 With you in this format again, we did our first exercise like that last year, and as it was discussed in the previous session with Haldoun Al-Bubarak, the world has changed since the previous edition of the World Policy Conference. So I think the conversation we are going to have is a natural continuation of the previous one with Haldoun Al-Bubarak, who focused essentially on the economic and business dimensions. And perhaps the starting point could be the following. I read with great interest, as I told you, a speech you recently gave at the Emirates Policy Centre here in Abu Dhabi, and you described, you analyzed the foreign policy of your country by formulated eight core principles. So I will not ask you to, I could read the eight core principles, but to start with I would like to focus on the very first one. The first one is, I read it, the first is that the primary goal of our foreign policy must be to promote the prosperity and security of the United Arab Emirates through an approach that blends our national values and our national interest. I like this very much because in fact any serious country could start with a sentence like this. So may I ask you to say a little bit more about your national values and your national interest? First of all, it really is a pleasure to be here again with you, Teri, and to continue really our conversation from last year. As you said, a lot of things have changed and as I was driving, coming to the conference, I was just thinking that, you know, we've had this Ukraine war, the Ukraine earthquake really and international politics, which was not even on the horizon when we were talking to each other a bit more than a year ago. I think again, you know, without going to the principles I outlined, I really want to say that we are really consolidating what we have been starting as, you know, a direction following the Yemen war. And that consolidation really is along these two principles that you spoke about. On the one hand, to not only speak about security and stability, but also to ensure that prosperity is actually an equal pillar. So I think this is something that we have been trying to do. And I think in the previous conversation that we had with Khaldun Mubarak, you can see that very clearly. We're very, very focused on making sure that prosperity becomes a pillar that is equal to what has been traditionally a Middle Eastern country's search for stability and security. This brings about really the issue that you just asked me. So what are these principles? And in that perspective, I am really speaking purely about how we act in the international system. And I think from that perspective, our position on Ukraine is a very, very clear example. I think it's very reductionist and very simplistic to come to a country like the UAE and say the UAE is neutral on Ukraine. The UAE is not neutral on Ukraine. The UAE is affected by the crisis on Ukraine. And the UAE is trying to find the right balance between our principles and the necessity for a political solution and an end to the war in Ukraine. So if you take our principles, again, where we are, our size, our region, number one tells you that the use of force in international conflict is something that really worries us a lot. So clearly, any use of force is something that we clearly see is not part and parcel of our long-term interest, and that's a major principle here. I think the other issue here is the idea, basically, also what I would say is the attack on the sovereignty of a state is a real problem for us. I mean, a lot of countries have changed borders due to historical circumstances. I don't think there is a country, or if there is, there's one or two or three that have had fixed borders over the last 100 years or so. So clearly, this is another principle that we can see that has an implication on the region we are, on the country we are, and so on and so forth. But I think also to balance this, we don't think that the crisis in Ukraine is a crisis that can be resolved through a military conflict. I think we've seen the lessons, for example, of World War I, the Versailles Treaty, where a country is defeated but rises again to try and change the international order. And I think, from this perspective, the idea, basically, of trying to find a solution is necessary. Now, in any conflict, there's always a peace party and there's a war party, whether it is on the Russian side or whether it is on the Western and Ukrainian side. People that think that just give us four more months and we can change things. Just give us another few weeks and we can change things. You know, we've gone through that same cycle in Yemen, to be honest, where, you know, on the ground, we always thought that three more weeks will change things and will allow us to negotiate from a better perspective. Now what if that doesn't happen? So clearly, I think what we are trying to do and I think our vote in the UN Security Council and in the General Assembly and in the Human Rights Council shows very, very clearly that this country is not neutral on Ukraine. This country is trying to actually balance what it sees as its principles and at the same time, a way out of the crisis. I use Ukraine, of course, as an example because I think it is very pertinent currently. Can we thank you very much? I must say that I personally, in my own view of the world, I subscribe 100% with what you are saying. But if we can spend a few more minutes on this issue because it concerns all of us, it is difficult to be balanced. For instance, in the discussion a few minutes ago with Minister Kuleba from Ukraine, he stated clearly that he is asking about his vision of victory. Victory means kicking out the Russians from the entire territory of Ukraine in the borders, in the 1991 borders. And in his view, there is no way to start any kind of negotiation before this goal is achieved. And the last question I asked him, I told him, if I were President Macron instead of me, what would you tell me? And he said, Mr. President, thank you for this and that. But please, do not give any, I translated it with my words, do not provide any exit to saving face exit to Putin. So this approach is totally incompatible with what we are saying. Well, again, I mean, I understand for Minister Kuleba's views because he is the one where his country is being devastated and territory belonging to Ukraine also occupied. But I think also from where we are, perhaps we have more of a neutral view, so to speak, about conflict and crisis in general. And I think what, and then I have to also say that the ability of the UAE to affect these effects is not very big because we are a medium-sized country in the Middle East, on the Gulf. So our ability really to affect all this is perhaps positive on the margins, but not really central in the main conflict. But I would come and say, I would argue that the world today is much more dangerous, much more complicated. And the way that we are looking at the future is less and less assured about stability, et cetera. And I think, again, we have to centralize the idea of diplomacy and the idea of political solutions. I mean, again, I don't want to argue point-by-point on this, but I think conflicts are more likely to end in a political, through a political process than through a military process. I mean, that's just the fact. So now, compared to last year, you know, Haldun al-Mubarak answered the question of the comparison, concentrating on the globalization aspect, business, technology and all that. Looking now on the classical security dimensions, from the viewpoint of your country, what would you describe as the greatest danger, the greatest threat, a kind of worst case hypothesis? Well, again, I think on a macro level, it's about really commitments as we go further. We are a country at the end of the day that has always had a Western and specifically an American overall cover for how they see the security, not only of the UAE, but the region. Is that going to be assured for the next 30 years? Is that implicit assurance of U.S. security for the region starting from the Carter doctrine going to continue and be more explicit for the next 30 years? I think on the macro level, that's one of the big challenges. I think on the more, if we drill down, of course, the nature of the threat is changing. I think the region here today is more concerned about specific threats. We're not going to see a threat, epic threat, such as the invasion of Kuwait, for example. I don't see that as the scenarios that are transpiring. But I see, for example, more concern about four or five threats that are more specific. Terrorism remains a real threat. We keep our eyes open on Afghanistan and other places. And even on Yemen, because that remains a major threat. In my opinion, cyber is becoming more and more also of a threat, because as you see, as our society has become more modernized, our dependence really on all these systems makes us also more vulnerable. As it makes our lives easier. I think the third issue, of course, is drones and missiles. I mean, Saudi Arabia has been targeted by more than 1,000 missiles and drones. These are mostly Iranian origin used by the Houthis. But again, suddenly, this issue has not really catapulted into being a major, major issue until these weapons, such as drones, have gone into the Ukraine theater. And suddenly, the world has rediscovered this issue. Well, we have seen this as a major, major threat in the other period. And I think then we continue with security of the sea lanes, whether it's for energy or whether it is for trade, commerce and trade. So as we move forward, I think the commitments of our traditional strategic allies, is it still there? Is it going to be termed? Including the U.S. And as we discussed recently here, especially the U.S. Is it there? Is it going to be explicit? Because I think it is important. If it is there and it is explicit, then this is a major cornerstone for the next 30 years. But if it is not there and it's not explicit, it means a lot of countries in the region will have to adapt. Now, my last point also on this is all this also shows that as we're going into this more dangerous zone and more unpredictable zone, I think there is a lot more for diplomacy and regional diplomacy in particular. The understanding that I might not like what the Iranian regime is doing on certain things in the region, but I have to talk to it. I have to try and make sure that the conduit of communication is open. I have to ensure that although there are things that I don't like, but I want the principle of non-interference and internal affairs to be enshrined because this is something that will also benefit me. So there's a lot, in my opinion, as we move forward that we need to do regionally. Now, I always say this is not naivety. It's not naiv, but it is just the reality and we have to get better at it. So one of the developments of last year is the failure of saving the GCPOA, the nuclear agreement with Iran. Originally, unfortunately, Mr. Trump, President Trump, is to a large extent responsible for that, but this is the reality today. How do you assess the consequences of Iran probably becoming a nuclear power in the relative linear future? Well, again, I think you need to look at also our position on the GCPOA, and ours is not only the UAE, but I think collectively Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. I think we were very much opposed to a GCPOA that did not take into account the Iranian regional activity and Iranian missile program at the time. I don't think the word drone was in the conversation. I think we moved from that position with the sort of revival with Obama signing of the GCPOA and all the drama following that during the Trump and Biden administration to what I would call a resigned position. A resigned position meaning that this is something that has already been decided. We can't really do much in terms of changing the agreement, the revived agreement. I think today we have a different situation. I think today we have a situation where we see that the GCPOA is most probably is unlikely. There is still a small window of opportunity, but I think Iranian demands on the one hand and at the same time developments later on internally and at the same time a hardening really of Western public opinion about how they see the GCPOA, even within Europe in my opinion, makes that much more difficult. Now, as it becomes more difficult, are we worried about a breakout? Yes, we are worried about a breakout. But I think we are also more worried about this sort of massive production of cheap missiles and cheap drones within the whole region. I think the region ultimately needs some sort of, you know, some sort of, again, diplomacy is really the solution of trying to make sure that countries, not only countries, but also non-government organizations and militias and so on and so forth, being actually owners of cheap missiles and cheap drones. So I don't know where we're going right now. I know that most probably the GCPOA as it stands is most probably not going to be done. So we have to wait and see. But I think this is an opportunity for all of us really to come and revisit the whole concept. And I always say that using the five plus one format is a positive thing, because then you ensure that whatever concept you have has the sort of international force and legitimacy to back it. So in my opinion currently, we have to wait and see where this is going on. But I think we really do need to revisit the whole idea of regional intervention, the whole idea. What are the rules of engagements as we move forward? Not only about Iran, but I think about the whole region because we have to incentivize Iran also at the same time. We have to come to Iran. And we know that a lot of the turmoil today in Iran is about also economic concerns. So from that perspective, I think Iran has to be included at some stage in this sort of pillar that I call of stability and prosperity. We have to incentivize it. We can't just criticize its nefarious activity, but we have to try and bring it in somewhere. I don't see this happening immediately. But I think as we discuss and as we talk and I think as the region understands that more and more it has to be more responsible for its stability. I think this is something that is unavoidable. Last year, you expressed very elegantly, as always, the wish that the European Union were more united in terms of foreign policy. Would you say that things have improved or deteriorated since last year? I think the language that we are hearing today about engaging with the Gulf is quite positive. But I think we have to wait for the actions. I think that language is also partly driven by self-interest. Again, trying to find new gas providers, new oil providers, that whole, you know, us politic of trying to, you know, to engage with Russia I think is broken down in Europe. And as a result, this is something that will take a long time for it to mend. It is fine for European countries to prioritize or many of them to prioritize their interests in the region, to look at the region. So we are hearing some good signs, but I think it has to be strategic. It cannot be transactional, in my opinion. This is why I mention your elegance, because you wouldn't say what I say, which is that the Europeans have no strategy. Well, you said it, right? It's my responsibility. I heard it. You said it. But I think what we are hearing, and I think especially from the Germans and others about re-engaging with the Gulf, I am encouraged, but again, I would warn that it should not be transactional. I think there is huge interest between us in Europe. I think there has always been this discrepancy between some of the national policies and the French is a good example of linking with the area, and I think with some other policies that are just loading it with moralistic baggage and loading it with other interests, and politics, I think, in my opinion, has to be more along the Hans Morgenthau School of Realism if you really want any results. I am happy to say, as you know, that once again I am 100% in agreement with you. I think that politics implies being realistic in the short term and with some idealist vision in the longer term. This is not what we are doing. But also, I think we should underline the importance for Europe of the Arab world, of the Gulf countries, and to a large extent the African countries. And I think we have to repeat time again that this should be a major concern for the European Union. So I think you would not disagree with that. No, definitely. I think definitely. But as I said, you know, we need to see the actions. We need to see the sort of realignment. We need to see more contacts. But I think at the same time it has to be long term, it has to be strategic. We will always have, you see, I always say we will always have good relations with Europe. The difference is really about a relationship that is just good or a relationship that's strategic. I think that's really the big difference there. You know? Haldun al-Bagh spoke of patience and rapidity in executions. What is missing is rapidity in execution in a way. Can we spend the last few minutes on coming back to the UAE? You mentioned diplomacy many times. There is a highly, very distinguished institute of diplomacy here in the UAE. And the Emir gave your own name to this institute, which is called the Anwar Gargash Institute of Diplomacy because of the services that you have rendered to your country for many, many years. So one of the mysteries of the UAE is that it is indeed a nation, I think it's very difficult not to think of the UAE as a nation, but with a very small minority of the population being natives. And it seems to work and it works in a remarkable way. But talking about diplomacy, you need an army of diplomats, if I may say so, because to achieve your goals, that is being active diplomatically almost everywhere because you need a very strong diplomatic force. So can you tell us a few words about how you are year after year achieving this goal? Well, I think the first part of my remarks is about the UAE. I think the UAE, I think it is classic in a lot of the Gulf writings on the sort of what we call population imbalance is to see the foreign presence in many Gulf countries as a threat. I think we turned that around in a few years ago and we started thinking of it as a positive element for the UAE. If you read a lot of the Gulf writing of the different nationalities that are not only part of the UAE but part of every single Gulf countries, I think in the last few years we came to a conclusion and said for all our lives the composition of these countries of the UAE will actually include this sort of huge diversity. So why should we look at them as temporary, transient, but we need to look at them really as positive and something that will enrich our society, so to speak, a talent of pull. So this has to pull talent. This has, I think, changed the way we look at things. I think the second element also, I was looking at numbers about naturalization of people who have lived in the UAE and our rate is better than Finland, for example. Over the last 40, 50 years, a lot of people today that you see as Emirates are people who have become Emirates through nationalization. This is not something that we advertise a lot but our rate is as good as Scandinavian countries really when you look at it. Now this comes back to how do you take your limited human resources and try and put them in a larger and ambitious diplomatic outreach. In my opinion, you can't do everything. So we have, in my opinion, two, three things we need to do. Number one is we need to manage our environment. Our environment is basically the Gulf, the Middle East, the Arab world. And our environment is really turbulent, problematic, and for us, don't really expect a lot to gain back from our environment in terms of economic benefit, et cetera, but it has to be managed. So I think if you look at the first goal is to be engaged in the region in more of a management mode, but we also have good successes here. There are plans to invest in Turkey. There are already plans of cooperating with Israel and Jordan and Egypt, et cetera. These are quite positive things. I think then number two is to manage your traditional partners, the EU, national countries that are part of the EU, the United States, the rising countries in Asia, China, India. So again, trying to also understand more and manage more is another area where we need to look at. I think we've always also had a group, a layer of countries where we think are major and we need to put some effort in. And here, I mean countries like Brazil and Indonesia, where we traditionally, like Brazil, do a lot of business but are not necessarily totally engaged or understand Brazil very well, et cetera, but we need to understand it more because there are bigger partners for us trading, et cetera. And I think recently, for example, what we are doing with Indonesia is extremely important. Our trade with Indonesia is very small. It's about $2.6 billion compared, for example, with our trade with India, which is hitting the $70 billion ceiling, for example. So our idea is we need to invest more time and effort in a country like Indonesia and try to quadruple that investment and trade portfolio. So clearly, if you look at the world as 190 countries plus, we are spread very thin. But if we look at the world from the sort of circles, so to speak, of where we need to put more effort, I think this is a little bit more manageable. So last question. Tomorrow evening, I think that we will close with that. We have the visit of the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Faisal Al Farhan. So what would you recommend me to ask him? I don't think you need any recommendations. But I think the first thing is it's a word about what's going on in Saudi Arabia. I think what is going on in Saudi Arabia is phenomenal in terms of societal, economic change. And I think that this is something that is positive for the whole region. I think this is a process, and a process will of course bring its own challenges. But I think strategically it's extremely positive. I think on the other hand, I see our relationship with Saudi Arabia as complementary, where I think a larger regional pie in terms of economy, in terms of investment, is something that everybody will benefit from. So clearly as you see more locations for tourism, as you see more industry, as you see more enterprise, it means that this whole pie in the Gulf is becoming larger. I think it is significant, for example, that the UAE, which is a country under 10 million population, is going to hit for the first time ever half a trillion dollars of GDP this year. And this is quite significant for a country this size. And I think how do you do that? Part of it is actually dealing with a more vibrant environment, and part of it is dealing also with a more dynamic environment. And I think definitely what's happening in Saudi Arabia is more vibrant and dynamic. So these will be my comments, and then you can use them the way you want. Thank you very much. I will remain discreet, and I will not tell him that I asked you, that has your advice. But thank you very much for your answer. Now, unfortunately, these conversations are always too short. So time is up. But I do not want to close this session without telling you again heartfelt thank you, because the WPC would never have met here in Abu Dhabi without you. Without our collaboration. Without our relations. So thank you. Thank you very much again. And I suggest that we applaud Dr. Gargash. Thank you. Thank you.