 Chapter 9 of the Idea of the Necessary Connection, Part 1. 48. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former being sensible are always clear and determinate. The smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola of foreign ellipses. The isosceles and skillenium are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind readily of itself substitutes on all occasions the definition for the term defined. Or even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the understanding, the various agitation of the passions, they're really in themselves distinct, easily escape us when surveyed by reflection. Nor is it in our power to recall the original object as often as we have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity by this means is gradually introduced into our reasonings. Similar objects are readily taken to be the same, and the conclusion becomes at last very wide of the premises. One may safely, however, affirm that if we consider these sciences in a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and much more intricate chain of reasoning and compare ideas much wider of each other in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt without extreme care to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions and the intermediate steps which lead to the conclusion much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple as not to consist of more parts than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our inquiries concerning causes and reduces us to an acknowledgement of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences, is the obscurity of the ideas and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought requisite to the forming of any conclusion. And perhaps our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper experiments and phenomena which are often discovered by chance and cannot always be found when requisite even by the most diligent and prudent inquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less improvement in either geometry or physics, we may conclude that, if there be any difference in this respect among the sciences, the difficulties which obstruct the progress of the former require superior care and capacity to be surmounted. There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy, or necessary connection, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall therefore endeavor in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms and thereby remove some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy. It seems a proposition which will not admit a much dispute that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything which we have not antecedently felt either by our external or internal senses. I have endeavored to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts of simple ideas that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas and find still some ambiguity and obscurity, what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas and render them altogether precise and determined to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics by which the moral sciences, the most minute and the most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas that can be the object of our inquiry. To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connection, let us examine its impression and, in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources from which it may possibly be derived. When we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is a hole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this section of objects. Consequently, there is not in any single particular instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection. From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee an effect, even without experience and might at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it by mere dint of thought and reasoning. In reality, there is no part of matter that does ever by its sensible qualities discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion. These qualities are all complete in themselves and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession. But the power of force, which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame. But what is the connection between them? We have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in single instances of their operation, because no bodies ever discover any power which can be the origin of this idea. 51. Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses give us no idea of power or necessary connection by their operation in particular instances, let us see whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds and be copied from any internal impression. It may be said that we are every moment conscious of internal power. While we feel that by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is the idea of reflection since it arrives from reflecting on the operations of our own mind and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and the faculties of the soul. 52. We shall proceed to examine them in this pretension and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may observe, is a fact which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means by which this is effected, the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation, of this we are so far from being immediately conscious that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry. For first, is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than that of the union of soul with body by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or control the planets in their orbit? This extensive authority would not be more extraordinary nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will, we must know this power. We must know its connection with the effect. We must know the secret union of soul and body and the nature of both these substances by which the one is able to operate in so many instances upon the other. Secondly, we are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority, though we cannot assign any reason besides experience for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will and influence over the tongue and fingers not over the heart or liver? This question would never embarrass us were we conscious of the power in the former case, not the latter. We should then perceive independent of experience why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force by which it operates, we should also know why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries and no farther. A man suddenly struck with a palsy in the leg or arm or has newly lost those members frequently endeavors at first to move them and employ them in their usual offices. Here he has as much conscious of power to command such limbs as a man in perfect health is conscious of the power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone and experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another without instructing us in the secret connection which binds them together and renders them inseparable. Thirdly, we learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power and voluntary motion is not the member itself which has moved, but certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits and perhaps something still more minute and more unknown through which the motion is successively propagated ere it reached the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof that the power by which this whole operation is performed so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event. Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves and totally different from the one intended, is produced. This event produces another equally unknown till it lasts through a long succession the desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must be known. Were it known, its effect must also be known, since all power is relative to its effect. And vice versa, if the effect be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How, indeed, can we be conscious of a power to move our limbs when we have no such power, but only then to move certain animal spirits, which though they produce at last the motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension? We may therefore conclude from the whole, I hope, without any temerity, though with assurance that our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves when we give rise to animal motion or apply our limbs to their proper use in office. That their motion follows the command of the will as a matter of common experience, like other natural events, but the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable. 53. Shall we then assert that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will prove that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy. First, it must be allowed that when we know a power we know that very circumstance in the cause by which it is unable to produce the effect. For these are supposed to be synonymous. We must therefore know both the cause and effect and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation, a production of something out of nothing, which implies a power so great that it may seem at first sight beyond the reach of any being less than infinite. At least it must be owned that such a power is not felt nor known nor even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely the existence of an idea consequent to a command of the will. But the manner in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is produced is entirely beyond our comprehension. Secondly, the command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as its command over the body, and these limits are not known by reason or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by experience and observation as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over ideas. Even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. While anyone pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or so why the power is deficient in one case, not in another, thirdly, this self-command is very different at different times. A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening, fasting than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these variations except experience? Where, then, is the power of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here either in a spiritual or material substance or both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts upon which the effect depends, and which being entirely unknown to us renders the power or energy of the well equally unknown and incomprehensible? Volition is surely an act of the mind with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find anything in it like this creative power by which it raises from nothing a new idea and with a new kind of fiat imitates the omnipotence of its maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who cold forth into existence all various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy and the will, it requires a certain experience as that of which we are possessed to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition. 54. The generality of mankind never finds any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature, such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food. But suppose that in all these cases they perceive the very force or energy of the cause by which it is connected with its effect and is forever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind that upon the appearance of the cause they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of an extraordinary phenomena such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men in such difficulties to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them and which they think cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers who carry their scrutiny a little farther immediately perceive that even in the most familiar events the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual and that we only learn by experience of the frequent conjunction of objects without ever being able to comprehend anything like connection between them. 55. Here then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse on all occasions to the same principle which the vulgar never appealed to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be not only the ultimate and original cause of all things but the immediate and sole cause of every event which appears in nature. They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated causes are in reality nothing but occasions and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force of nature but a volition of the supreme being who wills that such particular object should be forever conjoined with each other. Instead of saying that one billiard ball moves another by a force which it is derived from the author of its nature it is the deity himself they say who by a particular volition moves the second ball being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in their inquiries discover that as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body or a body on mind nor are we able either from our senses or consciousness to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other the same ignorance therefore reduces them to the same conclusion they assert that the deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body and that they are not the organs of sense which being agitated by external objects produce sensations in the mind but it is a particular volition of our omnipotent maker which excites such a sensation in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members it is God himself who is pleased to second our will in itself impotent and to command the motion which we erroneously attribute to our power and efficacy nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion they sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself in its internal operations our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our maker when we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object and raise up its image in the fancy it is not the will which creates this idea it is the universal creator who discovers it to the mind and readens it present to us 56 thus according to these philosophers everything is full of God not content with the principle that nothing exists but by his will that nothing possesses any power but by his concession they rob nature and all created beings of every power in order to render their dependence on the deity still more sensible and immediate they consider not that by this theory they diminish instead of magnifying the grandeur of those attributes which they affect so much to celebrate it argues surely more power in the deity to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures than to produce everything by his own immediate volition it argues more wisdom to contrive it first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that of itself and by its proper operation it may serve all the purposes of providence then if the creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts and animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine but if we would have a more philosophical computation of this theory perhaps the two following reflections may suffice 57 first it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the supreme being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man sufficiently apprised to the weakness of human reason and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical there must arise a strong suspicion if not an absolute assurance that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties when it leaves the conclusion so extraordinary and so remote for common life and experience we are got into fairyland long air we have reached the last steps of our theory and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses and however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided in every step which we take by a kind of verisimilitude and experience we may be assured that this fancied experience has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience but on this we shall have occasion to touch afterwards secondly I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this theory is founded we are ignorant it is true of the manner in which our bodies operate on each other their force or energy is entirely incomprehensible but are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which a mind even the supreme mind operates either on itself or on body when side to seat you do we acquire any idea of it we have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves we have no idea of the supreme being but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties where our ignorance therefore a good reason for rejecting anything we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in the supreme being as much as in the grossest matter we surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other is it more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from the impulse than it may arise from volition all we know is our profound ignorance in both cases end of chapter 9 chapter 10 of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by ML Cohen Cleveland, Ohio July 2007 an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume chapter 10 of the idea of necessary connection part 2 58 but to hasten to a conclusion of this argument which is already drawn out to two great a length we have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connection in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived it appears that in single instances of the operation of bodies we never can by our utmost scrutiny discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which to cause operates or any connection between it and its supposed effect the same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect the authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a bit more comprehensible so then upon the whole there appears not throughout all nature any one instance of connection which is conceivable by us all events seem entirely loose and separate one event follows another but we can never observe any tie between them they seem conjoined but never connected and as we can have no idea of anything which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connection or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasoning or common life 59 but there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined when any natural object or event is presented it isn't possible for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without experience what event will result from it or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses even after one instance of our experiment where we have observed the particular event to follow upon another we are not entitled to form a general rule or foretell what will happen in light cases it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment however accurate or certain but when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us as any matter of fact or existence we then call the one object cause the other effect we suppose that there is some connection between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity it appears then that this idea of a necessary connection among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur are the constant conjunction of these events nor can that idea ever been suggested by any one of these instances surveyed in all possible lights and positions but there is nothing in a number of instances different from every single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist this connection therefore which we feel in the mind this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection nothing farther is in the case contemplate the subject on all sides you will never find any other origin of that idea this is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never receive the idea of connection and a number of similar instances by which it is suggested the first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse as by the shock of two billiard balls he could not pronounce that the one event was connected but only that it was conjoined with the other after he has observed several instances of this nature he then pronounces them to be connected what alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connection nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other when we say therefore that one object is connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought and give rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence a conclusion which is a conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary but which seems founded on sufficient evidence nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding or skeptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary no conclusions can be more agreeable to skepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity sixty and what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present for surely if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to know perfectly it is that of cause and effect on this are founded all our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence by means of it alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses the only immediately utility of all sciences is to teach us how to control and regulate future events by their causes our thoughts and inquiries are therefore every moment employed about this relation yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it similar objects are always conjoined with similar of this we have experience suitably to this experience therefore we may define a cause to be an object followed by another and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second or in other words where if the first object had not been the second never had existed the appearance of a cause always conveys the mind by customary transition to the idea of the effect of this also we have experience we may therefore suitably to this experience form another definition of cause and call it an object followed by another and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other but though both these definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause we cannot remedy this inconvenience or attain any more perfect definition which may point out that circumstance in the cause which gives it a connection with its effect we have no idea of this connection nor even any distinct notion of what it is we desire to know when we endeavor at a conception of it we say for instance that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound but what do we mean by that affirmation we either mean that this vibration is followed by the sound and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds or that this vibration is followed by this sound and that upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses and forms immediately an idea of the other we may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of these two lights but beyond these we have no idea of it 61 to recapitulate therefore the reasonings of this section every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment and where we cannot find any impression we may be certain that there is no idea in all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds there is nothing that produces any impression nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connection but when many uniform instances appear and the same object is always followed by the same event we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection we then feel a new sentiment or impression to wit a customary connection in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for for as this idea arises from a number of similar instances and not from any single instance it must arise from that circumstance in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance but this customary connection or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ in every other particular they are alike the first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls to return to this obvious illustration is exactly similar to any instance that may at present occur to us except only that we could not at first infer one event from the other which we are unable to do at present after so long a course of uniform experience I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning I am afraid that should I multiply words about it or throw it into greater variety of lights it would only become more obscure and intricate in all abstract reasonings there is one point of view which if we can happily hit we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious expression in the world this point of view we should endeavor to reach and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them end of chapter 10 section 8 of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org reading by Daniel Polanco an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section 8 of liberty and necessity part 1 it might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy that the meaning of all the terms at least should have been agreed upon among the disputants in our inquiries and the course of 2000 years been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy for how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed and reasoning and make these definitions not the mere sounds of words the object of future scrutiny and examination but if we consider the matter more narrowly we should be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion from this circumstance alone that a controversy has been long kept on foot and remains still undecided we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy for as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together it were impossible if men affix the same ideas to their terms that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject especially when they communicate their views and each party turned themselves on all sides and search of arguments and search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonist it is true if men attempt a discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity such as those concerning the origin of worlds or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits they may long beat the air in the fruitless contests and never arrive at any determinate conclusion but if the question regard any subject of common life and experience nothing one would think could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions which keep the antagonist still at a distance and hinder them from grappling with each other this has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity and to so remarkable a degree that if I be not much mistaken we shall find that all mankind both learned and ignorant have always been of the same opinion with regard to the subject and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry that it is no wonder if a sensible reader indulges ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question from which you can expect neither instruction or entertainment but the state of the argument here proposed may perhaps serve to renew his attention as it has more novelty promises at least some decision of the controversy and will not much to serve his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning I hope therefore to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty according to any reasonable sense which can be put on these terms and that the whole controversy as hitherto turned merely upon words we shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity it is universally allowed that matter in all its operations is actuated by a necessary force and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect and such particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it the degree and direction of every motion is by the laws of nature prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion and any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it would we therefore form a just and precise idea of necessity when we must consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies it seems evident that if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted in such a manner that no two events for any resemblance to each other that every object was entirely new without any similitude to whatever had been seen before we should never in that case have attained the least idea of necessity or of any connection among these objects we might say upon such supposition that one object or event has followed another not that one was produced by the other the relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind and for instance reasoning concerning the operations of nature would from that moment be at an end and the memory and senses remain the only canals by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind our idea therefore of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable and the operations of nature where similar objects are constantly conjoined together and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other these two circumstances from the whole of that necessity which we ascribe to matter beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects and the consequent inference from one to the other we have no notion of any necessity or connection if it appear therefore that all mankind have ever allowed without any doubt or hesitation that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men and in the operations of mind it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity and that they have hitherto disputed merely for not understanding each other as to the first circumstance the constant and regular conjunction of similar events we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations it is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men and all nations and ages and that human nature remains still the same and its principles and operations the same motives always produce the same actions the same events follow from the same causes ambition avarice self-love vanity friendship generosity public spirit these passions mixed in various degrees and distributed through society have been from the beginning of the world and still are the source of all the actions and enterprises which have ever been observed among mankind would you know the sentiments inclinations and course of life of the Greeks and Romans study well the temper and actions of the French and English you cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the latter mankind are so much the same and all times and places that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by showing men and all varieties of circumstances and situations and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior these records of wars intrigues factions and revolutions are so many collections of experiments by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of the science in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants minerals and other external objects by the experiments which he forms concerning them nor are the earth water and other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to those which at present lie under our observation then the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world should a traveler returning from a far country bring us an account of men wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted men who were entirely divested of avarice ambition or revenge who knew no pleasure but friendship generosity and public spirit we should immediately from these circumstances detect the falsehood and prove him a liar with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons miracles and prodigies and if we would explode any forgery in history we cannot make use of a more convincing argument than to prove that the action described to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature and that no human motives in such circumstances could ever induce him to such a conduct the veracity of Quintus Curdius is as much to be suspected when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes as when he describes his supernatural force and activity by which he is able to resist them so readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body hence likewise the benefit of that experience acquired by long life and a variety of business and company in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature and regulate our future conduct as well as speculation by means of this guide we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives from their actions expressions and even gestures and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations the general observations treasured up by a course of experience give us the clue of human nature and teach us to unravel all its intricacies pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us public declarations pass for the spacious coloring of a cause and though virtue and honor be allowed their proper weight and authority that perfect disinterestedness so often pretended to is never expected in multitudes and parties seldom in their leaders and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station but were there no uniformity in human actions and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind and no experience however accurately digested by reflection would ever serve to any purpose why is the aged husbandman more skillful and is calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun rain and earth towards the production of vegetables and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and directed we must not however expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men in the same circumstances will always act precisely in the same manner without making any allowance for the diversity of characters prejudices and opinions such a uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature on the contrary from observing the variety of conduct in different men we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity are the manners of men different and different ages and countries we learn thence the great force of custom and education which mold the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character is the behavior and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has oppressed upon the sexes and which she preserves with constancy and regularity are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life from infancy to old age this affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures even the characters which are peculiar to each individual have a uniformity and their influence otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observations of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions or serve to direct our behavior with regard to them I granted is possible to find some actions which seem to have no regular connection with any known motives and our exceptions to all measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men but if we would willingly know what judgments should be formed of such a regular and extraordinary actions we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature and the operations of external objects all causes are not conjoined their usual effect with like uniformity an artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents the vulgar who takes things according to their first appearance attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence though they may meet no impediment in their operation but philosophers observing that almost in every part of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles which are hid by reason of their minuteness or remoteness find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in their cause but from the secret operation of contrary causes this possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation when they remark that upon an exact scrutiny a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes and proceeds from their mutual opposition a peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right but an artist easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels but fails of its usual effect perhaps by reason of a grain of dust which puts a stop to the whole movement from the observation of several parallel instances philosophers form a maxim that the connection between all causes and effects is equally necessary and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes thus for instance and the human body when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation when medicines operate not with their wanted powers when irregular events follow from any particular cause the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter nor are ever tempted to deny in general the necessity and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted they know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine that many secret powers lurk in it which are altogether beyond our comprehension that to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations and that therefore the irregular events which outwardly discover themselves can be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest regularity and its internal operations and government the philosopher if he be consistent must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents the most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation a person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer but he has the toothache or has not dined a stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage but he has met with a sudden peace of good fortune or even when an action as sometimes happens cannot be particularly accounted for either by the person himself or by others we know in general that the characters of men are to a certain degree inconstant and irregular this is in a manner the constant character of human nature though it be applicable in a more particular manner to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy the internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner notwithstanding these seeming irregularities and the same manner as the winds, rain, clouds and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry thus it appears not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind and has never been the subject of dispute either in philosophy or common life now as it is from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find to have always been conjoined it may seem superfluous to prove that this experience uniformity in human actions is a source once we draw inferences concerning them but in order to throw the argument into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist though briefly on this latter topic the mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself or is performed without some reference to the actions of others which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent the poor stratificer who labors alone expects at least the protection of the magistrate to ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labor he also expects that when he carries his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price he shall find purchasers and shall be able by the money he acquires to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence in proportion as men extend their dealings and render their intercourse with others more complicated they always comprehend in their schemes of life a greater variety of voluntary actions which they expect from the proper motives to cooperate with their own in all these conclusions they take their measures from past experience in the same manner as their reasonings concerning external objects and firmly believe that men as well as all the elements are to continue in their operations the same that they have ever found them a manufacturer reckons upon the labor of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools which he employs and would be equally surprised where his expectations disappointed in short this experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man while awake is every moment without employing it have we not reason therefore to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition an explication of it nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the people in this particular for not to mention that almost every action of their life supposes that opinion there are even few of the speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential what would become of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind how could politics be a science if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society where would be the foundation of morals if particular characters had no certain or determined power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions and with what pretense could we employ our criticism upon any poet or polite author if we cannot pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances it seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct and indeed when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence linked together and form only one chain of argument we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derive from the same principles a prisoner who has neither money nor interest discovers the impossibility of his escape as well when he considers the obscenity of the jailer as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other the same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel his mind runs along a certain train of ideas the refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsing motions and death here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions but the mind feels no difference between them and passing from one link to another nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical necessity the same experienced union has the same effect on the mind whether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure in motion we may change the name of things but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change where a man whom I know to be honest and opulent and with whom I live an intimate friendship to come into my house where I'm surrounded with my servants I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded but he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy so may a sudden earthquake arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears I shall therefore change the suppositions I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there until it be consumed and this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throws himself out at the window and meet with no obstruction he will not remain a moment suspended in the air no suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature a man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations I have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words and have rather shown a propensity in all ages to profess the contrary opinion the matter I think may be accounted for after the following manner if we examine the operations of body and the production of effects from their causes we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together and that the mind is carried by a customary transition from the appearance of one to the belief of the other but though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the power of nature and perceive something like a necessary connection between the cause and effect when again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds and feel no such connection of the motive in the action they are then apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from the material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have a place in voluntary actions we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes and though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers and ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will we shall find upon reflection that they dissent from it in words only not in their real sentiment necessity according to the sense in which it is taken here has never yet been rejected nor can ever I think be rejected by any philosopher it may only perhaps be pretended that the mind can perceive in the operations of matter some farther connection between the cause and effect and connection that has not placed in voluntary actions of intelligent beings now whether it be so or not can only appear upon examination and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion by defining or describing that necessity and pointing it out to us and the operations of material causes it would seem indeed that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul the influence of the understanding and the operations of the will let them first discuss a more simple question namely the operations of body and a brute unintelligent matter and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity except that of a constant conjunction of objects and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another if these circumstances form in reality the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind the dispute is at an end at least must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal but as long as we will rashly suppose that we have some farther idea of necessity and causation and the operations of external objects at the same time that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of the mind there is no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition the only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to material causes and to convince ourselves that we all know of them is the constant conjunction and inference above mentioned we may perhaps find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding but we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will for as it is evident that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters and as we always draw inferences from one to the other we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity which we have already avowed in every deliberation of our lives and every step of our conduct and behavior footnote 17 the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause namely a false sensation or seeming experience which we have or may have of liberty or indifference and many of our actions the necessity of any action whether of matter or of mind is not properly speaking equality in the agent but in any thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action and it consists chiefly into the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects as liberty when opposed to necessity is nothing but the want of that determination and a certain looseness or indifference which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one now we may observe that though in reflecting on human actions we seldom feel such a looseness or indifference but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives and from the dispositions of the agent yet it frequently happens that in performing the actions themselves we're sensible of something like it and as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty we feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing because when by a denial of it we are provoked to try we feel that it moves easily every way and produces an image of itself or veya-ati as it is called in schools even on that side on which it did not settle this image or faint motion we persuade ourselves could at that time have been completed into the thing itself because should that be denied we find upon a second trial that at present it can we consider not that the fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions and it seems certain that however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character and even where he cannot he concludes in general that he might perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition now this is the very essence of necessity according to the foregoing doctrine end of footnote 17 but to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity the most contentious question of metaphysics the most contentious science it will not require many words to prove that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity and that the whole dispute and their suspect also has been hitherto merely verbal for what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions we cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with motives and inclinations and circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other for these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact by liberty then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will that is if we choose to remain at rest we may if we choose to move we also may now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains here then is no subject of dispute whatever definition we may give of liberty we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances first that it can be consistent with plain matter of fact secondly that it be consistent with itself if we observe these circumstances and render our definition intelligible I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it it is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature but it is pretended that some causes are necessary some not necessary here then is the advantage of definitions let anyone define a cause without comprehending as a part of the definition a necessary connection with its effect and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition and I shall readily give up the whole controversy but if the foregoing explication of the matter be received this must be absolutely impracticable had not objects a regular conjunction with each other we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding which is the only connection that we can have any comprehension of whoever attempts a definition of cause exclusive of these circumstances will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as our synonyms to the term which endeavors to define footnote 18 thus if a cause be defined that which produces anything it is easy to observe that producing is synonymous to causing and like manner if a cause be defined that by which anything exists this is liable to the same objection for what is meant by these words by which had it been said that a cause is that after which anything constantly exists we should have understood the terms for this is indeed all we know of the matter and this constancy forms the very essence of necessity nor have we any other idea of it end of footnote 18 and if the definition above mentioned be admitted liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance which is universally allowed to have no existence end of section eight of liberty and necessity part one recording by Daniel Polanco of liberty and necessity there is no method of reasoning more common and yet none more blameable than in philosophical disputes to endeavor the refutation of any hypothesis by pretense of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality when any opinion leads to absurdities it is certainly false but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence such topics therefore ought entirely to be foreborn as serving nothing to the discovery of truth but only to make the person of an antagonist odious this I observe in general without pretending to draw any advantage from it I frankly submit to an examination of this kind and show venture to affirm that the doctrines both of necessity and liberty as above explained are not only consistent with morality but are absolutely essential to its support necessity may be defined two ways conformably to the two definitions of cause of which it makes an essential part it consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another now necessity in both these senses which indeed are at bottom the same has universally though tacitly in the schools in the pulpit and in common life been allowed to belong to the will of men and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives inclinations and circumstances the only particular in which anyone can differ is that either perhaps he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions but as long as the meaning is understood I hope the word can do no harm or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter but this it must be acknowledged can be of no consequence to morality or religion whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics we may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connection in the actions of body but surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind but what everyone does and must readily allow of we change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard to the will but only in that with regard to material objects and causes nothing therefore can be more innocent at least than this doctrine all laws being founded on rewards and punishments it is supposed as a fundamental principle that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions we may give to this influence what name we please but as it is usually conjoined with the action it must be esteemed a cause and be looked upon as an instance of that necessity which we would here establish the only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature endowed with thought and consciousness and when any criminal or injurious actions excite that passion it is only by their relation to the person or connection with him actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them they can either redound to his honor if good or infamy if evil the actions themselves may be blamable they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion but the person is not answerable for them and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant and leave nothing of that nature behind them it is impossible he can upon their account become the object of punishment or vengeance according to the principle therefore which denies necessity and consequently causes a man is as pure and untainted after having committed the most horrid crime as at the first moment of his birth nor is his character any wise concerned in his actions since they are not derived from it and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually whatever may be the consequences why but because the principles of these actions are only momentary and terminate in them alone men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation for what reason but because a hasty temper though a constant cause or principle in the mind operates only by intervals and in facts not the whole character again repentance wipes off every crime if attended with a reformation of life and manners how is this to be accounted for but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind and when by an alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs they likewise cease to be criminal but except upon the doctrine of necessity they never were just proofs and consequently never were criminal it will be equally easy to prove and from the same arguments that liberty according to that definition above mentioned in which all men agree is also essential to morality and that no human actions where it is wanting are susceptible of any moral qualities or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike for as actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they are indications of the internal character passions and affections it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame where they proceed not from these principles but are derived altogether from external violence I pretend not to have violated or removed all objections to this theory with regard to necessity and liberty I can foresee other objections derived from topics which have not here been treated of it may be said for instance that if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter there is a continued chain of necessary causes preordained and predetermined reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature no contingency anywhere in the universe no indifference no liberty while we act we are at the same time acted upon the ultimate author of all our volitions is the creator of the world who first bestowed motion on this immense machine and placed all beings in that particular position whence every subsequent event by an inevitable necessity must result human actions therefore either can have no moral turpitude at all as proceeding from so good a cause or if they have any turpitude they must involve our creator in the same guilt while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author for as a man who fired a mine is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be long or short so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed that being either finite or infinite who produces the first is likewise the author of all the rest and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule upon unquestionable reasons when we examine the consequences of any human action and these reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and intentions of a being infinitely wise and powerful ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature is man but those imperfections have no place in our creator he foresaw he ordained he intended all those actions of men which we so rashly pronounced criminal and we must therefore conclude either that they are not criminal or that the deity not man is accountable for them but as either of these positions is absurd and impious it follows that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true as being liable to all the same objections an absurd consequence if necessary proves the original doctrine to be absurd in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause if the connection between them be necessary and evitable this objection consists of two parts which we shall examine separately first that if human actions can be traced up by a necessary chain to the deity they can never be criminal on account of the infinite perfection of that being from whom they are derived and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable or secondly if they be criminal we must retract the attribute of perfection which we ascribe to the deity and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures the answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing there are many philosophers who after an exact scrutiny of all the phenomena of nature conclude that the whole considered as one system is in every period of its existence ordered with perfect benevolence and that the utmost possible happiness will in the end result to all created beings without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery every physical ill say they makes an essential part of this benevolent system and could not possibly be removed even by the deity himself considered as a wise agent without giving entrance to greater ill or excluding greater good which will result from it from this theory some philosophers and the ancient stoics among the rest derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions while they taught their pupils that those ills under which they labored were in reality goods to the universe and that to an enlarged view which could comprehend the whole system of nature every event became an object of joy and exaltation but though this topic be specious and sublime it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual you would surely more irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the recitude of those general laws which produced the malignant humours in his body and led them through the proper canals to the sinos and nerves where they now excite such acute torments these enlarged views may for a moment please the imagination of a speculative man who is placed in ease and security but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists the affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object and by an economy more suitable to the infirmity of human minds regard alone the beings around us and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system the case is the same with moral as with physical ill it cannot reasonably be supposed that those remote considerations which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one will have a more powerful influence with regard to the other the mind of man is so formed by nature that upon the appearance of certain characters dispositions and actions it immediately feels a sentiment of approbation or blame nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution the characters which engage our approbation our chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance once it may reasonably be presumed that the moral sentiments arise either immediately or immediately from a reflection of these opposite interests what though philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture that everything is right with regard to the whole and that the qualities which disturb society are in the main as beneficial and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counter balance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects a man who is robbed of a considerable sum does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them or why should not the acknowledgement of a real distinction between vice and virtue be reconcilable to all speculative systems of philosophy as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind and these sentiments are now to be controlled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever the second objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer nor is it possible to explain distinctly how the deity can be the immediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author of sin and moral turpitude these are mysteries which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle and whatever system she embraces she must find herself involved in in extricable difficulties and even contradictions at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects to reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience or to defend absolute decrees and yet free the deity from being the author of sin has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy happy if she be then sensible of her temerity when she prized into these sublime mysteries and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities return with suitable modesty to her true and proper province the examination of common life where she will find difficulties enough to employ her inquiries without launching into so boundless a notion of doubt uncertainty and contradiction end of chapter eight part two of liberty and necessity section nine of an inquiry concerning human understanding this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to find out how to volunteer please contact LibriVox.org an inquiry concerning human understanding by David Hume section nine of the reason of animals all our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of analogy which leads us to expect from any cause the same events which we have observed to result from similar causes where the causes are entirely similar the analogy is perfect and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive nor does any man ever entertain a doubt where he sees a piece of iron that it will have weight and cohesion of parts as in all other instances which have ever fallen under his observation but where the objects have not so exact a similarity the analogy is less perfect and then for instance less conclusive though still it has some force in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance the anatomical observances formed upon one animal are by this species of reasoning extended to all animals and it is certain that when the circulation of the blood for instance is clearly proved to have a place in one creature as a frog or fish it forms a strong presumption that the same principle has place in all these analogical observations may be carried farther even to this science of which we are now treating and any theory by which we explain the operations of the understanding or the origin and connection of the passions in man will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals we shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we have in the foregoing discourse endeavored to account for all experimental reasonings and it is hoped that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations first it seems evident that animals as well as men learn many things from experience and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes by this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects and gradually from their birth treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire water earth stones heights depths etc and of the effects which result from their operation the ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure a horse that has been accustomed to the field becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability an old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles nor are the conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded in anything but his observation and experience this is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals who by proper application of rewards and punishments may be taught any course of action and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him or lift up the whip to beat him is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows and intend to call him when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain tone and accent in all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it is always found in its observation to result from similar objects secondly it is impossible that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning by which he concludes that like events must follow like objects and that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations for if there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie to obtruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them animals therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning neither are children neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary actions and conclusions neither are philosophers themselves who in all the active parts of life are in the main the same with the vulgar and are governed by the same maxims nature must have provided some other principle of more ready and more general use in application nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation were this doubtful with regard to men it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one we have a strong presumption from all the rules of analogy that it ought to be universally admitted without any exception or reverse it is custom alone which engages animals from every object that strikes their senses to infer its usual attendant and carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other in that particular manner which we denominate belief no other explanation can be given of this operation and all the higher as well as the lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation footnote since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom it may be asked how it happens that men so much surpass animals in reasoning and one man so much surpasses another has not the same custom the same influence on all we shall hear endeavor briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings after which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended when we have lived any time and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature we acquire a general habit by which we always transfer the known to the unknown and conceive the latter to resemble the former by means of this general habitual principle we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty where the experiment has been made accurately and free from all foreign circumstances it is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation this will make a very great difference in their reasoning where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect one mind may be much larger than another and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects and to infer justly their consequences one man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas and mistaking one for another and there are various degrees of this infirmity the circumstance on which the effect depends is frequently involved in other circumstances which are foreign and extrinsic the separation of it often requires great attention accuracy and subtlety the forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation and nothing is more usual from haste or a narrowness of mind which sees not on all sides than to commit mistakes in this particular when we reason from analogies the man who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies will be the better reasoner biases from prejudice education passion party etc hang more upon one mind than another after we have acquired a confidence in human testimony books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another it would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men and footnote but though many animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of nature which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience these we denominate instincts and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding but our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself which we possess in common with beasts and on which the whole conduct of life depends is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties though the instinct be different yet still it is an instinct what teaches a man to avoid fire as much as that which teaches a bird with such exactness the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery and of section nine of the reasoning of animals this recording is in the public domain Chapter 10 Part 1 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Leon Meyer An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding Chapter 10 Part 1 of Miracles There is, in Dr. Tilletson's writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as concise and elegant and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority either of the scripture or of tradition is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles who were eyewitnesses to those miracles of our savior by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses because even in the first authors of our religion it was no greater, and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples, nor can anyone rest such confidence in their testimony as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy stronger, and therefore were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition on which it is supposed to be built carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered merely as external evidences and are not brought home to everyone's breast by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry in superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact, it must be acknowledged that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One who, in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly and conformably to experience, but it is certain that he may happen in the event to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe that in such a case he would have no cause to complain of experience, because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty by that contrariety of events which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found in all countries and all ages to have been constantly conjoined together. Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations, so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions, as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases he proceeds with more caution. He weighs the opposite experiments. He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments. To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation, and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event, though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases we must balance the opposite experiments where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. To apply these principles to a particular instance, we may observe that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim that no objects have any discoverable connection together, and that all the inferences which we can draw from one to another are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction. It is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony, whose connection with any event seems in itself as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity, were they not sensible to shame when detected in a falsehood, were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony, a man delirious or noted for falsehood and villainy as no manner of authority with us. And as the evidence derived from witnesses and human testimony is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind, and the ultimate standard by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always derived from experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty, and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it, but still with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several different causes, from the opposition of contrary testimony, from the character or number of the witnesses, from the manner of their delivering their testimony, or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other, when they are but few, or of a doubtful character, when they have an interest in what they affirm, when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or, on the contrary, with two violent separations. There are many other particulars of the same kind which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony. Suppose, for instance, that the fact which the testimony endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous. In that case the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any connection which we perceive a priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavor to establish, from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counter-poise and mutual destruction of belief and authority. I should not believe such a story were told to me by Cato, was a proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact it was allowed might invalidate so great an authority. The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly, and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. Footnote. No Indian, it is evident, could have experienced that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him, and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will resolve from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow, but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed that in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold, but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate. But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature, in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of the rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy. But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter, and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence. End footnote. But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they affirm, instead of being only marvelous, is really miraculous, and suppose also that the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to an entire proof. In that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with the diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air, that fire consumes wood and is extinguished by water, unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words a miracle, to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happened in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden, because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle. Nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof which is superior. Footnote. Sometimes an event may not in itself seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle, because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command, these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For, if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle, and no transgression of the laws of nature. If the suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws, because nothing can be more contrary to nature, than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not, this alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us. End footnote. The plain consequence is, and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. And even in that case there was a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior. When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and according to the superiority which I discover I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then and not till then can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.