 Good afternoon, yes it's working. Good afternoon everybody. We are with a small amount of people, but I'm sure you are all very eager to participate today and I'm very happy that you're here today. My name is Hannah van Den Bosch. I'm a program maker for Studium Generale and we organize all kinds of lectures like this one. You can also see many of our activities here on the screen. We also have Knight University coming up on the 19th of May, a big science festival that we also organize. And it's also good to know for students from Tilburg University that this lecture and also many of our other lectures count towards the Studium Generale certificate, for which you can visit five different lectures of ours, then write a small report and then you can get the certificate. More information can be found on our website. Today we have a lecture about match fixing and this is actually part of our ongoing short lecture series Fixing the Match. It's 45 minutes, around 45 minutes and then we have hopefully about 15 minutes Q&A for all the questions that you may have. And today the title is Just Tactics or Obvious Manipulation, which actually has to do with the prevalence and moral challenges and also the normalization of match fixing in sports. Because it is a really difficult question to answer sometimes where tactics and manipulation begins. And someone who can tell us more about this is Steph van der Hoeven. He's currently doing a PhD at Gent University in Belgium for the Department of Movement and Sports Sciences. And he's also part of the Sport Management Research Group. He actually already wrote many interesting articles about the topic of match fixing, mostly on non-batting and sports related match fixing. So please give a big applause to Steph van der Hoeven. Thank you Hanna for the nice introduction. So as already mentioned, my name is Steph van der Hoeven. I'm a PhD student within the Research Group of Sports Management at the Department of Movement and Sports Sciences at Gent University. And I'm doing research on match fixing. And today I will tell you something more about my recent work on match fixing, which is about the prevalence, moral challenges and normalization of match fixing. So here you can see an overview of today's evening. So first of all, I will give a short introduction, which builds further on the previous lecture given by Professor Spapens. Then I will tell you something more about our research on match fixing in Flemish sports and the moral challenges that come with it. And thirdly, I will tell you something more about our Erasmus Plus project Eposom, in which we examined match fixing in seven European countries, including the Netherlands. Then I will focus on the normalization of match fixing, especially within the unique strategic context of road cycling. And eventually I will end my presentation with some conclusions. So as already mentioned, during the previous lecture, Professor Spapens talked about match fixing, what it is, its definition, the different types of match fixing. He also explained some cases in the Netherlands and beyond. And he also reviewed some risk factors. Today I will repeat some of these things so that everything is clear to you. And then I will add some new insights to this. So match fixing, being a short, the manipulation of sports competitions, is as old as sport itself and has already occurred in a wide variety of sports and countries. As you can see on the slide, in tennis, football, badminton, basketball, cricket, boxing, and so on. Actually, the slide is way too small to show you all the sports that have already been affected by match fixing. The most widely used definition of match fixing is the one of the Council of Europe which describes match fixing or the manipulation of sports competitions as an intentional arrangement, act or omission, aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others. So, as demonstrated by this definition, one of the key difficulties is the broadness of the concept of match fixing, and this can be explained in several ways. First of all, there are different types of match fixing. A distinction is usually made between batting-related match fixing and non-batting-related match fixing. Batting-related match fixing aims to make profits on the batting market by batting on the manipulated game. Within this type, a distinction is usually made between batting-related match fixing in which people try to manipulate the specific end result of a match or the outcome of the match and then bat on this. And on the other hand, you have spot fixing in which people try to manipulate specific elements within a match. For example, who gets the first throw in, who takes the first yellow card, who wins the first set, and then they bat on this. On the other hand, you have non-batting-related match fixing, or in other words, sporting-related match fixing. With sporting-related match fixing, it focuses primarily on sporting interests. For example, when people try to fix a match to prevent the relocation of a specific club or team, or just to enable a specific club or team to become champion. Or another example is when people try to avoid meeting a certain competitor in the next round of a tournament. So, in all of these types, also bribery or coercion can be involved. Another example of non-batting-related match fixing is the Batminton scandal at the Olympic Games of 2012 in London, where eight Batminton players were disqualified from the women's double tournament, as they tried to intentionally lose their match to avoid a certain competitor in the next round of the tournament. So, the Batminton World Federation disqualified these athletes on the ground that they broke the code of conduct of the Batminton Federation, which states that they always have to perform at their best and try to pursue victory. An additional argument was that their behaviour was very detrimental and abusive for the sport. So, this example is actually the biggest example of a mass disqualification and the first example of a disqualification of multiple athletes from multiple countries for match fixing in the 21st century on the Olympic Games. An example of batting-related match fixing is the Zeynye case, which took place in Belgium in 2004-2005. Zeynye was a so-called Chinese businessman who infiltrated in several professional football clubs and bribed and coerced people into fixing, so athletes and coaches, so he could earn money by batting on the manipulated games through the Asian legal batting market. An example of spot fixing is the case of Matlotissier. Matlotissier was a former professional footballer of Southampton and in his autobiography he confessed that he was involved in an attempt to spot fix. More specifically, during a game in 1995 against Wimbledon, he and some friends had bad money on the fact that the first win would take place during the first minute. So, as planned, Matlotissier received the ball immediately after the kickoff and he tried to kick the ball out of play. Unfortunately for him, the winger of his team was not aware of this and he kept the ball in play, so their attempt to spot fix did not succeed. So, these are some examples. So, just for the sake of clarity, I would like to mention that when I speak about sport-related match fixing, I actually mean non-batting-related match fixing. These are synonyms that are often used interchangeably in the literature and also throughout my presentation. So, now I will tell you something more about match fixing in Flemish sports and the moral challenges that come with it. So, during the previous lecture, Professor Spaapens discussed the research he did together with Professor Overs in the Netherlands on match fixing and they found that 8% of their respondents indicated that they knew someone who had been approached for match fixing. Additionally, they saw that 4% indicated that they had already been approached personally for match fixing and moreover, the majority of their cases were sporting-related. Now, following these interesting results, we also got the idea to examine the prevalence of match fixing in Flemish sports, more specifically in Flemish football, tennis and ballminton. Additionally, we also would like to examine how match fixing related to the moral decision-making process of the people who are approached for match fixing. So, what did we do? We conducted an online questionnaire on match fixing based on the study of Spaapens and Overs and added elements to examine spot fixing and the model of rest, which I will explain to you in a few minutes. We disseminated the questionnaire through Facebook and email and additionally, we also visited some clubs and tournaments with tablets to recruit respondents. In total, we reached a sample of 567 other members who were affiliated with the Flemish Sports Federation of Football, Tennis or Ballminton. So, what did our results show? Regarding the prevalence of match fixing, we saw that 101 respondents indicated that they knew someone who had been approached for match fixing. So, this equals 17.8%. On the other hand, 36 respondents indicated that they had been approached themselves for match fixing Moreover, of these 36 cases, 33 cases were non-batting related and 3 cases were batting related. So, these results clearly show that non-batting related match fixing occurs significantly more in Flemish sports than batting related match fixing. The second part of our results related to the moral decision-making process of the people who are approached for match fixing and therefore, we used the model of rest. The model of rest consists of four steps. More specifically, the first step, moral sensitivity, which refers to the ability of an individual to recognize that the situation contains a moral issue. The second step, moral judgment, refers to the evaluation of the moral justification of the different solutions to the moral issue. So, in other words, during the second step, moral judgment, an individual will decide whether his or her moral action is morally right or wrong. In the third step, moral motivation, the moral solution, refers to the intention to choose the moral solution over other solutions. So, for example, financial gain. The fourth step, moral character involves courage and determination to follow through with the moral action despite external threats or pressure, for example. So, what did our results show? Our results showed that people who are approached for a non-batting related match fixing proposal frequently consented to the proposal because they don't see match fixing as an ethical issue, which is the first step of the process. Or even if they see match fixing as an ethical issue, they don't judge it as morally wrong, which is the second step of the process. For example, they saw it as a friendly gesture towards another club or athlete, or some of them stated that they don't see the problem to lose the set and eventually win the match. On the other hand, we saw that people who were approached for a batting related match fixing proposal know that it is an ethical issue, that it is morally wrong, but they consented to the proposal because of other inducements, like, for example, financial gain, which is a third step. Or people others who were approached for batting related match fixing consented because of external threats or pressures, which is the fourth step. So, our results show that the different steps of the moral thrust were linked to both types of match fixing. So, our results showed that both types of match fixing are clearly different diseases that ask for different remedies. So, based on this, we would state that to prevent non-batting related match fixing, awareness raising initiatives are necessary or an ethical quote on match fixing and so on, whereas for batting related match fixing, trustworthy whistleblowing protection programs are more appropriate. So, if you would like to know something more about this, then you can read our research online. You can visit the paper through this QR code. So, after these interesting results in Flanders, we got the idea to expand this research on a broader international scale. And therefore, we elaborated the Erasmus Sport Project EPOSM, which stands for Evidence-Based Prevention of Sporting Related Match Fixing. And this project went from January 2020 until December 2021, so it recently ended. And this project was co-funded by the Erasmus Plus programme of the European Union. So, our project team consisted of 10 project partners where we as Kent University were the coordinator. And for example, for the Netherlands, our academic partner was Utrecht University and our practical partner was Foundation CSCF. Our project had three main objectives. First of all, raising awareness about the prevalence of sporting-related match fixing, stimulating moral judgment regarding the fact that sporting-related match fixing is wrong, and sharing and transferring this knowledge on sporting-related match fixing. So, we tried to do this in three parts. So, in the first academic part, we conducted the online questionnaire on match fixing in seven countries. Then, in the second part, we elaborated action plans against match fixing and workshops on match fixing. And in the third part, we further disseminated our results and outputs of the project. So, regarding the online questionnaire, we conducted an online questionnaire on match fixing in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In each country, we focused on three sports disciplines, mainly football and tennis, and then, according to the national preferences, we added a third sport. So, for example, in Belgium, we focused on football, tennis and basketball, whereas in the Netherlands, we focused on football, tennis and hockey. Our target groups were respondents of 18 years or older who are or were involved in the selected sport disciplines per country. So, we really tried to reach a various range of sport actors, so current and former athletes, coaches, board members, referees, medical staff and so on. Eventually, we reached a total sample of 5,014 respondents across the seven countries. Of these 5,014 respondents, 17.5% of them indicated that they personally knew one or more persons who had been approached to fix. Additionally, 8.4% of them indicated that they had already been approached themselves for match fixing. So, if we count these both percentages together, so 17.5 plus 8.4%, then we have approximately 26%. However, between both groups, there was an overlap of approximately 6%, so there was 6% of the sample who indicated that they had already been approached themselves for match fixing, and that they knew someone else who had also been approached for match fixing. So, if we do 26% minus the 6% overlap, we have nearly 20% of the people in sports that has been confronted with direct or indirect match fixing proposals. So, if we have a closer look at the people who indicated that they had been approached themselves for match fixing, then we saw that the last or only match fixing proposal they received had only a sporting-related purpose in 68% of the cases, and it had only a batting-related purpose in 9.8% of the cases. So, again, our figures show that sporting-related match fixing occurs significantly more than batting-related match fixing. However, I can hear you think, where are the other 22.2%? Well, the other respondents indicated that they were approached for another motive without specification, or they indicated a combination of motives. For example, some of the respondents indicated that the last or only match fixing proposal they received had a sporting-related purpose and a batting-related purpose at the same time. So, for example, it can happen that someone wants to fix a match to prevent the relocation of a team and then uses this information to earn money on the batting market as well. So, this is an important finding that shows that both types of match fixing don't have to be separated, they can also happen on the same time. And additionally, there were some respondents who indicated that they did not know what the motive was of the proposal they received. So, as mentioned, in our project, we also examined match fixing in the Netherlands, and now I will give you a quick look at some figures for the Netherlands. So, in the Netherlands, we reached a total sample of 1,039 respondents in hockey, tennis and football. However, for our analysis, we only focused on the sample in hockey and tennis, because for these two samples, we were able to use the member panels of the Hockey Federation and the Tennis Federation in the Netherlands. For example, for the Hockey Federation, we sent our questionnaire to 3,097 members of their member panel, and we got an answer from 545 of them. And tennis, we sent our questionnaire to 4,400 panel members of the Tennis Federation, and we received an answer of 420 of them. In football, this methodology was not possible, and therefore we tried to reach respondents through social media, but we only reached a small sample, and therefore we decided to exclude them from the analysis. So, in this sample, we saw that 12% knew someone who had been approached for match fixing. This percentage was slightly higher in hockey than in tennis. And on the other hand, we saw that 7% indicated that they had been approached themselves for match fixing. What was surprising is that all of these cases were sporting-related. As we look at the research of Spapersnan authors, they indicated that 20% of the cases were batting-related. But if we have a closer look at their research, we saw that they mainly reached football players on a high level and the highest level. So the chance that batting-related match fixing would be reported in their research was also higher than with our research, as we tried to reach really all levels from the lowest to the highest. So these are some figures for the Netherlands. If you would like to know something more about our EPOSM project or specifically about the figures for the Netherlands, then you can check our website where result reports are present for the different countries. And on the website of Utrecht University, there is also a ditch version of the result report for the Netherlands. Additionally, we also have some social media pages where developments of the project were posted. So although the previous mentioned prevalence figures are very valuable, there are still other difficulties to the concept of match fixing. One of them is the question, when do we speak about match fixing? Where do proper tactics end and when does manipulation begin? Why is it possible that certain behaviour can be seen as tactics in one sport while it is considered corruption in another sport? To answer these questions, we examined the grey zone between tactics and manipulation in road cycling. Now, why did we choose road cycling? Because match fixing has hardly been investigated in road cycling despite some well-known incidents. For example, former cyclist Alexander Vino Kurov, which is on the left photo, was accused of buying his 2010 Lies-Bastogne-Liesh victory from the Russian rider Kolobnev. One year after his victory, a Swiss magazine revealed emails between both cyclists where an agreement was made about 150,000 euros. However, nine years later, both cyclists were cleared of corruption so in 2019 due to a lack of evidence. Two years after his first controversial victory, Alexander Vino Kurov was again discredited in 2012 after his controversial victory during the London Olympic road cycling race. So, despite these well-known incidents, match fixing has barely been investigated in road cycling. Additionally, road cycling is characterised by a unique strategic context as cyclists have to cooperate with their competitors to have success. Moreover, the cooperation between competitors assumes various forms ranging from whole teams working together in the peloton to cyclists sharing the burden in a breakaway. So, it is unclear where permitted cooperation ends and prohibited cooperation starts. Moreover, the world-governing body of cycling, the Union cyclist international or in short UCI, states that riders shall sportingly defend their own chances, any collusion or behaviour likely to falsify or go against the interest of the competition shall be forbidden. Although the UCI's apparent black and white rule implies that any form of cooperation or collusion is actually forbidden, they do not define where proper tactics end and a proper alteration start. As such, the boundaries between acceptable behaviour and misconduct remain unclear, causing a grey zone. This grey zone, a road cycling sculpture of agreement, can be explained by the peculiarities of road cycling. The first peculiarity is the fact that road cycling is an individual sport practised in teams, a so-called hybrid sport. Cycling races are organised as team events, but it is always one cyclist who wins the race. Additionally, road cycling is practised on public roads, with air resistance as the primary external factor and therefore the technique of drafting, which means riding so close behind another cyclist that the air resistance is significantly reduced, forms the main foundation of tactics in road cycling. By drafting another cyclist on a flat road, a cyclist can save up to 30-40% of energy. A third feature is that road cycling is characterized by hierarchical structures both within a team and between teams. Within a team, a hierarchical distinction is usually made between team captains who are expected to garner the team's results and helpers, or in other terms, domestics, whose only role is to support the team captains during the race. As such, there is an inherent tension between individualism and collectivism in road cycling teams. This tension is also present between teams as well, as the UCI makes a hierarchical distinction between UCI world teams, pro teams and continental teams. However, it happens that cyclists of the different team levels often compete against each other in the same peloton, so that's why we frequently see that the big teams dominate races, but of course agreements between cyclists of the different levels are also made. Fourthly, as cycling teams almost completely depend on their main sponsors, the contract durations are rather short, and therefore the job insecurity and the pressure to deliver results is quite high. Fifthly, the prize money in road cycling is usually shared with all team members, including the technical staff. This mechanism is used to stimulate cooperation within a team. However, this could also lead to a tendency to ignore the team tactics, and for example sell a race so an individual cyclist could earn more money. And lastly, the cycling peloton has often been compared to a family, in which each cyclist must adhere to tested or unwritten rules. However, this close-knit community has already shown to facilitate illicit activities, like for example doping use, as we think on the Armstrong case, while complexifying its detection and prosecution. Moreover, several authors have shown that cyclists were ostracized or even pushed out of cycling when they tried to denounce corruption cases. So, although the peculiarities of road cycling may explain road cycling's culture of agreements, they also emphasize the grey zone. Although the various forms of cooperation clearly differ in terms of questionability and improperness, they are all implicitly contrary to the UCI rule. So we state that behavior that could perhaps be seen as corruption is actually considered normal in road cycling. So to examine this, we use the theoretical framework of Ashford and Anand about the normalization of corruption in organizations, which states that three pillars contribute to the normalization of corruption. More specifically, the first pillar institutionalization refers to the process by which corrupt practices are enacted as a matter of routine, often without conscious thought about their property. The second pillar, rationalization, refers to the process by which individuals who engage in corrupt acts use self-serving ideologies to justify the acts in their own eyes. And the third pillar, socialization, refers to the process by which newcomers are taught to perform and accept the corrupt practices. So these three pillars are mutually reinforcing and interdependent and contribute to the normalization of corruption. So following all of this information, we had two research questions. The first one was, how do road cyclists perceive the existence of match fixing in their sport? And the second one was, based on the theoretical framework, how is match fixing institutionalized, rationalized, and socialized in road cycling? So to examine this, we try to interview cyclists. So we first had a short list of cyclists we would like to interview, then we contacted them, and if someone agreed, we also asked them to suggest other cyclists who could give their perspective on the subject. Eventually, we interviewed 15 road cyclists. All of them were male, four were female. They were of different ages and involved on different levels. For example, on the highest amateur level, elite without contract, to the continental level, to even the highest level in cycling, which is the world tour level. So what did our results show? Our results showed that road cyclists have a different understanding of match fixing. Cyclists generally explained their perception of match fixing meant deciding before the race what will happen during the race. So given their belief that they did not predetermine competition outcomes, they were convinced that match fixing does not occur in road cycling. Moreover, when it comes to bootmakers and online betting, they did not saw this as a threat to their sport. When I talk about bootmakers, I really mean bookies who are physically present along the roadside and who write down the odds on a child board. So these kind of bookies were also seen as a part of the tradition and folklore of the sport, even despite past incidents with them. On the other hand, the cyclists clearly distinguished the cooperation concept. They stated that cooperation was an inherent tactical part of road cycling and does not match fixing. On the other hand, they acknowledged that buying and selling races was not uncommon in their sport, mainly at lower levels of competition. And although mixed feelings were present, they didn't see this as match fixing as well. For example, they stated that you have to be in the decisive breakaway before you get that chance. So some of them stated that cyclists at the back of the peloton will not come in the position to buy or sell a race. So you first have to deserve it to be in that position to buy or sell a race. So they also didn't see this as match fixing. So albeit our results showed that cyclists have a different perception of match fixing compared to the definition of the Council of Europe, our results further showed that different forms of cooperation were normalized in road cycling. So regarding the institutionalization pillar, we saw that cyclists initially decided to cooperate with competitors for tactical reasons, out of friendship, for example with training partners of other teams. From a racy pro-coal perspective, so for example, I have you today, you help me tomorrow, or from a rational choice perspective, so where a cost-benefit analysis is made, this is more linked to buying and selling races. This all happened in a climate where ethics are quickly pushed aside. So in a second phase, we saw that cooperation became embedded in cycling structures and processes, which could be seen in the many or written rules that exist in a cycling peloton. An example of an unwritten rule is that it is not allowed to attack when an opponent is doing a sanitary stop. Or for example, in a stage race, when a general classification rider is in the decisive breakaway with a helper from another team, and they stay in front until the finish, then it's actually an unwritten rule that a general classification rider should give the stage victory to the helper. So these kind of unwritten rules were very prevalent in the cycling peloton. So we could see that the peloton was actually a kind of subculture which insulates the cyclists from the wider culture with its own norms, values, and where cooperation was normalized. So in a third phase, we saw that cooperation became routinized and habitual in road cycling. When we asked the cyclists about routinized fixing, they almost immediately pointed to the post to the France criteriums. These are a kind of exhibition races that are organized shortly after the Tour de France in towns in Flanders and also in the Netherlands. And they found it very normal that the result of these criteriums were predetermined as these criteriums have commercial purposes and serve to entertain the people. So they found this normal. Regarding the rationalization pillar, we could identify the eight rationalizing strategies as listed by Ashford and Anand. For example, cyclists frequently used selective comparison justifications to state that match fixing is a much bigger problem in football than in road cycling. So in this way, they tried to justify their own behavior and minimize the fact that it could also happen in their sport. Or they refocused attention. For example, when we were talking about the post to the France criteriums, they also sometimes stated that these criteriums were fixed for their own safety because after three weeks of Tour de France, they are very exhausted. And so for their own safety, the race was fixed. However, by using this rationalization, they tried to refocus the attention from the fact that the race was fixed to a non-stigmatized fact, their safety. Or they denied their responsibility by stating that everyone does it or in that particular situation, I had no other choice than to sell the race or they didn't see their behavior as something wrong and so on. So many rationalizations were used to justify their cooperative behavior. Regarding the socialization pillar, we could identify the mechanism of incrementalism. As we saw that cyclists gradually evolved their attitudes towards cooperative behavior throughout their career. The longer they are in the peloton, the better they get to know the other cyclists who are very strong and cooperative cyclists and so their attitude towards cooperation evolves throughout their career. On the other hand, we saw that cyclists also frequently compromised to avoid problems and social sanctions of other cyclists. For example, some of them stated that it is not done to break an agreement or to refuse an agreement because this could lead to social sanctions in the current race but also in future races. So if you break an agreement in one race, it could happen that in the next five races they will write against you. So these two mechanisms were sometimes supplemented by the mechanism of co-optation, which means that new commerce were induced by rewards. For example, money. However, we clearly saw that this mechanism of co-optation was subordinate to the reciprocal nature of agreements. So by showing how cooperation is normalized in road cycling, this study clearly challenged the concept of match fixing. Moreover, it showed that match fixing should not be considered in a black or white way. Although road cycling's culture of agreements may theoretically imply match fixing, we see that it is considered normal and inherent by the cyclists. As such, we may also wonder whether we are authorized to label this behavior as match fixing. Additionally, we also clearly saw that the normalization process is at the root of the gray zone we perceive in road cycling. So if you would like to know something more about this study, then you can find the original research article online also via this QR code. So then I would like to end my presentation with some conclusions. So building on the figures I showed you today, we can conclude that sporting-related match fixing occurs significantly more than batting-related match fixing. Following this, I would advocate that sporting-related match fixing should be given a more prominent place in sport-corruption research and prevention initiatives because until today, research and initiatives mainly focused on batting-related match fixing. Additionally, our study in cycling clearly showed that match fixing or behavior that could perhaps be seen as match fixing can become embedded, perpetuated and disnormalized in sports. Now, following all of this, so based on the figures which show that sporting-related match fixing occurs significantly more, that it is in fact more common and accepted and that it is actually easier to rationalize and socialize sporting-related match fixing because it is frequently seen as tactics and not as corruption, I would argue that sporting-related match fixing is more normalized or at least is more vulnerable to the normalization process than batting-related match fixing. So this does not mean that batting-related match fixing cannot be normalized. Certainly in countries or areas where corruption is more widespread, it is also possible that batting-related match fixing is normalized. Before I end my presentation, I would like to end with a small promotion talk. During August of this year, match fixing will be released with the title, Understanding Match Fixing in Sport, Theory and Practice. This book was edited by a colleague of mine and I also added or contributed a chapter to this book in which I explained some of the insights I showed you today. So if you are interested in match fixing, certainly check our forthcoming work. Thanks for your attention. Are there any questions? Yes, are there any questions maybe? I have a question about the... I think it was one of the last studies on cycling where you interviewed, I think, 14 respondents. 15. 15? Okay. And you mentioned only four of them were women. So I was wondering how you got these respondents. You mentioned the procedure that they would mention another name. And I was wondering why do you think there were so few women in the pool and what was the consequence in the results? Yeah, so first we had a short list of women we would like to interview. So involved on the different levels, as we clearly saw that the hierarchical structures within cycling, so continental level, a protein level and a world tour level. But with this kind of research, it is not evident to find people. So we contacted the different people on our short list. And when someone agreed, then we interviewed them and we also asked them to suggest other people who are interesting for our research. And unfortunately, we were not able to recruit an equal number of female cyclists than male cyclists. But in the end, we stopped the data collection as we saw data saturation. So as we saw that the answers frequently returned. So we kept recruiting respondents and after 15 respondents, we saw that several things were repeated in their answers. So then we decided to stop the data collection and then we analyzed this sample. Alright, any other questions maybe? Yeah? Thank you. Where exactly does the moral relevance for sports, the non-batting area then at least? I understand that with batting you're essentially just stealing money from people in a way. So that's clear. But for me at least, when I think of sports, the main point of sports would be simply entertainment essentially. And as long as the public isn't aware of matchmaking, does that really affect it? And if not, then where does it derive its moral relevance from? Well, actually any kind of match fixing is a breach of fair play. And fair play is the basic of sports that you should always pursue victory and try to win. So regarding sporting-related match fixing, if anyone sees it, it's still a problem. It's still against the spirit of sport to pursue victory. And that's where it all starts. So that is actually a breach of the basic principles of sport. And so we clearly saw that regarding sporting-related match fixing, they frequently didn't see it as an ethical issue or didn't see it as a problem. Frequently as a friendly jester, certainly on lower levels. I don't know if this answers your question. Yeah, just like responding, it also makes me think of a question of curious to think what you think about it. Like usually, or there's this critique nowadays coming up that there's also, you know, it's not in sports only about your physique or that you're really talented, but there's also lots of money, you know, like getting into sports and when you basically pay enough money, you can reach a top level or you at least have an advantage over others who cannot pay that amount of money. So, you know, match fixing is, of course, a big problem or one of those problems. But what do you think of like fair play in sports as general? Do you see it also, yeah, as a problem that is affecting sports nowadays? What do you think of that idea? Of fair play? Yeah, fair play and, you know, like all those issues that we are now facing when big amounts of money coming in but also match fixing. And I'm also really curious how you think we could prevent it, maybe. Yeah, for prevention, as I mentioned during my presentation, we can focus on education, so to raise awareness. But of course, we may not only focus on the fact that match fixing is only an individual problem. In our research, we sometimes speak about the micro, meso and macro level. So you have on a micro level the individual and then, of course, it's easy to state, it's the fault of the individual. But on the meso level, you also have the organization and the culture in the organization that is responsible for the behavior within the organization. And on a macro level, you have also the rules. So you can focus on education on an individual level and awareness raising, but also the rules and the organizations, the federations involved should also work on the prevention of it. All right, thank you. Any other question? Yeah, thank you for talking first of all. Fauci said that fair play is trying to win every match. And by trying to win every match, you don't participate in match fixing, right? Yeah, basically. Yeah, sure. Let's say in a tournament where you want to win the cup rather than, well, you might want to win every match in order to win the cup. But like in the work of 2018, where Belgium, in the second to avoid any type of competitors, right? We'll just say that in that case, when a team plays well within their own capabilities in order to try and win the competition, is in fact match fixing or not? Yes, in fact, in each game, you should play at your best abilities. But I think you were mentioning the match against England. So also the difficulty regarding this is to prove it. You should play to win the game. But of course, if they try to lose or draw the game, then if the intention is to fix the match, then it's actually match fixing. But if everyone says, yeah, we did our best, no agreement or it can be proved, then you have no evidence to show that it is match fixing. And that is actually what can be linked to the gray zone I showed you today, that certainly around sporting-related match fixing, someone can say that in our tactics at a certain moment, whereas others will say it's match fixing. And there in that gray area, it's not clear where we should draw the line, which is fault and what is not fault. Early on you mentioned the example of a badminton team being disqualified. Do you know how it was determined that that was match fixing? Yeah, the important thing about this was that it was about four duos and they played right after each other. So the four duos tried to intentionally lose the match. So the first match in the group stage was over a very bad level. You can also check these matches on YouTube and you will see that they played very, very bad. And so the spectators had paid an expensive ticket. Wanted to see top bottom and then they saw a strange game and the whole crowd was booing. So that was already a feature that it was not right. Then the referee even stopped the game and warned them to improve their game because it was so bad. And then one hour after that first game, the second game was exactly the same. So the spectators even got more mad. And then the day after, the Batminton World Federation decided based on their code of conduct that they had to be disqualified because it was a disaster for the sport what happened the day before. So that was also the first time that based on the code of conduct that athletes were disqualified. All right. Any other questions? No. Then I think we finish here. Thank you very much again, Steph, for giving this lecture today. It's also good to know that next week, next week on Thursday, we have our last lecture in this series by Sandra Meoze. She's a sports philosopher, also giving a talk about this topic. And yeah, for today, I found it really interesting also that in your research, you really looked at the corruption model in organizations and that you really applied it to, yeah, to match fixing basically. It's interesting to see those parallels and what actually comes out of it. And it also really makes me think, oh, it's even more difficult now to really, yeah, there's this big gray zone and to really detect or see what is match fixing and what it is not. It's not black and white, as you said. So thank you very much. And again, please give a big applause for Steph. Thank you.