 Thank you very much. I try to be very brief also to really facilitate discussion and I agree with Lucas that from where I started, what I tried to do is basically to to answer the question or to provide some ideas of why Germany seems unwilling to resolve the Eurozone crisis. I think there is a consensus emerging of what o'r fawr o'r hyn sydd yn ymlaen. Rydyn ni'n eu hunain i'r cyfloghau ydy'r hyn sydd eisiau ei wneud o'r cyfloghau yn siaradau cyfnod. Yn ymddir hwnnw'n wneud o'r cyfloghau a wnaeth ymddir yma sydd yn ei wneud i gyfloghau. Rydyn ni'n ddylch chi ffordd o wneud, yn ei ffordd o'r hyn yn ymddir o'r cyfloghau â'r ddefnyddio cyfloghau. Yn ymddir i mi, Mae'n ceisio gyda'r ddod o'r gaelid gyda'r gaelid gyda Ierys, a yma'r gwneud yr olau gennyddiad i'r kryysus, ac Lucas yn brydech yn un i'r ddod o'r ddod, a os gynnig yn ym Mhaglen yng Nghymru, ond ond hefyd yn gweithio'r gaelid gyda'r ddod yma'r Pwgol Llywodraeth Cymru, i ddim yn gweithio'r gaelid gyda'r Gaelid Gaelid a chyfloddol i'r gaelid gyda'r gaelid gyda'r gaelid that every country needs to look after its own banks in October 2008 in response to the Lehman Brother collapse, unknown at the time about the toxic relationship between sovereigns and banks. But still, the very firm view that this issue could be resolved in the national context. The second cardin era really to allow a narrative to emerge within Germany, felly ddau'r cyfnod o'r ffordd ymlaen o'r Sryddoedd Gweithgaredd, felly ddau'r cyfnod o'r Lathau. Rydyn ni'n ffwysig yw'r gweithgaredd, os ymlaen i'r Llyfrgell Mergledd, ac mae'n rhaid i'r cyfnod o'r rhamwg o'r gweithgareddau. Ond e'n ffwrdd yma'r 1 o 2, neu'r cyfnod o'r cyfnod o'r llwyllus cyfnod, ac mae'n gwybod, i gydag i'r rhan o'r gweithgareddau. ac mae'r ddweud yw'r cyfrgyrchu sydd yn ei gweithio'r mewn diwrnod y ffrindio yn Euromeu yn ei ddweud y llyfe sydd yn yr un o'r ffrindio. A wnaeth hynny, rhaid i'r ddweud y Deidw i'r ddweud eich ddweud ar yr oedd y Ddweud. Yna oherwydd mae'r ddechrau a rôl i'r ddweud eich ddweud y ddweud. Mae'r situation yn ymateb hwn i'r Gwyl Unigol yn rhan o'r pryddyn nhw'n ddwy'r ddullion yma yn siŵn. Mae'n cael y gallu colli ar gyfer y cyfrifredeg Cymru, sy'n gyhoedd sy'n cymryd ac yn bryd i Llywodraeth Cymru, sy'n cymryd yn ddiddordeb hwn yn ei ddiddordeb. Mae'r ddiddordeb hwn yn gweithio. A ydych yn ddiddordeb hwn yn gweithio. Mae'r ddydig i'r cyfrifredeg hwn yn gallu cyfrifredeg hwn yn bryd i Llywodraeth Cymru, a y ddweud y belaeth o eich yr astudio ardennig beth iawn. Mae'r gwahanol i learnigau ac a'r Cyfrannu, wedi y bydd tarihau o'i rew ar hyn, oedd yn y cyfrannu spinol. Gwrs hefyd, rydyn ni'n meddwl, yn fwy o'r cerddiaeth efallai ei gweithio ar y teimlo'r cyfrannu ar gael mewn tyw. Felly mae'r lle â chendwynt wedi gyngor iawn a'r ddaeth, ac mae'n cyfraithiaid eu cyffredig yn eu hynog yma o ymgylchau cyfredig ac, oherwydd, Ie ddweud, oherwydd gallwch yardwedd ar jo substitute, am gallu ei ffwrdd gweithio bod nredig ar 라는 gwahanol yma cael y cynnig, am cael ei fod yn y tro gan y gwybodaeth, mewn ei fod yn y du あlla, the debate about the automatic sanctions for future deficit sinners, the action on the ECB, the role of the ECB, the financial transaction text which would have ruled out by Angela Merkel year in year out. It is only now been agreed on the pressure by the German government. Mae'r ddau'r ysgolwyddoedd a'r ddau'r Gweithio Cyfnoddau, sy'n ddiddordebeth a'r ddau'r gyfer yr ysgolwyddau, ac mae'n cwrs ymlaen i'r gwaith i ddweud i'r cydweithio cyffredinol fynd? Mae'n ei wneud bod yr ysgolwyddoedd yn gweithio'r wgwlad 3, felly mae'n gwneud yn ei wneud o'r ddau'r Ddweud. Mae'n gwneud o gyffredinol eich cyfredinol, mae'n gwneud o gyfredinol, a'r ddiogelwch ar gyfer ar gyfer y cyfnod. Yn ystod, ond, ar gyfer cyfnod o'r ideologiaid, yn ei ffyrraedd ystod yn gwybod ymgyrchau rydych chi'n ei ffordd oherwydd y ddechrau a'r cyfnod o'r ddau cymryd. Mae'r ddweud yn y cerddau yn ysgrifennu cyfnod o'r debat. Mae'r ddweud yn ei gwybod yma oedd unrhyw o'r ddweud o'r ddweud. Mae'r ddweud yn ein bwrdd yn eich ddweud. boats often overlooked is a strong economic ideology within the German establishment that drives the answer is trying to impose on the rest of Europe. Ideology is a very much neoclassical, economic approach rooted in the order liberal debates after the Second World War. Here demand problem is surprise problems, if prices and wages don't adjust well enough the problem must be legal barriers a'r dyliadau ryffordd, trofodol, a'r dyliadau rŵr sut eich fray acid yn jecheg. Yn meddwl gwirio yn rhoi'r cyfrun ymlaen, a'r ISM, sy'n torno, wedi bod yn sgwr dyma, dwi'n gofio'r gwirio'r ysbydd, nawr arno i'r gwiriau gwirio'r gwirio yn arithio'r cyfrun. Yn Shoulden Rhyw?thol 25 felly erioedd yn gwneud ei wneud yma ni wedi'u wneud arloedau'r cyfrun. Mae'r cyfrun yma ar mmhigau dzellig neu'r cyfrn roeddau eich cyfrun. fashionable on how the crisis needs to be tackled with a range of economic solutions. I think the rest of Europe is still not ready to engage sufficiently with these economic arguments, often rejecting them outright as economic nonsense or literacy—Sound chili olet leashtyn. Contrasting them with some of the liberal wisdom we find in the ending-ception world. We find a particular in the ending-section world. So you see a lot of chastran between the bayt in the economic side, which I yn gwybod i gyda gweithio'r pharmynol, o gynonydd o'r gwnaeth cyffredinidol. Rwy'n symud o ddeilio'r Ymddaf, y bydd yn urmownig o f rozpanyddio'r rhaid o'r Cwld ymddo i CaelsrOR. Ym hynny rhaid o'r diwrnod arwyntiau. Wrth gynnydd o'r cyffredinidol, roedd ddefnyddio'r gwrdd cyffredinidol. Mae'n gwybod fod yn cael ei gwerthoedd gwybod o'r Llywodraeth o'r Llywodraeth reo wychael yn oed yn gynghraffa'r cyfrifiad. Felly mae'n adnod o'r cwrd ymlaen, o'r ffordd o'r gwrth yn y ddweud, a'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddwyllchiadau, o'r ddweud? Felly mae'n ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r prosesau sy'n bethau hyn arwyr yn dymigraeddhau i'r law gennym. Felly ydych chi'n gweithio i'n ddwyllchiadau a llunegiau ar yr ardal, sy'n 93. Felly mae'n ddweud ymgai, ond mae'n ddweud, ok? Felly mae'r ffordd, o'r Llyfrgell, yn gweithio'r Llyfrgell, ond mae'r bod yn dweud i'r ddweud o ddim yn gyhoeddig deimlo lledigol. Felly mae'r ddweud i ddweudio'r ddweud i'r ddweud i chi'n gwybod. Mae'r ddweud i'r rhaid o ddweudio'r lledigol, oeddeni'n ddweud i'r busau lledigol o ffwrdd a'r proses dyfu. Felly nid wedi cael eu mewn gwahanol o'r ddweud o'r gaeliau basically impotent in the phase of what's going on. It doesn't know how to strengthen the Bundestag in its ability to shape policies, if anything to veto and control, but its ability to shape has completely gone. And at the same time, it has ruled almost illegally the European Parliament to uphold some of the principle of shaping European policy. So we've reached an impasse in Germany about what the constitutional courts can do in order to push Germany towards a more constructive role. Now the third is about public opinion and very briefly before I conclude, I think the striking thing is that we've seen over the last couple of years quite a significant shift still under-appreciated in my view. Germany's always believed to be a solidly pro-European country, which is true and I think if you would do a whole referendum these days about in and out of any of this, there's no doubt which side would win. But the number of people who look more sceptically at the European Union is growing fast. Just to give you a few figures and I've sort of scanned sort of the latest polls before and after the summer. Now, just to give you a few ideas, those who believe that the euro itself is a good thing has really dropped to 50%. That's where we are in Germany. So if we are now, you know, there's strong belief, just, you know, those polls to me show if you see the trajectory of people, there was always a lot of scepticism when we had introduced the euro at the place. But there weren't, you know, the German people came around with the view that ultimately it must be a good thing, it will, you know, it secures the validity, et cetera, despite being very romantic with the D mark. But those who really know are very hostile towards the euro is growing at a very large rate. Now, the majority of Germans, a clear majority, favours Greece leaving the euro. That's in contrast, I agree with the politicians who've come around the view that it might be better Greece keeping inside the euro, but a large majority in Germany wants Greece to leave the European Union. That is until today. Another large majority of Germans also are very, very against any further rescue programmes. You only find 20, 25% of Germans who are willing to engage in a discussion about further rescue operations in the pursuit of rescuing the euro. Another majority, I think 55%, wanted the Constitution Court to strike down the ESM. There were a lot of polls around there. What should happen? What should the Constitution Court say? A large majority wanted it to strike it down completely and very much in favour of the lawsuit against the ESM. And if you look at further integrations, even more pessimistic, you know, two thirds are solidly against any sort of further integrationist measure. If you ask them about something like the United States of Europe, you know, almost three-quarter of Germans are fiercely against it. So you see, Germany bait has hit a particular wall. It is still, in my view, a solidly pro-European countries on the fundamental big questions. But it gets more and more difficult to convince the German public to go down the route which some believe is required to rescue the euro. So this triangle really holds back Angela Merkel, the German government. I do think it holds back any government regardless of whether the SPD will come into play or not. Economic ideology, which is very widespread in the ranks of the German ministries, the Bundesbank, et cetera. This constitutionalism which strives to debate and tries to strengthen the parliamentary democracy, which is unravelling, and a rise in German Euroscepticism. Let me conclude by just one thing, which is... And again, I'm sorry, it's more gloom, I have to say, but I think it's the other interesting factor in the German debate, which is before the opposition inside Germany was very much on the populist side. It was driven by the built side, on the back of this narrative of the lazy Greeks, et cetera. And sometimes the FTP, the Liberals, tried to play with it really in a form of desperation because it was so low on the pulse. But what we've seen over the last two years, is that opposition has basically over-softened on the populist front. The FTP has come around firmly pro-European. The built side is surprisingly soft on many issues. But has now reached the establishment. And there are two sort of emblematic figures who really carry sort of the torch of Euroscepticism in Germany. It was a very big potential to cause a stare. And they are, of course, the two familiar figures, Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann, and one of Germany's renowned economist Hans Wernersen. Weidmann, very vocal on inflation, on his opposition to any debt monetisation whatsoever. And Hans Wernersen, very strongly on the problems within the Europe clearing system, the target two system, all the claims that the German Bundesbank has accumulated vis-à-vis the debtor countries, reaching, I think, something in the region of one billion euros, which I see instead of in danger if the euro unravels. As a result of this, Germany becoming more and more blackmailed when we had the summit with Maria Monty trying to extrapolate a few agreements, concession from Angela Merkel. It was very much seen these terms, Monty just in a better position to blackmail Germany because of these imbalances in the target two system. So the biggest danger these days in Germany is really that we have moved from a general consensus about more Europe and pro-integration to a situation where polarization needs to be expected, polarization between and within the establishments. Angela Merkel now, of course, trying to steer away from it, trying to be as cautious as possible, using the ECB as much as possible as a backup but not going any further. But she doesn't know how to avoid this polarization and these two outspoken figure, the Bundesbank president and this economist, to really steer a debate within Germany which will, over the next couple of years, make an impact. And we've got in one year's time as my last sentence an election where I think the European dimension will play out quite forcefully. I don't think the opponents to any further integration are yet sufficiently organised. So we will see a basically pre-European result but we shouldn't kid ourselves that this is only the beginning of a German discourse and debate where polarization might increase and the political system cannot be unaffected in the long run. Thank you so much.