though the uh maybe you know only communication line maybe you can say that but in uh the meaning significance is that it's a very symbolic so i think if you want to play uh you know political game in the region how to deal with the china maybe north korea very much important for maybe north korea how to handle the north korea would be a litmus test for your future strategy in uh you know in the region of nosia station so nevertheless i we had a great time to discuss on many issues and last word as i in the opening Martin Luther king has he he came to washington cashier check but and i think that uh we we came to washington in the midst of uh you know uh covid 19 you may understand the inter korea relation korean you know korean problem has the dual dimensions of course not korean people who are residing on the northern part of korea we're sharing the same culture in the same language but in the different states you know but we came to hear not to uh appealing some kind of a nationalistic sentiment to the people in washington we came here because the state is our ally so how to manage peacefully on the korean peninsula it is a common goal for the two ally states at this moment thank you very much thank you uh you talk about learning the right lessons i want to bring up a story from mark twain or guidance that he had about making sure that we learned the right lessons and not learned the wrong lessons and he uses the analogy of a cat on a hot stove right if the cat sits on a hot stove you can be sure that he will never sit on a hot stove again but may also be the case that he'll never sit on a cold stove right so i i want to thank everyone uh for joining uh today again it was um our first test in an in-person event um there may be uh fatigue north korea fatigue in washington but there's certainly not fatigue amongst korea and asia watchers certainly people brave uh this uh chance to leave the comfort of their room to attend a person uh in-person event so i thank you so much for participating thank you to the panelists uh who came from korea as well as those who are uh participating uh remotely from montana and oregon uh i also want to thank my colleague lucy stevens and yang for help putting the event together as well as the embassy of the republic of korea uh thank you again