 From week two, you may remember how the United Nations came to existence at the end of the Second World War, and how the World Organization is structured. In particular, you may remember the central position of the Security Council, which is the organ having, in the words of Article 24 of the UN Charter, having the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. You remember also that the Security Council is made of 15 members, five of which are permanent members. And those permanent members are, as you know, probably China, France, Russia, Russia who took over from the USSR, also the United Kingdom and the United States of America. They are often referred to as the P5 nations, permanent members. And then there are 10 other countries sitting at the Security Council. Those are non-permanent members of that organ, and they are elected for a term of two years by the General Assembly. Originally, the composition of the Security Council was of 11 members, including the P5. The number of the non-permanent members has been increased from 6 to 10 by an amendment to the Charter that entered into force in 1965. The various non-permanent members elected are taken from the various regions of the world. And you can find many details on the composition and work of the Security Council on the UN website. Let me quickly recap how the Security Council takes its decisions and what are its powers under the Charter. Under Article 27 of the Charter, each member of the Council has one vote, and decisions are taken by an affirmative vote of 9 members out of 15. When decisions do not relate to procedural matters, paragraph 3 of Article 27 says that the majority of 9 out of 15 need it, which is needed for a decision, that this majority must include, I quote, the concurring votes of the 5 permanent members. However, in practice, and as made clear by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory opinion, it has been consistently accepted that the voluntary abstention by a permanent member does not prevent the resolution to be adopted by the Council. In other words, if a permanent member wants to prevent the adoption of a resolution, it must cast a negative vote. Such negative vote is called a veto, if the majority of 9 has been reached. Each permanent member is thus conferred by the Charter the extraordinary right to veto the adoption of a resolution, despite the fact that more than 9 members of the Council have voted in favour of the draft resolution. If the draft resolution is supported by less than 9 members of the Council and that no majority exists in its favour, the negative vote of a permanent member does not prevent by itself the resolution to be adopted, and in such a situation, the negative vote of any permanent member should not be understood as a veto, the resolution is not adopted because it is not supported by at least 9 members of the Council. There have been many criticisms of the veto power of the permanent members, and there have been many attempts also to reform the veto right. It is indeed quite astounding that an organisation which is premised on the equal sovereignty of its members bestows upon some of them such an unequal privilege. But as you know, this is the result of an historical situation, and it reflected the status of the world by the end of the second world war. One can criticise the veto power of the P5 nations, but it is undoubtedly part of the legal rules that each UN member state has duly accepted by ratifying the Charter. And despite many attempts to reform the right of veto, no changes have so far been brought to that system. And no legal change could be brought to it without the consent of each of the permanent members, because under Article 108 of the Charter, amendments to the Charter require to be ratified by two-thirds of the UN members, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. So any legal change to the veto system requires that those having the veto accept to change it. As you can see, the procedure at the Security Council is quite demanding, because the veto of the P5 is a constant threat, therefore prior negotiations between the main players are essential to get a resolution through. And this is the stuff of high-level diplomacy, and the wording of important resolutions are not only negotiated in New York's between the ambassadors, but it is also sometimes directly negotiated from capital to capital. And also sometimes a draft resolution is tabled without real prior negotiations, but with the clear expectation that it be vetoed, just to be able to make the headlines and try to lay the blame on the vetoing power. And this is, again, the usual game of diplomacy. Let me turn now to the powers of the Security Council. The Council has different powers, most notably under Chapter 6, 7 and 8 of the Charter. Chapter 6 concerns the pacific settlement of disputes. In that regard, the Council has a power of recommendation. It may adopt resolutions that recommend inside member states to do something, but it cannot decide that they must do something. In particular, the Security Council cannot impose on a member state to refer a dispute to arbitration or to the I.C.J. It may suggest that, but jurisdiction will always rest on the consent of the disputing parties. Chapter 8 of the Charter relates to regional arrangements. In substance, the Charter does not preclude the settlement of disputes or the maintenance of peace and security through regional fora, but any enforcement action by a regional organization needs prior authorization by the Security Council. In other words, the Security Council stands ultimately above regional arrangements or regional organizations when it comes to using force.