 File 35 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, Volume 1. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by George Yeager. Book 1 Part 4 Section 3 of The Ancient Philosophy Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method of becoming acquainted with our own hearts and knowing our progress in virtue to recollect our dreams in a morning and examine them with the same rigor that we would our most serious and most deliberate actions. Our character is the same throughout, say they, and appears best where artifice, fear, and policy have no place and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. The generosity or baseness of our temper, our meekness or cruelty, our courage or pusillanimity influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded liberty and discover themselves in the most glaring colors. In like manner I am persuaded there might be several useful discoveries made from a criticism of the fictions of the ancient philosophy concerning substances and substantial forms and accidents and occult qualities which, however unreasonable and capricious, have a very intimate connection with the principles of human nature. It is confessed by the most judicious philosophers that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections formed by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct, sensible qualities of which objects are composed and which we find to have a constant union with each other. But however these qualities may in themselves be entirely distinct it is certain we commonly regard the compound which they form as one thing and as continuing the same under very considerable alterations. The acknowledged composition is evidently contrary to this supposed simplicity and the variation to the identity. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to consider the causes which make us almost universally fall into such evident contradictions as well as the means by which we endeavor to conceal them. It is evident that as the ideas of the several distinct successive qualities of objects are united together by a very close relation the mind in looking along the succession must be carried from one part of it to another by an easy transition and will no more perceive the change than if it contemplated the same unchangeable object. This easy transition is the effect or rather essence of relation and as the imagination readily takes one idea for another where their influence on the mind is similar hence it proceeds that any such succession of related qualities is readily considered as one continued object existing without any variation. The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought being alike in both cases readily deceives the mind and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities. But when we alter our method of considering the succession and instead of tracing it gradually through the successive points of time survey at once any two distinct periods of its duration and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities in that case the variations which were insensible when they arose gradually do now appear of consequence and seem entirely to destroy the identity. By this means there arises a kind of contrarity in our method of thinking from the different points of view in which we survey the object and from the nearness or remoteness of those instance of time which we compare together. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes the smooth progress of the thought makes us ascribe an identity to the succession because it is by a similar act of the mind we consider an unchangeable object. When we compare its situation after a considerable change the progress of the thought is broke and consequently we are presented with the idea of diversity. In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible which it supposes to continue the same under all these variations and this unintelligible something it calls a substance or original and first matter. We retain a like notion with regard to the simplicity of substances and from like causes. Suppose an object perfectly simple and invisible to be presented along with another object whose co-existent parts are connected together by a strong relation. It is evident the actions of the mind in considering these two objects are not very different. The imagination conceives the simple object at once with facility by a single effort of thought without change or variation. The connection of parts in the compound object has almost the same effect and so unites the object within itself that the fancy feels not the transition in passing from one part to another. Hence the color, taste, figure, solidity and other qualities combined in a peach or melon are conceived to form one thing and that on account of their close relation which makes them affect the thought in the same manner as if perfectly uncompounded. But the mind rests not here. Whenever it views the object in another light it finds that all these qualities are different and distinguishable and separable from each other which view of things being destructive of its primary and more natural notions obliges the imagination to feign an unknown something or original substance and matter as a principle of union or cohesion among these qualities which is what may give the compound object a title to be called one thing not withstanding its diversity and composition. The parapetetic philosophy asserts the original matter to be perfectly homogeneous in all bodies and considers fire, water, earth and air as of the very same substance on account of their gradual revolutions and changes into each other. At the same time it assigns to each of these species of objects a distinct substantial form which it supposes to be the source of all those different qualities they possess and to be a new foundation of simplicity and identity to each particular species. All depends on our manner of viewing the objects. When we look along the insensible changes of bodies we suppose all of them to be of the same substance or essence. When we consider their sensible differences we attribute to each of them a substantial and essential difference and in order to indulge ourselves in both these ways of considering our objects we suppose all bodies to have at once a substance and a substantial form. The notion of accidents is an unavoidable consequence of this method of thinking with regard to substances and substantial forms. Nor can we forbear looking upon colors, sounds, tastes, figures and other properties of bodies as existences which cannot subsist apart but require a subject of adhesion to sustain and support them. For having never discovered any of these sensible qualities where for the reasons above mentioned we did not likewise fancy a substance to exist the same habit which makes us infer a connection betwixt cause and effect makes us here infer a dependence of every quality on the unknown substance. The custom of imagining a dependence has the same effect as the custom of observing it would have. This conceit, however, is no more reasonable than any of the foregoing. Every quality being a distinct thing from another may be conceived to exist apart and may exist apart not only from every other quality but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance. But these philosophers carry their fictions still farther in their sentiments concerning occult qualities and both suppose a substance supporting which they do not understand and an accident supported of which they have as imperfect an idea. The whole system, therefore, is entirely incomprehensible and yet is derived from principles as natural as any of these above explained. In considering this subject we may observe a gradation of three opinions that rise above each other according as the persons who form them acquire new degrees of reason and knowledge. These opinions are that of the vulgar, that of a false philosophy and that of the true where we shall find upon inquiry that the true philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar than to those of a mistaken knowledge. It is natural for men in their common and careless way of thinking to imagine they perceive a connection between such objects as they have constantly found united together and because custom has rendered it difficult to separate the ideas they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd. But philosophers who abstract from the effects of custom and compare the ideas of objects immediately perceive the falsehood of these vulgar sentiments and discover that there is no known connection among objects. Every different object appears to them entirely distinct and separate and they perceive that it is not from a view of the nature and qualities of objects we infer one from another but only when in several instances we observe them to have been constantly conjoined. But these philosophers instead of drawing a just inference from this observation and concluding that we have no idea of power or agency separate from the mind and belonging to causes I say instead of drawing this conclusion they frequently search for the qualities in which this agency consists and are displeased with every system which their reasons suggest to them in order to explain it. They have sufficient force of genius to free them from the vulgar error that there is a natural and perceivable connection betwixt the several sensible qualities and actions of matter but not sufficient to keep them from ever seeking for this connection in matter or causes. Had they fallen upon the just conclusion they would have returned back to the situation of the vulgar and would have regarded all these disquisitions with indolence and indifference. At present they seem to be in a very lamentable condition and such as the poets have given us but a faint notion of in their descriptions of the punishment of Sisyphus and Tantalus for what can be imagined more tormenting than to seek with eagerness what forever flies us and seek for it in a place where it is impossible it can ever exist. But as nature seems to have observed a kind of justice and compensation in everything she has not neglected philosophers more than the rest of the creation but has reserved them a consolation amid all their disappointments and afflictions. This consolation principally consists in their invention of the words faculty and occult quality for it being usual after the frequent use of terms which are really significant and intelligible to omit the idea which we would express by them and to preserve only the custom by which we recall the idea at pleasure so it naturally happens that after the frequent use of terms which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible we fancy them to be on the same footing with the precedent and to have a secret meaning which we might discover by reflection. The resemblance of their appearance deceives the mind as is usual and makes us imagine a thorough resemblance and conformity. By this means these philosophers set themselves at ease and arrive at last by an illusion at the same indifference which the people attain by their stupidity and true philosophers by their moderate skepticism. They need only say that any phenomenon which puzzles them arises from a faculty or an occult quality and there is an end of all dispute and inquiry upon the matter. But among all the instances wherein the parapetetics have shun they were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination no one is more remarkable than their sympathies, antipathies and horrors of a vacuum. There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature to bestow on external objects the same emotions which it observes in itself and to find everywhere those ideas which are most present to it. This inclination, it is true, is suppressed by a little reflection and only takes place in children, poets and the ancient philosophers. It appears in children by their desire of beating the stones which hurt them in poets by their readiness to personify everything and in the ancient philosophers by these fictions of sympathy and antipathy. We must pardon children because of their age, poets because they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy. But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness? End of File 35 File 36 of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume Volume 1 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by George Yeager Book 1 Part 4 Section 4 of the Modern Philosophy But here it may be objected that the imagination according to my own confession being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy I am unjust in blaming the ancient philosophers for making use of that faculty and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible and universal such as the customary transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes and the principles which are changeable, weak and irregular such as those I have just now taken notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind nor necessary or so much as useful in the conduct of life but on the contrary are observed only to take place in weak minds and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy and the latter rejected. One who concludes somebody to be near him when he hears an articulate voice in the dark reasons justly and naturally though that conclusion be derived from nothing but custom which infixes and enlivens the idea of a human creature on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. But one who is tormented he knows not why with the apprehension of specters in the dark may perhaps be said to reason and to reason naturally too but then it must be in the same sense that a malady is said to be natural as arising from natural causes though it be contrary to health the most agreeable and most natural situation of men. The opinions of the ancient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities are like the specters in the dark and are derived from principles which however common are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect and to arise only from the solid, permanent and consistent principles of the imagination. Upon what grounds this pretension is founded must now be the subject of our inquiry. The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind derived from the operation of external objects and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. Upon examination I find only one of the reasons commonly produced for this opinion to be satisfactory that is, that derived from the variations of those impressions even while the external object to all appearance continues the same. These variations depend upon several circumstances, upon the different situations of our health. A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats which before pleased him the most. Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men that seems bitter to one which is sweet to another. Upon the difference of their external situation and position colors reflected from the clouds change according to the distance of the clouds and according to the angle they make with the eye and luminous body. Fire also communicates the sensation of pleasure at one distance and that of pain at another. Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent. The conclusion drawn from them is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagined. It is certain that when different impressions of the same sense arise from any object every one of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in the object for as the same object cannot at the same time be endowed with different qualities of the same sense and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different it evidently follows that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype. Now from like effects we presume like causes many of the impressions of color sound etc. are confessed to be nothing but internal existences and to arise from causes which no ways resemble them. These impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of color sound etc. We conclude therefore that they are all of them derived from alike origin. This principle being once admitted all the other doctrines of that philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence for upon the removal of sounds, colors, heat, cold and other sensible qualities from the rank of continued and dependent existences we are reduced merely to what are called primary qualities as the only real ones of which we have any adequate notion. These primary qualities are extension and solidity with their different mixtures and modifications figure, motion, gravity and cohesion. The generation increase, decay and corruption of animals and vegetables are nothing but changes of figure and motion as also the operations of all bodies on each other of fire, of light, water, air, earth and of all the elements and powers of nature. One figure and motion produces another figure and motion nor does there remain in the material universe any other principle either active or passive of which we can form the most distant idea. I believe many objections might be made to this system but at present I shall confine myself to one which is in my opinion very decisive. I assert that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means we utterly annihilate all these objects and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant skepticism concerning them. If colors, sounds, tastes and smells be merely perceptions nothing we can conceive is possessed of a real, continued and independent existence not even motion, extension and solidity which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on. To begin with the examination of motion it is evident this is a quality altogether inconceivable alone and without a reference to some other object. The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving. Now what is our idea of the moving body without which motion is incomprehensible? It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or of solidity and consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of these other qualities. This opinion which is universally acknowledged concerning motion I have proved to be true with regard to extension and have shown that it is impossible to conceive extension but as composed of parts endowed with color or solidity. The idea of extension is a compound idea but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior ideas it must at last resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple and indivisible. These simple and indivisible parts not being ideas of extension must be non-entities unless conceived as colored or solid. Color is excluded from any real existence. The reality therefore of our idea of extension depends upon the reality of that of solidity nor can the former be just while the latter is comarital. Let us then lend our attention to the examination of the idea of solidity. The idea of solidity is that of two objects which being impelled by the utmost force cannot penetrate each other but still maintain a separate and distinct existence. Solidity therefore is perfectly incomprehensible alone and without the conception of some bodies which are solid and maintain this separate and distinct existence. Now what idea have we of these bodies? The ideas of colors, sounds and other secondary qualities are excluded. The idea of motion depends on that of extension and the idea of extension on that of solidity. It is impossible therefore that the idea of solidity can depend on either of them or that would be to run in a circle and make one idea depend on another while at the same time the latter depends on the former. Our modern philosophy therefore leaves us no just nor satisfactory idea of solidity nor consequently of matter. This argument will appear entirely conclusive to everyone that comprehends it but because it may seem abstruse and intricate to the generality of readers I hope to be excused if I endeavor to render it more obvious by some variation of the expression. In order to form an idea of solidity we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without any penetration and it is impossible to arrive at this idea when we can find ourselves to one object much more without conceiving any. Two non-entities cannot exclude each other from their places because they never possess any place nor can be endowed with any quality. Now I ask what idea do we form of these bodies or objects to which we suppose solidity to belong. To say that we conceive them merely as solid is to run on in infinitum. To affirm that we paint them out to ourselves as extended either resolves all into a false idea or returns in a circle. Extension must necessarily be considered either as colored which is a false idea or as solid which brings us back to the first question. We may make the same observation concerning mobility and figure and upon the whole must conclude that after the exclusion of colors, sounds, heat and cold from the rank of external existences there remains nothing which can afford us a just and constituent idea of body. Add to this that properly speaking solidity or impenetrability is nothing but an impossibility of annihilation as in part two section four has been already observed for which reason it is the more necessary for us to form some distinct idea of that object whose annihilation we suppose impossible. An impossibility of being annihilated cannot exist and can never be conceived to exist by itself but necessarily requires some object or real existence to which it may belong. Now the difficulty still remains how to form an idea of this object or existence without having recourse to the secondary and sensible qualities. Nor must we omit on this occasion our accustomed method of examining ideas by considering those impressions from which they are derived. The impressions which enter by the sight and hearing the smell and taste are affirmed by modern philosophy to be without any resembling objects and consequently the idea of solidity which is supposed to be real can never be derived from any of these senses. There remains therefore the feeling as the only sense that can convey the impression which is original to the idea of solidity and indeed we naturally imagine that we feel the solidity of bodies and need but touch any object in order to perceive this quality. But this method of thinking is more popular than philosophical as will appear from the following reflections. First it is easy to observe that though bodies are felt by means of their solidity yet the feeling is a quite different thing from the solidity and that they have not the least resemblance to each other. A man who has the palsy in one hand has as perfect an idea of impenetrability when he observes that hand to be supported by the table as when he feels the same table with the other hand. An object that presses upon any of our members meets with resistance and that resistance by the motion it gives to the nerves and animal spirits conveys a certain sensation to the mind but it does not follow that the sensation, motion and resistance are any ways resembling. Secondly the impressions of touch are simple impressions except when considered with regard to their extension which makes nothing to the present purpose and from this simplicity I infer that they neither represent solidity nor any real object for let us put two cases that is that of a man who presses a stone or any solid body with his hand and that of two stones which press each other. It will readily be allowed that these two cases are not in every respect alike but that in the former there is conjoined with the solidity a feeling or sensation of which there is no appearance in the latter. In order therefore to make these two cases alike it is necessary to remove some part of the impression which the man feels by his hand or organ of sensation and that being impossible in a simple impression obliges us to remove the whole and proves that this whole impression has no archetype or model in external objects to which we may add that solidity necessarily imposes two bodies along with contiguity and impulse which being a compound object can never be represented by a simple impression not to mention that those solidity continues always invariably the same the impressions of touch change every moment upon us which is a clear proof that the latter are not representations of the former thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses or more properly speaking betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect and those that persuade us of the continued and independent existence of body when we reason from cause and effect we conclude that neither color sound taste nor smell have a continued and independent existence when we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe which has such an existence End of File 36 File 37 of a treatise of human nature by David Hume Volume 1 This LibriVox recording is in the public domain Recording by George Yeager Book 1 Part 4 Section 5 of the Immateriality of the Soul Having found such contradictions and difficulties in every system concerning external objects and in the idea of matter which we fancy so clear and determinate we shall naturally expect still greater difficulties and contradictions in every hypothesis concerning our internal perceptions and the nature of the mind which we are apt to imagine so much more obscure and uncertain But in this we should deceive ourselves The intellectual world though involved in infinite obscurities is not perplexed with any such contradictions as those we have discovered in the natural What is known concerning it agrees with itself and what is unknown we must be contented to leave so It is true would we hearken to certain philosophers they promise to diminish our ignorance But I am afraid it is at the hazard of running us into contradictions from which the subject is of itself exempted These philosophers are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances in which they suppose our perceptions to in here In order to put a stop to these endless cavals on both sides I know no better method than to ask these philosophers in a few words what they mean by substance and inhesion And after they have answered this question it will then be reasonable and not till then to enter seriously into the dispute This question we have found impossible to be answered with regard to matter and body But besides that in the case of the mind it labors under all the same difficulties it is burdened with some additional ones which are peculiar to that subject As every idea is derived from a precedent impression had we any idea of the substance of our minds we must also have an impression of it which is very difficult if not impossible to be conceived For how can an impression represent a substance otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an impression resemble a substance since according to this philosophy it is not a substance and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance But leaving the question of what may or may not be for that other what actually is I desire those philosophers who pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds to point out the impression that produces it and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates and from what object it is derived is it an impression of sensation or of reflection is it pleasant or painful or indifferent does it attend us at all times or does it only return at intervals if at intervals at what times principally does it return and by what causes is it produced if instead of answering these questions anyone should evade the difficulty by saying that the definition of a substance is something which may exist by itself and that this definition ought to satisfy us should this be said I should observe that this definition agrees to everything that can possibly be conceived and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident or the soul from its perceptions for thus I reason whatever is clearly conceived may exist and whatever is clearly conceived after any manner may exist after the same manner this is one principle which has been already acknowledged again everything which is different is distinguishable and everything which is distinguishable is separable by the imagination this is another principle my conclusion from both is that since all our perceptions are different from each other and from everything else in the universe they are also distinct and separable and may be considered as separately existent and may exist separately and have no need of anything else to support their existence they are therefore substances as far as this definition explains a substance thus neither by considering the first origin of ideas nor by means of a definition are we able to arrive at any satisfactory notion of substance which seems to me a sufficient reason for abandoning utterly that dispute concerning the materiality and immateriality of the soul and makes me absolutely condemn even the question itself we have no perfect idea of anything but of a perception a substance is entirely different from a perception we have therefore no idea of a substance Inhesion in something is supposed to be requisite to support the existence of our perceptions nothing appears requisite to support the existence of a perception we have therefore no idea of Inhesion what possibility then of answering that question whether perceptions in here in a material or immaterial substance when we do not so much as understand the meaning of the question there is one argument commonly employed for the immateriality of the soul which seems to me remarkable whatever is extended consists of parts and whatever consists of parts is divisible if not in reality at least in the imagination but it is impossible anything divisible can be conjoined to a thought or perception which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible for supposing such a conjunction would the indivisible thought exist on the left or on the right hand of this extended divisible body on the surface or in the middle on the back or foreside of it if it be conjoined with the extension it must exist somewhere within its dimensions if it exist within its dimensions it must either exist in one particular part and then that particular part is indivisible and the perception is conjoined only with it not with the extension or if the thought exists in every part it must also be extended and separable and divisible as well as the body which is utterly absurd and contradictory for can anyone conceive a passion of a yard and length a foot and breadth and an inch in thickness thought therefore and extension are qualities wholly incompatible and never can incorporate together into one subject this argument affects not the question concerning the substance of the soul but only that concerning its local conjunction with matter and therefore it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are or are not susceptible of a local conjunction this is a curious question and may lead us to some discoveries of considerable moment the first notion of space and extension is derived solely from the senses of sight and feeling nor is there anything but what is colored or tangible that has parts disposed after such a manner as to convey that idea when we diminish or increase a relish it is not after the same manner that we diminish or increase any visible object and when several sounds strike our hearing at once custom and reflection alone make us form an idea of the degrees of the distance and contiguity of those bodies from which they are derived whatever marks the place of its existence either must be extended or must be a mathematical point without parts or composition what is extended must have a particular figure a square, round, triangular none of which will agree to a desire or indeed to any impression or idea except of these two senses above mentioned neither ought a desire though indivisible to be considered as a mathematical point for in that case it would be possible by the addition of others to make two, three, four desires and these disposed and situated in such a manner as to have a determinate length, breadth and thickness which is evidently absurd it will not be surprising after this if I deliver a maxim which is condemned by several metaphysicians and is esteemed contrary to the most certain principles of human reason this maxim is that an object may exist and yet be nowhere and I assert that this is not only possible but that the greatest part of beings do and must exist after this manner an object may be said to be nowhere when its parts are not so situated with respect to each other as to form any figure or quantity nor the whole with respect to other bodies so as to answer to our notions of contiguity or distance now this is evidently the case with all our perceptions and objects except those of the sight and feeling a moral reflection cannot be placed on the right or on the left hand of a passion nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or a square figure these objects and perceptions so far from requiring any particular place are absolutely incompatible with it and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them and as to the absurdity of supposing them to be nowhere we may consider that if the passions and sentiments appear to the perception to have any particular place the idea of extension might be derived from them as well as from the sight and touch contrary to what we have already established if they appear not to have any particular place they may possibly exist in the same manner since whatever we conceive is possible it will not now be necessary to prove that those perceptions which are simple and exist nowhere are incapable of any conjunction in place with matter or body which is extended and divisible since it is impossible to found a relation but on some common quality it may be better worth our while to remark that this question of the local conjunction of objects does not only occur in metaphysical disputes concerning the nature of the soul but that even in common life we have every moment occasion to examine it thus supposing we consider a fig at one end of the table and an olive at the other it is evident that in forming the complex ideas of these substances one of the most obvious is that of their different relishes and it is as evident that we incorporate and conjoin these qualities with such as are colored and tangible the bitter taste of the one and sweet of the other are supposed to lie in the very visible body and to be separated from each other by the whole length of the table this is so notable and so natural an illusion that it may be proper to consider the principles from which it is derived though an extended object be incapable of a conjunction in place with another that exists without any place or extension yet are they susceptible of many other relations thus the taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of color and tangibility and whichever of them be the cause or effect it is certain they are always co-existent nor are they only co-existent in general but also co-temporary in their appearance in the mind and it is upon the application of the extended body to our senses we perceive its particular taste and smell these relations then of causation and contiguity in the time of their appearance betwixt the extended object and the quality which exists without any particular place must have such an effect on the mind that upon the appearance of one it will immediately turn its thought to the conception of the other nor is this all we not only turn our thought from one to the other upon account of their relation but likewise endeavor to give them a new relation that is, that of a conjunction in place that we may render the transition more easy and natural for it is a quality which I shall often have occasion to remark in human nature and shall explain more fully in its proper place that when objects are united by any relation we have a strong propensity to add some new relation to them in order to complete the union in our arrangement of bodies we never fail to place such as our resembling in contiguity to each other or at least in correspondent points of view why? but because we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity to that of resemblance or the resemblance of situation to that of qualities the effects of this propensity have been in section 2 towards the end already observed in that resemblance which we so readily suppose betwixt particular impressions and their external causes but we shall not find a more evident effect of it than in the present instance where from the relations of causation and contiguity in time betwixt two objects we feign likewise that of a conjunction in place in order to strengthen the connection but whatever confused notions we may form of an union in place betwixt an extended body as a fig and its particular taste it is certain that upon reflection we must observe in this union something altogether unintelligible and contradictory for should we ask ourselves one obvious question that is if the taste which we conceive to be contained in the circumference of the body is in every part of it or in one only we must quickly find ourselves at a loss and perceive the impossibility of ever giving a satisfactory answer we cannot reply that it is only in one part for experience convinces us that every part has the same relish we can as little reply that it exists in every part for then we must suppose it figured and extended which is absurd and incomprehensible here then we are influenced by two principles directly contrary to each other that is that inclination of our fancy by which we are determined to incorporate the taste with the extended object and our reason which shows us the impossibility of such an union being divided betwixt these opposite principles we renounce neither one nor the other but involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity that we no longer perceive the opposition we suppose that the taste exists within the circumference of the body but in such a manner that it fills the whole without extension and exists entire in every part without separation in short we use in our most familiar way of thinking that scholastic principle which when crudely proposed appears so shocking of totem in toto and totem in qualibet partae which is much the same as if we should say that a thing is in a certain place and yet is not there all this absurdity proceeds from our endeavoring to bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it and that endeavor again arises from our inclination to complete an union which is founded on causation and a contiguity of time by attributing to the objects a conjunction in place but if ever reason be of sufficient force to overcome prejudice it is certain that in the present case it must prevail for we have only this choice left either to suppose that some beings exist without any place or that they are figured and extended or that when they are incorporated with extended objects the whole is in the whole and the whole in every part the absurdity of the two last suppositions proves sufficiently the veracity of the first nor is there any fourth opinion for as to the supposition of their existence in the manner of mathematical points it resolves itself into the second opinion and supposes that several passions may be placed in a circular figure and that a certain number of smells conjoined with a certain number of sounds may make a body of 12 cubic inches which appears ridiculous upon the bare mentioning of it but though in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists who can join all thought with extension yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists who can join all thought with a simple and indivisible substance the most vulgar philosophy informs us that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately and without the interposition of an image or perception that table which just now appears to me is only a perception and all its qualities are qualities of a perception now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension the perception consists of parts these parts are so situated as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity of length, breadth and thickness determination of these three dimensions is what we call figure this figure is movable separable and divisible mobility and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects and to cut short all disputes the very idea of extension is copied from nothing but an impression and consequently must perfectly agree to it to say the idea of extension agrees to anything is to say it is extended the free thinker may now triumph in his turn and having found there are impressions and ideas really extended may ask his antagonists how they can incorporate a simple and indivisible subject with an extended perception all the arguments of theologians may here be retorted upon them is the indivisible subject or immaterial substance if you will on the left or on the right hand of the perception is it in this particular part or in that other is it in every part without being extended or is it entire in any one part without deserting the rest it is impossible to give any answer to these questions but what will both be absurd in itself and will account for the union of our indivisible perceptions with an extended substance this gives me an occasion to take anew into consideration the question concerning the substance of the soul and though I have condemned that question as utterly unintelligible yet I cannot forbear proposing some farther reflections concerning it I assert that the doctrine of the immateriality simplicity and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism and will serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so universally infamous from this topic I hope at least to reap one advantage that my adversaries will not have any pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them the fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe and the unity of that substance in which he supposes both thought and matter to in here there is only one substance says he in the world and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible and exists everywhere without any local presence whatever we discover externally by sensation whatever we feel internally by reflection all these are nothing but modifications of that one simple and necessarily existent being and are not possessed of any separate or distinct existence every passion of the soul every configuration of matter however different and various in here in the same substance and preserve in themselves their characters of distinction without communicating them to that subject in which they in here the same substratum if I may so speak supports the most different modifications without any difference in itself and varies them without any variation neither time nor place nor all the diversity of nature are able to produce any composition or change in its perfect simplicity and identity I believe this brief exposition of the principles of that famous atheist will be sufficient for the present purpose and that without entering farther into these gloomy and obscure regions I shall be able to shoe that this hideous hypothesis is almost the same with that of the immateriality of the soul which has become so popular to make this evident let us in part 2 section 6 remember that as every idea is derived from a preceding perception it is impossible our idea of a perception and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other whatever difference we may suppose betwixt them it is still incomprehensible to us and we are obliged either to conceive an external object merely as a relation without a relative or to make it the very same with the perception or impression the consequence I shall draw from this may at first sight appear a mere sophism but upon the least examination will be found solid and satisfactory I say then that since we may suppose but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and impression any conclusion we form concerning the connection and repugnance of impressions will not be known certainly to be applicable to objects but that on the other hand whatever conclusions of this kind we form concerning objects will most certainly be applicable to impressions the reason is not difficult as an object is supposed to be different from an impression we cannot be sure that the circumstance upon which we found our reasoning is common to both supposing we form the reasoning upon the impression it is still possible that the object may differ from it in that particular but when we first form our reasoning concerning the object it is beyond doubt that the same reasoning must extend to the impression and that because the quality of the object upon which the argument is founded must at least be conceived by the mind and could not be conceived unless it were common to an impression since we have no idea but what is derived from that origin thus we may establish it as a certain maxim that we can never by any principle but by an irregular kind such as that of section 2 form the coherence of our perceptions of reasoning from experience discover a connection or repugnance betwixt objects which extends not to impressions though the inverse proposition may not be equally true that all the discoverable relations of impressions are common to objects to apply this to the present case there are two different systems of being presented to which I suppose myself under a necessity of assigning some substance or ground of adhesion I observe first the universe of objects or of body the sun, moon, and stars the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses and other productions either of art or nature here Spinoza appears and tells me that these are only modifications and that the subject in which they in here is simple in compounded and indivisible after this I consider the other system of beings that is the universe of thought or my impressions and ideas there I observe another sun, moon, and stars and earth and seas covered and inhabited by plants and animals towns, houses, mountains, rivers and in short everything I can discover or conceive in the first system upon my inquiring concerning these theologians present themselves and tell me that these also are modifications and modifications of one simple, uncompounded and indivisible substance immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a hundred voices that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn and the second with applause and veneration I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great appartiality and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible and that as far as we can understand them they are so much alike that it is impossible to discover any absurdity in one which is not common to both of them we have no idea of any quality in an object which does not agree to and may not represent a quality in an impression and that because all our ideas are derived from our impressions we can never therefore find any repugnance betwixt an extended object as a modification and a simple uncompounded essence as its substance unless that repugnance takes place equally betwixt the perception or impression of that extended object and the same uncompounded essence every idea of a quality in an object passes through an impression and therefore every perceivable relation whether of connection or repugnance must be common both to objects and impressions but though this argument considered in general seems evident beyond all doubt and contradiction yet to make it more clear and sensible let us survey it in detail and see whether all the absurdities which have been found in the system of Spinoza may not likewise be discovered in that of theologians see Bale's dictionary article of Spinoza first it has been said against Spinoza according to the scholastic way of talking rather than thinking that a mode not being any distinct or separate existence must be the very same with its substance and consequently the extension of the universe must be in a manner identified with that simple uncompounded essence in which the universe is supposed to in here but this it may be pretended is utterly impossible and inconceivable unless the indivisible substance expand itself so as to correspond to the extension or the extension contract itself so as to answer to the indivisible substance this argument seems just as far as we can understand it and it is plain nothing is required but a change in the terms to apply the same argument to our extended perceptions and the simple essence of the soul the ideas of objects and perceptions being in every respect the same only attended with the supposition of a difference that is unknown and incomprehensible secondly it has been said that we have no idea of substance which is not applicable to matter nor any idea of a distinct substance which is not applicable to every distinct portion of matter matter therefore is not a mode but a substance and each part of matter is not a distinct mode but a distinct substance I have already proved that we have no perfect idea of substance but that taking it for something that can exist by itself it is evident every perception is a substance and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance and consequently the one hypothesis labors under the same difficulties in this respect with the other thirdly it has been objected to the system of one simple substance in the universe that this substance being the support or substratum of everything must at the very same instant be modified into forms which are contrary and incompatible the round and square figures are incompatible in the same substance at the same time how then is it possible that the same substance can at once be modified into that square table and into this round one I ask the same question concerning the impressions of these tables and find that the answer is no more satisfactory in one case than in the other it appears then that to whatever side we turn the same difficulties follow us and that we cannot advance one step towards the establishing the simplicity and immateriality of the soul without preparing the way for a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism it is the same case if instead of calling thought a modification of the soul we should give it the more ancient and yet more modish name of an action by an action we mean much the same thing as what is commonly called an abstract mode that is something which properly speaking is neither distinguishable nor separable from its substance and is only conceived by a distinction of reason or an abstraction but nothing is gained by this change of the term of modification for that of action nor do we free ourselves from one single difficulty by its means as will appear from the two following reflections first I observe that the word action according to this explication of it can never justly be applied to any perception as derived from a mind or thinking substance our perceptions are all really different and separable and distinguishable from each other and from everything else which we can imagine and therefore it is impossible to conceive how they can be the action or abstract mode of any substance the instance of motion which is commonly made use of to shoe after what manner perception depends as an action upon its substance rather confounds than instructs us motion to all appearance induces no real nor essential change on the body but only varies its relation to other objects but betwixt a person in the morning walking in a garden with company agreeable to him and a person in the afternoon enclosed in a dungeon and full of terror despair and resentment there seems to be a radical difference and of quite another kind than what is produced on a body by the change of its situation as we conclude from the distinction and separability of their ideas that external objects have a separate existence from each other so when we make these ideas themselves our objects we must draw the same conclusion concerning them according to the precedent reasoning at least it must be confessed that having no idea of the substance of the soul it is impossible for us to tell how it can admit of such differences and even contraries of perception without any fundamental change and consequently can never tell in what sense perceptions are actions of that substance the use therefore of the word action unaccompanied with any meaning instead of that of modification no addition to our knowledge nor is of any advantage to the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul I add in the second place that if it brings any advantage to that cause it must bring an equal to the cause of atheism for do our theologians pretend to make a monopoly of the word action and may not the atheists likewise take possession of it and affirm that plants, animals, men, etc are nothing but particular actions of one simple universal substance which exerts itself from a blind and absolute necessity this you'll say is utterly absurd I own it is unintelligible but at the same time assert according to the principles above explained that it is impossible to discover any absurdity in the supposition that all the various objects in nature are actions of one simple substance which absurdity will not be applicable to a like supposition concerning impressions and ideas from these hypotheses concerning the substance and local conjunction of our perceptions we may pass to another which is more intelligible than the former and more important than the latter that is concerning the cause of our perceptions matter and motion it is commonly said in the schools however varied are still matter and motion and produce only a difference in the position and situation of objects divide a body as often as you please it is still body place it in any figure nothing ever results but figure or the relation of parts move it in any manner you still find motion or a change of relation it is absurd to imagine that motion in a circle for instance should be nothing but merely motion in a circle while motion in another direction as in an ellipse should also be a passion or moral reflection that the shocking of two globular particles should become a sensation of pain and that the meeting of two triangular ones should afford a pleasure now as these different shocks and variations and mixtures are the only changes of which matter is susceptible and as these never afford us any idea of thought or perception it is concluded to be impossible that thought can ever be caused by matter few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this argument and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute it we need only reflect on what has been proved at large that we are never sensible of any connection betwixt causes and effects and that it is only by our experience of their constant conjunction we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation now as all objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant conjunction and as no real objects are contrary c part 3 section 15 I have inferred from these principles that to consider the matter a priori anything may produce anything and that we shall never discover a reason why any object may or may not be the cause of any other however great or however little the resemblance may be betwixt them this evidently destroys the precedent reasoning concerning the cause of thought or perception for though there appear no manner of connection betwixt motion or thought the case is the same with all other causes and effects place one body of a pound weight on one end of a lever and another body of the same weight on another end you will never find in these bodies any principle of motion dependent on their distances from the center more than of thought and perception if you pretend therefore to prove a priori that such a position of bodies can never cause thought because turn it which way you will it is nothing but a position of bodies you must by the same course of reasoning conclude that it can never produce motion since there is no more apparent connection in the one case than in the other but as this latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience and as it is possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the mind and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and motion you reason too hastily when from the mere consideration of the ideas you conclude that it is impossible motion can ever produce thought or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection nay it is not only possible we may have such an experience but it is certain we have it since everyone may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments and should it be said that this depends on the union of soul and body I would answer that we must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought and that confining ourselves to the latter question we find by the comparing their ideas that thought and motion are different from each other and by experience that they are constantly united which being all the circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect when applied to the operations of matter we may certainly conclude that motion may be and actually is the cause of thought and perception there seems only this dilemma left us in the present case either to assert that nothing can be the cause of another but where the mind can perceive the connection in its idea of the objects or to maintain that all objects which we find constantly conjoined are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects if we choose the first part of the dilemma these are the consequences first we in reality affirm that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or productive principle not even the deity himself since our idea of that supreme being is derived from particular impressions none of which contain any efficacy nor seem to have any connection with any other existence as to what may be said that the connection betwixt the idea of an infinitely powerful being and that of any effect which he wills is necessary and unavoidable I answer that we have no idea of a being endowed with any power much less of one endowed with infinite power but if we will change expressions we can only define power by connection and then in saying that the idea of an infinitely powerful being is connected with that of every effect which he wills we really do know more than assert that a being whose volition is connected with every effect is connected with every effect which is an identical proposition and gives us no insight into the nature of this power or connection but secondly supposing that the deity were the great and efficacious principle which supplies the deficiency of all causes this leads us into the grossest impieties and absurdities for upon the same account that we have recourse to him in natural operations and assert that matter cannot of itself communicate motion or produce thought that is because there is no apparent connection betwixt these objects I say upon the very same account we must acknowledge that the deity is the author of all our volitions and perceptions since they have no more apparent connection either with one another or with this supposed but unknown substance of the soul this agency of the supreme being we know to have been asserted by as Father Malabranche and other Cartesians several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind except volition or rather an inconsiderable part of volition though it is easy to perceive that this exception is a mere pretext to avoid the dangerous consequences of that doctrine if nothing be active but what has an apparent power thought is in no case any more active than matter and if this inactivity must make us have recourse to a deity the supreme being is the real cause of all our actions bad as well as good vicious as well as virtuous thus we are necessarily reduced to the other side of the dilemma that is that all objects which are found to be constantly conjoined are upon that account only to be regarded as causes and effects now as all objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant conjunction and as no real objects are contrary it follows that for ought we can determine by the mere ideas anything may be the cause or effect of anything which evidently gives the advantage to the materialists above their antagonists to pronounce then the final decision upon the whole the question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible all our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union either with what is extended or unextended there being some of them of the one kind and some of the other and as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought as far as we have any notion of that relation it is certainly a kind of indignity to philosophy whose sovereign authority ought everywhere to be acknowledged to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her conclusions and justify herself to every particular art and science which may be offended at her this puts one in mind of a king arraigned for high treason against his subjects there is only one occasion when philosophy will think it necessary and even honorable to justify herself and that is when religion may seem to be in the least offended whose rights are as dear to her as her own and are indeed the same if anyone therefore should imagine that the foregoing arguments are anyways dangerous to religion I hope the following apology will remove his apprehensions there is no foundation for any conclusion a priori either concerning the operations or duration of any object of which it is possible for the human mind to form a conception any object may be imagined to become entirely inactive or to be annihilated in a moment and it is an evident principle that whatever we can imagine is possible now this is no more true of matter than of spirit of an extended compounded substance than of a simple and unextended in both cases the metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally inconclusive and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing if my philosophy therefore makes no addition to the arguments for religion I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them but that everything remains precisely as before End of file 37