 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. Today we have Ambassador Bhadrakumar with us and we are going to discuss something that he's been following very keenly over the years. That is of course the Iran, the United States nuclear standoff, particularly with Trump reneging on the U.S. agreement, pulling out of the nuclear agreement. And what has followed is Iran slowly stepping up the pressure on the, at least the American allies, that they should do something concrete about the deal. Otherwise it's a completely non, it's completely something which Iran cannot accept if it continues this way. Do you think, Ambassador Bhadrakumar, that there is now some possibility of change with Biden having taken in the process of taking over in the U.S., because we don't know which way things may still fall out? Looks like now the game is over for Trump. Thank you, Praveer. Let me, first of all, let me wish you a very happy new year. You've done a lot of very good work. I call it the work every sense I look at it through the last year and I hope this good work will continue. And probably you will step up further. Wish you all the best and thank you. Thank you. Say to you too. Yeah. Now, you see the first point is the transfer of power Trump has now conceded openly. To my mind, the kind of precipitated situation that he tried to create in Washington has boomeranged. And from this point onward, it's a downhill slide for him or Trump, because I heard on BBC Radio early this morning some interviews, it's a program of interviews from the political class in the U.S. And I find that even not only the top figures like Raham, Lindsey Raham, even middle-level politicians in the Republican party find that this is something Trump is carrying it in a way, proceeding in a way that is detrimental to America's long-term interests and the political foundations of the state. So I think we can safely assume that Trump's exit is certain. The second point is that I think the chances of his playing the role of a spoiler in the sense to create some sort of a ugly situation from a military point of view involving Iran, which is something that Israel wanted badly. And even the United States is allies in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia in particular had also been looking forward to. I think that's not going to happen now. So in the remaining 13 days, the Iran issue is not likely to flare up. Let me put it like that. That's also a second good thing. And the third thing is the incoming election results from Georgia, the Senate runoff elections. And if one was already in the back of the Democrats and the other one seems to be also leaning that way. And if that is the case, then we have a position here where the House of Representatives and the Senate are both in the control of the Democrats. This would certainly strengthen Biden's hands across the board, not only on the Iran issue. But in the case of Iran issue, there was always the apprehension that the Israeli lobby and the residual influence that the Saudis have in the Beltway might be deployed to store any real progress. I think that there on that score, I think Biden is now going to be on a stronger wicket. This is the third point which is going to work in the favor. So we have in the course of the past 24 to 48 hours, dramatic things have happened in the US politics, which are going to be game changers. That's how I evaluate. So do you expect the Biden administration to be able to re-continue the old JCPOA agreement, bring it back in some form? You see, Praveer, the fact of the matter is that much of what Trump has done is possible to undo from Biden's point of view through executive orders. That is Iran's primary demand is with regard to lifting the sanctions. Now getting back into the JCPOA is a different process altogether. But Iran has indicated that if the sanctions are lifted, it is quite willing to roll back the steps that it has taken in terms of its enrichment program and other attendant details and perform once again within the four walls of the JCPOA, which means the purity of the enrichment process should be kept to a low level, 3% or something like that. Stockpiles will not be there because earlier time also the purified uranium was taken every to Russia, which was storing it under the 2015 deal. Now that was not possible because Trump imposed sanctions. So the stockpiles are increasing and according to a report I saw a week ago or something in the IAEA, the as of August of September already, the stockpiles had increased to something like 12 times what has been provided for under the JCPOA. So it's still much lower than what was there in 2015. So that's the other side of it. Yeah, that is the other side. But the point is, the point I'm making here would be this that the timeline is going to be very important. First, as we both agree, the climate has become more conducive for a forward movement for an end of a stalemate. The political opinion generally in the US is also leaning towards this that the maximum pressure approach toward Iran has not brought the expected results or the results that Trump promised, which is that Iran would be in a much weaker position. Iran is certainly weak in one sense in terms of the sanctions having a debilitating effect on its economy. But on the other hand, we don't see any acceptable shift in the Iranian attitudes. And would I be right in saying that what you're saying is it is possible to bring back it's not maybe the US into the JCPOA, which is a different issue. But at least that Iran continues to adhere to the JCPOA terms and the sanctions are lifted. And more importantly, the European Union is also able to trade with Iran because because of the sanctions, that's what they were not able to do. It's really the financial sanctions that was biting the countries, including India, that you couldn't really trade with Iran because your banking system or whatever financial instruments you have, they will all come under US sanctions. It's not international sanctions, but US sanctions. And unfortunately, the financial controls of the world still are with the United States. You see, there are two broad categories of US sanctions on Iran. As you know, US sanctions on Iran have been a reality ever since the Islamic Revolution. So let's be clear that on this plane today, we are discussing the nuclear related sanctions. Then there is the other bit of sanctions, which are also very severe in terms of non nuclear issues. That is Iran's regional policies, the US allegation that Iran is masterminding terrorist groups operating in the region, that it is policies are detrimental to American regional interests and the insecurity of its allies and so on. So there is a package of sanctions relating to that which date back actually to the early 1980s, the time of that from the time of that hostage crisis immediately after the revolution. Iran is not getting into that part. That is something which is linked to a normalization of relations with Iran with between the two countries, which is going to take a long, long time. What we are talking about are the nuclear sanctions and you have exactly summed up when you said that the nuclear sanctions, once they are removed, Iran couldn't care less whether the other sanctions, the non nuclear sanctions, American sanctions are in place or not because the JCPOA then provides a very high degree of almost total integration of Iran into the world economy. Now, which means it can generate even its own income, let alone the block funds. The block funds will have to be released, which runs into fantastic amounts, very big amounts, tens of billions of dollars. But apart from that, on a day to day basis, Iran can generate its own income because it can sell oil and also one oil can buy it from Iran. So the market forces then come into play and Iran is quite happy with that. And then there is no particular distress in Iran in the society. The economy can start moving into a state of normalcy and so on. So what you said is absolutely the point. The point is that once the sanctions are removed, the Trump sanctions on nuclear thing is removed, then the JCPOA's full potential is liberated. And then Iran can come back to a state of normalcy. So that is what is important. And the main factor here is we have to discuss that. There we get into the Iran domestic situation. That is the other question I wanted to ask you. Having faced this pressure of the United States and the belief that the United States is not treaty capable, even if it removes and the bind in the sanctions four years later, again the first set of sanctions can come in. And therefore the Iranian positions, can it harden to the extent that they will then not normalize relations? Would that be something which would stand in the way? Is that possible? You see, Iran will certainly have drawn certain lessons from its experience. But having said that, what happened also didn't come entirely as a surprise to Iran, because it was always on guard that this sort of an eventuality may develop. The Gold Post may get shifted further, etc. But here, you know, the advantage for Iran is that if the agreement is not jettisoned and the agreement is preserved, whether the United States is part of it or not is not very important, because the agreement has a dynamics of its own. For example, as of last October, Iran is now possible to trade in weapons. And by 2024, the capping on Iran's ballistic missile program is going to be lapsing. In fact, the period beyond Iran is going to regain all its prerogative and rights as a non-NPT nuclear member state. As you know, the safeguards which have been imposed on Iran are unprecedented. No country on earth has ever accepted this sort of a tight regime. More than tight, Iran is a very, very intrusive IAEA regime. In fact, one of the issues of that is, have the past IAEA inspectors passed information with the United States used in the assassination of the nuclear physicist Pakris Ali. You see, that is exactly what I meant, that extremely intrusive inspections and Iran at every stage had to concede more ground to them, like they can hold surprise inspections. They can enlarge the list, like India also has an agreement with IAEA. But you know better than I do, that that is on the basis of a certain charter, a certain listing order for assets. And they are restricted to those assets. But in the case of Iran, it's not like that. The inspectors suddenly one fine day get a feeling that XYZ installation may have something to do. They suspect they have information. Then Iran comes under pressure to open up that also. This has happened also in the past. So you see the point here is that despite all that, if Iran agreed in the 2015 deal, that is because Iran fundamentally doesn't have any intention to make nuclear weapons. And I would imagine that in terms of their political culture and the Islamic system, they do take very seriously the fatwa that was given by Imam Khomeini. And it is, I don't think any leader in Iran would have the gumption to bypass it. And he has called it anti-Islamic to make nuclear weapons like this is a horrifying weapon. And, you know, that's a kind of mindset that Iran has on this issue. So that is never very important for them. And this enrichment in a big level of food stockpiles of enriched uranium and so on, it's not very important for them. They agreed for the 2015 deal, because even if there is a passage of time up to 2024, where they may have all these restrictions on them, there is going to be a future where they'll be, they can get rid of all this and live a normal life as a member of the whole community in every sense and can get market forces to prevail. Because we must understand that this is a country which is phenomenally rich in mineral resources. And it's not just oil and gas across the board, you know, it's very rich in minerals. And it has got a very big market, relative terms close to about 100 million people. And it has got also another thing, a very strong, well-developed agriculture and by far the highest capacity of any country in that region, any regional state in the absorption of technology, high technology. It's a very innovative society also. The human resources are very rich. And you look at the kind of, we know the kind of the systems with all these sanctions and all the handicaps they had that they were able to develop in a way that the United States has now forgotten that there is even a military option against Iran. They did not do that. So you see, all these things make it very clear that the Iranians are confident that if the nuclear sanctions are lifted, they will become unstoppable as a regional, global power. You know, this is the point. And that we have to put aside the Western propaganda about Iran. It's not like that at all, that country's ethos, its culture, its endowments and so on. So I think they are, they made their calculations. But you write from the experience of the 2015 deal, they will have brought certain contusions. And if at any moment they are going to get into any kind of negotiations and deal with the United States, hopefully the United States, I think the Europeans also didn't really fulfill. We know that. They stayed on, they profess their interest in preserving the JCPOA. They disagreed with the American, except from the JCPOA. And they urged Iran constantly to abide by the terms of the JCPOA. But they didn't fulfill. The moment the American sanctions were imposed, the European companies squatted. And the European governments did not really give any kind of protection, which would have encouraged their own countries, national companies to stay put in Iran. So you see, it's a harsh word. And we have to recognize that. But within all that, I think the Americans understand now that this is a road to nowhere. And only by coming back into the framework from this platform and negotiating now, you have seen the Jake Sullivan's interview with Fareed Sakaria. Now, it's a very interesting point that he did not mention about negotiating another nuclear deal. He spoke about follow on negotiations. So it's very, very important distinction he has made there. That is the signal to Iran that they are not going to, Americans know that Iranians will not renegotiate this deal. And there has to be a forward movement in a different way. So that point has been considered. And overall, I think Sullivan's remarks and Sullivan's remarks are very important because Sullivan was the person who opened the back channel, operated the back channel and create and brought the situation to that point where John Kerry and Wendy Sherman stepped in and began negotiating. So he had a very big role at that time in that. And he knows the subject. He knows the protagonist in Iran. And therefore, that is why his interview was of much interest actually. No, I think what you're saying sounds extremely logical. Of course, as you know, when it comes to world history, when sometimes do not follow logic, but nevertheless, the forces at this point of time seem to be tipping towards the direction that you've suggested. And I think one very important point that you have made that Iran is a country, barely 100 million people with the kind of resources it has, most importantly, not oil resources alone, but the resources as human resources and the cultural history it has not only as a country, but also in the region, its influence has been far wider than people sitting in the West or even in India would really understand its influence in West Asia as well as in Central Asia. So given that history that if Iran is able to emerge and I think what you are saying, I agree with that it looks like that the game for the Trumpian approach is over. Then we are going to see a new correlation of forces arise in the region, not free from conflict, but certainly giving a much greater role to Iran than we have seen till today. Because Iran in spite of all of the forces against it has played a very important role as we saw in West Asia against the Daesh, ISIS against various other forces arranged over there. So I think that can only grow bigger with time and that's what you are indicating. So I think at this moment it seems to be a situation where things may start looking better after Trump leaves and hopefully the Indian government will also take lessons from what is happening and relook at its West Asian policies which I think at the moment has been rather one-sided. But I'm going to leave that discussion for another day. Thank you very much Ambassador Bandrakumar for being with us.