 My question is, what do you think about the current governance we have today in Ethereum? Specifically, how we make major decisions. What are your thoughts on how we're doing that? And if it's like it should be different? So, I've been involved in it really tangentially. I've attended a number of the developer's meet-ups, which are public on cool hangouts, and anyone can attend and watch. I think a lot of the criticism of the governance model that's used in Ethereum is unfounded. If you actually watch the proceedings, and you understand the dynamics between developers, and the way these things have evolved over time, it's clear that there aren't really many dominant ideas or domineering positions. People can come up with positions that are out of the ordinary, they can present them as an EIP, they can bring them up to the core developer meet-ups, and have a conversation very openly. I haven't heard anyone being shouted down, or turned away, or chased out of that meeting for expressing a different opinion. In fact, if anything, the funny thing is, if you watch it from the outside, you're like, okay, so the person who's in charge of Ethereum is X, or the three people who are in charge of Ethereum are XYZ, and then you watch one of these developer meet-ups, and they're clearly not in charge. The beauty of actually knowing these people, if you've just joined Ethereum, and you look back, and you're like, oh my god, this 19-year-old kid, and you're in awe. But here's the thing, that is a result of distance. Once you get to know the kid, he's just a kid, very nice guy, and so is everybody else in Ethereum. So all of that gets washed away, and you suddenly start dealing with another person who has ideas that are sometimes right, and sometimes not, and you have an argument, and a debate, and a reasoned discussion. I haven't seen anyone on the developer calls kind of defer to authority, and I think that's powerful. The one thing I would say is that in Ethereum, the developers are more powerful than the miners. In Bitcoin, the miners tried to use their power, and we ended up with a bit of a constitutional crisis. It's kind of like making a national emergency declaration when there's no emergency. Was that left-wing? Or was that just anti-fascist? It's anti-fascist. So the bottom line is that I think there are some differences in governance, but they're mostly that interplay between miners and developers. I think the Ethereum community, one of the reasons that it's not insular and it's not heavily controlled, is because you have a much bigger ecosystem of application developers, library framework, etc., who are trying to take what the core developers do and make it work in a very broad range of use cases. That keeps the protocol in check, meaning that if you start breaking things for thousands of application developers, you're not going to hear the end of it. That's a balance that doesn't exist in Bitcoin. In Bitcoin, it's a single application platform. There are a few voices that can really direct that, and many of those voices are large corporations. I have an ambivalent perspective on it. I hope that was a satisfactory answer. Great answer. Thank you, Jameson. Unstoppable code. I believe that the reason why all of us are in this room is because of unstoppable code. We saw a few years ago when the DAO, the distributed autonomous organization, had a problem. The Ethereum Foundation was able to exert enough influence on the community. They exerted a central influence on a distributed set of nodes to roll back certain transactions, which in effect meant that that code was unstoppable. What are your comments on this back? That was a great question, Michael. I did some talks about the DAO situation back then. A couple of disclosures. One, yes, I invested in the DAO, $16, because I wanted to see the voting system. But I understood that this was alpha-level code at best, so that's as much as I was confident in putting in. I think the DAO was a simple case of two terrible choices, neither of which is any better than the other. On the one hand, you've got the possibility of one person having 14% of the Ethereum circulation. Just a year before you go to proof-of-stake. Four years before you go to proof-of-stake. But still, an unattainable situation, because that could cause some wringles in the future. I do believe in the idea of a mulligan. You know what a mulligan is? It's a golf thing. You break a window and you go, can I do that one again? Mulligan, and you try again. My golf game consists of only mulligans, so there you go. I think this was a case where it was early enough, the stakes weren't that high, and there were two bad choices. I think it creates a bad precedent, because every time that happens, it weakens the ability... of all the people involved in those decisions, or promoting those decisions, to say, later, I can't. It makes the can't sound more like it won't. I have a rule in life, which is, when you make decisions, when you write emails, when you communicate with people, always think, how would this sound if it was being read aloud to my mother? How would this sound if it was being read aloud to a grand jury, or a congressional hearing, and I'm the one sitting in the chair? When it comes to making these decisions, I transport my mind that I'm thinking, you made the decision, now you're sitting in front of the congressional committee and they're saying, Mr. Andreas, there are now terrorists from ISIS trying to buy child pornography in order to treat it for drugs. Just combine all of them together. And we need you to stop this dab. Your honor, sirs, congresspeople, distinguished ma'am, whatever the title is, I'm afraid I can't do it. Well, but in August of 2014, as the record shows, you in fact did do it. So why do you say you can't do it now? Oh, that was a mulligan. So allow me to explain members of Congress. So when you're playing golf and you break a window, so it goes downhill from there. This is a very dangerous precedent. And I think we all got away with it. There's a lot of people in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency environments that are very, very smug about the Dow. I think we should all be a lot more humble when we see a stumble that rhymes accidentally. But the idea being that every cryptocurrency is going to have crises, bugs, problems. Bitcoin did. It had a moment where it issued 100 billion Bitcoin in a single block. Yeah, that's a bad one. It's like hard, sound money with a fixed monetary policy. Oops. It's okay. These things happen. The question is, can we mature past these and learn the lesson? And so for the Dow, there were two lessons. One is, don't put too much money in untested code. And the other lesson is, that was your last mulligan, friends. The next one is going to carry consequences. And maybe you got away with this one. So I want to kind of start with Bitcoin as an example to it. Where since with Bitcoin, you can introduce censorship due to the pseudo-anonymous nature of the addresses. And some other protocols make that infeasible at a protocol level due to different encryption and cryptographical approaches to things. Following into something like Ethereum with unstoppable code where I and I'm sure many others would worry if the oops clause has already been too late for Ethereum or anything like that. If at a cryptographic level when you can't really know how, do you see that sort of as the way to go with things where at a protocol level, I can't throw anything back. Because I don't know how to find the outputs that were responsible for the thing, or what have you. So if you have any thoughts on that? Well, I'm not quite sure what you're asking, but I think one of the things we can do, when we make decisions about how we develop code, and even when we make decisions about how we develop a platform, I don't really have a role in that. I'm mostly the explainer who comes in afterwards and goes, let me tell you what just happened. But I think one of the decisions we can make is, if we put unstoppable characteristics into the protocol, into the encryption, into the various layers of the protocol, what we're doing is we're strengthening the can't-defense, right? So, okay, you've built an unstoppable DAP. Well, if you build an unstoppable DAP and you don't put any governments in it, and there's no way for you to stop the DAP, that gets appealed to the Supreme Court of Ethereum, right? So, you've got to realize that a lot of the people we're going to be dealing with come from an institutional mentality, whereby they go, okay, young man, let me speak to your manager, please. And so you call the person who wrote the DAP, and they say, no, no, no, I can't. Okay, young man, let me speak to your manager, young lady, let me speak to your manager. And eventually they're going to bump it up all the way up to Vitalik, probably, or somebody like that, and they're going to go, are you the manager? The problem is you're going to get this escalation, right? So, if you can't stop the DAP, you try to stop the platform. If you can't stop the platform, you try to stop the network. If you can't stop the network, you try to stop the currency. If you can't stop the currency, you try to stop the exchanges that are exchange of the currency. And then you all find out why Bitcoin is a really useful ally, because it's built some unstoppable money for you. But yes, we need to put these unstoppable characteristics deeper into the code, right? And that goes for building better privacy and confidentiality in the base layer of Bitcoin, building ZK Snarks and other capabilities in the base layer of Ethereum, creating more protocols for privacy, for mixing, for anonymity, and things like that. It's very important to develop these technologies now, right? You can't become anonymous once they start coming after you. You need to do that in advance.