 The start until mama tells me that so this is why I'm I'm standing by and Matt is telling him All right, thank you. Welcome. Welcome everyone. My name is Bill Taylor I'm one of the vice presidents here at the Institute of Peace And I'm very pleased to be able to open this session ambassador ambassador doctor doctor It's very good to have this this Distinguished group here as well as people in the in the audience here It's a it's a great opportunity for us to have this conversation It's been 50 years Since the United States Democratic Republic of Vietnam the Republic of Vietnam the Provisional Revolutionary government of South Vietnam signed an agreement to end the war and Ambassador Negra Ponte knows something about this agreement and he says he's going to tell us a little bit about that this morning This allowed the return of US troops. I know something about that And the release of American prisoners of war So 50 years The post war time Has not gone. Yeah, not without difficulties. There were problems during that time After the capture of Saigon by the People's Army of Vietnam and you know unification of the country it took another 20 years Till 1995 for the US and Vietnam to normalize relations Since then our political economic educational security relations have developed they've improved We know that we remember that senator Patrick Leahy Who was a real sponsor of this effort here at the Institute of Peace? He made the he made the point that we've come a long way together And we have further to go That's one of the purposes of this discussion here today Institute of Peace here we do we do conflict we try to prevent conflict mitigate conflict Terminate conflict is a new concept terminate conflict conflict as well as help work out conflicts afterwards And on this business of what we're doing today looking backwards It also will help us we hope to look forwards to look forward to be able to use some lessons that we may have learned We hopefully have learned about the Vietnam conflict So that we can use going forward So I'm very pleased to welcome this group of speakers that we've already recognized On on meaning and lessons of the Paris Peace Accords including both Vietnamese and American perspectives from diplomats as well as historians Ambassador John Nicofanti I worked for him. I follow him around I follow him around he didn't know it, but I was following him in Vietnam. He was trying to build peace I was doing something else He was an aide Henry Kissinger During the Paris negotiations Professor Leon Han Nguyen And Carolyn Eisenberg Dr. Eisenberg have both written books about this about this aspect From course the North Vietnamese and the and the US perspective perspective Lee our first speaker will be the Vietnamese ambassador to the United States When quick zoom No stranger to this building. We're very glad to have you back. Mr. Ambassador. And with that, let me turn this over to you Thank you. Thank you. Thank you so much and a very good morning to all of you and Ambassador William Taylor's my president of the US Institute for office This thing with speaker ladies and gentlemen First I wish to thank the US Institute of peace for inviting me to Speak at this significant event today exactly one year Since I took office in Washington DC exactly today. So it's great honor Thank you. Thank you so much. And I also Acknowledge and appreciate the US IP for its active role and dedication in promoting peace reconciliation and post war settlement in Places around the world including Vietnam over the years You know the 1973 Paris peace accords or the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam Was signed 50 years ago and different parties people and especially historians my look at the event from different perspectives so let me share with you my reflections from the perspective of Vietnamese diplomat Broadly speaking the 1973 Paris peace accords reflected the overarching trend of peace national independence and anti-war Movements taking place Around the globe including in the United States at the time in history the peace accords were the results of the most complicated and Prolonged negotiations in the modern Vietnamese diplomacy They underlined the burning aspirations of Vietnamese people for peace But one that must come along with national independence freedom and reunifications While reflecting the dynamics on on the battlefield The accords were also the bulldox of the of the able Negotiators who skift fully snatched the golden opportunity and Ambassador Joe Neocorte Who is present here with us? was With then the assistant to state secretary Henry Kissinger was one among them But we we should also acknowledge that above all The long-awaited accords arrived at the expense of millions of the Vietnamese lives For the party's concerned The accords were a critical milestone for the United States They marked the end of its direct engagement Into the most prolonged war of the 20th centuries The controversy of conflict that took its toll and deeply divided the US society For Vietnam The accords ended our direct confrontations with the United States on the battlefield paving paving the way for the subsequent reunifications reconstruction and development of our countries into where it is today For the entire society for the entire South Asia The accords were a key To ending the confrontations between the two blocks enabling ASEAN to grow and Expand into a strong and united associations a comprehensive strategic partners of the United States and a key part player in the Indo-Pacific architecture that we see today For the Vietnam US ties in particular The peace accords closed behind a sad and painful chapter in the history of our bilateral relations and opened up a pathway towards better mutual understanding and Reconciliations although it took much time and great efforts to get there the two countries normalized relations in 1995 and Defined the comprehensive partnership that we will together celebrate its its 10th anniversary this year Well Without the peace accords that ended the world 50 years ago I'm not sure whether we can enjoy the Vietnam US relations that are extensive and Substantial as they are today You see Vietnam has become the US 7's largest trade partners Over the world as a two-way trade turnover exceed 130 billion dollars last year and our close people to people ties Being reflected by the 30,000 Vietnamese students in schools and university across the United States I totally agree with Ambassador Wilhelm Taylor in his opening remarks that the bilateral relations Have been strengthened across the board from politics economy defense and security to education Assistant State Secretary Danian Gritten bring once said and I quote The sky is the limit for the US Vietnam partnership So I agree with Dan as well and Believe that I believe that our bilateral relations are excellent 50 years after the peace accords And and there is still much room for it to go to grow to new heights So ladies and gentlemen Looking back at the Paris peace accords and the past 50 years journey I think there are several major lessons that we can learn from first the success of diplomacy helps and most of the wars and conflicts Of course the results of negotiation reflect the dynamics in the battlefield However, if the parties can engage in diplomatic dialogues with good faith and with a human spirit that goes beyond hatred and self-fitness to find solutions meeting their respective legitimate interests then that would be the essential condition to ending their wars and conflicts and thus Saving hundreds thousands or even millions of lives That lesson remains relevant in our world today where devastating conflicts and unnecessary wars are still taking place second Preventing a war is hard But it is worth the try rather than going into a war and then spending decades to settle its consequences To preserve peace and prevent conflicts countries especially bigger ones need to know the history the deep aspirations and legitimate interests of smaller ones the 1973 Paris peace accords reflected the intense aspirations of the Vietnamese people for peace national independence and reunification So I'm certain that if the then American leaders had understood the Vietnamese history and the deep aspiration of the Vietnamese Vietnamese nations They would not have decided to engage into that war Third There is no way that you can break the will of a nation by force In our world today while conflicts may still be taking place here and there Peace cooperation and development remain the prevailing chance Dialogue remains the right option to set the differences Cooperation and dialogue should be fostered in place of confrontations fourth The spirit of shelving the past and working together To work the future in the reconciliation and expansion of the Vietnam-US relations Has become an example for parties in the aftermath of wars and conflicts We have gone from foes to friends as We step by step fostered mutual understanding reconciliation and strengthened cooperation in various areas to become comprehensive partners in 2013 so this year we will be Celebrating both the 50th anniversary of the Paris peace across and the 10th anniversary of the comprehensive partnership Looking back at the past is a useful way to better understand the present and Be better prepared for the future. So I believe that lessons from the past Including the 1973 Paris peace across We'll have Vietnam and the US better understand each other Grow stronger ties and have greater respect for each other's interests. I Have every reason to believe In the brighter futures of the Vietnam-US relations that will serve the interests of both peoples and benefit peace stability cooperation and Development in the Indo-Pacific and beyond So that concludes my remarks. I thank you very much for your kind attention and please accept my best wishes For your good health happiness and success. Thank you So many thanks ambassadors open for those reflections which link the history of the Paris peace accords with the Present day of us Vietnam relations And thanks also to you and your colleagues at the Embassy of Vietnam for your cooperation in organizing this event and other Work of us IPs Vietnam war legacies and reconciliation initiative I'm Andrew Wells dong. I've Worked on that initiative now for a year and a half at US IP. So it's great to see you all here today and it's my responsibility to introduce our Remaining panelists so First to start with Ambassador John Negroponte whom Ambassador Taylor already introduced in part he has an extensive diplomatic and national security career that started in Vietnam in Hue and then he was the Vietnam Office director at the National Security Council during the Nixon administration. So it was an assistant to National Security Advisor Kissinger at that time supporting the peace talks with Vietnam Subsequently he's been ambassador to Honduras Mexico the Philippines the United Nations and Iraq And his most recent position was its deputy secretary of state Under the George W. Bush administration and since 2009 he's been teaching at multiple universities and at McLarty Associates here in Washington Ambassador Negroponte has been described as the last American diplomat, which I really hope is not the case Welcome to US IP ambassadors I know I'm not the last I guess I guess it sounded like a catchy title to the the author Ambassador Taylor sir, thank you very much to the Institute of Peace for Organizing this symposium on the 50th anniversary of a very important Accord signed between the United States and And Vietnam And thank you ambassador for your comments the ambassador mentioned that You know, you can look at the Vietnam War from and the peace from many different Perspectives and I want to tell you I have held almost all of them in my life I think we've all had and those of you lived during the war Know that both endless Nocturnal event debates we used to have those of us serving in in Saigon And the endless internal debates we had within ourselves About what we were doing and whether we were doing the right thing and I have some of the letters that my Parents received from me during that time and I see that I I have seen That I espoused every which view about the conflict at one time or another. I was a neutralist I was a pacifist. I wanted to bomb the heck out of North Vietnam on and on and on I Guess as you go on and life your views tend to firm up a little bit more and I probably have a more consistent perspective today and Then I did at the time But I want to mention a couple of Historical points before I talk about the Accords themselves and the first is I've always been very impressed by the correspondence that Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt had with each other and those of you who've looked at that correspondence Which is really fascinating riveting They at towards the end of World War two started having a really pretty acrimonious debate about Roosevelt's view that the Brits should get rid of their colonies And he was really very adamant about that and Churchill would consistently respond that he had not been elected prime minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire and But Roosevelt was very Firm on this and that's what he felt ought to be done And of course Rose Franklin Roosevelt died in April of 1945 the war hadn't ended yet and Harry Truman Took over and You got to wonder whether If Roosevelt I know this is a counterfactual and a what if but I think it's a pretty damn big what if When Ho Chi Minh declared the independence of Vietnam in September right of 1945 had Franklin Roosevelt been alive What would he have done? given what he professed to believe so I just Want to leave that one out there and then contrast it With what Harry Truman actually did Which was to listen to the all-powerful and not that revered institution by others in the State Department the European Bureau and Which was powerful then and it's always thought of itself I remember one of the assistant secretaries saying once we're the only global bureau And that was in recent times and they advised Mr. Maybe it was Atchison at the time Or Marshall I can't remember whom The Secretary of State and Harry Truman that we should the French really needed a lift for their morale. They suffered so much during World War two And we should help them by helping transport troops back to the colonies and So we helped the colonial powers restore their authority in Vietnam and After World War two and so I always felt that that was a pretty important Turning point the other historical reflection. I'd like to make is when The Berlin Wall fell and then the Soviet Union collapsed I I was ambassador to Mexico at that time and I Was having a reception at the Embassy and the famous Mexican author and philosopher Octavio Paz was one of our guests and I was in a bit of a celebratory mood about What had happened to the Soviet Union and stuff and he looked at me very seriously and said Yes, but you know history never stops and that's true history doesn't stop and so While we I agree about studying the lessons of history I'm all for that but we just have to remember also that it goes on and it has amazing and I think sometimes wonderful twists and turns and things that just looked impossible 50 years ago are Very possible today. And so we should always Keep our eyes and our minds. I think open to the possibilities that exist within relationships and I for all the Frustration and I think candidly on happiness that I felt at the time of the Paris peace accords I have been somebody who has applauded the development of US Vietnam relationships During the period of normalization. I was one of those like some of the famous Senators John McCain and others Ambassador Peterson who were advocating for you know getting over it and let's establish relations as soon as possible Let's not hold Grudges which the United States does do quite well sometimes. I mean we've held a grudge against Fidel Castro and the Ayatollah Khomeini for an awfully long time now and No one we seem afraid And hesitant to explore what the possibilities might be of some kind of other relationship I'm not now is probably not the time to advocate for relationships with Iran, but I Think you get my point We can we can hold grudges for a long time So I was in Vietnam from 1964 to 68 Working at the embassy Working at the Consulate in Hwe It was my second assignment actually in the to the Foreign Service. I've been in in Hong Kong I got to travel over much of the country, especially central Vietnam Got to know it quite well and then I left Saigon in early 68 I left Three weeks before the Tet offensive. I had no inside information. I just happened to have left Three weeks before then And that was another turning point if you will because general Westmoreland made an incredible error We nobody ever really points this out But in the wake of the Tet offensive he asked for 206,000 more troops to be sent to Vietnam Now I think that was one of the most foolish Messages that was ever sent to Washington headquarters Imagine if Bill Westmoreland had Sent a message saying mr. President We have Delta very Significant blow to the Vietcong and of South Vietnam. They're they're practically Decimated for all practical purposes and I think you can now safely withdraw 200,000 troops from this country. I think That recommendation would have entailed very very little risk for the United States strategy at that time And it might have affected the mindset of the American people about the war Rather than all Walking around thinking that we'd suffered some kind of terrible defeat and had to get out of there. So I just Suggest you might want to reflect on on that point as well. I think the The way Westmoreland sort of dealt with this situation Had a negative impact. I think on attitudes towards our continued involvement my Debate or quarrel with when I have that little internal argument inside of myself With our Vietnam policy during that time was more with the way We fought the war then how we ended it I feel that and I attended meetings At the embassy in Saigon. We called it the it wasn't the country team as we normally Refer to the leadership of a mission. It was called the Mission Council and both Ambassador Bunker chaired it and General Westmoreland was a member of it and I remember one year he gave a Briefing on our strategy towards Vietnam our military strategy and and he got up there on the blackboard and he Described it. It was very clear very simple graphic where he put Here are the People's Liberation Army in the north. Here's American troops the South Vietnamese army will defend the villages and That's the way it's going to be we'll do the brunt of the fight He really believed that the American troops should do the brunt of the fighting and I walked out of that meeting scratching my head and saying isn't that a prescription for a Perpetual US presence in Vietnam and where is the effort to? make the South Vietnamese forces more capable and it took The advent of general crate neighborhoods to change that approach and develop the South Vietnamese army and if you look at Their performance for example during the Easter offensive in 1972 And onwards they made a very credible showing much better showing than they would have made four or five years Earlier so you know you could ask yourself if we'd had a Vietnamese Vietnamization policy much earlier could that have made a difference and by the way to me the Vietnamization issue is One which carries over into our policies generally and as Ambassador Taylor will attest When he and I arrived in Iraq We had zero Money in our reconstruction budget To defend to help develop and train and equip the armed forces of Iraq zero And I said something's really wrong with this picture They we had money for water we had monies for creating a consumer product safety Agency we had we had you can imagine every little pet project that anybody ever had on the civilian side They had it for in that 17 billion Dollar reconstruction program zero For the military and the Pentagon at that time had no money in its budget for the Iraqi armed forces and I Pleaded with Washington and I asked Bill actually to do a review the first month I was there and we recommended to Washington as a consequence of that review To reprogram two or three billion dollars to the training and equipping of the Iraqi forces and For me that was a direct lesson From Vietnam if you're talking about Lessons learned Just a little bit about the peace process Which I was involved in Really at two different stages the first was with ambassadors Harriman and Vance when Lyndon Johnson Selected a delegation to go out to Paris in May of 1968 and I I was part of that delegation Philip Habib who was a very revered Foreign service officer was the senior career person on the delegation and he asked dick Holbrook To pull together the rest of the team and dick and I were good friends and knew each other well And he asked me to be part of the team so I went out there and I was there for About a year and a half from May of 68 so well actually about 14 15 months and I was there for the phase which led to the halt of the bombing in November of 1968 and And That it's the next lesson about negotiations and And it happened again in 1972 it just some interesting coincidence always caused the North Vietnamese to make their critical proposals on The beginning of October of a presidential election year in the United States Now I can even remember laid up tall pulling his paper out of his tunic and telling dr. Kissinger in October October 7th to be exact of 1972 you're in a hurry aren't you you won't find that in any record. I'm sure but that's what laid up tell us said and we tried to and and Dr. Kissinger followed the script that I think North Vietnam hoped he would Would do and that happened in 68 as well and we ended up with the bombing halts over North Vietnam Just one insight about those talks just to Give you a little bit of a flavor of the way Maybe I'm not obviously wasn't a typical American April Harman was a billionaire, but But how they thought about Vietnam Harrowman had spent his World War two as Franklin Roosevelt's representative in London and then he went to Moscow to be the envoy to Joseph Stalin During the latter part of the war So he always Talked to the Vietnamese delegation About Stalin and I'm not sure they really cared to hear that much about Stalin I they never they were always expressionless Whenever he talked about Stalin But but he had sort of Stalin on his mind when he was talking to And I'm sure he was trying to show that he had credentials for dealing with a communist regime I mean that was clearly his message But it went a little further and he called me into his office one day We were in the embassy building in Paris and he took several hundred French Franks out of his pocket and he said John for the next tea break. We had rented a safe house out in The suburbs of Paris somewhere. I can't remember. I was involved in finding the safe house but he said John for the next tea break at our Secret meeting out in the suburbs At the safe house. I want to serve them a caviar and You know, I'm not an expert about Vietnamese culture, but I know something I said well, mr. Ambassador That's fine and so please let's serve caviar, but we better also have something sweet At the tea break and so we also bought some very nice cakes and this and that and I was doing my little catering Job there for Averill and I went down to the caviar store and bought the caviar And then then I bought cakes and I remember Harrowman watching at the tea break what they Vietnamese delegation ate and of course they all ate the sweet cakes that we had we had served them and it was my I was the winner in the situation because I love caviar and But that that was just a little vignette The one thing I'd say about the Paris talks Is that the title and the ambassador read the title it's the agreement To end the war and restore peace to Vietnam. We're very good At using euphemisms, right? Now, you know what that agreement was. We all know what it was It was a withdrawal agreement. That's all it was Uh, it was a withdrawal agreement pure and simple and it was not What the ambassador the title the ambassador read because that happened afterwards, right if I remember correctly certainly The fighting wasn't over and I chuckled to myself because when we negotiated The status of forces agreement with iraq At the end of the bush administration When it was over I called up chet crocker. I said chet. You've done exactly the same thing we did in 1973 You've signed a withdrawal agreement From iraq. You remember it provided for withdrawing by the end of 2011 and that's really all that that agreement was about so we have a way sometimes of euphemistically describing The kind of agreements we enter into And I hope we weren't under any illusion And I do if nothing else I would fault dr. Kissinger for writing a book called ending the vietnam war because he did not end uh, the vietnam war unless you Want to give him credit for having created the opportunity The created I would argue the certainty for hanoi's ability to Bring the war to a rapid conclusion In their favor All that said There's been a lot of water under the dam since I I couldn't agree more That I don't know if the sky is the limit when mr. Crittenbrink uses that phrase But we have certainly Come a long way in the relationship. We may have started a bit late I think the 1990s was late We could have probably done it 10 years earlier If we'd seen fit But I think it's a good thing um, I personally I felt the same way about north and south vietnamese. I mean I like the vietnamese people a lot I think I would say I even love vietnam I think it's a wonderful country and I think it suits united states interests To develop that relationship the very best we can And not only for Geopolitical reasons and there those do exist But I think also just intrinsically I think it's uh in in our interest And I think it's uh It fits very well also With our interest in cultivating Nurturing strengthening the best we can our relations with The six or 700 million people Who live in the 10? ocean countries, so I think it's a part of the world that Makes great deal of sense for the united states to pay attention to And uh, I think it behooves us to do that. Thank you very much Thank you ambassador for both personal and historical Reflections so our Last two speakers Are both historians as ambassador taylor introduced who have written important books about this period And so i'm interested in their reflections on what they've heard from the ambassadors and also on the meaning of of this anniversary so lian heng yuan is a professor at columbia university Is the author of hanoi's war an international history of the war for peace in vietnam And she's currently working on a history of the ted offensive And and other books so Welcome, uh professor han Okay, so it's going to be hard to follow two amazing ambassadors So i'm going to try but at first before I begin i just want to thank Andrew wells dying for inviting me here today and also to the ministry of foreign affairs in vietnam as well as the us institute of peace to ambassador taylor to ambassador yeoman ambassador nagrapanti and of course to rusty For being on the panel today. Sorry. I call her rusty She goes by So in following up, you know after the two ambassadors and being born a year after The paris agreement. I can neither say I lived through this so I don't have these great anecdotes that professor that ambassador nagrapanti had nor am I Was I from the democratic republic of vietnam? I was born in the republic of vietnam So come from hail from the south so my Brief comments today really do come from this vantage point as a historian as someone who is judging Um the history and it's a it's a kind of interesting position explained to my students you you are You know, you you are a judge when you are a store and you can reflect it back upon these events And assign judgment evaluation to the events and you know coming here today when andrew told me what this was going to be about Like why are we commemorating the paris agreement to end the war and restore the peace as ambassador nagrapanti had just said and Ambassador um had had read out the title Because it didn't either it was just a withdrawal agreement for the united states So why is it then should we mark this occasion because it it failed in both of those objectives And of course the war didn't end until 1975 with the fall or liberation of of saigon So it's an interesting exercise that we're doing today But when I teach this then like okay, so why did it fail? And I think I have a few reasons now would love to discuss this because I do see many Other historians in the room as well as participants as well as Most importantly, I think also the mofa the vietnam farm ministry because one of the things that I think we can all agree upon is this You know what ambassador you'll put forward today and representing the vietnamese government is a very positive spin on Just the sort of penultimate end To that war and that takes a very very, you know For the the winning side to be able to do that despite the millions who had died as a result of Of the vietnamese civil war and particularly american military intervention I applaud that positive history But I think I would just say no we have a very we need to judge it in a much harsher light So why did the paris negotiations fail? Well, think about structurally So there are these public talks four party public talks that included the united states the democratic republic of vietnam The republic the democratic republic of vietnam and eventually the provisional revolutionary government. So those were open They were very well covered by the international media We all could track the progress or lack of progress of those talks But it didn't matter what what transpired at these public Proceedings it was really the secret bilateral talks and bilateral It was between the united states and north vietnam to decide on the fate of south vietnam with neither the republic of vietnam Or the provisional revolutionary government In attendance at these secret meetings that the world press could not cover and could not evaluate and could not Share with the public world opinion to say wow that you know, maybe negotiations Aren't going very well and we should have a better say You know kind of give feedback to our leaders. So so we didn't know we didn't know about until the very end of the process close to In in 1972 that these were taking place So structurally something was not going to produce a viable political compromise or diplomatic settlement to end that war Just structurally it was it was impossible And then another reason if you look more closely look at the the powers involved I think it's not any one side that's to blame I think the failure of producing a peace agreement At paris lies at the feet of all of the parties involved. So if you look at the united states What was the strategy that the nixon administration had going in in 1969? Well, that was publicly peace with honor, but what does that mean? I think in the way that the most historians Teach that that means that you know, it's basically the same strategy that was in place Under previous american administrations and that is the preservation of a non-communist south vietnam at all costs So in that sense again, it wasn't then to really end american Intervention it was to preserve a non-communist south vietnam, but no administration lbj Administration could not could not crack that nut The nixon and kissinger believed that they had a better chance and they were going to try Despite having less room for maneuver than the previous administration Um, then let's look at the democratic republic of vietnam. What? Strategy did le yong and later call who i've identified as the two leaders in hanoi? What was their strategy? Well here too? I don't believe that it was to uh negotiate to to come to a speedy end to The war in fact, it was you know, what i've argued is It's talking while fighting, which is what leisland had already Outlined but what does that mean? I think in the way he believed it was to focus more on the fighting aspect than on the talking aspect To carve out a military advantage on the ground so that it would have Better impact at the negotiating table So until that great decisive victory could be had militarily on the ground There weren't going to be substantive talks to end the war just binding time Now what about the republic of vietnam? Well here it was quite clear in the second republic under wing bank you In this period from 68 all the way until the week before well on april 21st When he stepped down it was to consolidate his firm grasp his power over the republic of vietnam and to ensure that the united states Leave very slowly if at all So if none of the parties actually had that desire to negotiate a piece That would be that would actually bring an end to the hostilities And come to some sort of political compromise none of those powers in 1960 69 had those objectives instead As i just kind of outlined they were different the You know and then if you look at the two sides and here again Their complications so the united states and republic of vietnam never really were unified in their negotiating strategy The democratic republic of vietnam the provisional revolutionary government were they were a much more effective negotiating team And they had a much better diplomatic strategy than the united states and republic of vietnam that were pursuing Different different objectives during this period So that's so first structurally second just look at the at the strategies of of the of the combatants of the war leaders in hanoi in sygon in washington dc The third thing i'll point to is again when i teach about the failure of the peace agreement is look at the international Context and i think here it's very important because there were massive changes taking place You know one of the things i say is when you teach about the vietnam war Of course you have to teach about that in the context of the cold war of the us-soviet rivalry But you know what's also important the syno-soviet split and the syno-soviet split underwent massive changes in this period What you had happened, of course at the very start of the negotiations the first hostilities that transpired between the soviet union the people's republic of china in march of 1969 When these border troops You know open fire against one another these russian and chinese troops that was a game changer for the vietnam war So i actually when i teach this i i ask the students What was the most important battle that took place In march of 69 that had an impact on the vietnam war and they're throwing out. Well, was it something was it, you know Was it something that that transpired at? You know at in northern vietnam the central highlands and i'm like no it's it's the usury river Border clashes and why because it's at this point that china Identifies the soviet union as its number one enemy and no longer the united states So what you have is the beginning of the seeds being planted for nixon and kissinger's super power diplomacy to actually yield fruit Because of these massive changes taking place in the international Proletarian movement and to the syno-soviet split it becomes bloodier So for the first time the us administration can actually square the syno-soviet vietnamese triangle Which was already a very difficult Juggling act that hanoi leaders had to perform even prior to march of 1969 But what you have at this point is now an opening for third party players in particularly again china and the soviet union To have an impact on the vietnamese Peace agreement so again another factor of why the agreement wasn't going to actually yield a Lasting piece another element of course is look at the fighting on the ground what transpires between 1969 all the way to 1970 and 73 you have uh, you know again while operation rolling thunder So sustained bombing has ended nixon still has the ability to bomb north vietnam and he's holding that very very You know that very valuably and close to to him in terms of Having a strategy to to really carve out that military advantage and to bring north vietnam to its knees So they're still bombing in there and of course what we saw is the operation menu Um, and so what you have with operation menu and then also in the expansion of the ground war You have the regionalization of the vietnamese war. Yes Cambodian last were always intricately involved in the vietnamese war effort. They couldn't escape what was happening Next door, but you have the official regionalization of the war With the joint us are being encouraged into cambodia and then of course lamb sun 719 So the war isn't winding down. In fact, it's expanding beyond the borders of vietnam Beyond the bombing the secret bombing beyond the regionalization of of the vietnamese war You're also going to have the largest Ground offensive that the north vietnamese are going to undertake since the ted offensive and of course that's the 1972 spring summer offensive Also called the wing way offensive also called the easter offensive. So again, why are we discussing this protracted peace negotiations when Again, what it what it what it what it amounted to at this point was just another theater of battle Another place to buy time or to find an advantage when the armies could actually duke it out On the ground and then finally i'll just point to it again when I teach this look at look at just even the final stretch leading to January late january of 1973. So right after The easter offensive i've argued in my book then in the summer of 1972 with the failure to retain guangdi This is what prompts le yong to kind of do a 180 on his negotiating or his diplomatic strategy And that is no longer look we have to remove two And the united states has to withdraw at the same time. They cannot be separated Well at this point in the summer of 72 he's like no, we'll negotiate the americans out. We'll deal with two later In addition to To that you also have of course, and this is what ambassador negra ponte You know why all the north vietnamese always did kind of bring out something in october of Of a presidential election u.s. Presidential election year. So, too, did the vietnamese so did the south vietnamese I'm sorry in in the fall of 68 that was to Reaching out and and corresponding not reaching out. There were actually many channels To the nixon nixon team and that was to hold out But he didn't need to be told to hold out and not send a delegation to paris He would have he would have figured that out anyway So he was much more astute actually than The north vietnamese in trying to sort of manipulate american presidential elections in the fall of 1972 This came in the form of a list of 69 modifications to an agreement that he was never a party to In which there was only by way of captured intelligence. Did he actually find out the vietnamese wording? Here i've poured so much time and effort into looking at these cia documents and why The saigon regime had such a problem with this administrative structure Uh And here he was like, what is this? This is clearly governmental Uh, uh, try a partite commission. It's not just administrative. We have a problem with this We can discuss as a group what kissinger knew or what he didn't know But but just in that this is the the level of mistrust and lies and suspicion was just Um at such high levels So much so even between allies and enemies that i don't see how An actual piece could have been could have been produced by by uh by january 1973 And of course the most important one was right before the signing. There is a massive bombing campaign That kills 2000 North vietnamese During the christmas bombing that leads right to right to the signing that basically just afforded the same agreement That was that could have been had in october of that year So again all these barriers to why the paris agreement never You know ended the war or restored the peace and i'm just pointing out a few of these reasons why but i would love to discuss More especially uh with this group, but i'll i'll end with just you know again andrew gave us um some some prompts and he said So should this be the basis for uh us vietnam reconciliation or for other peace agreements? And i say hell no uh because uh i think it's a bad model and fortunately despite the fact that There is the 1973 paris agreement to end the war and restore the peace us vietnam reconciliation still managed to get off the ground by the 1990s what i hope Is that we find maybe another historical example and here i'll say i don't know this is Again inspired by investor nagerpanti trying to pull for my historical chops I really liked teaching about the post world war one era And in particular the spirit that gripped europe to really abolish wars for all the time and that's the you know The spirit of lucarno, and i hope that that reigns in terms of us vietnam reconciliation the strengthening of our comprehensive partnership As well as i would say between vietnamese Abroad and vietnamese in country because i think that's really where we can have most of the of the important reconciliation Efforts have to be made it's really to to heal those wounds of war between former vietnamese Who potentially were from the republic of vietnam like myself? And the vietnamese living in vietnam today that i hope the spirit of lucarno reigns over us as well. Thank you Thanks very much and our final speaker is professor carolin or rusty eisenberg Who's a professor of american foreign policy at hofstra university? She's the author most recently of fire and rain nixon kissinger in the wars in southeast asia We'll go a little bit beyond the 10 o'clock hour so that she has time to share her remarks Thank you. I just want to start by saying it's really an honor to be here And to thank my fellow panelists that have made this discussion such an important one and The u.s. Institute of peace for inviting me and andrew to encouraging me to join It really is a special honor today. I was thinking that It 50 years ago, so this would have been if it's exactly 50 years ago It would have been the peace agreement had already been signed But I think it would have been very difficult back then for anybody to envision an occasion like this Because there was so much bad feeling really all around. So the fact that we're all here today In a friendly spirit is itself. I think very significant and meaningful and of course we're all coming from very different places so for somebody of my age and background When I come to washington what I think about is all those demonstrations that went on the tens of thousands Hundreds of thousands of people that came back here over and over again marching for peace in vietnam And hopeful that with our feet That we would change what was going on ending the war and also very afraid that that would not be effective at all So coming from that place, but now i'm going to speak as a historian and not as a marcher And I thought it would be really inspirational To begin with a quote for richard nixon who's barely been mentioned this morning So four days before the paris agreement was signed Richard nixon went on television Telling the american people that quote all the conditions he had laid down have been met After an extraordinary effort the united states had truly achieved peace with honor And he assured americans that this this settlement meets the goals and has the full support of president too And the government of the republic of vietnam as well as that of our allies and he looked forward to a piece that lasts and a piece that heals Well, you probably didn't need to come here to know that sometimes richard nixon did not tell the truth Just But there's literally nothing in that statement. That's true Nothing it didn't meet us requirements because the u.s Had been trying for years to have a situation where the u.s Would take its troops out and the north vietnamese would take their troops out mutual withdrawal And that whole pad was long gone, but that would have been a very important american requirement. It wasn't met Um The agreement infuriated president too When he when he saw this agreement his response was quote, we're on the edge of catastrophe On the brink of an abyss Uh said said president so it actually went nixon heard that that's what he said His response was quote when you think of what we've done for him On cambodia what we've done in laos what we've done. I may a jesus christ. He owes us one now and he owes a damn fast Um, so, you know, he wasn't he was not confused about how the south vietnamese Um view this agreement And the third thing which all of our speakers. They think have really referred to is that it didn't bring peace And nobody thought it would There was a clear expectation on every side that In a matter of I mean I'll go back and say what wasn't clear was when was the fighting start again That was a question But there was no question that the fighting would resume and as several of our speakers have said this was an agreement that really um Was an agreement to cover us withdrawal And have the us leave in of what was thought to be a face saving way But it certainly did not bring peace to vietnam and and nobody really thought that it would so why did nixon and kissinger sign this agreement and I've written about 500 pages on that topic, but I'm going to like boil it down because i'm looking at the clock There are numbers of reasons why they signed this agreement and several of them Have been mentioned. Some of the factors were were long term factors Right. So the strength of the adversary the determination Of the fighters inside south vietnam and the government of north vietnam that The willingness that no matter how many casualties were seemed to be sustained or even particular defeats on the battle So that this enemy kept coming and would made it clear that they would continue to fight So that weighed on them all along Right a second factor was the weakness of south vietnam And the weakness of arvin And vietnamization and was not really a success It's and in reality nixon and kissinger understood that it was not a success And that was brought home to them and this hasn't been mentioned today But it was brought home to them by lambsons 7 19, which was the first time that the south vietnamese army Was going into laos without us ground troops and which turned out to be absolute Colossal embarrassment To the united states because the troops were supposed to go there. They were supposed to stay. They were going to do very well And in fact, they're very hesitant to advance They finally advanced to where they're supposed to be for three months. They immediately leave and flit That's an important thing for nixon and kissinger that they registered that They could lie to the public about this was a great success They knew it was a failure and I think the same thing is relevant to the easter offensive Which you know many ways people can talk about it as You know as a defeat for the north But for nixon and kissinger they understood That the south vietnamese troops had on the whole not performed that well That was certainly their perception of the situation The record is full of wise cracks by the two of them about the ineptitude of the south vietnamese troops So that's weighing on them also and third of all what's weighing on them is domestic pressure Very very important both, you know, certainly From the organized peace movement certainly from congress and when you put that in I think the key point And you know, historians want to go on about the particulars. So I'm struggling to To bring it all together But what really is true they had no choice They had no choice by the fall of 1972 They were in a situation where there were no combat troops left in south vietnam. Nobody said that Right, they've been withdrawing those troops all along. That was the thing that they did not out of love of peace But because that's what they thought was necessary in order in order to quiet domestic descent Was to take the troops out in increments, but as of november They don't have ground troops to fight anymore. That's a huge factor in this story A second thing is congress So real quickly on the role of congress people in congress were always complaining about the war. There was nothing That, you know, that that that there was criticism. There was nothing new about that But even though those complaints had gone on and even though it was true That congress kept failing to pass anti-war legislation By november of 1972 after the election and people look at the landslide of richard nixon Not looking at congress more anti-war members of congress were elected in 72 than had been there so far And in fact nixon's top allies Which had who had supported him all through senator stennis Barry goldwater Representative ford In november they come to him and they tell him very clearly There will be no more money For this war when the new congress comes in And so it is absolutely essential that henry has to make a deal Now and get the us out. So the reality is that these that the president and and You know and his national security advisor Had really no choice at that point but to make a deal and leave Can I just grab some water But in many ways I think that the peace agreement that which is in the peace agreement The paris agreement is actually a sign of american failure Not a sign of american success and not a sign of a commitment to peace either But one of the things that historians are still debating and public figures are still debating when they talk about the the paris agreement Is was this a betrayal? Right. Was this a betrayal? Is that really what the story is we betrayed an ally? And in one sense, there's truth in that in the respect That there was profound disrespect profound disrespect for For the south finamese government and for president to Contempt for him and they lied to him and they gave him They tried to trick him into a kind of false understanding of what those conversations were When the south finamese expressed unhappiness by the time you're at that point Nixon Kissinger really didn't care they they were absolutely determined that they're going to make the agreement With or without south finamese support. So in a narrow sense, you could say that's a betrayal But I don't think it is. Well, I don't think that's the important betrayal I think the important betrayal was the betrayal of our own people who we sent to fight over there And the betrayal of the people of vietnam, cambodia and laos that the united states kept pumping money and weapons Into a war that went on year after year where the end result from early on looked like it was going to be a failure But for the most part the lives that were expended in that conflict We're not american lives. There were enough american lives But then we get to the millions of people in vietnam laos and cambodia Whose whose lives were sacrificed in pursuit of really an american goal for the for for their country I think that's the big betrayal and that sort of brings me towards You know one thing that I think is very important, which hasn't been said about on the american side Right, which is what did our country learn From this vietnam experience? Well, they learned some things get rid of the giraffes put more restrictions on newspaper men But was there ever a time where here in the united states we came to terms with the tragedy That we had created that there was any reevaluation of the idea that the united states has the right to put troops in other country and other people's country That that's fine that that you know that that's a problem There was that that understanding that acceptance never really happened And the reality i'm a university professor, so I get to talk to students all the time And one of the things is that the whole tragedy of vietnam has been really erased I walked into class last week and I asked my class had anybody heard of me lie Had anybody heard of me like no one had heard of me lie nobody And i'm using that you know me lives obviously a very extreme case, etc But I think it emblemizes The failure for there to be any rethinking or any appreciation our country about the damage That a militarized foreign policy can cause for our own people and for foreign people And so finally I think you know i'm very struck with the situation in ukraine and obviously you know everybody Um who is looking at what the russians are doing there is horrified But it's also relevant to ask ourselves a question to what extent Does did the american quest for military supremacy in europe? Taking advantage of the end of the cold war the dissolution of the soviet union and not seeing that it is an opportunity and a chance for peace But actually for a chance to extend the american power With horrific consequences for people who are non-americans, but who now are faced with a war horrific war with actually No clear end insight to that war and in closing. I just want to comment in very quickly About the situation in asia Right because the lesson that american policymakings are drawing from what's happening in europe and ukraine Is we need to do more to build up military power in asia To make as to have as many allies as we can have to have as many military bases as we can get And we will call that security And I think one of the lessons of vietnam is that in the name of security Massive violence can easily result militaristic solutions get rationalized And so hopefully what the lesson of vietnam should be i think for all of us And in our appreciation that today we can come together You know and wherever we were, you know, I whatever disagreements we had etc That we can actually talk together and begin to move forward Well, let's say that that should be the example To be followed and that coming out of the new u.s. Relationship with vietnam should not be another military alliance But it should be giving birth to a thrust of diplomacy and peacekeeping And if we move in that direction, we really will have learned the lesson of vietnam. Thank you So these issues clearly still provoke discussion and many opinions 50 years later, which is which is why we're here. Uh, and uh, it's like to thank all the speakers for their Reflections and and bringing it up to the present day Uh You know, I thought I would be able to conclude by saying here are some things we agree on and here are some things that need more discussion Uh, which we can we can take further But certainly the fact that us troops withdrew from vietnam As a result of the accords is a a significant aspect that everyone mentioned and that regardless of the connection between that and future us vietnam relations and normalization there was recognition of the importance of that and and the value of it Between our two countries. So on that note, I'd like to close the public session. Thanks to everyone for attending and listening