 I would like to focus in today's presentation about what I call the phenomenon of the Poland quick maturation as an EU member state. I will argue during this remarks that in the past 10 years of being at the table Poland grew from the position of the junior partner to the status of the Kim member state that today actively co-shapes European policy. After having collaborated briefly of the most evident examples for me of this Poland maturation as a member state, I would like to outline the major factors that solidify Poland's credibility on the European Union stage. And finally, I would like to sketch a little bit the challenges ahead of foundations of our Polish-European policy. And if the time allows, maybe I would like also to offer some recommendations on how Poland should review its original European strategy to successfully address those challenges. My remarks will be based on the works that we've developed together with my colleague and my coordinator, Roger Parks, in recent months and the papers that we've published. So first of all, let me please start with the first point. In my opinion Poland really did enter into the new membership cycle as a credible and viable partner. I think it still raises the eyebrows of some commentators that back in 2000 for perceived the C countries, Poland and the others as a troublemaker and declaimants of other solidarity. But today, and I think it was also rightly mentioned in the report that was published by the Polish MFA in the report of the Polish 10 years in the EU, Poland is very often perceived through the prism of its triple role, through the prism of the regional leader, through the prism of the member of this influential big six group. And finally, through the prism of the country that successfully builds bridges between the northern and southern Europe, thanks to its well established regional cooperation also with the Baltic and Nordic countries, but also thanks to the fact that it has relatively it went unscathed through the severe sovereign debt crisis and the economic crisis. Of course, the image of Poland as a constructive player would not have been possible if it wasn't for its ability to form stable coalitions with the other member states. And the extent of this normalization, I think of the Polish normalization on the EU stage is also proved in the statistics of the EU voting procedures. If we look at the voting procedures, you will see that Poland and other C countries, they blocked in the council far less than they were first expected and far less than the older member states did before the big bank enlargement. And maybe I will give you a couple of examples of how Poland managed to form those coalitions. And I think that one of the most spectacular is, of course, the formation of the Friends of Cohesion Policy Group in the negotiation in the multi-annual financial framework negotiations. This group that consisted also of the other Fischegrad countries was one of the most vocal players in the negotiations. And actually, how did Poland manage to perform the leader of this group and also managed to maintain the cohesiveness of the group, despite the fact that some of its members also flirted with the group of the net players? Moreover, Poland in the last years has not shied away from also taking up initiatives, which also proves, in my opinion, the consolidation of its member states, the maturation. Well, the most recent example is the European Energy Union that is being promoted as one of the initiatives that Poland is one of the leaders. It is also a result, of course, of the discussions of the March European Council Summit that encouraged member states to come up with some constructive ideas. Also, during its EU Council presidency, Poland promoted the idea of the democratization, not only in the Eastern countries, but also in the southern neighborhood that led to the formation of the European Endowment for Democracy. Moreover, what I find pretty crucial is that Poland also managed to have its voice heard in the issues that have been traditionally in the domain of the Franco-German tandem, such as the future of Europe debate. And Poland, together with Minister Westerwelle, co-chaired the gathering, so the future of Europe group. This group consisted mainly of the old member states and mainly of the Euro-Eens. Well, also in the last years, since the sovereign debt crisis broke out, Poland has been really successful in governing support of its Euro-area partners for the so-called Euro-plus formula in the economic governance. As together with the other pre-in-members, it managed so far to safeguard the cohesiveness of the project. I think that the fiscal compact is one of the most relevant examples Poland has been, Poland was very active in promoting the provision of the fiscal compact saying that within five years the wording of the fiscal compact should be incorporated into the EU law. And I think also that the Euro-Sammits, and the Euro-Sammits were Poland and other pre-in-member states, and in fact also those that are called out, Euro-outs, they can participate in this Euro-Sammits, despite, I think, the big reluctance in the beginning of the French president's circus. This is another example of successful efforts. And the last example is also the banking union negotiations and what Poland has successfully managed to safeguard was this notion of the close cooperation in terms of a single supervisory mechanism that allows not only Euro-ins but also pre-ins to participate in the decisions about executing the provincial supervision of credit institutions. Now let me please move to the external factors that actually solidified Poland's position on the European Union stage. And the first one I think, it was paradoxically a sovereign debt crisis that strengthens Poland's hand in the EU. First of all the crisis shifted the attention from the East-West clivages that were associated still with the Eastern enlargement to the North-South divisions and I think it developed a very favorable ground for Poland to better market presence in the EU, particularly keeping in mind that Poland managed to made it through the worst phase of crisis, relatively unscuffed. To give you an example, in 2013 Poland's GDP grew by 20% against the features from the 2000-2008. And I also think that all this has made Poland a partner of choice, not only for Germany but also on occasions, even on France, that has been a traditional supporter of more intergovernmental Europe, of Europe that it's not a particular vision that we would support. We would definitely support a more community method in developing the European project. And I think that Poland has also benefited all over these years, particularly in the last years, from certain weakening of the Franco-German tandem, because both key players started to reaching out to the partners outside the Euro area block. And whereas Berlin has helped us to spawn the term pre-in, which strengthens our hand in negotiations on developing a genuine economic and monetary union, France, under the president all on stairs, seemed to have cultivated snow-gullist thinking. And finally, as a last factor that I would like to point to, which affected our credentials, this is the Poland's chairmanship of the EU Council. And I would like to focus here on a very specific dimension of our presidency. Poland managed during its presidency to smooth the inter-institutional relations with both the European Parliament and the European Commission that have been rather tense since 2010. And the institutional type of war has been diffused thanks to Polish efforts in more regular and structured form of parliament's involvement in MFF negotiations, but also thanks to the compromise that was achieved, for instance, on the correlation tables. Of course, these are the inter-institutional intricacies, but they gave a new pace to a legislative process. And actually, this inter-institutional relations, this very specific dimension of Polish presidency leads me to the final point of my presentation that is the fundamentals of the Polish-European policy and the challenges ahead of them. And I would like to stress that this is the strong partnership with the community institutions that has always been at the heart of the Polish-European policy. And we've been strong support of the Monet logic, because we believe that the Polish and the communitarian institutions were called up to safeguard the integrity and coherence. And as such, both European Parliament and the Commission have been strategy allies in building bridges between Poland and the other Eurozone members. But as you know, the sovereign debt crisis put these fundamentals of the Polish-European policy in the test. And it has not only pushed towards greater intergovernmentalism, but also to the forms of the Eurozone cooperation only. And Poland faced the limitations of its traditional European strategy. These limits of the supranational influence on the Eurozone governance became very, very clear already during the Polish presidency. And the fiscal compact was one of the most evident examples. Another watershed moment for Poland's traditional EU strategy based on the supranational relations, were the negotiations, this is my perspective, were the negotiations on the single supervisory mechanism, a first pillar of the banking union. Despite Poland's expectations that the Parliament would promote the interest of the non-euro area members, maps from the Committee, if you reviewed the debates, actually target the Council compromise as too favorable for non-euro area members. So this is just to give you an example of the limitations of the supranational institutions. And just to sum up, because I know that I'm running out of time, I think that this last decade gave rise to discussions that by abandoning its traditional partnership with the EU institutions and embracing more intergovernmental Europe, Poland could branch out more for itself. And this becomes particularly tempting in the light of its already well developed bilateral relations with the EU partners. But also in the light of growing Poland's, I would say uneasiness with some of the commission initiatives. One of the examples is of course, commission's attempts to regulate shale gas, or the revision of tobacco products directive. But I would argue that following this path would be very harmful for Poland. Because Poland still remains in this kind of a liminal stage. It is not Euro-In, but it is not entirely Euro-Out either. It is legally obliged to enter the Eurozone. Thus I think that it still needs its two-track strategy, which is based on the both community methods that is then complemented by the environmental partnerships to limit the risks that are associated with the process of further Eurozone integration. And I think that this strategy is likely to be tested very soon. I'm not sure if this is being discussed in Ireland, but this is definitely something that is being discussed in Poland. This is the new EU council voting system that is entering into force from November 2014. Of course we will have this transitional period, but I think that this strategy of both, this two-track strategy will allow Poland to establish more favorable grounds in the EU council, which as you know first gives a preferential treatment to the larger member states, but also in theory it also, it might facilitate favor Eurozone consolidation. And such the strategy and as such Poland will need both. It will need both strong communitarian institutions, like strong commission, which will in a way diffuse a possible caucus of larger member states already in the pre-legislative phase, but it will also need a solid network of intergovernmental partnerships to which it could reach out first if the Euro area decides at some point to act on block. I will finish here. Of course I'm very happy to answer all the questions and maybe also to develop a little bit on those major points. Thank you very much.