 Israel. Initially Reuters news reported that three Lebanese officials told them that the two rockets had been fired, one of which had landed in Lebanon. But this is coming after the Hezbollah terror group made threats earlier in the day, urging all of Lebanon to take action against Israel. For more on this, we are joined by our defense correspondent Jonathan Regev, who is currently at the Prime Minister's office. Jonathan, what do we know so far? Well, this is basically the sequence of events. It started roughly two hours ago with a report of an explosion very close to the Israel-Lebanon border, not clear on which side of the border. Only later on did the army confirm that some kind of a rocket was fired from Lebanon and landed just within Israeli territory. Shortly after that report, there were reports of some 15 artillery shots or artillery cannons fired towards Lebanon from Israel, sort of a response to what was fired from Lebanon. Just minutes ago, another report of an explosion inside Israeli territory, possibly another mortar shell, maybe more than one launched from Lebanon. These are the facts that we know so far. Of course, a very concerning development. These things you never know how they will develop. I can't tell you this, Ariel. It was about a few weeks ago. I attended a lecture by IDF chief of staff, Ertzi Alevi, who said that Hizballah is now in a place where they are constantly trying to challenge the IDF, but challenge it in a way that will not drag the area into a full-on war. We're seeing this all the time, a few months ago, the terrorists which crossed from Lebanon and planted an explosive device at the Megiddo junction from 15 miles away from the border. More recently, those tents that were built on the other side, on the Lebanese side of the border fence, but still in Israeli territory. Those two tents with the Hizballah personnel within Israeli territory. Now we're seeing these rockets fired, none of them heading towards populated areas, but still sending a message that Hizballah is constantly, constantly trying to challenge Israel. So Jonathan, what then is the trigger point for the IDF? If they're going to engage in these provocations, Hezbollah, what does the IDF do? When do they say enough is enough? Well, here we saw an example. Those rocket fired into Israel, not causing any damage, not causing casualty, not triggering alarms. It was clearly sent to a place where it will not create any major damage, but this is the place where Israel says, this is not something we can tolerate anymore. We have to retaliate. Again, a retaliation, not meant to drag the area into a full on war, not targeting installations or compounds or anything targeting opening open areas, but making sure that any fire towards Israel is there's at least some kind of response with fire from Israel towards Lebanon. Thank you very much, Jonathan. And we're going to come back to you as more information comes in, and you can fill us in on the latest of what's happened. Until then, though, we are going to return to our studio. We have a security panel forming here with our senior diplomatic correspondent, Owen Alterman, as well as our correspondent, P.S. Dekalbach. Let's jump directly into this with you first. Pia, this has against the backdrop of a great deal of Hezbollah, let's say, provocations, as well as threats over the past months. Give us the background. Right, Ariel. There have been serious tensions between Israel and Hezbollah in recent weeks. This is mainly focusing on two tents that have been set up by Hezbollah in recent weeks on the demarcation line, on the blue line that functions as a sort of border between Israel and Lebanon. Now, the area we are talking about, the area that is called Hardov by Israel and the Shabbat al-Fam's by Lebanon, Syria. This is an area that is claimed by three of those countries. But in fact, these two tents operated by Hezbollah are placed south of the blue line, basically positioning them in Israel. And these two tents, of course, Israel is demanded for these tents to be removed by Hezbollah. There have been negotiations through third parties such as the United States and France to come to a diplomatic agreement, if you will, between Israel and Hezbollah, because this has been also the topic of serious threats coming from Hezbollah that Israel was to remove these tents by force. This would lead to war. This would lead to a serious escalation. But now, in recent days, during the last week, we have heard that Hezbollah agreed to removing at least one of those tents. The UN peacekeeping unit forces are right now investigating whether that is indeed the case. But this morning we've heard renewed threats from Hezbollah, focusing also on the border fence that Israel has been working on, renewing for the past couple of weeks. That has also triggered serious clashes also between residents in the Israeli army. Thank you, Payah. We're going to move to you as well, Owen. We're hearing that this is most likely from Hezbollah position. It's not exactly confirmed that it's Hezbollah yet, but is very much signs pointing to that. What are the ramifications of this? Well, listen, I ate a wider frame, Ariel. This is a border that's always been tents, famously so. But after the 2006 war, for a number of years, for many years, it was a border that was very tense, but also quiet. There wasn't activity on it. There weren't clashes across it. But that's changed in recent years, and we've seen a kind of medium term trend of the situation gradually, and I think the emphasis on that word gradually, deteriorating until you get an event like this today, which, given that context, doesn't seem all that shocking or surprising. You're right. If it were indeed firing by Hezbollah of rockets, that wouldn't have sensed to be something new, right? Because rocket fire, we've seen in the past, has been reportedly done by Palestinian factions on the Lebanese side. So that would be something new, but it would be of a piece of this entire trend. And the question for Israel, and you got into it with Jonathan Regiff, how much is Israel willing to tolerate? And that's actually a very good jumping off point, because that is the question that we're going to be asking as well. Lieutenant Colonel Sareed Zahavi, who is joining us as well right now, let's jump directly into it. One, how much can Israel tolerate and what should Israel's response be? Well, it's a good question how much Israel can tolerate. I think the main cause of the main goal of Israel is to prevent war. But of course, the message should be sent that situation of making the northern border of Israel, the same as the southern border of Israel is unbearable. And this is something that Israel will not be able to tolerate. For us in Alma Center, it is clear that in the past year and a half, this is what Chisbara and Iranians are trying to do, are trying to raise the tension, maybe create more escalation on the northern borders. I've been on the border yesterday. I saw the Chisbara military operatives watching at me. This is something that is the daily reality. And it is clear that something is changing here. I wouldn't say gradually, but I would say in the past year and a half, Chisbara risk assessment totally changed. And that's actually what I want to follow up on, because as you just mentioned, we have seen provocation after provocation over the last year, including his ball up moving military positions directly onto Israeli territory. Why now? Why do they think they are strong enough to do that at this time? It's not a half. And the answer goes in various circles, beginning with what is happening inside Israel, but not only including what is happening in the Middle East in general, and even going all the way to Ukraine. It's the same line of risk assessment that is being done, whether in Beirut or in Tehran. And due to this risk assessment and probably misleading and unrightfully assessment on Chisbara's side, that maybe now it's a better time in. Iran is gaining more and more achievements in the Middle East. United States is not doing anything about the nuclear program of Iran. Chisbara feels that it has less to lose inside Lebanon because the situation is that bad. Israel is experiencing an internal crisis. And all of that together gives them the impression that maybe if they will rest the tension on the North and border, they will get some advantages from their own side. Again, I think they are wrong, but this is the assessment on the other side. And while we've been talking about Hezbollah, it's not exactly confirmed that it's them yet. What are the odds that this could be a Palestinian faction on the Northern border as well? It could be a Palestinian faction. The last case in Passover, it was clear that even though it was a Palestinian faction, Chisbara was involved. There were occasions that it was Palestinian factions, what we say in Hebrew, like under the nose of Chisbara. In this case, we don't know, but I cannot ignore the situation on the border in the past months as I see it, including the tense that you mentioned not far away from this place specifically. And that's why to say that this is Palestinian faction without talking about Chisbara, I think this is very misleading. And one of the things we've seen because you mentioned Hezbollah, you mentioned Palestinian factions, all of them have been seeing more and more support from Iran in recent years. How much does Israel have to look at the possibility of dealing with a constant multi-front battle of attrition back by a very powerful regional power? Look here, they are the best news and the good news. Iran is pushing hard to create a multi-front situation that Israel will be facing and from everybody who was talking around that in the past few months here. But we have seen in the past at least two escalations in Gaza and in Jenin that all the other players are not rushing to join the party full-scale to attack Israel from all fronts. I think that the Iranians still have a long way to go. But on the other hand, I believe that if there will be a north and front that will be open again around the interests of Hezbollah itself, there is a stronger possibility that Hamas and the PIJ will join in. What would be the trigger point from Iran's perspective to effectively launch this multi-front operation? Well, many things. First, again, assessment that Israel is weak enough to actually gain achievement or assessment that the strategic situation in the region bringing Israel to a situation that it's weak enough, considering also other players like United States and Russia. That's one thing. Another thing can be the nuclear issue. If they get into a situation that they actually get in progress in the nuclear issue and they want to draw the Israeli attention elsewhere, Lebanon could be a very effective sacrifice for them. Thank you very much, Sariq, for explaining just what's going on or at least a little look behind the scene so we can speculate, at least for now. Thank you very much. We're going to return now to our panel in studio. I want to start with you, Owen, again, because we had discussed what if it's Hezbollah, what if it's a Palestinian faction? What are the ramifications of it being a Palestinian faction? Right. Well, first of all, just a quick update, Ariel. We're getting reports that it was not, in fact, a rocket or a set of rockets that was fired across the line, but in fact, shells. And again, we saw the Israeli military answer with shelling. But obviously, look, you have to take very seriously what Sarita Havi just said, that again, no one acts in south Lebanon without Hezbollah's at least dissent. That's been the prevailing wisdom. I wanted to interrupt because we're just seeing a report right now that an IDF official has claimed that there is an assessment that it was a Palestinian terror group in Lebanon carrying out retaliation for Janine. Not a confirmation, but it is an insider saying that this is a intelligence speculation. Right. And important information if it's true. I mean, obviously, again, as I was saying, we have to take very seriously what Sarita Havi just said, right? That this is being done at least with Hezbollah's assent. And that is a change of policy and a change of direction for what we've seen in the years following the Second Lebanon War. And it is, I think, fair to argue that it shows a kind of loss of Israeli deterrence. That said, if it were in fact, again, as you just reported, Arielle, a Palestinian faction on Hezbollah, it at least is not an escalation in that sense. And Hezbollah at least wants to keep its distance and ascending a signal that it doesn't want to get directly involved. Of course, from Israel's perspective, the next question is, what happens to these Palestinian groups? Does Hezbollah or other actors in Lebanon, do they take action against them to try to restrain them? And again, it doesn't change the wider trend, which we've been talking about, that this border that was always tense, but still always quiet, is not tense anymore and leads to the kind of scenario that Sarita Havi was describing, where the northern border gradually, without any of us really paying too much attention, starts to look more like the southern border and starts to lead to the sense of instability and a kind of erosion, maybe a gradual one and maybe not a dramatic one, but still a kind of erosion in Israel's security and Israel's position. And again, to your persistent but correctly persistent questions, where is that red line? Is this a kind of new normal that the Israeli public is going to be willing to tolerate or not? And I think it's not an easy question. And that does require a follow-up of source, but this one with you, Pia, we have seen Hezbollah becoming more and more confident in their position and their ability to do so. Where are the limits for them? How far do they think they can go without provoking a response from Israel? Well, they are definitely trying out now to see how far they can go without a significant response from Israel. We have seen that also with these two tents where reportedly they will withdraw one of them. We've seen increased presence of Hezbollah operatives also operating along their border. We've seen clashes during the renewal of the Israeli border fence there. So this has not been a quiet border again in recent weeks and months. So we have seen also Hezbollah testing the waters, especially with these two tents. Then, as Jonathan Regev mentioned, that Hezbollah affiliate that came into Israel to place a bomb in an attempted attack that did not succeed. So we saw that Hezbollah has been more and more active on the Israeli border or also within Israel. But if this indeed turns out to be a Palestinian faction, that would also not be surprising at all. The Palestinian factions have been trying to tie together the fronts, whether it be Gaza, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or also Palestinian factions in Lebanon and in Syria. Just in fact, only in May. Hamas leaders met with the Iranian president in Syria to really speak about a united response to Israel and to things that are going on against the Palestinians, also especially now after that major operation in Genine. The Palestinian factions have, of course, announced retaliation. And we've also just heard Nasrallah only a couple of weeks ago, also in a major speech, talking about the fact that Hezbollah is, of course, standing on the side of the Palestinians and that there would be the possibility of also a major united response. So if it would be a Palestinian faction that would not be disconnected from Hezbollah, because as we already spoke about, Hezbollah is involved in everything that is going on, especially in southern Lebanon. But it would not be at all surprising if that we will see now an even more tightening of the fronts together also between Hezbollah and the Palestinians, Ariel. This actually does bring us onto the question of deterrence itself. We've been talking about Israel is losing its deterrence effect on Hezbollah and on some of these Palestinian factions in the north. The question is, if Hezbollah isn't actively joining them yet, they're at least providing a shield. They're allowing them to do so. But the existence of Hezbollah is that acting as a deterrence on Israel's ability to stop these Palestinian factions. You know exactly where I wanted to go. We said before that this question of whether the Israeli public will tolerate a kind of scenario along the northern border, which looks a little bit more similar to the stereo in the Gaza Strip, that it's a tough question. And it may sound strange. Why would the public be willing to tolerate something like that? And the answer is because of the alternative. I mean, if the alternative is an all out war with an organization like Hezbollah, given the firepower that Hezbollah has, something that could potentially be a multiple in terms of its scale and its scope of what we saw in 2006, that's a very, very heavy price. And I'm not saying the public wouldn't ultimately get there and that the political and security establishment wouldn't ultimately get there. Maybe even get there sooner rather than later. It obviously depends on how things develop. But I think it's not automatic and I think it's not an easy call to make. And in that sense, you're right, Arielle, the prominence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the development of its arsenal. And I think we have to say in the background, the development of the Iranian nuclear program in this sense do act as a kind of deterrent for Israel. But I think it's important to note that the opposite is also true, right? And Hezbollah famously said after the 2006 war, if he had known beforehand what he knew afterwards, he might not have embarked on that kind of war. We know Lebanon has the third worst economic crash since the mid-19th century. And that's not just me sitting here in the studio at the Jaffa Port saying that, that's the World Bank saying that, right? And the position of the country is so dire. And Hezbollah has been attacked from within Lebanon, of course, has always been attacked from within Lebanon, but given the political situation, economic situation even more so. So it's not an easy decision for them to try to push this too far. So again, I think there are restraints on both sides. But certainly Hezbollah, as Pia was saying, as our other guests I'm saying, as we've all been saying, has been testing those restraints and has been willing to take on some risks that may over the long term not prove to have been a wise set of risks for them to take on. But again, it has to be said up until this point, they've been able to put it bluntly to get away with it. And I'll briefly follow up with that as well, because you mentioned the economic and social situation in Lebanon right now. The question is, is that making it more difficult or is that making it more certain? Because generally when you have an economically, an economic disaster and social instability, a war is the perfect way for a regime to tie everything together. That's what I'm most interested in hearing from Hezbollah experts, from Lebanon experts. Over the course of the next day, or God forbid the next few days, what is the impact of that on Lebanon? And you're right, what's the set of incentives on Hezbollah given the economic crisis in Lebanon? What is Hezbollah trying to achieve in terms of its public opinion, in terms of its soft power by doing this? Because that might be the real goal, to show that it's part of the resistance, part of fighting Israel. But as Jonathan Regev said, without really paying a price for doing that because of the deterrence and the potential and the cost that Israel would have to bear in really taking serious action. That's actually a great part to bring Jonathan Regev back into the discussion hour at Defense Correspondent Jonathan Regev. I want to ask you as well, are there any special instructions from the military or the government for the people living in the North? And if they're not out yet, what would those instructions tend to be under these circumstances? At least for now, the answer is no, there are no special instructions, their routine is normal. Let's remember we're at the beginning of July, schools are out, meaning many, many tourists are flocking to the plenty of tourist attractions in the North. That is something that clearly has to be taken into consideration for whoever makes the decisions here in Israel. For the moment, there are no special instructions. This is at least for now. If things escalate, of course, it might be a different story. Jonathan, I have another question for you as well. Ultimately, is there an obvious way at this point that we might know in the next few hours for both sides to back down from this without immediate escalation? Yes, I mean, say that now if there really was a rocket fire towards Israel and Israel instead of firing 15 artillery cannons back into Lebanon, we'll fire five of them and the other side will not do anything. That perhaps will show that this may be over, but the potential for escalation is clearly there. Whether it was Hezbollah that really sent the rockets or whether it was some kind of a Palestinian faction, the potential for escalation clearly exists. The Middle East in general and Lebanon was Hezbollah in particular, they're very difficult to understand and to perhaps think what will be the next step. You don't really know. As was mentioned here in the studio, Hezbollah is now willing to take a little more risks, but Hezbollah remembers very well and as was mentioned in the studio, Hassan Nasrallah said it himself in 2006. If I knew in advance that this would be the response, this is some kind of an endeavor that I would not have gotten into. So Hezbollah, I believe, is trying to do what the chief of staff said a few weeks ago, what I previously reported, is trying to challenge Israel, but in ways that will not drag the area completely into a full-on war. I think Hassan Nasrallah knows very well that if a mortar or even three mortars are fired towards the border area, this is something that will require Israel to some kind of a response, but a low response, a soft response, clearly not something very big. I think that Israel also knows that firing 15 artillery cannons into an open area in southern Lebanon, that perhaps will bring some kind of a response from the other side, but not a full-on war. Everything I said here makes sense and it's rational. Can we really rely on rational when we're speaking of the Middle East, when we're speaking of Hezbollah? I'm not so sure. And I know that you very recently did a tour of the north of the shelters and the fortification for the civilian populations in the area that are under the constant threat of Hezbollah's rocket artillery. What sort of findings did you see? Is the north ready? No, absolutely not. The Israeli rule, the Israeli law dictates from the early 90s after the first Gulf War, means that every building that was built in Israel since the early 90s needs to have that protected room inside Mamad as it is called here. And I think we've already seen in hundreds of cases how this protected room in the house saves lives because you can quickly run to it in case of a rocket and it's fortified and it saves lives. All this is true for homes built after the early 90s in the past 32, 33 years. The homes that were built earlier than that, they still have the old style of shelters many times under the building in places in the north. For example, in Shlomi, where I did that inspection, Shlomi lies about a quarter of a mile away from the border fence. If a rocket is sent to Shlomi, there will be no time for people to run to shelters, to underground shelters. They need those protected rooms in their homes for the moment. They do not exist in about half the homes built in northern Israel, the older homes built previously to the early 90s. So I think as far as shelters, it is clear that northern Israel is not exactly ready and war with Hezbollah will not only include the far north of Israel, not only border communities, but also Haifa, also further south. A lot of the communities in the north and not only there require further shelters. Thank you very much, Jonathan, for explaining just what's going on over there and what Israel's state of readiness is before we go on a very short break and then continue our coverage immediately afterwards at one o'clock. We'll just give you a quick recap. To remind you, the IDF has confirmed that a rocket was fired into Israel from the northern border. It is unknown right now whether or not it was from Hezbollah or from one of the various Palestinian factions in the north. There are some sources saying that it is very likely to have been a Palestinian faction in response to the raid that just happened in Janine. But again, the situation is still very delicate and it's part of a destabilizing situation along Israel's northern border and constant provocations that have been attributed to the Hezbollah terror organization as well. We're going on break now as we are just about out of time. But when we get back at one o'clock, updates on this story and the security situation.