 Thanks very much for this opportunity to be part of this conference with us and for most of the title of my paper is and even original development in Ghana as politics matter Now I was actually asking this question because if you look at the vast amount of literature on special inequality original inequality in developing countries in African countries It tends to be largely a political dominated by the literature on your classical economics arguments concerning the issues of geography the more influential and recent new economic Geography which was adopted by the World Development of 2009 and so forth So my interest is to show that that politics does indeed also matter in our understanding of this problem And how we can actually go about addressing the problem of special inequality in the African context Of this the way I intend to go about the arm the presentation I started with a brief background and motivation of the study the framework that guided my analysis that I introduced the case study on Ghana There is a question that I address how I went about addressing those questions the findings and a few concluding remarks and policy implications of If we look just I mean just cast our minds back just a few years back just from 2000 One can you that we've actually witnessed a Relative shift from what some of the summer Maxwell referred to us a new new poverty agenda in the early 2000s So what what we call today a new equity agenda? I mean what we entered it in the first century when they The overarching concern of the international community was about how to reduce absolute poverty in the world And there was very little concern about issues of inequality and equity. I mean a very typical example Is the Millennium Development Goals if you just look at the type of Goals that were spelled out today we see a significantly different kind of agenda For example, I mean we we see how issues of inclusion and equity are occupying a center stage in the ongoing discussions about What a post-2015 development agenda should look like Within this overall problem of increasing consent to the problem of inequality the spatial dimensions of inequality has been of Concern for a number of reasons one being that I mean already it is a very significant contributor to the overall inequality and Also, I mean and it's also rising in many developing countries according to this very recent evidence And this is a warning consent because I mean apart from the adverse implications of inequality in general for the poverty and Growth agenda the spatial dimensions of inequality can push in the mind social and political Stability and for South Africa this trend towards increasing the quality is quite puzzled. It's very surprising and this is what Branko Milano, I am Milano victory does that Africa should be a low inequality continent because African countries are poor and under culture based and also because land the main access is widely shaped So he goes on to hypothesize that the surprisingly high level of inequality in South Africa in African countries in general is Principally a political phenomena, but what exactly does this mean? This is the kind of hypothesis that I I'm interested in exploring my paper and I tried doing so taking advantage of some new emerging literature on the on the politics of development I'm summed up in the notion of political settlements and one critical voice I mean behind this literature is Mr. Khan of the University of London who defines and political settlements as an Interdependent combination of a structure of power and institutions at the level of the society that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability political settlements analysis focuses largely on tricky elements powerful elites Interests and institutions and the fundamental question being raised and as far as this concept is concerned is how It's about how powerful elites use the power at their disposal in shaping adjusting and Roger adjusting institutions in a Manatex bed saves their interests and the implications of this for resource allocation the implications of this for policy formulation and implementation And their impact on development outcomes both at the national and sub-national level So as far as this literature is concerned if we ask the question as to why is facial inequalities persist their answer simply is that Lagging regions tend to continue to lag behind simply because or largely because they do not have the power to adjust institutions and policy in their own favor And It's not the only voice behind this kind of imagine literature I mean if we just compare the works of Douglas north in the 1990s to his most recent work on violence and social orders We see as I mean a passive shift I mean from from his notion of I mean the critical role of institutions to look more closely at the underlying configuration of power that shape the actual function of of of institutions themselves So I'm gonna say that there is an imagine consensus. I'm not suggesting that I mean this literature is homogeneous In fact, it is very far from homogeneous But there are a number of conversion points among the work of Mr. Khan dog dog last move and call it and we've just listened to the presentation of On the work of a smoglu and Robinson and in their work on why nations fail They I mean the important work of inclusive political institutions in shape in development outcomes One of the conversion points as far as the decision is for us to move our way at least slightly From the dominant notion of institutions matter And this was the notion that dominated the 1990s institutions matter if you want to develop get the institutions, right? What this literature suggests and that we should move beyond that mantra to looking more closely at the role of power and politics in Shaping how institutions actually function in other words We should move beyond the rules of the game looking more closely at the actual game within the rules In fact, the game never the game hardly for those that was as far as developing an African country since in particular Say and the suggestion they did for us to move beyond institutions because Which that can make the point that if powerfully groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an institutional structure They will strive to change it and they do and they often do this either by adjusting formal state institutions in line with their interests Or by establishing informal arrangements that sidestep or undermine formal state Institutions the same line of thinking is very evident in the very influential work of Douglas North and colleagues on limited access for this in developing countries One of the conversion point is that this literature explains to how I mean as to ask how rent seeking and patrolling dominates the politics of Development of both African countries and in developing countries more brilliant So I'm interested in applying this type of literature or concept to explain the problem of special inequality in the con in the context of Ghana I mean I can't look which is divided into ten administrative regions The three regions missing up the upper west upper east and northern in Ghana are general referred to as north or northern Ghana Who has the rest of the seven administrative regions are categorized as part of southern Ghana And I find Ghana I mean I say a particular interesting case in exploring the political And opinions of special inequality for a number of reasons political or in terms of politics We are I'm sure each and every one of us have have had of the notion that Ghana is an immediate democratic developmental state a model for Africa and therefore the experiences of Ghana can offer important lessons for the African country I have the African continent as a whole Economically Ghana was with typical illustrious the African experience where the problem of rising special inequality have okay lied within the context of Impressive economic growth and poverty reduction at the national level Just a few statistics as to what I mean by enough self-divide the rate of economic growth in the north in Ghana during 1992 to 2006 according to the JLS's data was only 35 percent of the south and during the same period between 1992 and 2006 What are the number of four people decreased by some 2.5 million people in the south increased by some 0.9 million people in the north so that is the Let me just give you a few more examples of what I mean by enough self-divide or Ghana original inequality in Ghana This is giving us and this is an incidence of extreme poverty in Ghana according to the most recent JLS's data in 2006 Just look at the national average What we are seeing in this picture is that it is only the green northern region the northern upper is in upper west region that have incidences of extreme poverty higher than the national average and compared to a national average of only 18 point two percent of the national population being categorized as extremely four six point two percent of the population in great Accra we are seeing as much as 79% almost 80% of the population in the upper west region being categorized as extremely four so this is the kind of inequality that I'm looking at if you look at I mean data on pick up I mean pick up that income you see a similar I mean as I mean as exact trend Now particularly like you to take notice of these two upper east region upper west region the levels of poverty in these regions because I mean I'm going to explore a subsequent case that is focusing on these two regions So I would like you to keep a notice on that This is a more dramatic version of the north-south inequality I mean which is looking at that thing equality at the district a more disaggregated district level I mean this is the victim the 20 poorest and 20 most affluent districts in the south and what we are seeing here I mean I'm using the headcount poverty As an indicator we have the 20 poorest all in the north while the 20 most affluent I mean with very little levels of incidence of poverty being concentrated in the south So the question so this are the questions that I'm asking why are the four northern regions been excluded from guidance? It's an impressive important reduction This is an impressive group important reduction records and what rules do politics and power relations pay in understanding This problem and I try to do so By attempting to use the political settlements from work and this is the way I think I mean if you look at the literature It doesn't it is not about special income inequality the immediate political settlements concept It's not about special inequality, but I'm trying to use the ideas the dominant ideas and that concept to help Explain I mean to help us show how it can also help us understand the problem of special inequality in In the African country or in developing countries more broadly And I think we ought to do that we need to understand how political power is distributed in society and this can be measured I'm suggesting by the composition of ruling at its cabinet ministers deputy ministers Key bureaucratic positions in government and so on and so forth But it's also important not just to focus on quantity but also quality in fact there's a lot of immediate literature that shows that The inclusion of women in South Saharan African countries in political institutions has kind of increased Substantial but they are influence on the policy agenda remains very limited So the politics of development also distinguishes between what is referred to as the politics of representation from the politics of influence In fact the fact that you are represented doesn't mean that you have influence for example We cannot expect the president or the finance minister to have the same I mean if you have if you have a region they haven't the minister for finance and economic planet And another one having the deputy minister for say tourism you cannot count them as one each I mean they are definitely different in terms of how much power they have over how resources are allocated in society And this goes down to the concept of inner core Landman use the concept of inner core of political power to go beyond the quantities to look in more closely at the quality of representation It's also important to understand within a given context how politics and power relationships institutions policy formulation and implementation Outcomes as well as the distribution of public resources and how this can be related to the distribution of power In society more broadly. So what am I finding? And first of all, I try to understand the spatial distribution of political power in Ghana focusing on the 2000s And I gathered some data for some 114 names between 2001 to 2008 Those who represent who are in government are called the 10 administrative regions in Ghana And what we are seeing here basically is that clearly we can see that every single region has a representation At least even though they vary quite substantially but more importantly If we relate that data to the population shares of the various regions We see some significant discrepancies with some regions far more represented than others Those in the positive values are indicating that they were a lot more represented than their population shares Whilst those in the negatives mean that imply that I mean their level of representation were much lower than their share in the national population But this is a more important aspect of Of the work that I'm more interested in I went further to disaggregate that data into the different governmental positions Into cabinet, ministerial positions, deputies and what I gathered as the inner core of power Looking at the three northern regions, if we focus on deputies We see clearly that they were far more represented, I mean they were represented a lot more than their shares in the population And that's why we are seeing them, the positive figures there But if you look at the more influential positions in government, for example cabinet For example the inner core If you look at both the first terms, the first and second terms of that particular agenda power Looking at, you see the same pattern of kind of trend being a lot more represented quite strongly In amount deputies ministers but significantly underrepresented in the more influential positions in cabinet But what should we, why should we, I mean why should we bother ourselves with this What should we be concerned that We have a region being more represented in less influential positions And much less represented in the more influential positions in government And I think part of the answer lies in the type of political settlement in Ghana And the Moustakhan categories and different types of political settlements And Ghana falls between what is referred to as a competitive, clientelist political settlement This is a type of political settlement where both barrel politics is a huge reality This is about Ghana What that means practically, I mean this is an interview data from cabinet ministers You see when people have power, they not only appoint their people to strategic positions But when a decision is to be made and resources to be distributed They find a way of getting it more to their people When you are given the opportunity to make a decision and you are in the driver's seat People tend to benefit their people So you see it is the space that you have to operate That person creates opportunities for you I mean there are a lot of, quite a number of Ghanaians in this room And I'm sure they know the kind of politics that prevails in the Ghanaian context I try to, I mean to apply this literature, this overall framework And looking specifically at the particular case study Which is the minimum challenge account on agricultural modernization And this suggests some basic facts about the MCA in Ghana The amount involves some 547 million US dollars And this is in fact the largest bilateral grant in Ghana's political history The goal was to reduce poverty through economic growth led by agricultural transformation Through the implementation of three interrelated projects It is implemented in some 26 districts from the Greater Accra, Ashanti, Northern, Volta, Eastern and Central regions But who are the excluded regions? Four regions, and they include those highlighted in right And I'm sure you remember those are actually two communities About the poorest regions, the most impoverished, food insecure regions Where among those who are excluded from the distribution of the resources associated with The minimum challenge account The question I'm asking is why? And why should you have a project that seeks to reduce poverty through economic growth Through agricultural transformation and so on and so forth And yet you tend to exclude the most impoverished, the poorest The most, I mean the highly food insecure regions Where you have over 80 percent, 90 percent of the people In some cases being largely food insecure and so on and so forth If you look at the formal selection criteria according to the MCA official Current proposal document They did the selection on the basis of three factors Rural poverty, agricultural potential of the various districts And proven success in private sector investment These were the formal selection criteria of the district So my interest is to find out whether this formal criteria Can actually explain to us why these poorer regions were excluded So I look at, I mean I explore what I regarded as the politics of the beneficiary selection And the selection be justified on the basis of rural poverty Highly question, I mean nobody, that cannot be a sustainable claim at all The top three regions, the top two regions that are an upper waste Where the incidence of rural poverty as of 2000, 2000, 2003, 2004 Where incidence of rural poverty rated between 92 to 99 percent Where the various that were excluded from So you cannot sustain the claim that these beneficial districts were selected On the basis of levels of their, of their incidence of rural poverty The second is agricultural growth potential I mean this is a highly questionable claim as well Those regions, the three northern regions in general I regarded as the potential food baskets of Ghana I mean the food crops are likely produced And in the 1970s Ghana export, Ghana became self-sufficient in rice production And indeed exported rice to neighboring countries And where was this rice produced? It was in the north Over 80 percent of that rice was produced in the north Look at the political party manifested of the dominant two parties in Ghana And they refer to these various are the potential food baskets Of the count which cannot regard them are lacking the potential for And so this claim cannot also be sustained as far as my understanding is concerned Proven success in private sector investments, yes I mean if you look at parties of private sector investments The north is just nowhere to be found I mean much of the investments are, are, are located in the south But there are questions to be asked Because we know very well that private sector investments are encouraged generally by public sector investments in infrastructure You need to put in the roads You need to put in the schools and so on and so forth And yet if you look at expenditure data across a whole of the roads sector infrastructure and so on and so forth The, the government at the time launched what it called the press The President's Special Initiatives And these projects were meant to facilitate private sector investments In Ghana And yet these variants were again excluded from those kind of initiatives So if you tend to exclude certain regions from the ground That they do not have sufficient private sector investments And yet you have not in any case created the necessary condition For facilitating, for facilitating private sector investments in these same regions Then there is an issue there So as far as my understanding is concerned None of these formal selection criteria can explain to us Why these variants were excluded from the Millionaire Challenge account So what are my explanations? How do we understand these targeted errors? I think first and foremost the answer lies in the nature of the government coalition at the time And the North's expression generally from what I consider as the inner core of power If you look at the paper that is online I highlighted some kind of power play that went on in parliament How Northern political elites try to resist the expression of those regions How did they not succeed The kind of explanations that were rendered by the dominant Southern counterparts And so on and so forth And in an interview with one team member of the MCA He summarized the argument as I asked him why these regions were excluded And what was the role of the MCC The MCC stands for the Millionaire Challenge operation In the United States because this MCC itself was interested In high value agricultural crops So I was asking him whether it would play a role In explaining the exclusion of these regions And his answer was The problem wasn't MCC imposing its will on us Yes it definitely wanted a good business case They wanted an economically just file program But the real problem was Ghana The political leadership here The political world was lacking That was indeed the problem But why was the political world lacking My second explanation is about the interests of dominant ruling elites And I explained this largely in terms of the electoral influence Of the ruling coalition I mean if you look at voting patterns in Ghana These same regions have historically been opposition regions As far as the ruling party is concerned They don't vote for the party at all I mean in 1996-2000 elections The party at the time had no single parliamentary seat in those regions In other words those are the very regions that tend not to vote And I mean I had a lot of part A number of rotation from key political figures around the time Explaining how the role and the role of politics played Or electoral calculus of dominant elites played a role And explaining the exclusion of these There is one factor that I You probably wouldn't see in the paper I mean I cut some sections When I was trying to meet Rachel's well-limited pain But I was highlighted here And probably incorporated back into the paper at some point I think the whole thing cannot be explained by politics I found the role of ideas and ideologies to the critical I would just leave out this quotation But just focus on the case of Volta If we argue that the north or those regions were excluded Because they were not voting for the party You have an issue there Because the Volta region is indeed also regarded As the vote bank of the then opposition party And I tried to find out what happened And I found the role of ideas and ideologies The ideology of the ruling party Which saw the private sector as the engine of growth There were a whole lot of agricultural production initiatives Going on in the Volta region On which the government could build upon In the Volta region and so on and so forth And MCC's own interest in agricultural cross-culture Played a role and explained why the Volta region Became part of the MCA So these are some of the conclusions that I'm drawing That I have drawn in the paper That achieving inclusive growth And inclusive development more broadly Should not be seen purely as a technocratic exercise That requires good policies It is in fact as much as much due with policy As with politics And by politics I'm referring to inter-elite power relations In this concept We all know that developing countries Are characterized by clientless politics Patronage driven kind of politics And my argument basically is that within that context The political inclusivity The extent and nature of inclusion of marginalized groups Is critical to fostering their socio-economic inclusion In the wake of Francis Stewart on Horizontal Inequality Highlight these kind of arguments In a number of country contexts But there are some two important caveats One is that I mean as far as my minus is concerned It is not just about whether Lagging groups or marginalized groups are included Or not But it is more importantly about the terms And conditions of their inclusion How are they included Is a more critical question that we need To be thinking about The second caveat I think is Is the fact that The political inclusion of elites from marginalized groups Is not as sufficient And in fact in some cases It may not be a necessary condition For addressing the Americanality A lot also depends on the commitment and capacity Of both national and sub-national elites I will leave it here before Rachel sanctions me