 Okay, while this is being said again, let me thank Wider for the invitation and also for sponsoring part of this part of the countries that are part of this project. I wanted to say a couple of words. Right now the coordinators of the project are Chico Ferreira, Marie, François and moi. And the interesting thing that we are striving to do is to include not just developing countries and middle-income countries, but also the big advanced countries. So far in addition to the countries that have been presented here, I may forget some of course Brazil with Chico and others, Russia with Lopez Calva and Daria Popova. I don't know where she is. And also we have Indonesia, I don't know if we have. And if I forgot someone, I apologize. And as I was saying the day that I gave my little tour of economic thought in Latin American economic thought at the inaugural session, Wider didn't used to focus so much on it, but maybe when you came, Tony, you're the one who brought it. But I was here in 1985 in a very interesting project coordinated by Lance Taylor and Jerry Heliner, I don't know if he's here, which was on stabilization adjustment and we did look at inequality issues. But if you look at the working papers over time or books, etc., of Wider, until 1999, there are two or three on inequality and since then there are about 300. So it's an interesting trend and this is part of this trend. Now, first of all, we have been working, when I say we, me, Luis Felipe, Raimundo, Chico, Francois, working on the inequality in Latin America now for quite some time. And some of you may have seen some of the work. What I'm going to present today is primarily coming out of these three articles to our published one in Andrea, Andrea, of course Andrea, you're another one who's been doing a lot of work on inequality in Latin America in Andrea's book published by Wider, a paper that we're about to finish. And the new project in which, because we want to focus on top incomes, we have managed to grasp the Latin American in the top incomes group, Facundo Alvaredo, I don't know if he arrived, but he's about to arrive. So what I'm going to be presenting today, I'm going to be part of the results of Mexico and then Raimundo, I thought it was important for him also to be part of the presentation is going to flesh out what happened in the labor markets. Quickly, it's interesting that Latin America, I mean when Joe Staley talks about inequality in the world, he doesn't want to talk about Latin America because it doesn't fit his story. But Latin America has experienced a decline that has been quite systematic and has happened practically in all the countries. And Mexico is one of them. And so we're going to focus on Mexico. I'm going to go really fast because our time allocation was cut in half. This is what happened in Mexico. Interestingly, right after NAFTA is when inequality started to decline. We don't know yet how or if it is linked to the process of greater integration with the US, but that's I think one area we would like to investigate further. But here it shows you an inverted U where inequality was rising from the period of the late 80s to the mid 90s and then it has been falling. When you look at labor market inequality, it seems to be maybe reversal in the declining trend. However, when we push the data further which we're doing now, it's not clear. What we've seen is that it has kind of petered out. The decline has not continued. And so this is a Yitzaki type of decomposition. And what you see here is the contribution of labor income. This is the first one for each one of those years. This is a problem on MacPC, not percentage, by the way. So labor income was decreasing inequality, inequality decreasing in the period in 2000, 2004, 2006. In the last point, it was inequality increasing. Even though we don't have the top incomes, we do have income from businesses and rents, et cetera, on a small scale. Those were all inequality increasing transfers were inequality reducing and increasing over time in terms of the effect. And the other thing that was been very important in Mexico is remittances as an equalizing factor. So what we have done is that once you start with this, you say, okay, so what's really interesting would be, since we know that this, even though it's inequality increasing, is missing what's happening at the top. All the things that I showed you do not have data from the top. Interesting is what happened in the labor markets as a story that explains the decline in inequality. We have the same analysis as Murray showed for South Africa in terms of applying the commitment to equity framework for from Mexico. And from Mexico, we had, we did a little bit over time. And this here shows how the before after comparison of transfers has been increasing in terms of the decline in inequality to compare this one with this one. And big time that decline in poverty, right? So transfers have been responsible for what we're observing. But I think that one of the very interesting stories in Mexico with some surprising results is the labor markets and I'm going to pass it on to Remundo now. Thank you, Nora. So as Nora mentioned, inequality has been going down in Mexico with the slowdown recently. So what we have been doing in our previous papers is trying to investigate what is the reason of this decline in inequality in the last 15 years. And well, there are three possible hypotheses that we put down there. There is an increase in relative supply of skilled workers or rather maybe since institutions via minimum wages or unionization rates, or maybe about the quality of the education, meaning degraded tertiary for young workers or skills of solace sense for older workers with college education. So we're going to analyze that. So this is a typical graph of supply and demand, like cats and Murphy and cats and Golding. It's the relative returns on the left hand side and the relative supply on the right hand side. So it's college over all other workers. And what we see is that in the relative supply is not increasing that much before 1994. And then there is a large increase in relative supply of college educated workers. And what we want to know is is this related to wages and how is that set up? And we observe that the returns decrease at the same time as relative relative supply increases by a lot. So maybe some part or part of the story of the declining inequalities, a large increase in relative supply of college educated workers. We don't when we contrast with institutions, for example, minimum wage or unionization rates, there is no action. So after 1994, 1996, basically, there is no change in the real minimum wage or in unionization rates. So institutions like minimum wage or unionization cannot explain changes in the wage structure during this period. But this is a similar graph to the others. Here we have the evolution of the log hourly wage by education group. And so what we observe is basically we normalize everything to all the groups in 2008. So we observe that the decline in returns or in absolute wages for the college educated workers has been declining since 2000. And there is an acceleration basically before 2008, after the crisis. And the group that has lost the most is the college educated workers. So now the next step we have been analyzing is why do college educated workers show this pattern of declining wages, absolute wages. So we show we're trying to analyze that. And here we have this table. And this is a very complicated table. And we are short on time. So let me tell you this is a cohort analysis by year of birth. And then we observe over time their wages. And I just want to say basically three message three messages from here. One is that the oldest workers show the largest declines in wages from 2000 to 2014 is like 40% decline in real wages. But young workers start with a lower salary. However, their wages do not fall over time. So they are the only ones among all the college educated workers that show an increasing pattern in real wages once they start their labor lives. So basically this is it in the final minute. So the to wrap up the message is that labor market was very important. The story has been a decline in the wage premium. Even though education inequality declined, we have paradox of progress. So it's unequalizing. We can't explain it, but we can do it later. However, you know, we started looking at real wages and we discovered that the wage premium not only fell in terms of relative terms, but also that wages of people with college fell throughout the period. So inequality declined because the top started to lose. And then, you know, we said, oh, is it the new workers? Probably lower quality. University has been expanded quickly. The margin of student is of lower quality. Turns out no, it's the older workers that are the ones who are losing out the most. So we think there must be a story there. Our conjecture is that it must be a story of a process by which the older workers are being replaced either by technology or by younger workers who are cheaper and know how to use the technology. And when you start asking people anecdotally, it clicks. It actually has been happening. There is a tier of people of college education that have been losing jobs and have to accept lower wages. So that's a very interesting story. We want to pursue it further. Zero. So I only wanted to tell you something a little bit about we don't have the top income. So maybe when we add the top incomes, our story changes drastically. And an example, I always give this as a little bit of an extreme example, but collecting data from Merrill Lynch, Forbes, etc., and I calculate in our 5% return, which is return normal times on the wealth that people say they have on average. Look at what the average monthly income would have to be, 600,000 for the millionaires, billionaires, 50 million a month. Carlos Slim, who's Mexican, would be making 150 million a month. And what is the two richest households in the Mexican household survey make? 45,000 a month. So we don't have them. And so we have to really get them in. So finally, for the new project, this one is going to be sponsored by wider, like India and South Africa. It's going to be Alberto Campos and Wagon. And we're going to try to incorporate the income from capital and top incomes. I think the labor market dynamics has a story that we need to pursue further to see how it's linked also with changes in demand, hopefully. Education, when will the paradox of progress end? And a profile of fiscal redistribution. Thank you.