 Good afternoon. I'm Sharon Squasone. I direct the proliferation prevention program here at CSIS and I'm delighted to welcome you into this nice cool Enclave. I hear that it's really hot outside today. I am very very pleased to have here with us today Dr. Resha Rahman from New Delhi and Before I introduce him I just wanted to make a few administrative notes. So please take your cell phone and put it on Vibrate We are going to that's really the only administrative note. The other one is I think we are totally on the record Right And this is being webcast So I think we do take questions via email. Is that true Bobby? Well, you can always try you can try my personal email If you want to do that, we are gonna have plenty of time for questions. So I Urge you to be thinking about that As we go along Dr. Rajah Rahman many of you may know him in some of his Different capacities. He's a theoretical physicist By training And studied under Dr. Hans beta at Cornell University many many years ago But he has taught and conducted research at Princeton University, Delhi University, and the Indian Institute of Science And has had long-standing affiliations with Harvard, Stanford, MIT CERN and Princeton Some of you here may know him as a founding member and co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials And when we were talking about You know, what should he come and present on at CSIS? It's really hard because here's an expert who can talk about anything really technical issues policy issues And so what we chose to look at was In the last year since the BJP came back to power in New Delhi What's happened? What's shifted if anything in the worlds of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy? So Dr. Rajah Rahman, I'll give the floor to you. Thank you Thank you very much and so again begin by thanking CSIS and Sharon Scorsoni for arranging the stock and Mr. Bobby Kim for all his courtesy in the logistics This is my first visit to CSIS and I'm very happy to be here. I'm overrored by this building. I Thought it might be useful to give an update of the past year's developments on nuclear India Particularly because a new government assumed office about a year ago The philosophy of the party that formed the government the BJP Has been known to be significantly different from that of the earlier Congress government Which ran the country for eight years and then several times before that So there was considerable speculation before this government actually came to power as To how this chain might affect the country's nuclear policies both the strategic and civilian In fact, it may be recalled that the last time the BJP government came to power within a few months that exploded the nuclear weapons So the first nuclear test was done. I mean apart from the 74 thing By the BJP government as per its promise soon after it came to power So the questions would they do other spectacular things this time or not and so on This is a question whose answer you already know. So I'll just elaborate on the answer There are two topics in particular on which developments or Absence of I mean much of the story concerns the dog did not bark as Shenokum says Things that didn't happen are as important as things that did happen And they're significant. I'll touch upon them first is the collection of strategic issues nuclear posture such as no first use and related features of the nuclear doctrine their relevance to Pakistan's Nassir missile and Pakistan's proxy warfare through terrorism. This will be analyzed The current state of minimum deterrence in India will be analyzed and I'll also talk a little bit about how Well, deterrence is working in fact within India and Pakistan Then an entirely different sub topic where also things have happened in the past year I'll talk about nuclear civilian energy and the cooperation with the US and with France and with Russia On building civilian nuclear reactors. So I'll give a little background of each of these topics and then talk about what happened In fact, the key thing on the second sub topic is the nuclear liability act in India Which created a lot of problems and it's on its way to being resolved We don't know how far it will get completely resolved and then during the Q&A session Sharon assured me we can have a free for all anything So let me talk about the nuclear posture and doctrine the the last available official statement of India's nuclear security doctrine comes from a note issued by the cabinet committee and security, which is the highest body in India discussing security matters. It's the subcommittee of the cabinet and It released a new note It just in the newspapers as in the public domain, which is viewed as the official statement of our nuclear doctrine So this remains as our official statement. I won't Describe all that is in it because that's old news It was based on a draft doctrine that was released in 1999 Soon after the test, I think that was a very statesman I think that the government did the government generally tend to be secretive and ours just as much as anybody else's and to issue a doctrine statement within six months of such a sensitive matter as a nuclear Policy Was I thought of good thing? It was released to the public and people like me who have known normally no access at all To corridors of anything could read about this in the newspapers and slowly get into To the public debate. So that was done in 1999. It remained as a draft level four years later It was made official by this release from the cabinet's committee on security And what I'll talk about here is not the full doctrine, which is complicated But one element of that was a declaration of no first use and that is relevant to the past year Everybody knows what that policy is but that that we India will not use nuclear be the first used nuclear weapons against any country Now the policy is generally denigrated by many analysts as an empty and pointless thing Because it's a trawler statement of intent not a statement of capability and may not be believed by the adversaries So what's the point of putting it out? in fact my Pakistani colleagues whom I meet often from time to time on track two meetings say that they don't put any faith on This is no first use doctrine of India In the event of a crisis they would base their strategy on the actual arms movements and deployments and Not worry about what the statements earlier to that might be as hard strategic Plan this of course makes sense. You look at what's going on and not pay much attention to intentions Nevertheless, I think that it was good that the country put out the no first use statement at that time because it was first of all a sincere statement. I believe that the country believes this Policy and it was meant to reassure the world community soon after the tests that our intentions are not Nuclear aggression or war winning So it was a good statement as a diplomatic and political level whatever be its actual operational usefulness Nevertheless throughout this period there has been a body of opinion within India's strategic community The most somewhat more hard-line people who advocate dumping this no first use Policy they feel it weak weakens our deterrence it encourages adventures among the part of adversaries They would rather keep all nuclear options open as For instance, I believe is the case in the US and isn't the case in Pakistan Advocates of this viewpoint might have hoped and many of them explicitly express the hope that the BJP Which is sought to believe in a much more muscular military and foreign policy would abandon the no first use claws And on the other side of the debate moderate elements were concerned about the same thing that the BJP government would be more hawkish and abandon or modify no first use and so it's interesting that The Prime Minister even before he became prime minister during the last few weeks of the election campaign Elate these fears by declaring that he will leave no first use alone that he will not take it in any way That happened approximately here from now and so the no first use remains as stated in the old doctrine documents and One would call this. This is a non-development. That's what I meant by the But so that nothing is changed, but it's an important non-development This is one that was worrying a lot of people and even now people would like to see it changed so This is one thing that's happened. The other thing was there were some other changes in the Cabinet committees 2003 doctrine Which were not there in the earlier doctrine some things were added and some of them are relevant to today's situation in South Asia Let me mention One of them is the preconditions for nuclear retaliation It said that nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory and on Indian forces a phrase that was added which said anywhere so this phrase then Not there in the old document and added in the new document and it presumably means then that if the Indians were to go Into another country with their forces and those are attacked by nuclear weapons Even if that happens in somebody else's soil, India would consider it as an attack on India. We can't retaliate So this was added in the 2003 document explicitly deterred a nuclear attack on our forces should they enter alien territory It's not very implausible that in today's situation because after Pakistan developed the Nasser, which is a nuclear capable Battlefield missile which could be used on invading Indian forces So this possibility that Indians may be attacked in an alien territory By a nuclear weapon is not so it's not something which is impossible to imagine But the threat that India will counter-attack with a Nuclear massive nuclear attacker. I think it's an idle threat because if there's only a minor nuclear Hit on Indian forces within let's say Pakistan Killing a few hundred people a few hundred is not a small number But in the scale of things one talks about amongst weapons of grand our mass destruction It is a small number killing a few hundred soldiers and destroying some artillery India will will deem it wiser to retaliate with only a conventional attack It'll be silly to have massive nuclear retaliation Even if the other side drops a small nuclear weapon as long as it does it on another territory and causes far less than Damage, which you would call as mass destruction So there's an argument for removing this clause in relation Sometimes I'd say remove this clause because including a threat in your doctrine Knowing fully well that you know how to go through with it could lower the credibility It's a it's a it is of course speaks well of the country that they won't go through with it But when you have that and document and then don't go through with it It people would say it could lower the credibility of the doctrine as a whole and reduce subsequent defectiveness of the nuclear deterrent But of course the government is not going to do that because removing a phrase from a document is a very very Active process and that can be read in a hundred different ways. So I don't think come it's gonna change that But the lat but enough in all fairness The language does not really make it mandatory that we will go and hit them with a nuclear force should they attack us elsewhere But only that there's the option of doing so and a distinction between that option and the compulsion is something that The adversary may not wish to take a chance on so to that extent it may serve some purpose The second change was the addition This was I think following what the US did and that is this phrase saying in the event of a biological or nuclear attack Again, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons I think this was introduced in the US and then the Indians immediately copied it introduced in theirs This again is in some sense Mostly an idle thread because biological and chemical attacks can come in all shapes and sizes Somebody can dispoison some pawn somewhere few people will die. That's not in the same scale as calling for a massive retaliation So once again like the case of the nuclear strike In other territories. This is again something which probably is not in the mass destruction realm at all But nevertheless it was included because at that time there was a sphere and largely because it was done by the US So these are two additional changes that are operate without there which are still there Which have not been changed by the new government. In fact, the new government really hasn't done anything on the strategic front Which I consider to be a good thing in the sense that so much more could have been done that they didn't do Now I'll conclude this discussion of the strategic issues by Summarizing in my view has nuclear deterrence worked in India's case First let me take it versus Pakistan. I think not withstanding outdated references which even persist even now of an India-Pakistan arms race I don't really don't think India is racing against Pakistan. I mean at one time. Yes, but no longer It's true that some Indians get very agitated every time there is news that Pakistan is acquired one thing or the other A couple of years ago Cypri made a statement that they have 100 weapons in India's only 90 weapons have already got agitated It's that's all but luckily these things make very little if impact on policy. So I Don't think India is competing at the nuclear on the in the nuclear arena with Pakistan at all We already have in place an arsenal which is more than sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage And the nuclear doctrine says that the purpose of our arsenal is one of a minimal deterrent Which can cause unacceptable damage. It's not a war waning thing. It's not meant to do more damage than just cause unacceptable damage in the other side, so We have an arsenal that's more than enough I can't go into detail because it's not enough time to do this and therefore no government even a remotely responsible one in Pakistan in my view would consider the nuclear first strike on India. I don't seriously think they would I'm not worried that they would In the same way Pakistan also has an arsenal to deter India and No serious analysts in my view even in Pakistan expects us to conduct a nuclear strike on them first They may worry about many other things, but not this thing So I think there's really the deterrent to the extent. It's there has worked on both sides either country I think seriously expect the other to launch a first strike So mutually deterrent arsenal exists on both sides But I must go on record saying that Pakistan arsenal has served a different operational purpose From the outset Pakistan has argued that their nuclear forces were designed to also deter the conventional attack by India because a bigger country with a bigger army and so on But The induction of things like the battlefield missile Nasser signals a lowering of that red line But more than that the threat of nuclear attacks to cover conventional attacks Could apply not just in a war But even in response to an Indian retaliation against terrorist attacks of the kind that's in Mumbai So if tomorrow there's another terrorist attack and the country India were to respond with the conventional hit Would that be considered as something warranting a nuclear response or not? so the issue of Developing a nuclear arsenal to deter a conventional attack in the context of terrorism gets complicated and there are people who View who in India many people have the view that the Pakistan's nuclear arsenal its main purpose now is a cover for subcontinental terrorist strikes This is not question of my view is the view that people feel So this is a problem in my view. This is the single biggest problem in South Asia The only thing that can possibly do spark something there is a terrorist attack on India not necessarily by Pakistan But by any any mischievous element as they say wants to create trouble All you have to do is to set up a terrorist attack Maybe point some signals towards Pakistan and you start the whole possibly spiraling Sequence of actions so This is as far as Pakistan's concern as far as China is concerned Which is really the country about which much of India's strategy and armory now is being built Our deterrence force against China is far from complete For the lack of delivery systems not lack of warheads because the number of warheads you need to deter anybody is still small If you believe in minimal deterrence So in that context the developments of the past year there is the Agni five which is a missile Which is whose range is 5,000 kilometers was tested again a few months ago and on a mobile launcher and If such a thing is placed in the northern border it certainly can reach Beijing and it can reach even points higher like Harbin so Finally India is getting to a stage where there is some kind of a deterrent with this is very recent Agni five of course has been under Development for some time, but its second or third test has just taken place and they say in a couple of years It will be inducted into the into the force Similarly the submarine the nuclear submarine in India once it's right now. It's still somebody that's Learning its ropes. It's undergoing sea trials and so on and it doesn't have any missiles placed on it But if the missiles are placed on it it poses a threat to China and principle so finally India is beginning to Have some kind of deterrent against China until now in fact as of today. It doesn't know deterrent at all and and certainly at the beginning of the Around the time of the 98 tests We had nothing at all I remember after the 98 tests going to my first meeting in China Expecting that I'll be surrounded by people asking so what happened to the test and so on nobody gave a damn in China And when I asked them aren't you worried they said no So they really were not interested in the Indian arsenal Most of the time, but now I think it's getting to a point where they will take notice Of course China has a stock of much many more weapons warheads and much bigger warheads But I think in the print if you follow the principle of minimal deterrence This is something that most strategists even in India don't quite understand having An arsenal for minimal nuclear deterrence is a very different thing from a war winning arsenal or from a for Arsenal for any other reason because in a minimal deterrence you just need enough to deter When as this word goes to weapons bombs dropped on Los Angeles is all it takes You don't need thousands at all for minimal deterrence All you have to make sure is that those two can get there in the same way same argument applies But it's India versus Pakistan and India versus China and part of the logic of minimal deterrence is that they are the size of the Adversaries arsenal is not important. If they have a thousand elephants, you don't have to have a thousand elephants like in the old days Here you just need enough to scare the other guy So that is a common factor that doesn't depend on the size and the strength of the adversaries arsenal So in that sense what we have is enough for Pakistan what we have is enough for China what China has is enough for the US and so forth So I just wanted to make these comments some of these happened during the past year some of these are in the way of a background So now I'll move on to nuclear energy scene All these are leaving various things open ended. We can discuss that later if you like So let me go to the nuclear deal. Sorry about that First thing is what the old India-US nuclear deal. I'm just for background It may remind everybody 10 years ago. India's nuclear energy capacity was appalling. It was only about four gigawatts Strictly less than that and some of its reactors were running well below capacity for lack of uranium. We couldn't buy uranium because they were sanctions Meanwhile hopes of continuing with the economic growth that was beginning to happen eight or nine percent called for a corresponding growth in energy requirements and therefore For the nuclear share of that energy production It was expected that about 20 gigawatts would be needed by 2020 and 50 gigawatts by 2050 And we had only four at that time in in 60 years of nuclear activity So it was really the requirement was really Large and any attempt to reach it was really ambitious So that's why India went in for the nuclear agreement. There might have been other reasons which I won't go into the political reasons But purely from the point where nuclear energy it was ample reason to seek an agreement with the US and After three years are very hard negotiations went on and on and on the newspapers covered it. Suddenly they had to learn nuclear things Finally led to the lifting of sanctions by the nuclear suppliers group And I don't know how many of you are republicans or how many of you Democrats But I want to go on record that this was made possible because of the push government. They pushed they did the heavy lifting They twisted arms into Unbelievable shapes so that the deal will go through and it did so I think Indians must acknowledge this fact So in 2008 the deal was complete and our soon thereafter the sanctions were lifted and the major benefits that were expected to accrue to us There are two kinds. One is the import of uranium, which we were so really lacking both natural uranium and low industry uranium for every water reactors and the other on this front things are moving well from that time from 2008 Slowly agreements are being signed with various countries to import uranium import uranium imported uranium is coming in Some sort of a stockpile is being prepared Australia Australia is one whole dot But it's expected that mr. Modi's attempts to charm them might have worked there too and they might soon agree to give us uranium and Existing reactors are therefore back into action apart from new reactors which require the uranium we're getting The other benefit that was supposed to grow that's the bigger one more difficult one was collaboration on building foreign reactors In India it was clear that the capacity of the Indian reactor building community was just not big enough To handle the kind of growth that was needed. So it was important It was the growth depended which strongly on requesting other countries to build reactors in return for money In this again There was very rapid movement in the first instance soon after the deal the reactor suppliers from US Russia and France were waiting in the wings For the NSG to lift the sanctions to lift and then there seemed to be enough demand for all three There was no fight between any of them. We wanted them the French we wanted Americans We wanted the Russians all of them to build as many reactors there as they wanted So initially agreements and MOUs were signed with the following three Westinghouse in G to build their ABWR AP 1000 reactors Rosatom from Russia to build eight more of their thousand megawatt Vver reactors of the kind they were they are building in South India now and Arrival from France to build six of their advanced EPR reactors of 1650 megawatts in Maharashtra So these agreements initial grievance and statements of good intent were signed very soon after the deal was done Things looked very positive at that stage and then came the nuclear liability acts. I'll say something about the nuclear liability act With so much nuclear expansion planned involving various parties from various countries and so on it was clear that a Good tight nuclear liability law was needed especially for nuclear accidents So the Indian Parliament passed what's called the civil liability one nuclear damage bill in 2010 Now the bill had several progressive measures Including a total operator liability of 300 450 million dollars They are measured in SDRs for some reason, but it's for 50 million dollars But the important thing what the bill was that this money was to be dispersed within three months of the accident to the victims who don't have to Make legal suits and so forth. They just have to show the damage has been done So it is a very progressive act Compared to something else that had happened in India, which is what's the next item the bill the nuclear civil liability bill Was discussed in the parliament through some by some coincidence on the 25th anniversary of the Bhopal gas leak tragedy Most of you may know what that was a poisonous gas of a union carbide plant Got released and tens of thousands of people died and Even today many of them have not recovered the children are getting problems So it was a huge tragedy in India and the public sentiment was that dove chemicals We told it at that time did not adequately compensate the victims So the parliament in that kind of mood in the shadow of the 25th anniversary of Bhopal passed a very strict comparatively strict Nuclear law Which demanded that the operator which of course in the first in the operator in India means the Indian government We run all our reactors So the government was required by the law to pay compensation to the victims But having done that they would have right of recourse from the supplier if fault could be shown There's a proper language for it. I have the entire text somewhere Now such supplier liability is normally makes sense in terms of common sense You buy a car you depending on whose fault it is you can certainly sue Toyota or whoever Okay So it's more the norm than the accept exception in commercial purchases And in fact in the three mile island accident in the United States People sued not only the reactor operator But the designers and the constructors the operator design sued the designers So all this happened even within the US In terms of nuclear liability However in the international reactor purchases Supplier liability goes against current practice There's the most recent of these a convention on supplementary compensation where the operators will be fully liable for damages So the Indian law by seeking adding on supplier liability was doing something unconventional and not Unexpectedly all the suppliers from all the three countries US France and Russia were unhappy with India's supplier liability clause It was also not clear if even if they accepted it who would insure against this So the price Anderson doesn't exist in yes There's a different world and it was not clear which insurance company would give him an apology to cover nuclear liability whose Damages were sort of unknown and people had all kinds of images how much it might cost So as a result of that as soon as the liability law came in and people understood it to be what it was progress came to a complete haul In terms of nuclear reactor purchases from any of these three countries The government worked hard to find a solution acceptable to foreign suppliers Including a set of rules it turns out in garments of all kinds of ways of in a gling around things So there is a law but then there's a law has to be interpreted then to execute the law you have a set of rules so there and you can slip in a few things and Therefore the guidelines for the operation of the liability bill the government frame formed a set of Guidelines where the quantum of penalty was sort of mitigated without violating the the law But foreign builders still remain Unpersuaded so it went on for three years All this was in the previous government the Manmohan Singh government which had invested so much in the nuclear deal People will recall the government almost fell and had to be to Reselect itself because of the nuclear deal. So there was a lot. They had invested So they continue to try hard to make sure the reactor building part of the deal Also, fructifies Finally a year ago. There was a breakthrough with the Russians essentially March or something the plan was The breakthrough came because of the following plan that Indians the Indian insurance company general insurance company Which is a public sector government owned company Offered to evaluate each component of the Russian reactors and prescribe an insurance from premium It agreed to ensure them. It prescribed a premium that will charge For to cover compensation that Russia has to pay after an accident and The government was also willing to pay the Russians a little bit more money as For purchase of the reactors to take into account the premium that will be needed to pay this insurance And as I say, I should mention that this all this has nothing to do with the BJP or Mr Modi this is all done the month before he came to power and the last few days of the Earlier Congress government Their years of effort towards making this happen bore some fruit Just around March April of last year so the Russians got off the block and They were already in any case building 2000 megawatt reactors in a place called Coudangalam in South India Which had had lots of protests in the protest in fact attracted attention all over and they were building this even before the international sanctions were lifted in 2008 That's by using what is known in the trade as grandfather clauses Claiming that the agreement to build the reactors in India was made before the sanctions were laid down This highly debatable thing where was that an agreement made to two guys just whisper to each other to say Well, they're sitting down, but the international community So in one of these reactors is functioning the others expected a commission the international community Just look the other way on this grandfathering story. Let it happen. These are the mysteries of the international community I don't understand. In fact, the Chinese are doing the same thing. They are selling reactors Near Karachi to Pakistan using again the grandfathering argument that the deal was struck between them long before the sanctions came in So some reactors were already being built Including to buy the Russians in India in the new deal after these sanctions were lifted to more Russian reactors Where we're negotiated to be built? $2.5 billion each and The the bottom line is that the price of the reactors would be such that it will cost customers six rupees a unit was roughly 10 cents a unit which is kilowatt hour and This price that the Russians would be given for that reactor was taken was took into account the liability costs So the premium was included so the Russians are happy with the price and this has been now negotiated and sealed on US reactors there was progress after Only after Mr. Modi before that there was no progress at all and As you people know Mr. Modi went on a blitzkrieg of foreign visits after the new government came to power And he was very well received in all of them and partly because of his impressive Electoral mandate partly because he was at these image of a man who can get things done and Equally importantly an influential Indian diaspora particularly in the US And in these visits Mr. Modi always had the Indian nuclear program I mean the civilian nuclear program as one of the items for discussion So when he visited the US last wall and had this great event at Madison Square Garden And also got a friendly reception from the president president Obama And then Mr. Obama subsequently agreed to come as the chief guest at our Republic Day celebrations There are a lot of one whom he happened in last summer fall as part of all this the two leaders agreed to actively solve this Yeah, use US reactor liability problem. They applied pressure on their people excuse me and Joint committees were formed with Indian and American representatives to urgently find solutions Before mr. Obama lands in India for the Republic Day and solutions were found in both leaders of Two governments press on its solutions are found And the solution had the following highlights One was the insurance pool once again like with the Russians The liability for the American reactors Would be covered by Indian insurance insurers Half of it would be covered by Indian insurers and the other half would be covered by the government of India So some people are upset in India that look you're covering their damaged liability But that was what was negotiated and mr. Modi is so far been able to withstand whatever pressure there might be against this The other important part of that agreement with the with the United States was that the US had earlier wanted as per their own law periodic inspections of their reactors for non-proliferation purposes the Indians didn't like that and the US withdrew that demand on the ground that IAEA is in any Case going to be safeguarding these reactors. So why so did they on their side they pulled back that demand The other concern was that the liability law There is a clause which says like lawyers like this phrase not withstanding all the above So not withstanding all the above anybody can sue anybody else in the country the law of thoughts and that this Liability act does not exempt the suppliers from normal civil suits allowed by the Constitution of India so that Translated means that some anybody in the streets can say that the environment has been ruined by this nuclear reaction Reactor explosion doesn't matter what the operators paid the victims the country is you know has all this expenditure to spend so there may be a Lawsuit with no upper limit at all. So this was a matter of concern for the US it is one particular section of the liability act and The government of India officials seem to have successfully convinced the United States government officials that Such law of thought will be used only against can be used only against the operator who was directly involved and not the supplier How you convince these things? I don't know the details The attorney general of India supposed to prepare a paper to have prepared a paper Passed it on to the legal experts in the American side at the time when mr. Obama left both parties seemed happy It's all I can say I haven't seen that document not what I had really have interpreted it It really requires a very much more league expert legal qualification than I have But one must caution that the American reactor problem has not been solved first of all unlike the Russian reactors The American reactors will be built by private companies they have their stock stockholders. They were bottom line their profits. So Even if the two governments are satisfied with the agreement doesn't means the builder is satisfied the agreement and as far as I know as Of now both Westinghouse and GE are looking at the fine print and somebody told me this afternoon Oh, yeah, they'll keep looking for another two three years. It seems it's not clear how much How problematic that fine print is so as of now that hasn't been crossed even though the two governments have agreed and there will be certain amount of political pressure I'm sure to make sure this works out, but and There's an additional complication because to Shiba and Hidachi Have links with Westinghouse and GE if I have links, I'm putting it in the center problematic way We in India will also need Possibly a nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan to buy the American reactors with Japan's components are there Japan's ownership the stock ownership is there. So One may need an India Japan nuclear deal, which we have been seeking. We haven't gotten yet So there are all these problems still pending with respect to the Frusion of the Hindu US cooperation on reactor buying and finally I conclude with some remarks about the French reactors Again in the last days of the government Congress government the poor thing made a strong push and France and India agreed to a price on the EPR reactors Where they managed to lower the price from what the Arriva people wanted at the beginning Which is 15 cents per unit down to six cents per unit. This was agreed and France has also decided to provide India with a loan for the project of building those reactors All that is all good, but Can Arriva deliver on the agreement of 10 cents a unit? their contract to build a similar plan in In the UK is running to various problems, but even if it all works out successfully There the cost is 15 cents and there's no supplier liability in UK. It's only in India So it's not clear how the French can deliver on this so once again, Mr. Modi came to the rescue you went to France and there was much one homie and An agreement was signed as a result between Arriva and an Indian manufacturer of reactor components called Larson and to bro and the deal was that Larson and to bro would make reactor components for the French reactor this Satisfied many requirements one is that the government wanted to push local manufacturer of things and secondly if This company has been producing components anyway in India for Indian reactors So it's not that they don't they have no back experience in this and if they do in fact produce critical components for the French reactor it first of all reduce costs costs are much less in India and Secondly avoid the problem of our we Arriva sourcing against some components from the Japanese So these two advantages would accrue if this plan works through in fact, he was constructing two EPRs in in China at Tishan and At four billion each and those seem to be progressing. Okay and Because there are also lower because Chinese collaboration has been allowed So the Chinese are into the technological scene and that brings the prices down So maybe a similar deal can work in India, but Arriva is having very serious problems as people know Already four or five months ago one read in the New York Times what happened to them the their reactors Particularly their construction of EPR reactors. They built all kinds of reactors But their EPR reactors the state of the art reactors with they want to build in India They're building one in Finland. They've been building and building and building for years now The there has been a huge delay. It was supposed to be ready 2005. It is not 2015. It's not ready The costs have gone up from 3 billion euros to 8 billion euros. That's still not done. We're still counting You could say this is because the Finnish or finicky is they say That's not the point because in France in Flaminville. There's another reactor same size same capacity Which the French Arriva is building for France where again? There has been a delay. They're still not complete and the price is again gone up from about 3 million 3 billion euros To almost 8 billion euros some problems are therefore arising in building this extremely sophisticated reactor It's not coming within the projected costs And it's also not clear whether Arriva as a company will recover from its financial problems The latest news I heard was that it's not been given a standard and poor rating of BB minus It was BB plus already BB plus meant really don't lend them anything and BB minus is a couple of steps lower So the company is having problems the French government is worried about it They're taking steps and people would be fired and all those things will happen But at the end of it all will Arriva be in a position to construct reactors in India is not clear yet So on the French reactor to one has to keep one's finger crossed As to what will happen. Thank you Thank you That's a full plate of issues But you did it within a half hour, so that's terrific. Well, I For one have a whole list of questions, but while You guys are you in the audience gathering your questions. I may take the chairs prerogative to ask one or two Right now even as we speak the NPT review conference is going on up in New York and As you know One of the the quid pro quo's For the US India deal for the US unlocking the door to the nuclear suppliers group Was to bring India kind of into the fold sort of to accept norms of non proliferation and so One of the positive developments, I think up at the NPT is and through the prep-com Process has been the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT have put together Reports It's hard to describe these they're kind of thick, but they're the basic point was to be a little more transparent about Weapons issues physical material production That sort of thing and do a standard report So Do you think here's my question It's a long wind up for a simple question Do you think that? This is the even though obviously India is not going to join the NPT and has certain problems with the NPT But that kind of reporting is ultimately very important for transparency and accountability and if we believe eventually we'd like a world without nuclear weapons, so This perhaps in the cards this is even discussed in India well I'm not off the government. I'm not indulging in any act of treachery in Mentioning these things frankly, you know a year ago. I mean a few years ago emanating out of this town was the NTI index right on you know various nuclear security and so forth and India did pretty badly in that I think it's a second loss or something like that and this year it ended up being the worst and there was considerable unhappiness back home about that issue and While that index was being prepared the government of India was asked several times by NTI to answer the issues that were raised and the government Politely said no, we don't want to engage in this at all So this is a typical example as a result of that got a bad index in 2012 got a bad index. I mean rating in 2014 Gradually the government is Realizing the importance of being transparent their earlier view was look this is between diplomats We we tell the Pakistan is we tell the Americans through proper channels. What's going on? We don't have to tell you I mean you were just NGO. This has been the Operating philosophy of the government so what they actually do in the way of safety and security is a lot better than what appears from outside and The fact that the world is changing and that you cannot any longer Continue with daddy knows best as a philosophy is something which is not caught on yet fully It's happening slowly the government has in fact put out a little pamphlet last year two years ago on India's nuclear security and safety the steps that they have taken I really think this is because of pressure that came from these indexes So it is happening, but it's happening slowly and it's certainly true that We have not believed in transparency It was felt that these are all sensitive matters and as long as you assure other governments There's no reason for the public to get into it Which is no longer consistent with the world as it is today So I think it's happening, but happening slowly is not fully happened, but it's in the right direction more and more things are coming out and Do you think that the BJP also Well, the BJP is unlikely to be more transparent than the earlier But I think the lack of transparency is not so much a political thing as it's a bureaucratic thing It's the department's and officials in these places are not accustomed to talking about things openly I don't think the government has told the political leadership has told The ministry the foreign ministry or the nuclear people not to make things transparent These are considered to be technical matters of the nuclear people thought something could be put in the open So I think the change of leadership here wouldn't matter unless top political leaders come and tell mr. Modi your country is not being transparent That would make an impression on him purely from the sense of relations between top political leaders and countries That may set something going below, but if really they don't have a view on this Thank you. I'm gonna open the floor. So we have a microphone in the back We're gonna go to Paul Walker first and then second and third so please just state your affiliation and Emily this way and then Try to make it a question. Great. Thanks Thanks Sharon and thanks for the nice presentation I want to ask you a very basic question about what what's it driving? What in your mind is driving India's? Desire for nuclear power You know Those of us who I think know a little bit about India realize that it has enormous social economic needs and given the the last decade or more of You know escalating costs, which you referred to you know with regard to the oculotu reactor in Finland and now the flamenville reactor in France and given the You know Japanese recent experience as well It would seem to me that there this is a in some ways a very foolish Uneconomic choice that India is making You know probably any country let alone one it was so much economic needs is India today So why would in to be doing this? Why haven't why aren't they more emphasizing either gas? energy or solar or wind or other sustainable energy sources rather than nuclear Well, I think Several streams in what you've said which made it being answered One is that there is in fact a huge amount of emphasis now on solar energy in India These things are not really competing with each other because this government is finding funds to for what it's worth When during Obama's visit, there's a 20 billion dollar deal on solar energy Some kind of a promise of course at the level of framework agreement, but so there is a great deal of emphasis The wind capacity in India has always been much more than the nuclear capacity It's just that the wind wind installations work only one seventh or one sixth of the time when being what it is And so the production is less but the capacity is much much more So in a sense the nuclear has received much more public attention But the fact is that fair amount of emphasis maybe not as much as should be has gone into solar and wind already in the past and solar is very much in the Amongst the important things in the new government's policy that I once reads it every other day But what about the nuclear side with nuclear seismic going on since 1947? It's an old thing and slowly it's grown and the sanctions were lifted So naturally it seemed like good opportunity grow in that direction and I used to be a supporter Soon after the of the whole India-US deal for that reason and I thought the nuclear energy should be encouraged in India in 2008 Prices were not so bad in 2008 The US had just started the Renaissance and in fact contracts were received from 20 different companies None of them are making it now because of cost So the cost is a relatively new development given the time scale in which these decisions are made and I'm sure the cost will Eventually become a dampener in the Indian project. There's always turn around time in this I don't think we need to abandon it But certainly need to focus more on other forms of energy in the government slowly doing it in my view I certainly the French deal I think is gone and the US deal doesn't seem to be working For whatever legal reasons we may be surprised that it works something so on its own Costs as well as these problems may lead to a slowing down of the nuclear program The other part of the nuclear program, which was very highly favored by our agency was the close fuel cycle business It was thought that we don't have enough uranium in the country and mr. Baba who's the father of our nuclear activities said look you've got thorium and it's possible to convert thorium into u233 Etc. Etc. So there has been a plan since those days of having fast breeder reactors Which would convert thorium into u233 which would then peel off and reuse and so on as the close fuel cycle It's it's a religion in India. I really believes in it But once again those breeder reactors are not progressing as fast as one thought So and also uranium is available in plenty after the deal So there's an argument for slowly phasing it out But once an agency has been working for 25 years on a project and slowly overcoming difficulties You can't tell them to stop so these are political reactors But in terms of the spirit of what you're saying I agree and I think it is going to happen Regardless of what anybody think the costs are going to bring the nuclear down is my thing So even though I have a supporter once I'm no longer a supporter of nuclear energy because of the cost I'm not that worried about the hazards. I think they've been exaggerated It's my view, but the cost will bring it down in my in my view I'm Saira. I'm visiting fellow at Stimson Center. Thank you very much professor Raman for such a wonderful talk. My question is about India's talk Ryan Like you mentioned that India is pursuing minimum deterrence in October 2014 National Security Advisor a G double he stated that India is going to shift its posture from Credible minimum deterrence to only credible deterrence Do you think that India is going to increase its nuclear weapons with a high rate or India is going to pursue open-ended? And my second question is about this tracking system You mentioned that India did not agree to this tracking system Despite of the fact that you have insisted on it. Do you think that this Is going to have some implications for India's nuclear program Given the fact that India's separation of civilian and nuclear facilities are not physically separated and not You know nuclear experts are not separated on that Do you think does it has any implications for India's nuclear program? Thank you Well, if the country drops the word minimal from the children I think it'd be very bad thing. It's my view and I don't think there's any serious proposal in some context He might have said that There are many people who believe in that but that goes against the whole spirit of the nuclear doctrine There are of course lots of people who feel it shouldn't be there for me I'm an I'm against nuclear weapons So for me that word minimal is the one word I hang on to and keep on hitting them with the word minimal minimal So I personally think we're bad. I don't think there's any serious move to do that You might have mentioned it somewhere to collection of people who probably wanted to hear that So I don't see any other evidence other than that statement that that'll happen. It won't happen easily. There'll be a lot of resistance to that On the separation of facilities You know, it is already going on. It is for instance certain places like Kaiga and Kalpakam are facilities which are now fully military So even though power comes out of it that power goes into the breeder. It's one of the eight protected So I think the separation is going on Separation of the human beings hasn't taken place in some sense same person as a chief of both that happens in Many places but the process of separation of the physical facilities is happening So that inspections and safeguarding and so on can be done conveniently at one place without Intruding into a place where it shouldn't go that process is beginning to as more or less happened now What has happened is a cluster of reactors in certain places have been called military and clusters have been called civilian And they are not in the same region at all The question up here Michael Lowenthal with the National Academy of Sciences You've talked about the nuclear doctrine, and I wondered if you could say anything about how Any change in the nuclear doctrine might be translated into Actions or changes within the nuclear weapons enterprise itself the production and so forth there have been changes in new developments and enrichment and things like that in India that Have people asking questions, and it's not clear how it links up to the doctrine well the doctrine The important thing is of course whether it's minimal and so on if it is minimal then there's also question How much you think is needed for minimal that remains as an item of debate? as of now The reactors that have been designated to produce weapon grade plutonium are continuing to do so But there isn't too much of it. There's only one reactor left. There's the droop up so Any change in policy Right now is not going to make much of a difference the real difference will come when the breeder reactor is completed and You see what happened to the plutonium that is siphoned off that That is really yummy weapon plutonium which comes out of a breeder reactor. So whether the claim Well, it's not technical as from tomorrow it may be become one but yeah Because it's essentially a dry cleaning instrument the breeder reactor you feed in bad plutonium you get out weapon grade plutonium out of it But the government claims that they're using this plutonium only for feeding further breeders to generate more power so at the time when the Breeders have worked for five years and the rods have been taken out reprocess what it does with that material Will determine whether there's going to be any significant increase in the weapon counter Until then the drawer is going to go on the river can make at most three four weapon warheads a year worth of material So that's not a very rapid growth at this time So at the moment, I think any changes of policy is not going to significantly affect the warhead production It might affect the delivery system production that those things may happen So the launching of the submarine the launching of the Agni five. They are examples Not of any change in doctrine because the doctrine always said there would be a triad of You know sources from which these can be sent up So there is no change of doctrine, but there is progress in implementing those aspects of the doctrine Which may very well be pursued quite vigorously by the current government with its ideology being what it is I don't know if I answer You have a question back here Jeff Smith, sorry No, I'm sorry. You'll you can you can then no Jeff first and then Sorry Sorry, who do you want to go? I'm sorry the gentleman behind you first and then and you can follow up just pass the microphone It's Jeff Smith at the Center for Public Integrity Could you say something more about the an expansion of enrichment capacity at Mysore and Chalakir The two new facilities that are under construction or have been at Mysore has been operating for a bit and it's being still being constructed the Mr. Lowenthal's question asked you about the impact of enhanced capacity on Perhaps your weapons development and the strategy that underlies the use of the potential use of those weapons and use you answered about plutonium, but the expansion that's underway now has to do with enrichment and as you know Many outside observers feel that the expansion exceeds what's necessary to fuel the reactors on the submarines So they see an excess there, and they're wondering what that excess is for. I'm interested in your opinion about what it's for Yeah, well that's it's true that more expansion there is expansion going on in enrichment facilities The government statement is that we are going to build a whole fleet of the submarine The second one's already the hull has been done and the third one's already beginning So it's hard to say with the new surety that these are not going to be used for that That the new enrichment facilities. I don't know what is the quantitative basis of worrying about that yet? I'm sure people have said so I Personally would think that there is no plan to build weapons using you H.E.U. One reason might be if the government wanted to have H bombs fusion bombs for which you do need H.E.U. in various intermediary capacities, but I don't think the government has any plans to Revive building stronger weapons than the good old 20 kilowatts and 50 kilowatts Fissile weapons, fission weapons we have Once again, this is connected to minimum deterrence Certainly want to make a bigger bang for the buck you would want to build The H bomb and there was also the feeling that the earlier one fizzled out There was much talk about that but the government hasn't picked up that fizzle and saying well We must therefore go back and test test again That's a related issue if you that fizzled out then if you want to build bombs using H.E.U. And so on you love to test again computer tests may not be good enough and testing is something I'm quite sure the Indians don't want to do not only will you use it lose the NSG and all the benefits that come from it You simply bring a lot of probium on yourself So even though people don't accept this minimal deterrence Regardless of what's written on paper by and large. There's no great demand to increase the arsenal a whole lot Even the people worry that Pakistan's got some more weapons that just dies out after a few days Some of us get on TV and all that happens So I really don't think there's any This is my reading of course, you know much of this one one only has to go by one's nose One doesn't really know what's deep inside in the minds of the government from whatever I know I don't think there is any real move to enlarge the arsenal a great deal in India There is a move to enlarge the delivery vehicles that I know but the arsenal and the number of warheads I don't think there is so if they are building more HU my own judgment would be that they are just building it as long as the As fast as they can you never know how much you will know need for which submarine and these are all long-term projects You don't know when the submarine will be ready. So I think those are probably not meant for weapons would be my reading Right here and then Walt you're after that Thank you Ben Lamont with the German Marshall Fund Sorry, I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on the politics of possibly reforming the Liability Act The nuclear scientific community was notably Notable for its opposition to the Agreement in the first place are they active at all about the Liability Act and is there any possibility of a wholesale Revision of the act or are these side deals? Going to be the future and if so can they sort of deliver The capacity that that people are hoping for in terms of a number of reactors, etc Well as far as the repeal of any change in the law, I think that's politically simply not possible The government exert I mean expended a great deal of its goodwill and its energies in getting the nuclear deal through The energy clearance after that when these liability laws and came They just wasn't enough steam left to overcome the very strong opposition that was there against the suppliers So I think the chance of the government being able to and the present government was very much in the opposition and fought for the liability law at that time So I think the liability law is going to stay people will just try to find legal ways around it to the extent It is possible. I think I think that that is what is the likely to go on and your other part of the was that in terms of Reactor capacity well if these three things work even then I don't think we're going to hit 50 gigawatts by 2005 no way, but let's we can just add the each of these countries supposed to be roughly 8,000 megawatts And that is going to take a long time So I think even in the next 20 years if 8 times 324 gigawatts come that's the maximum one can expect I think it'll be much less than that rate So the notion of having 60 60 gigawatts I think it's not realistic and I think this sooner we stop talking about those numbers the government The better it would be Thank you very much. My name is Walt Slocum. I'm with the Atlantic Council and I used to be in the Defense Department Thank you very much for a very interesting and at least for one. It was not a specialist very forthcoming and candid Presentation I wanted to ask a question about the no first use issue if I understood you correctly Although Pakistan maintains Formally a no first use policy There is concern in India that they in fact go beyond simply the inherent capability Which you mentioned, but that they have actually done things Which indicate that they regard their nuclear arsenal as a part of conventional deterrence And my question is what are the elements beyond the Nasser missile? that make one concerned on this point and For the longer term is there any prospect of a discussion or an agreement in which both sides would Agree to refrain from certain actions that increase the concern about I guess better to put another way around To do things or to refrain from actions that would increase the inherent credibility of the respective No first use pledges As far as my understanding is concerned, sir I believe that Pakistan does not have a no first use policy It is explicitly said that we don't believe in that because our concerns are different the things that worry is a different and In particular because the nuclear Forces in Pakistan are developed as a counter to the conventional Indian nuclear forces So in the first part of what you raised I have to ask you again in the sense I don't think Pakistan has ever declared a no first use policy and to the extent that statements have emerged From various people. There's no official doctor and documented Pakistan statements always have said no we do not believe in no first use So that is where that remains on the other fronts It's hard at the moment. They do have various kinds of agreements. They notify each other's missile launches They notify each other's the locations of the reactors so that nothing is warmed there at that level for a fair amount of threat reduction and CMB is at taking place confidence-building measures, but in stronger on stronger Items, it's not happening. For instance, one of the things then track two and so on I try to push is that In as much as our weapons are demated and de-alerted in as much as the Chinese weapons supposed to be demated and the Pakistani weapons are also demated as of now Why don't the three countries get together and announce that our weapons are demated? And that we are in a state of de-alert Country is not willing to do that. I I even tried to tell the Indians. Why don't we just wallet, you know? Voluntarily just announced unilaterally. There are weapons are demated countries don't want to make that commitment There is no compulsion. There's no pressure either from the outside world or from within the domestic policy Which doesn't care about these issues at all to do that and governments normally would not do something like that Unless there's a there is a push so there is basically no pressure from anybody else that They should do things to mitigate the dangers By and large I would consider both countries to be fairly responsible possessors of nuclear weapons Unlike the Wall Street Journal article in 2007 so on I have the complete faith that our boys can keep it as well as Anybody else and there's every reason to believe we had no accidents or anything But beyond that there any active measure to actually come to agreements and announcements Neither government seems to be willing to that includes China. I've had trilateral meetings with them They all seem to say yes, we do it, but we don't particularly get into an formal announcement That we do these things If I if I may follow up on that this question of Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons has been I mean, I hope it's being followed in in if there are in the of Pakistan track to Dialogues now I have heard that even in Other track-to-dialogues we've we've tried to US and Russian Track-to-experts have tried to point out the Shall we say deleterious effects Tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO context I When I look at the Security environment right now I see a lot of troubling things happening in Pakistan I see it that being one of them and then India is perennially focused on China at what point? Can you is there a possibility of de-linking because because that's a D-linking which Well the fact that as as India tries to establish its Credibility vis-a-vis China Pakistan continually kind of rats it's up a little bit and this question of To the detriment of Indian Pakistani relations and the this question of this the language anywhere I would think almost that's a positive thing because Pakistanis are seriously thinking about you know the use of tactical nuclear weapons on their own soil against the Indians and they think the Indians won't retaliate so but So that deterrence is you know a good thing and a bad thing Right you're I would hate to see the two countries walk down that path that the US and Russians did for so many years with Absolutely, I think there is also rumors that the Indians are building now Weapons which could be sort of battlefield usable. There's no confirmation that they are nuclear capable or not but Cruise missiles are being built and this question can they carry nuclear or not many things can be Nuclearized later even if it's not so this trend is there. It's a very bad trend but So one of the questions is what can you know what kinds of confidence building measures, you know Is it dialogue is it technical measures? I think it's not probably to me It's not just statements about demating it probably has to go a little further than that So I wondered if you had any well, there is yeah, I want one particular new problem has come with the submarines With the submarines. It's harder to be in a state of D alert than with other forms of missiles So any attempt on India's part to talk to Pakistan saying let's be alert after the coming of the submarine immediately The issue will come up. What about your submarines? That is that is one thing. The other thing is also the coming up of these mobile launchers Now that both countries are learning to use launchers that can move around in order to ensure survivability of the weapons That lowers your ability to do things in the last minute the launchers have to be More or less have to carry everything with them. You can't keep the weapon somewhere else and bring it over and So things in terms of technological developments are actually going backwards in this on this area of D-alerting and keeping things non-ready Doesn't directly answer your question, but it's a related situation the later development. So the technology is pushing it in a different direction unfortunately So when mobile land Lugney 5 for instance has is out of a sister and you know, it's a mobile Launcher and once you do that you have to put the weapon in it. You can't bring it from somewhere else So I'm afraid that that family of conference building measures is going backwards rather than forwards So if I make do we have other questions? Zahid Jamil the Center for Strategic Policy Analysis. Thank you for the for illuminating Presentation it was really helpful I had two questions one you're you're right that there is no doctrine on no first use as far as Pakistan But the president had made a statement to the Hindu in fact to the Indian press which has been a matter of controversy So it's never been sort of Reconciled as to what but the president in Pakistan had made a statement. The military may have a different view We don't know we'll see Just to set the record straight on that one Second on the question. I know we're talking about the nuclear aspects But and you said that they would you know India doesn't need to have a sort of arms race anymore as far as nuclear is concerned But Pakistan Can can I get your thoughts on the possibility of an anti ballistic missile sort of race that may take place and what that would do to the number of Warheads are deployed, you know deployment capabilities. Thank you. Yes, that the last thing is a very very important point I had forgotten not included it because of time restrictions Anti ballistic missile development will completely Ruin all my arguments about minimal deterrents and so on and so forth Because if the minimal deterrents you have is stopped by the other side, you just have to get more weapons So what would have been a more or less stable? Ending of the arms race fairly soon can be ruined by successful development of missile defense Fortunately, I think the missile defense in India still in its infancy and it'll take a long time before any reasonable Defense is possible. Also. These are counter value weapons I mean, which is a nice way of saying that the plan is to bomb the people not the not the silos So to speak and in counter values, you know, as long as even one city is open, you are vulnerable and Anti ballistic missile Development, even if it goes much faster in India and so on may at most protect some apex leadership Some central part of New Delhi or something, but it's not going to be protect can't protect the 200 major cities of India So I think in some sense, it will not seriously affect the Pakistani deterrence capability Even if India successfully builds and which itself is far away So in that sense anti missile missiles, you know If a country simply has anti ballistic missiles to protect its apex leadership or its main arsenal or things like that the other country won't mind as long as the aim of the nuclear weapons is Against is intended to be used on civilian populations And not on so that being the case Fortunately, the anti ballistic missiles will not do as much damage as they could otherwise otherwise do but it is still a Sort of dangerous development missiles Milton honing, you know what a few years ago a while back there was Reports of concern over exchange nuclear exchange over cashmere What is the there's anything current going on in cashmere that would raise the heat to that level? I Don't think so. I don't think there would I don't think there was ever a situation where inside India and Pakistan People felt there would be nuclear exchange over cashmere even with the cargo thing happened. I Think I was in the US and that was considered the most dangerous place on earth I would call my wife saying how would this isn't fine. Nothing's going on here So I think that I think the both countries in this sense have been quite responsible that the threshold for their Going nuclear has been kept very high and they don't lightly consider doing it Political statements are a different matter some vigorous leader may come and say we'll bomb the hell out of the other country It's one that's just words in serious things I don't think there was ever a situation even when the two armies were confronting each other knows to knows No nuclear thing was ever contemplated so cashmere is the kind of dispute where unless I Don't think it will lead to a nuclear conflict. What is more likely is that cashmere like event happening the heartland of India That could set things going in the sequence that I said led to conventional thing a direct nuclear response to anything any act of terrorism in cashmere and anywhere else totally Other questions Michael Lomantall again You described the the deterrence strategy and very much the same way that I've seen it described elsewhere, which is Sort of multiple bilateral deterrent relationships do Do you or do other people in India think about it in terms of a multilateral dynamic that Maybe a little unstable in other ways that you wouldn't capture in a multi multibilateral approach I Mean multi bilateral assistance from just bilateral. I mean Well, can you explain the terminology? I mean what we're most accustomed to in the United States is a bilateral stability relationship with the Soviet Union and Russia Clearly India has two different potential adversaries on its borders that it worries about deeply So it's sort of multiple bilateral Cases, yeah, it's multiple three-way because there is also links between Exactly, that's why that's what I'm talking about is there more sophisticated Thinking about the stability of the trilateral relationship Yeah, I don't good question, but I think the only stability there would be a set of three bilaterals So to speak that each country really feels no need to be aggressive on the other two for whatever reasons on the nuclear front I don't think the fact of it being there. There's no three-body force there I think it's only pair-wise two-body things is my view That's what's been holding so far and the dynamics of each pair is going to be independent of well, except for the Pakistan China dynamics Will affect the India Pakistan India China relationship But even then it could one thing that could happen is that if there is too much concern expressed Let's say by India about a China Pakistan Nexus so to speak as to use that word It may well be that the Indians may seek an agreement from China saying look you can't do this kind of thing We know so they may force there may be an attempt to get an agreement out of all three countries All right, we won't do this. You don't do that. You don't do that that may happen a road is being built across The Pakistani occupied Kashmir and that is the kind of thing if it if it turns out that it can land Plains on it and so on people may get sufficiently agitated in India to seek a trilateral solution Is the thought never occurred to me until you ask the question. So I'm talking from the top of my head That is the kind of there could start such a process Where one of the three says there's only way this can settle down only way are bilateral Anxieties can be settled is through a trilateral agreement then it might happen, but somebody is to feel that way Pakistan clearly doesn't feel that way and China doesn't feel that way that the trilateral is an issue Indians are the only ones sort of stuck in the fulcrum of that thing So Indians may someday seek such a thing in that case We have time for one more question from front Hi, yes, one touch from Hindustan times and there's not a question It was President Zardari who said that Pakistan has a no first use policy And he said that that one of our summits You know we have it have an annual summit and he said this in response to a question Which didn't Which was clearly not a stated position He just he was winging it because next morning the army was all over him and they were denials of all kinds I would not deny what clarifications came out saying the president was kind of wing it Just thought I would clarify that thanks. Yeah, I think the gentleman there. I don't I forget the year Which he said this but he said this between the start times. Yeah. Thank you. No, thank you. Thank you for that No Other than to thank you. Well, no, no, thank you. Thank Bobby and Emily for your support and our IT staff and please join me in thanking our guests