 Well, good evening. My name is Steve Sen. I'm the director of the Sours China Institute. First of all, let me extend a very warm welcome to you all on behalf of Sours to the China Institute's annual China debate. And of course, the year now is 2019. 2019 is a year of anniversaries for China. As you know, it's, of course, the centenary year of the May 4 movement. It's the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It's the 60th anniversary of the Lushan Conference. It was at the Lushan Conference that reaffirmed the great leap forward, which would result in the death of over 40 million people by starvation. It's also the 50th anniversary of the 9th Party Congress. Why do I mention the 9th Party Congress? Because it was there and then that the Communist Party of China incorporated Chairman Mao's theory of continuous revolution into the party constitution, something that we will find rather quaint today, but it did happen. It's also the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Spring and the subsequent military crackdown around Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. And if I may be a bit cheeky, may I also add that it is the first anniversary of a major event last year. That's when Xi Jinping became leader for life in China. And don't forget the last time there was a president for life in China and that was Ren Shikai, which happened about a century ago. The focus of the debate today is on whether China's rise will be peaceful. The issue really affects us all because China is now very, very tightly integrated to the rest of the world. The entire global economy and the Chinese economy are so closely tied together. If China's rise should be less than peaceful, it will have a very significant implication for all of us. And of course, the issue of whether China's rise will be peaceful or not is something that Graham Ellison has talked a lot about in terms of the Thucydidus trap. But the comparison of the history of ancient Greece when the rise of Athens resulted in the response of Sparta and the competition that resulted in war is still applicable in the 21st century. I think it's a very big question that we need to ask. One fundamental difference is, of course, that we are in the nuclear age. The concept of mad, mutually assured destruction that prevented the Cold War from turning hot still applies. So the idea that's two major nuclear weapons days would necessarily goes to war because they are competing against each other is a question that we will need to address. And the concept of what is peaceful, I think, is also one that we need to think about in the digital age, in contrast to what we would take the words to mean in the kinetic age, when it was straightforward and simple. Now, if a major rising powers today can simply deploy or demonstrate the existence of overwhelming force with its neighbors and persuade its neighbors to just do what it wants to be done, would that rise be peaceful or would that be considered as non-peaceful? I put it to you that amongst you here, different people will have different views on the subject. I don't think there is one simple straightforward answer to it. And that's the reason why for this particular, for our debate, I would prefer that we don't actually follow the binary Oxford Union's type of fall or against the motions type of debate. The subject is much too complex, much too nuanced for us to do so. We force our panelists to simply speak for the motions or against the motions. We might well generate more heat than insight and light. And hopefully with the weight we have, encouraging our panelists to discuss it, taking into account the many different shades of great, we will have a much more interesting debate. And for this debate, I have the pleasure to present to you a very distinguished panel indeed. They consist of some of the most thoughtful and insightful scholars from China, the United States, and, of course, the United Kingdom. I will encourage them to debate among themselves. And then I will open the debate to everyone in the lecture theater. So I shall try to make sure that there will be plenty of time for everyone to get engaged in. The order of the panelists speaking will be, first of all, Professor Feng Zhu. Professor Zhu is the executive director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea and of the Institute of International Relations, both at Nanjing University. He's also a senior research fellow at the China Institute of Peace and Development. Feng was educated at Peking University, where he taught previously. The second panelist to speak will be Evan Mediorost. Evan is the Pena family professor in Asian studies at Georgetown University. Before Georgetown, he had a very distinguished career in public service, and I'm not going to list a very long list of public offices he held. I would just like to highlight that he served, for example, as a senior director for Asia at the National Security Council and also as special assistant to President Obama in the position of which he was President Obama's senior advisor on China policy. Evan was educated at Bayes College, the LSE, and most important of all, Saurus. Welcome back. The third speaker will be Catherine Morton. Catherine is the professor of China's International Relations at the University of Sheffield and also an associate fellow at the energy, environment, and resources program at the Chatham House. Before Sheffield, Cathy served as the associate dean for research at the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She was educated at SUC6 and also the ANU. The last and most emphatically not least speaker is David Mike Lampton. Professor Lampton holds the Hyman chair, and he is also the director emeritus of Chinese studies at Johns Hopkins University. And since January this year, he's also taken on the road as the Oxenburg roadland fellow at the Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University in the sunny state of California. Mike was educated at Stanford University and also a recipient of many honors. Let me remind you that this event will be filmed and it will be put on podcast. If you really do not want to be filmed, let one of our children help us note we try to sit you in some place that is out of the camera. Now if you have not done so, may I request you to put your mobile phone not off but on silent. You are, in fact, encouraged not to put your phone off because we'd like to encourage you to use social media to share your thoughts on the debate. And I think the handles should be on the screens there. Now let's start the China debate. So over to you, Professor Zhu. OK, thank you, Steve, for your current invitation. It's my big pleasure coming and enjoying this very distinguished panelist for such a very timely theme, China's Rise of Peace for Not. My answer is very simple. So my answer goes this way. By asking another question, is there any possibility China's rise could be non-peaceful? My answer is no. I virtually know. There's no way China's rise could be non-peaceful. I think the international relations theory and the history both very, very powerfully tell if our power would like to try some sort of with a non-peaceful policy, it should be based on three very primary factors. One is its military capability could be some sort of, we say, peer competitor to the dominant power. But we see, yes, China's spending a lot of money in military modernization. But where in China could be some sort of a peer competitor from the US? I see almost there no way. Even there is some sort of silver lining. China could just catch up. But then I see, for example, US's global gravity of the Technology Innovation Center. Then was the US's military and industrial complex. It couldn't be just overwhelmed by any competitors. Then if you look at the Chinese newly armed Navy and Air Force, I have to say, yes, in terms of their equipments, it's some sort of a very impressive. But in terms of their combative capability, it should remain largely nascent. So what kind of the ground the China could race on to come after the US become a peer military competitor? My answer is, there's no way at all. Their second factor is also very clear cut. That means China also could just form a strong alliance behind China. If we're just trying to try such a non-peaceful attempt to change some sort of a power redistribution international system, then such a formulation of the online system is absolutely required. But the question is, is there any power would like to outline China? The UK would like to disband your special relations from the US and the shift over to China for strategic re-aligns? Or I'll say, it's absolutely no. Then we can also search another candidates for them, Japan, Korean, all the China's neighbors. Then you're asking them question. You want to just say, re-align with China? There I'll say, it's absolutely no. Yes, a couple of countries would like to align China. Iran, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and even in North Korea. We only have one alliance. It's a North Korea. But if you read the Chinese newspaper, there's no such a mentioning. DPRK now remain some sort of online to China. So without some sort of a strong formulation of online system, China should just the better with a shy way from some sort of any thinking about non-peaceful option. The third factor is also, I think, is inevitable. That means there is some sort of strong assurance of domestic coherence. All the Chinese would like to cost us their life for the highly and wholly enterprises of their national defense. But look at today's China. I think a leading challenge for my country is unfinished domestic transition. That means we're not, just how I say, transform ourselves by successful democratization. It's a leading, I think, short hands of my country in terms of such a power transition. That means the leading restraint to the China's futures, some sort of capability projecting is domestic, is not international. So when China could get through such a democracy, we say, center the domestic transition, no answer yet. But unless China could successfully running through such a re-democratization, we say, center the transition. China always being a vulnerable power. So then my conclusion is very clear cut. Without such a re-emergence of three key factors, don't think through any options for my country to come after non-peaceful re-emergency. On contrary, the leading fear for my country is preemptive breakdown by predominant power. That fear is legitimate and also very existential. So then, yes, my country also have to, just how they get some sort of military spending increasing. And we say, add it to the China's strategic space to maneuver vis-à-vis some sort of American supremacy and some sort of such a big online system. But it definitely means China will be left any option for non-peaceful rise. OK. Thank you very much, Professor Zhu. Let me move on and ask Evan to make these opening remarks. And also, let me encourage other panelists that after one of your colleagues have spoken, and if there is something that you really want to challenge him or her on, feel free to do so. Evan. Thank you. Thank you very much, Steve. And thanks to all of you for coming tonight. I'm a very proud graduate of SOAS. So it's a particular personal pleasure for me to be back here today. And Steve, I want you to know that I'm convinced that it was my SOAS degree that got me the White House job with Obama in 2009. Of course. So who knows? We may have a future Senior China Advisor for the US, UK, Singapore government in the room someplace. So the question before us today is, will China's rise be peaceful? And the answer to that question is profoundly important. It's essentially the central challenge facing the current international system. Because it goes to the issue of what's going to be the future shape of the international order, and specifically the relative distribution of power among the existing actors in the international system. And the answer to this question, will China's rise be peaceful, touches on the big issues of international affairs, global governance, economic prosperity and stability, and ultimately war and peace. So will China's rise be peaceful? And my answer is no, and it's already quite problematic. Let me give you three reasons why. Number one, China is at best ambivalent about the current international system. And it will actively seek, and in fact, it's already actively seeking to change certain attributes of the international system that suit its interests. Now I don't believe China is a disruptive, revisionist international state. It's not the Soviet Union version 2.0, but it's clearly a dissatisfied power that doesn't like some aspects of the current international order. And in certain areas, as its power and capabilities has grown, it is sought to undermine some aspects of that system. But here's the challenge. In analyzing China's international behavior, China has one foot in and one foot out side of the current international system. Those dimensions of the current international order rules, norms, and institutions that it likes and serves its interests. It actively participates in, supports them, and then even does creative and interesting things like pursuing the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. But it clearly wants to change those aspects of the international system that it believes doesn't serve its security and its economic interests. And it's those areas that, in many ways, have already made China's rise not a peaceful phenomenon. For example, China's views on the issue of unclossed, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and how China has pursued its interests in the South China Sea by building up these seven reclaimed features and gradually, incrementally militarizing them, including violating a commitment that Xi Jinping made to Barack Obama in the Rose Garden of the White House during his state visit in 2015. Number two, the issue of Taiwan and the way in which China uses a mix of economic and military coercion to create an environment conducive to its interests on Taiwan. Number three, alliances. China is clearly uncomfortable with US alliances and calls them relics of the Cold War, forgetting the fact that the ultimate example of Cold War logic is the normalization of US-China relations, two powers getting together to balance the Soviet Union, the US dollar. China is profoundly uncomfortable with the US dollar, the predominance of the US dollar in the international financial system, and it's discomfort with the dollar that has really driven the strategy of remedy internationalization, a strategy that hasn't gained enormous momentum in my assessment, but nonetheless reflects the fact that China seeks to apply its strategy of democracy in international relations to international finance as well, and then, of course, on broader economic questions, rules and norms related to trade and investment. China increasingly in recent years has pursued mercantilist economic practices at home, Xi Jinping in recent years has doubled down on state-directed development strategies and externally the use of economic coercion against countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Norway, et cetera. And last, but certainly not least, the issues of basic UN norms on human rights, which China has signed up to, but is not living up to in its practices, and say no more than, you know, if you're a Uyghur living in Xinjiang, I don't think you feel like China's rise is a particularly peaceful phenomena. Point number two, the US-China relationship is only becoming more competitive and the risk of confrontation is growing. So regardless of China's intentions, the interaction between the United States and China is becoming more competitive, which increases the risk of competition. The sources of competition between the United States and China are broadening and intensifying. While security competition and economic competition has always been a part of the US-China relationship, they're intensifying. Now we add to that competition on questions of technology and potentially even ideology. Many Americans are asking the question, what does it mean when China advocates the China alternative, right? A different form of economic and political governance that Xi Jinping put forth in his speech at the 19th Party Congress. Is China now getting involved in interfering in the domestic politics of countries, New Zealand and Australia? Number two, US views on China are hardening in a fairly enduring manner. This is not just the increasing tensions in the US-China relationship are not a Trump phenomenon. They are a structural phenomenon. Many in the United States, across political parties, across the defense establishment, the economic establishment, the educational establishment, the US no longer sees China as sort of a transitional state whose interests may eventually converge with American interests and values. But in fact, labor, business, finance, civil society, the diplomatic community, certainly the American defense community have broad-ranging concerns about Chinese behavior. And look at the US political establishment, the US Congress. They're growing increasingly concerned about a broad range of Chinese behaviors in the security area and economic areas and questions of political interference as well. And importantly, this is not the growing tensions in the US-China relationship are not just an issue of perceptions and competing narratives. Rather, it may very well be differing views of economic, political, and international governance. As China's capabilities expand, its intentions seem to be evolving as well. And this sort of growing competition and risk of confrontation between the United States and China is not just localized to the US-China relationship, though that's probably the best example of it globally, but it now applies to the EU. Look at the recent statements and actions by the EU as an institution, but also key member states like France and Germany in recent weeks and months. And then lastly, the buffers and stabilizers in the US-China relationship are weakening, which only increases the risk of confrontation and competition. And then my third and final point is the way in which China defines its interests and the way it pursues its interests as the CCP seeks to stay in power are more likely to diverge with current international rules, norms, and institutions than they are to converge. Look at Daibingua's article in 2010, the Chinese White Paper on Peaceful Rise in 2011, they basically identify three different interests of China, maintaining CCP rule and social stability, number two, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and reunification, and three, economic and social development. Those are all valid, understandable interests, but the way in which China is pursuing each one of these is drawing a stark contrast with prevailing rules, norms, and institutions internationally and particular with the United States. And as Xi Jinping pursues a sort of Chinese nationalism, almost a Chinese essentialism at home, it's drawing an even greater contrast with prevailing rules, norms, and institutions. So I think lastly, and to finish up, I think what the international community needs to see to determine definitively whether or not the China's rise will be peaceful is whether or not China as a rising power is prepared to do what past rising powers have done, which is to offer some signals of strategic reassurance. In other words, I'm gonna put my short-term interest aside for the sake of systemic stability on economic questions, on security questions, that China is going to commit to sustaining rules, norms, and institutions from which many states overall benefit, even if that means that it constrains China's interest over the short term. And it could very easily start by adopting a degree of restraint over its behavior in the South China Sea, and domestically at home begin to internalize some of its commitments related to trade and investment liberalization as opposed to doubling down on mercantilist economic policies, state-directed development, and importantly, adhering more to its commitments under the World Trade Organization. I don't believe confrontation between China and the rest of the world is inevitable, and it's certainly not inevitable between the United States and China. But as China pursues its interests, especially using more coercive tools, the risks of China's rise being not peaceful exist today and they're only rising. As an American, of course, I pay a lot of attention, predominant attention to the US-China relationship. And the US and China are not natural partners, but they're not inevitable enemies either. Thank you. Thank you very much, Evans. It's wonderful to see two very strong views being clearly articulated. Let me hand over to Cathy, Professor Morton, and hear her views on this subject, and then I'll come back and perhaps encourage a robust discussion on these two contrasting views. Thank you very much, Steve. It's a real pleasure to be here, and thank you all very much for coming. This is gonna sound like we've all conferred beforehand, but I promise you haven't. Guess what I sit in between? I'm in the gray zone over this question, but I have to say that I've also changed my mind. Quite recently, and I'm becoming more pessimistic. I'm becoming more pessimistic because I think that China's emergence as a global power in the world, not a regional power anymore, but as a global power, is gonna lead to more tensions, and low-level conflicts, yes, most definitely. Because there are sharpening divides over national security, and also there are now, I think, much more contestation over what constitutes a level playing field in the economic realm. And of course, we all know in international relations that economic interdependence plays that role of mitigating tensions when they build up strategically. So it's really that nexus between security and economics, I think, is where I sit, if you like, in this gray zone over whether China's rise will be peaceful. The other point to make is that perhaps I have a different concept of power because for me, power is quintessentially social. It's a social phenomenon. And on that basis, any state can stand up and say that their intentions are peaceful. The question is whether other states will also view those intentions to be peaceful. So this question of legitimacy, I think, gets right at the heart of really what Evan was saying about this contestation taking place over order, order today, but also what the future order is going to look like. So it's the social dynamics which are also making me more feel more pessimistic in international relations in general, but specifically when it comes to the United States and China. I also have my three points as to why I'm becoming more pessimistic. The first, I'm only gonna talk to very lightly because Evan has already spoken about this which is essentially this build up of competition across all realms, diplomatic economic security when it comes to US-China relations and particularly the concerns over the economic, the breakdown on the economic side and the fact that economic incentives are no longer adequate to stabilize the relationship. I would just perhaps make one further point that it seems to me what is lacking in the relationship today is a common strategic purpose. What really, in the very big sense, holds these two powers together in the similar ways to why they came together in the first place in terms of normalizing relations against a common threat, i.e. sort of deterring against the Soviet Union. Now, if that big common strategic purpose is the rules-based international order, then I think it is going to be very difficult navigating some of this terrain. The second point I'd like to make is that there is this, particularly at the regional level, we're seeing this growing divergence between a US-led international order and what is increasingly becoming more defined as China's grand strategy of national rejuvenation. Of course, this is now very clear in terms of Xi Jinping declaring that China's ambition is to become a global power by 2049. And that, of course, is also stirring up fears of more military competition, not so much in the traditional sense, but again, because of this fusion, if you like, between the civil and the military domains, particularly being exacerbated by digital technologies. And at a time when the rules themselves are still in the making, I think it's very important when we talk about contestation over international rules and norms to be clear that we still have spaces in international relations that are relatively ungoverned. And the digital economy and cybersecurity are two very good examples of that. And it seems to me that what's happening in terms of that build up of competition between the United States and China is a real manifestation of that. Third, and this I say sort of slightly more tentatively, it seems to me, and I'd be really interested to hear what others on the panel think about this, it seems to me that to date there's been a global consensus, and this is beyond the US and China, there's been a global consensus that China's reform and opening up to the world has been beneficial, beyond China. It's generated multiple benefits. Now there's a risk, and I'll just say it's just a risk, that that global consensus could start to break down, could start to become more fragile. That is a problem I see for China today. Now we see it with the Belt and Road Initiative. We all know that the Belt and Road Initiative is generating risks as well as it's generating opportunities. Now there is a possibility there for a realignment, there's a possibility for learning to take place, for more constructive engagement, for lessons to be learned. So it's not just a negative, that could become a positive. And we know there's been discussions here in the UK as well about what kind of cooperation is needed to make sure that we can, if you like, reboot that global consensus, that what's happening in terms of China's grand strategy of national rejuvenation is not just for China, it genuinely is for China and the world. But at the moment I think we're still at a very low level of cooperative engagement around that issue. And it's becoming further exacerbated by what has all been said about China's emergence as a technological power. And that, as I said, again, is because the rules are still not clear, they're still in the making, because of the ambiguity between the civilian and the military realms over these technologies. And because without that kind of level of cooperation preexisting that can be drawn upon, then I think if you bring all of these things together, you can see why I'm in the gray zone and kind of starting to darken in my gray as the days go on and as I read the news. So I'm gonna leave it there. I think my, I guess, final point was if we see a way forward, then it would be, again, coming back to the table on the side of the United States and China, thinking and discussing what is that, what is the common strategic purpose on both sides? How can both sides benefit? How can other countries who are not the United States and China benefit? And also what needs to be done to ensure that we can both maintain and expand the current international rules-based order as in the digital age? I think you were spot on, Steve, when you said what does it mean to be peaceful in the digital age? Thank you. Thank you very much, Kathy, for your very thoughtful and well-calibrated thought. I think probably at this stage, move on to ask Mike, Professor Lamptons, to give us openings and then we will bring some of those issues back for discussions. Okay, well, thank you very much, Steve, for the invitation, thank you all for coming and I think what I'll have to say is not inconsistent with the center of gravity, but I think there'll be some distinct points of view that I'll express. I was struck when you mentioned this being the anniversary of the Lushan Plenum in 1959 and you mentioned the starvation that followed in China. But what I remember is Pengduai had the guts to stand up against Mao Zedong and say, you're a petty bourgeois fanaticist. That's what I remember and in a way, I can't help. What happened to him, Mike? No, no, but I'm just simply saying, I think we have to be now self-critical of our leadership in both countries. And I, so that'd be the first thing that I'd have to say there. Secondly, as to the main question, will China's rise be peaceful? I don't think kinetic warfare is certainly not impossible, but I think there are other dangers here. First of all, the relationship's becoming an increasingly deterrent relationship and so I think we're already involved in an arms race and cyber race that maybe isn't fully appreciated publicly. Secondly, I think we are in a struggle, so to speak, with China for dominance of the next year is technology, manufacturing, markets, and so forth. So there's gonna be a big aspect of industrial competition here. I think, so that's the first thing I would say is that I don't think force is inevitable. You can imagine it in Taiwan, you can imagine accidents and miscalculations in the East China Sea, South China Sea. But I think what we're looking toward is a future of much more deterrence, security dilemmas, arms races, industrial competition, and so forth. I think the global economic system will provide less than it could if it operated according to comparative advantage in the future, let's put it that way. Secondly, I think we have to acknowledge, I think, that China needs to do some major things. For its own welfare, not just to get along with the US. And certainly, I think getting back on an economic and modest, to be sure, a political reform track is absolutely essential to reassure its neighbors and the bigger powers. And so China's gotta make some big moves. And I don't want what I say about the US to be confused with not recognizing China's got some major things to do. Secondly, it has to reassure its neighbors. I'm doing a big project that involves seven Southeast Asian countries with respect to China. And all of them are sort of looking to hedge their bets with China, looking for reassurance. And I think China could provide that if it had the kind of policies and leadership that I think would do that. And finally, China's gotta be more reciprocal in its economic relations. And those are all big, big changes China's required. But what I wanna do is just in the couple of minutes that remained to me, recall that President Obama in about, Evan tells me 2015, 2016, I actually thought it was 2014, was on a plane in Asia. And somebody asked about management of international policy under, foreign policy under Obama. And he said, well, our first policy is to quit doing stupid stuff. That was the way he formulated, sort of the Hippocratic Oath of International Relations. And the point is that in the United States, we are beginning to discuss seriously in the public domain what I think are some really to be very delicate, unproductive lines of discussion and probably very damaging. And let me just tick off a four that are, I think by no means universal, but not in all cases have the Democrats entirely disassociated themselves with some of the more, what you might call economically protectionist measures. But first thing I think that is gaining currency is talking about economic decoupling in a sort of sense of dismantling global production chains. I mean, whatever you, there have been all sorts of inequalities that arise from the kind of division of labor that developed with globalization. But now people are seriously talking about dismantling and just decoupling and breaking down supply chains. I think that we ought to make it a more humane and equitable set of economic relations in the world, but not dismantle the idea of interdependence. And that discussion in the US has some alarming aspects. Secondly, I was just absolutely staggered when the head of policy plans in the US Department of State gives a speech in Washington DC and says it's the first time that we will have a great power competition that is not Caucasian. I mean, this is the head of policy plans in the US Department of State at a major think tank in Washington. I mean, this is truly amazing. Thirdly, I think we have to talk in the United States and it's identified with our director of FBI, Mr. Ray, but it's a broader and there, let me say, there is a problem of Chinese spies in the US. So I'm not saying there's a zero problem here, but he's essentially painted this as a whole of society threat that requires a whole of society response. And I can tell you that Americans of Chinese descent are really alarmed at this and the capacity for this to sort of become, as our president would say in another context, a witch hunt. So that's, finally, it seems to me that we've got an awful lot of, China I think's got a mercantilist policy, let's be clear, but the way our president speaks about trade in terms of simple trade balance and enhancing our surplus, reducing those of others is a mercantilist way of thinking about it. And we're going away from trade multilateralism to trade unilateralism. And I think the great achievements we've had is to try to put trade into a multilateralist framework of negotiation and dispute resolution. There've been problems, I'm not saying that, but we're going, it seems, the wrong way. So what I'm trying to do is say, yes, I would agree with Evan and I would agree with, I mean, I wish I could agree with my friend Zhu Feng. I think we are going in a more conflictual direction, but it is, in my view, and China has to do big things, but let's remember there's another hand, it is not just one hand clapping here, it's the United States is involved and I think we need to really figure out what our first principles are. In other words, it's not just China that has to figure out where it's going. Thank you. Thank you, Mike, for your very, again, thoughtful and actually very constructive approach to how to see the relationship between China and US being moved forward and perhaps China's relationship with the wider world as well. Let me go back to Zhu Feng first, to see what your responses would be to some of the key arguments being put from the other side. Is China changing the international order? Is China's policy, whether it's intentional or unintentional, causing alarms in China's, among China's neighbors? Is China's policy helping those really extreme people in places like the United States coming up with views that takes Chinese community in the United States as a whole? Is China responsible for any of these? Can China do something about it? What's your take on it? Okay, good questions. I really enjoyed panelists' comments and presentation. I think my country, of course, problematic because nothing is perfect. On the other hand, you also can see so how much time China just spent and it becomes some sort of a very shining rising power. It's just a four-day case. I can tell you, I got in at a minute into the Peking University in 1981. Then I used the coupon for food, for clothes, for everything. I was not stopped, but I was angry. But today, you can see China is well developed in some sort of coastal areas. So then my prescription is because China's rise just to come through some sort of a such a very, very rapid speed. Then now the Chinese governments and Chinese society also just come across some sort of, my laboring is speed has. I mean, it's a little bit dizzy because we're driving so, so fast. So if it's just happening, then don't just the house I always expect. The China could just the house I put everything in place and the China could project. Well, you know, the policy agendas in some sort of a very perfect way. My theory, to be honest, China largely is the adolescent power. You can imagine how big, how distinctive China's transition has been in the past four decades. So it's some sort of speed with a dash. It's really, really produced a lot of, it seemed to me, confusion in somehow is inconsistency. But it definitely by no mean, my country is we say some sort of revisionist power. I think a leading task force for my country, as I mentioned, is still scammering to come through the China's unfinished, the domestic transitions. I think that will assure China for some sort of a lasting, bright future. I think it's a consensus. But the problem is, as I mentioned, so China is highly polarized today. Then we'll see by nature, China's transformative power, all such a sense put together. I see my country somehow acting in smartly. And even we say a little bit, you know, leave a lot of a mess. But how what, how such a sense? Well, completely redefined China in the eyes of the US and the West. No, I disagree. So then from this point, I see the United States still serve a very important driving force for my country's innovation. For example, Trump's trade, you know, war. Yes, of course, cause a lot of irritation in my country. But partly it's rarely serve as a wake up call to China. We're considered, we should recognize when the China just a house that emerges so fast, how international community will be responding. Then the China's international environments will be more challenging and the more strategic, we say such a straining German. Then when the US hit him back, I think it's also very spontaneous. So I also published the Chinese OPED and just trying to warn my people. That's no way, that's useless. Just a crying over spilled milk. Today there's a lot of, you know, Chinese complaint. Why US, just how they changed its policy course so dramatically and so quickly? The reason is, I think the power transition now is on the way. So then US is overwhelmingly cautious off some sort of a security consequences of the China's commercial technological developments and advancement. Five years ago, no one can imagine the Huawei and OPPOS, you know, cell phone market share were surpassed Apple. Five years ago, no one imagined the Huawei will be taking a cutting age in 5G, we say, some sort of a development. But now it's become some sort of a reality. So I totally understand, American concern is adversely strategic and security driven, but the problem is, don't just demonize the China all the way because my country have 1.4 billion people that want to have a better off. They deserve a better off in coming days. Yeah. Now, I'm very mindful that I promise you that I will allow for a good bit of time for you to join the debate. I will try to keep to that promise. But before I do so, let me just ask the other three panelists. Are you reassured? Are you changing your mind after what Professor Zhu has spoken so eloquently? This time I do it in reverse order. So I actually go for Mike first and then Kathy and finally to you, Evan. Well, I think the thing that I would take away is that, which is what I've always believed is China's a very diverse place with a lot of different people, with different views. And there is a big constituency in China for a more positive direction reform in both its market sense and its intellectual democratic sense put it that way. So I think there is a constituency for China among the things that we would want. You know, I think the problem is that Xi Jinping to me looks like he's not as strong as he needs to be if he even had the inclination to push in a more positive, from our point of view, direction. I think he's acting like a scared leader very worried about both his personal security and worried about system security. And one of his first acts was to create a national security commission. And it wasn't the Chinese version of the National Security Council in Washington. It was truly to prevent subversion at home and linkage with outside subverting forces. So I think that in a way what you have is there's a sort of pretense of a strong leader, but underneath, I think it's gonna be a problem moving in a decisive positive direction in a sense because he isn't as strong as he needs to be in a way politically. But I think there's the possibility for positive change in China. Thank you, Mike, it's good to hear that. I think it's interesting to hear that you think Xi Jinping is not strong enough. And of course, the implication is that if he's strong enough, he will do the right things and the rest of the world will have not much to worry about. Let me correct that. I said I didn't think he had the proclivities either, but it is gonna take a strong leader to move against the accumulation of vested interests in China. Now we may have a weak leader that's inclined to move the wrong direction. Okay, Cathy, have you been reassured by Professor Zhu? I've been reminded of two things. One is the importance of empathy and international relations, foreign policy. And two is just this ongoing kind of insecurity complex within the Chinese mindset. And the interesting question is, what is it gonna take to move on from that? Because after four decades of opening and reform, you would not expect a continuing, when does the adolescent become an adult? And so it seems to me one of the problems is that where China is at the moment is that it's an inward looking emerging global power. And that's the problem. And that's the problem in terms of trying to, I guess read some of these social dynamics. We have a lot of discussion in touch relations about being a responsible great power, right? A responsible global power. So yes, of course, there is responsibility first and foremost to the Chinese people. Yes, well understood. But at what stage does the shift take place? Where by China kind of looks outwards to the world and thinks, okay, there's responsibility also. For example, what's happening with some of the Belt and Road Initiative project? For example, the debt builder that's taking place in various countries. So that would be my response. Thank you. Sounds like a very diplomatic polite way to say that the jury's out. Evan. Well, thank you to Zhu Feng, Mike, and Kathy. I think the debate is shaping up very, very nicely. And Zhu Feng is a very articulate advocate of the Chinese perspective. But like Kathy, how long are we going to call China an adolescent? The reform and opening period is now 40 years old. So is this a 40 year old adolescent living at home with its parents? On this question of sort of China's engagement with the international community, Professor Zhu paints this picture of a developing country simply focused on feeding its people. And it's sort of having all these things done to it by other countries. But the kinds of policies that we're talking about today in debating China's peaceful rise, these are all proactive, deliberate policy decisions largely on the part of Xi Jinping since he came to power. Nobody forced China to deploy in ADIS in the South China Sea. Nobody forced Xi Jinping to double down on state-directed development policies by creating the new bay area where the shang'an development area outside of Beijing. Nobody forced China to articulate made in China 2025, through which it was going to pursue industrial policies to dominate a key variety of tech sectors. Nobody forced China to militarize the South China Sea by creating these seven artificial features and building up the military. So in some sense, these are all proactive, deliberate policies on the part of the Chinese government. The challenge is the rest of the world is wondering sort of to what end? What, how does China think about rules, norms, and institutions? Does it fully buy into the sort of rules-based system from which it has benefited substantially? And so to Ju Feng's very perceptive question about what explains this change in U.S. thinking, the change has less to do in my assessment with relative capabilities. And it has more to do with an accumulating number of data points that American policymakers realize, suggested China in fact was going in a very different direction than we had expected. I mean, I can tell you, I joined the White House in 2009. The Chinese had a fantastic opportunity with President Barack Obama to begin forging a sort of, you know, a relationship based on mutual interests in which there would be give and take on both sides. But in fact, what you saw was sort of every initiative we, almost every initiative we put on the table faced difficulty and resistance, especially on the economic front. So the sort of, the point at which we're at today with the trade war is a result of an accumulation of frustration, not just on the part of the government, but the American business community whose market share, whose intellectual property was constantly, gradually, incrementally being compromised by Chinese-owned government policies at home. So it's not as if American leaders woke up one day and said the gap between us is really narrow, far narrower than we had expected, so now we have to compete. It's rather, what we saw was a series of policy decisions, economic policy decisions, security policy decisions, you know, behavior not just in East Asia, but globally that suggested that not only the way China defines its interests as a rising power, but the way it pursues its interests are increasingly inimical to those of the United States and to a broader global order that had been created post-World War II. And let me point out, in making these arguments, this in no way sort of excuses bad behavior on the part of the United States. I completely agree with Mike Lampden. There are plenty of things that the United States has done, but we're not talking about the United States today, right? The resolution is, will China's rise be peaceful? We're talking about China. And yes, there are absolutely elements of US policy that are revisionist, arguably more revisionist than China. But again, this is not about the United States. And criticizing China is not as sort of, you know, as an American suggesting that America is blameless in this phenomena. But when we're talking about this question of will China's rise be peaceful, if China continues to define its interests and pursue them in ways that create divergence more than convergence, not just with the United States, but with the EU, other major powers in East Asia, it's very likely that confrontation will result at some point. Thank you very much, Evan, very clearly articulated. From, let me give you a chance to make a brief response and then I'll open this to the floor unless the other panelists have a dying point to make. The one issue that I would particularly like you to address is the question that being put again and again is China buying into the rule-based international order? So much has been said that China is not. What is your take? Okay, yeah, first of all, I think, as I mentioned, China is in transition. Most important factor to, we say, reflects the transition is, don't force me too much critical to the Chinese leadership. Otherwise, my job and my own self will be in risk. But fortunately, so I think it's an international occasion I'll just talk in English. So then I see some sort of two leading shaheans with this government in Beijing. One is a really, really on the estimate, some sort of such a very complicating effects out of their overconfidence. So I think like Evan's, there's a lot of things. To be honest, I'm very agreeable, for example. So island reclamation, we're almost to get it just the house unfolding on the seven rocks and ice lights. Is that necessary? On other hands, how much money we spend? Then it is just the house I really could, just a bigger addition to reinforce the China's military posture in Western Pacific. No, before the American specific freeze and air force, such a reclaimed or reconstructed islands and the military force, it just looks like sitting dock, easy to destroy. But psychologically and politically, does this government feel satisfied? Because we're slowing away, we're fracturing our muscle and they're showing our confidence. But I promise, what's the real effects? Second, I think it's also very telling evidence. Better to load initiative. Yeah, from the beginning, I was one of the minority who is very critical to this concept because looking back past the 400 years, every time a bigger power just initiates the overseas commercial expansion, it will suffer, suffer what? Suffer from other powers hitting back by security and political recalculation. But this government is really little bit on estimates. It's a real, some sort of very sterling effects. So then, as I mentioned, yes, China's 40 years old reformer, but still very adolescent. Because they're still for shut off, very, we say, sharp and trustable and operable international visions. To be a scholar of IR, I really over-worried. And I promise, what's the exit? As I mentioned, we need a very expectable action and reaction cycle between the China and the US because in the past four decades, there's no power, which is so illuminating my country for redirection to some sort of a sound of face, a sound of destination. But now, the US is retreating. The US is saying, you're a bad guy. I have to punch you. On the other side, I also see American National Security Machine. Now he's crunching on against the China. Even if you read the New York Times article on the April 17th, I become unmatched sided because I suffer from the visa revocation from the FBI. The reason is they steal the mail of a spy from my body. I got shocked. But I have to say, I'm just victimized by some sort of a deterioration of bilateral relations. Now the US National Security Machine is crunching on vis-a-vis China. How we can face that? So another very, very negative signal is there is a resurging of new Maccassism. A lot of the complaints about China's infiltration of two inter-American universities and colleges, then such a sense will be fair. The older society approach is really vis-a-vis China's, we say, first of all, Caucasian competitor. So all such a sense, also just how I say, constant big question marks. We need to think through. Thank you very much, Professor Zhu. I'll open this to the floor. Please raise your hands, catch my eye, and then wait for the microphone to come to you. And please keep your question or comment very brief and to only one question or one comment only so that other people will have a chance to do so. I think the lady there is the first hands that I have seen, yes, right here. Are there originally have two questions? If you could also say who you are first. I'm Janet, I'm a trivening scholar now studying in Ghostmouth and I have strong feelings when Zhu Fang is saying about this Caucasian versus Chinese because if he metaphors China as a adolescent, I feel like, because I'm from Hong Kong, I feel like Hong Kong is a child facing domestic violence seriously by China. So for example, like when I using the Chinese online platform, they always exclude Hong Kong as they overseas. And when they want to intervene our law criminal system, they say, Hong Kong is part of China. Like recently there is a very serious debate about the figurative offenders, whether Hong Kong is part of the ICCPR or contractors. So we only send criminals to countries or regions who are also side the ICCPR, but China try to intervene this and make a change the law so they can grab anybody from Hong Kong to China. So we have no say over our own rights. So for a more historical perspective in terms of the international relations, when China and British government in the Sino-British Joint Decorations promise Hong Kong people will have universal suffrage after 10 years, we turn to China. It doesn't happen. And after 20 years when Hong Kong people try to strive for their own rights, promised civil rights, the China government said the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which is a legal treaty registered in United Nations, they say it is not meaningful anymore. So I want to... Can we be a bit succinct so that other people will have a chance? Sure, sure. Yeah, and they are also using a lot of information warfare, psychological warfare on social media towards Hong Kong elections and politics. So I would like to hear all the panelists, their view towards this, because obviously I'm not a Caucasian and I'm a Chinese. I think we got a point. I think it's probably a primary for Professor Zhu. Maybe first and round after the question. So just you want me, immediate response? Yeah, that's a quick, short response and then we'll... Okay, thank you, Mr. Singh. Your question is really sharp and very important. Almost 25 years ago I did my post start to the Chinese U of Hong Kong. That kind of Hong Kong back to the 25 years ago was so impressive, much better than right now. So then I totally understand why you just feel, just pray so much. Now the problem is my answer is unless China could successfully or ultimately just running through domestic transition. There's a little bit, I think a slim hope for China, Hong Kong could be just treated in some sort of a way you just expected. So then I see Hong Kong's future is highly and coherently connected with China's domestic transition. So then let's put the hope on that historical progress, but now I think President Trump become some sort of reading compelling force to get China moving forward. So then I hope that things will be getting better. Thanks. Okay, let's go for a second round. Gentleman over there. Peter Humphrey. After that red hearing, Steve, I'd just like to come back to the central question here of this discussion, which is will China's rights be peaceful? I think we would be very naive to think that this question can be addressed only looking through the lens of US-China relationship and we need to look at other diplomatic relationships, geopolitical relationship. So I think there's like, actually I've got four elephants here in the room. One of them is... Just one question. It's only one question. One elephant is India. There's clearly a very tense relationship developing between India as a peer competitor. And another is Russia, where I think we're starting to see a more nuanced attitude from Russians towards China. We can't assume that their love fest will go on forever. And a third one is Japan. I think the relationship between Japan and China and the relationship between Japan and Russia are all going to be quite important. And Japan actually has a lot more to offer Russia than China has in some respects. And fourth elephant in the room is internal cohesion in the CCP. There is a spectrum of opinion in the CCP. We see it externally very superficially as a monolith of some sort. It isn't. And Chinese leadership changes don't happen through external interference. They happen through internal disagreement. So they're the four elephants. And I think all of those probably have some bearing on this question. I'd like to hear what you have to say about that. Thank you, Peter. I'm changing the way how I manage it because of the clocked not being my friend here. And ultimately I'm responsible to wind this up by half-past. I'll pick, say, two more questions and then I'll ask the panelists to respond. Yes, the gentleman there with the green. My name is Lawrence Wong. I'm a Marxist who stands on the shoulders of Chen Duzhou. So I want to make some observations, really, which is that today, China's rise has risen outside the American umbrella, whereas Germany and Japan's growth, they have grown underneath the American umbrella. So that explains so much of this conflict. My second observation is that the threat to Venezuela today... You reached the one point here. Yes, yes. My observation then, my question, is not from China. So, does the panel agree that... agree with Martin Wolf that the demands upon China from the American administration, he likened it to the modern, unequal treaties. It was written in the Financial Times. Okay. I'll pick one more question. Somebody from any month in the back. All right, we don't know... We'll go for that, but we don't usually go for students. Help us, sorry. But if we have time, we will, but we try to give others a chance first. Okay, my name is Yu Hao and I'm doing my Masters in International Migration and Public Policy at the LSE. Very quick question. I would like to ask the panel about the rise of Chinese nationalism, especially among the young people and what's the implication in regards to the future of the rise of China. Thank you. Okay, thank you. We have a few questions here on the table. And this time, I actually asked... I forgot to go first. I think I'll ask the others to pick the one that you would like to take on first. And I will ask the other panelist to try to take on some of the other questions. Mike? Well, all interesting questions. And just on the elephants in the room, Japan, I just would emphasize as a really problematic relationship that will have great bearing on where things go. But I want to do the unequal treaties and just say that if you look, the core demand that the Trump administration has or a part of the core demand, and I think it related to your made in China 2025 and all of that, is that essentially we want China to substantially do away with what I would call its broad approach to industrial policy. And I can understand why we do that. All right, well, it's both in our interest and in the interests of a more open trading and finance system. But if you look at the Chinese experience, and I've been studying the development of high-speed rail, in 2000, China had no high-speed rail industry to speak of. Through a concerted effort of mobilization of capital research resources, stealing intellectual property from the French, among others. But through a concerted national effort, it not only developed the technology, but build a national grid of four vertical and four horizontal train lines. And has an export industry that now may not be quite the quality of the Japanese, but it's moving forward very well. So China has had some accomplishments with its industrial policy. Civil nuclear power might be another and sees its future of high tech moving up the value chain to be doing this. So it seems to me, China's had a certain amount of success here and is, for many practical reasons, reluctant to give that up, so to speak. So I think in a way, you have to ask yourself, is the, have I characterized the US demand correctly? Maybe not. And is it reasonable to think China would completely buckle on this issue if they see at least some gains they've made? Cathy? Yeah, I think it's some, I guess the point I would like to make that if I'm not totally agreement on all the demands that are being made, but if the US is not making the demands, who will? So despite what anyone might think of what's going on on Twitter and Trump, et cetera, and whether the policy's been taken too far, the question is, who else would do that? And it seems to me, particularly because of China's, if we see China as having this insecurity complex, if we see it as being constantly vulnerable and therefore constantly feeling that it needs to be going high speed, catching up every day, then who is actually gonna come in and say, you know what, there are limits to that? That ambition needs to be bounded. Who's gonna do that? So I think that that's an important question. I wanna come to the question of nationalism because I think it's really, really important. And it gets to what we do in the universities. One of the problems is, I think, particularly in terms of the younger generation, is that we are not having enough discussions on China's peaceful rise around the sensitive topics. There's a lot, when we're in the classroom, there's a lot of reserve, I think, is the best way of saying that diplomatically on the part of students to be able to, and as well as professors and lecturers as well, I have to say, to be able to sort of have these open conversations about, say, human rights, Tibet, what's happening in Xinjiang, and to feel that you are in a space where you are reasonably secure in order to do that. I think that is really important. And education, I think, is right at the center of this discussion of, I could say more, but I think it's right at the center of this discussion on nationalism. Your point about us being very focused on the US and China, I agree with you. In some ways, it's not surprising, given the state of the relationship, given who we have, also the expertise here on the panel tonight. And also, it's a huge, complex question, and you're gonna have to do another session, I think. I'm sure we'll have to. So really go through and all of those, and I'll stop there, because I can see the timing is moving on. But again, the question of time, I think, unfortunately, hasn't allowed us to cover all of that. And particularly, I think, getting into the CCP, which gets into the anti-corruption campaign, which we've not talked about. But again, there's a whole list of things that we haven't said. Thank you. Evan. So I'll make a few points. On this question of sort of what's the right frame with which to view this question of China's peaceful rise. Obviously, the United States-China relationship is important. You could argue it's sort of the inclusive case. If China and the US are able to work it out, then that will have positive ripple effects. But that said, it's also important to look at this question of China's rise through its interactions with its periphery. So whether you go to New Delhi or you go to Tokyo, I don't think you're going to get a radically different view of China's rise than you would get in Washington. There will be differences. Some of them will be more nuanced than one another. But when you talk to Indian policymakers, what are they concerned about? They're concerned about aggressive Chinese actions on territorial issues. Look at the Doklam episode, right? I mean, during Xi Jinping's first visit to India, there was sort of a skirmish at the border that was supposedly meant to be addressed through rules of the road. And that only resulted in the big sort of border blow-up at Doklam. So India is becoming more concerned about China's rise, not less. And it's essentially the same thing in Tokyo. Tokyo remains very preoccupied with the security situation understandably in the East China Sea. And the China-Japan economic relationship is becoming more competitive. It's not becoming more complementary. And as frustrated as the Japanese may be with Trump, I think they are doing their best to maintain a certain stability in the US-Japan alliance because they understand the long-term economic and security challenge. When you look at China-Russia, it's sort of the other side of the coin. Because from a US perspective, the Russia-China relationship looks closer. And it looks closer not just in security terms, but in economic terms. And increasingly, there's sort of an ideological dimension to it in the sense of, for example, the Russian-Chinese visions of cyber sovereignty, sort of using digital technology, using standard setting as a way to promote a different way to manage internet governance and the degree to which the government would have control in internet governance. So that's only accentuating the degree to which it appears as if the sort of governance divide, and you could call it the ideological divide, between China-Russia and others is growing. So I agree very much that it's important to look at this question from the perspective of other countries, but it's not necessarily reassuring on this question of will China's rise be peaceful. But let me be very clear. China's rise need not be an unpeaceful phenomena. International relations is not physics in the sense that there's no laws of thermodynamics in international relations, but rather personal agency matters enormously. So if the Chinese leadership sort of, I think if they begin to reflect and understand the concern, the pushback, the resistance that's being generated by their policies, there is the possibility that they will adapt and change. I personally was encouraged by Xi Jinping's speech at the Belt and Road Forum, where he seemed to reflect criticism in concerns of others that were then validated by people like Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, who said they're working with the Chinese government and BRI to improve the debt sustainability related to Chinese lending. So there's absolutely that possibility for sort of learning and adapting. The question is how much pushback, how much resistance does there have to be before the Chinese government appreciates and understands the concerns of the international community? I can tell you in the United States, the way the debate has evolved under Trump is that the Obama administration tried the diplomatic approach, and what it got was an ADIZ in the East China Sea, seven quasi-military bases in the South China Sea and really no productive change on the economic agenda. So Trump comes in and says, well, they tried the diplomatic approach, now I'm going to try the confrontational approach. It clearly got Beijing's attention whether or not it will result in a productive deal that produces long-term stability and addresses American concerns about reciprocity, market access, I think still remains an open question. But America is very much debating these questions about how to work most productively with China because whether or not diplomacy and negotiation absent the threat of kind of sanctions or other punitive measures remains very much an open question. Thank you very much, Evans. Phone, you will have the last word at this debate. Feel free to either address some of the questions being raised or some of the comments that the panelists have shared with us. In particular, I think if you could address what I think Evan has ended in terms of that by the more positive note, that would be really helpful. Yeah, I think like Evan is very, very soft about some sort of such a working secondary level of the power competition in the region. Of course, it's a big concern to Chinese as well. But the problem is if you look at China in there, so we're a neighbor for more than 2,000 years, our wages, the hats, the one tentative, broad military conflict between 1962. So most of the time in history, both powers always just stay in peace. The reason is very simple. The Everest mountain just sitting in between. That kind of geopartics doesn't change anymore. Then China, Japan. Yes, I think that Japan is very traditionally typically the maritime power. China is continental power. So some sort of tricky dimension of the Chinese transition is Chinese leadership just trying to show the Chinese new aspiration we should be maritime power either. Then you raise the Japan's concern. But the problem is if we look back to 2,000 years, China-Japan relations were just the 42 wars very intensely just between 1895 and in 1945. The reason is China was suddenly just getting very weak. Today when China is reemerging, then some sort of a war sparks will also well be just to completely mislead the China-Japan relations. History usually is a very interesting analogy. East Asia, in terms of geostrategic landscape, is completely different from Europe. So I always a very sincere learner from the European history. But the problem is such a great power competition and its logic dominates the European powers in the past 400 years will not matter and work completely in East Asia. So that's why I have to say, yes, look at Japan, look at India. They are strategic choice of clear cat. Very standing, firm, ways the US, but on the other hand, never neglects. There is another dimension in their policies, I mean, hedging. So then China should be learned smarter and accommodative, but the problem is my question is the US anchored international order could also leave a space for China to grew up. Trump administration could be increasingly accommodative and on the other hand, also could still just serving Americans democratic beacon to redirect China for a great future. But unfortunately, when Trump came to power, Americans democrat beacon is eclipsing. It's really, really my bitter concern. I'm serious. Thank you. Well, thank you very much. Evans, Fond, Cathy and Mike. Before I completely wind up, I would like to do a straw poll. I didn't ask you at the start of this debate whether you agree with the statement or whether you agree that China's rise will be peaceful or whether you thought China's rise will not be peaceful. In a sense, it doesn't really matter. What does matter and what I would like you to tell me by raising your hands is whether after this debate you have in any way changed your view on the subject, not asking you whether you swing from thinking that China's rise will be peaceful to being non-peaceful or the other way around, but have you changed your view on the subject in a significant way? If you have, could you raise your hand, please? Right, that's a good number of people who have raised their hands. Nonetheless, the clear majority haven't raised their hands, so clearly you know your view on the subject pretty well. Well, let me just draw this China debate 2019 to a close and thank the panelists as well as all of you for your participation. I do apologize that I was not able to keep the time better and allow more questions and comments from the floor. Thank you very much.