 Good morning. I'm Stephen Schragin, the Shoal Chair in International Business at CSIS, and I'd like to welcome you here to CSIS on behalf of my colleagues, the Embassy of India, and the Diplomatic Courier to this event on looking towards the G8 Summit in Italy. We couldn't be more pleased to host such an esteemed group, not only on the stage here, but many members of the audience, including the heads of research institutions, many former senior government officials both from the U.S. and internationally. And we look forward to a real dialogue today on some incredibly important and timely issues. In fact, so timely and important that less than 48 hours ago, President Obama and Prime Minister Berlusconi were discussing many of these issues, especially about how the G8 responded to the global challenges we're facing in the wake of the economic crisis. And I should start by congratulating our Italian colleagues and our U.S. government officials for some very successful meetings. So successful, in fact, that the President's meeting with the Prime Minister ran double the expected time. And not to be topped by that, the Congressional meeting with Speaker Pelosi ran apparently four times longer than was planned. As a matter of fact, the meetings were so successful that the Ambassador, who was our plan for a speaker today, is still in a sense in meetings that was called back to Italy to help plan for the G8 Summit coming up. So I think while, you know, we're disappointed that he couldn't make it here today, it shows the importance of this issue. And we're very honored to welcome the Deputy Chief of Minister, Minister Cardi, here today, who brings a wealth of his own experience to this role. And we look forward to his deep insights on the outcome of those very extensive conversations we've had over the last couple days and Italy's vision for the G8 Summit and beyond. As I mentioned, he brings deep experience in U.S. issues, having served in his current role as DCM over two years, and his experience goes far beyond DC to many of the critical capitals in the G8 and also in the global economy, including Paris and Beijing. And he has deep multilateral experience at the U.N., including serving as special envoy for U.N. Security Council reform. And his background also extends to senior levels of the media and politics, which we all know can greatly influence events or at least how they're interpreted, serving as a top spokesman in the foreign ministry and also as a diplomatic advisor to the President of the Senate. So again, with that, we're honored to have him here, and we look forward to his remarks before we start our first panel. Minister Cardi. I'd like to have a copy of the CV you just read because it's really great, and I could use that, you know, for my career. Thank you for the introduction. I really would like to thank the CSIS and all of you for coming here this morning. As that has been said, two days ago, Prime Minister came to Washington for his first official visit after the inauguration of President Obama. And it was, of course, an important meeting because in two, in three weeks, we are going to host in Italy, in L'Aquila, the summit of the G8. And they have a very productive meeting, I think, and they went over the agenda of the summit and discussed a lot of bilateral relations and a lot of issues in terms of European-U.S. transatlantic agenda, the relation with Russia, of course. Iran was among the topics discussed, as you may imagine, and other, of course, important topics. But I would like to thank again the CSIS and, of course, also the diplomatic courier for all the efforts they made in organizing this conference. I'm not a specialist of nonproliferation and, you know, being a diplomat, I'm not a specialist in everything, anything, but I will try to give you some general comments about the discussion that you are going to have this morning. As I said, today's conference is extremely fortunate, time-wise. Just two days ago, President Obama and Prime Minister Berlusconi had an extremely fruitful discussion on a number of themes of mutual interest. They also spoke at Lens on the next G8 summit, which will take place on July 8th to 10th in La Quila. And by the way, I may remember that the G8 was... the location of the G8 was changed from La Magdalena in Sardinia to La Quila in Abruzzo because of the earthquake that struck the region and especially the city of La Quila three months ago. So actually the idea of the Italian government was to provide to La Quila, you know, a location to show the world how the reconstruction efforts are going. And I think it's a good idea and it's also a very much symbolic gesture toward the Italian regions frequent by the earthquake. The two leaders addressed the particularly thorny issue of the global economic crisis. They both discussed the way ahead and made reference to the package of financial measures that the G8 finance ministers have put together recently a few days ago in Lecce. It's a southern Italian town which has come to be known as the Lecce framework, which is a framework that will be discussed further, of course, taking into account important contributions such as the Americans one in a few days. And we hope that the G8 in La Quila will be a successful step towards adopting this framework of financial regulations. The general principle which has to be translated into concrete measures is that we're going to have improved oversight. We need to have improved oversight, better practices, corporate governance and rules for transparency and regulation of the financial sectors, accounting rules and also the issue of tax havens. These are all issues that have been discussed in the framework of the G8 and the G20 in the last months, and we know very well. There is indeed a real need to improve our coordination and information sharing so as to prevent those situations from happening again. Today and in the future, the G8 and the G20 can work together in a coordinated approach to revitalize global growth and lay the foundation for reform that can no longer be postponed to international financial institutions. World Bank, IMF were created 60 years ago in Bretton Woods. Of course, then things were very much different from today. The G8, like the G20, must clearly relate the dangers of resorting to protectionism. That was another issue that was discussed between President Obama in a meeting, between President Obama and Prime Minister Berlusconi. So the commitment to talk about that in L'Aquila and to see what can be done to revitalize the door around, of course, and international commerce. So the dangers of resorting to protectionism and the need to renew the negotiation on liberalizing international trade the door around bear in mind that the latter demands a shared commitment by all developed countries and emerging countries, economies like. Other than the economic and financial themes, I would also like to briefly touch upon the other top priorities of our G8 summit agenda. Climate change is on top, and that was underlined very strongly by President Obama and Prime Minister Berlusconi when they met the other day. The Italian presidency intends to contribute to the success of the upcoming UN conference in Copenhagen in December to define a post-Kyoto agreement on climate. Europe has been leading the way in setting ambitious environmental goals for itself. The new course announced by President Obama on environment laid the basis for creating a new transatlantic pillar that can energize global talks on the environment. Through NEF, the Major Economist Forum, the Major Economist Grouping that brings together industrialized countries and emerging economies, the G8 can play a central role in moving the waters. As to development and eliminating poverty, there also will be key topics on our agenda. We must first prevent the economic and financial crisis from penalizing Africa in terms of either political attention or development aid policies. And in La Quila, there will be a special session devoted to the meetings with the African Union countries. The African Union presidency will be there also. It will be all... The third day will be devoted to this important issue of food security, of course, and how the industrialized countries can do more in terms of shielding from the economic crisis than the least developed countries. And that's, I think, a very important topic also that was discussed by our two leaders. In this perspective, we must examine Africa's development needs from a broader perspective in order to mobilize a set of instruments and players that can generate development. The Italian presidency will organize a special working session, which I referred before, with the leaders of the African countries to seek common solutions to problems we feel are common. We must listen more to our African friends and make them co-participants in global policies. We cannot decide for them in Brussels or Washington. We must decide with them. Terrorism and non-proliferation are today major challenges to our security. The war on terrorism is quite different from a conventional war. Of course, it is asymmetric. It cannot be fought with military means alone. The approach must be comprehensive and that must be an effective, preventive strategy. This is why Italy has decided to promote a political initiative to better link national and international policies on the various national and transnational destabilizing factors that feed terrorism, drug and weapons trafficking, illegal migrations and money laundering. The G8 role in this matter is particularly important today. A clear success story is the Rome Lions Group, which brings together government officials and experts in the areas of country and terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking. As to non-proliferation, and I recognize some of the leading experts here in the room today that will take part in your panel, apart from the economic side, it is necessary to firmly encourage a rekindled multilateral spirit, also in view of the conference to revise the proliferation treaty that will take place in 2010. We can no longer treat proliferation on a case-by-case basis, once Iran, at that time North Korea and so on. We need to strengthen the multilateral regime in a world where proliferation has become much easier. The NTP, of course, is 40 years old. These efforts will take on greater credibility if there were to come hand-in-hand with a disarmament program. We would have more authority to influence states that want nuclear weapons if today's nuclear countries would set the example and begin reducing their arsenal. I think this is one of the central issues that President Obama has put on his agenda. We are greatly counting on the new U.S. administration to promote the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Multilateral negotiation would benefit enormously from a revitalization of the bilateral strategic agenda between the United States and Russia. And in this respect, we really look forward to the summit that will take place in Moscow from the 6th to the 8th of July between President Obama and President Medvedev. During the talks in the White House the other day, President Obama asked specifically that the G8 agenda at some point may examine the results probably of these talks that will be held in Moscow. Starting from his speech in Prague, a very important speech indeed, can examine ways to strengthen our cooperation on a multilateral basis because, of course, it's important to have that the nuclear superpowers can talk bilaterally to start, for example, but it's also important that we share this information and that we all encourage these talks to be productive and we all work for the same goal. Finally, let me conclude by saying that all these issues that the Italian presidency of the G8 has placed at the heart of the agenda will remain with us for years and that will in the future see the commitment of not only the G8 but also of the major regional and international institutions. The interaction and synergies between national governments and the latter international institutions and the framework of multilevel governance is key to solving problems that have become too complex to be treated exclusively in one forum. Before concluding, I would like to add very few words about the format of the summit in La Quila that may be of interest for you. There's been, of course, as you know, a lot of discussion on enlarging the governments, putting new partners at the table. Of course, this has been done firstly and very, very quickly in November when the G20 Washington meeting was called by the American administration and 20-plus countries were seated at the table to talk about the economic crisis. In light of this new perspective and the need for a more broader set of countries sharing the same goals and taking the same responsibility in terms of addressing the problem we face in the world, the Italian presidency of the G8, which has started, as you know, in January, has decided to enlarge the format of the summit in La Quila in Italy. It's a process that has been started already. It's called the High League and Dam process. It was started during the German presidency in G8, but this time the idea was really to have these countries sitting at the table on a parity basis and to talk about the issues, not only the issues that are relevant for them, but all the global agenda, to try to produce a broader consensus that can in turn allow to address all these big challenges. In La Quila, the agenda will be first meeting at eight in the format of eight countries, the original eight, of course, G8 countries. Then another five countries will be added to that. They are called the G5. They include China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa. They represent a broader geographical area of the world. They have strong interest in participating and setting the agenda and addressing the agenda. Egypt will be invited too because of its geographical location, its importance for the regional perspective in the Middle East. So there will be these eight plus five that will form the bulk of the agenda in La Quila. And then these 13 or 14 countries will in turn meet with the African countries in the last broader framework and format to address global issues. I think it's very important that the Italian presidency has taken this unprecedented step to formalize this enlargement. We think that the G8 can still play a role, you know, as a nucleus for some issues. There are certainly common interests within the G8. But it is time to enlarge the governments and enlarge the formats and to address in a better fashion all the important issues we are facing today. I think it will also probably be a topic of discussion today. I really look forward to a discussion and let me express very much the appreciation again to CSIS and the diplomatic career and all the important panelists that are converged today for the meeting. And I wish you a productive morning of discussion. Thank you very much. Thanks. Good morning, and thank you so much for being here with us today. It is my distinct pleasure to introduce to you the next panel. And actually I will introduce to you Mr. Eric Peterson, who's moderating the next panel, and then I'll leave it up to him to introduce to you our distinguished panelists today. Eric is the senior vice president here at CSIS, and he's also the director of the Global Strategy Institute, what we call a think tank within a think tank. And Global Strategy Institute has a special place in my heart. It's how I met Eric years ago when I was a college student. He interviewed me for a job at Global Strategy Institute. And I didn't end up working with him, for him, but I ended up working with him years later. So I'm very happy to be here today collaborating this important project and so I will not review all these accomplishments that Eric has under his wing, but I will let you know of a few things. Eric is a futurist, and I learned all about futurism when I met him, and he established the Global Strategy Institute to assess long-range trends, and he's working on a book currently that will be published hopefully this summer that discusses seven revolutions and seven futures, and those are the long-term strategies assessing how we can prevent and how we can assess trends that are going to change and revolutionize how we look at the world. So... Oh, and did I mention he's also an advisory board member at the Diplomatic Courier, among his many advisory board roles that he has. So, without further introduction, I will give you Eric Peterson. Thank you very much for that very overly kind introduction. Ladies and gentlemen, when I hear the expression futurist, I always remember a lecture I had from colleague Arno de Borgera here at CSIS sometime back in an elevator. He looked at me and said, oh, a futurist, living by the crystal ball. At the end of the day, I would probably eat crunched glass. And he was very right. I think if we all can try to decipher the developments day-to-day that confront us now, the kind of big and significant issues that are filling the G8 agenda, among other things, as Minister Cardi has so eloquently described, we would be lucky in terms of navigating our way forward. This morning I have the pleasure of moderating a panel in one of the key issues that the minister identified, namely nonproliferation. Clearly, developments in the urgency of the matter in this regard have both been highlighted by geopolitical developments, not only in North Korea, but the remarkable set of news stories that we're seeing to the extent that they're coming out of Tehran right now, looking at developments in Iran. And I'm delighted to report to you that we have two outstanding and leading thinkers to take on some of these big issues for us. Let me briefly set out their credentials, but in order to save time, I'd like to refer you to the packet to the biographical descriptions that we've distributed to you. We'll be kicking off here going forward with Joseph Sirencione, who is the president of Plowshares Fund. He, of course, is well known as the leading authority in this field. He's, among other things, the author of Bombscare, the History and Future of Nuclear Weapons. He has served previously as senior vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress and as director of nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he was for eight years. He also worked for nine years in the U.S. House of Representatives as a professional staff member of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Government Operations. A tremendous background, many of you will recognize him from his very significant media exposure. And he has agreed kindly to kick us off here, and then I will be introducing our speaker after him in turn. So, Joe, thank you very much for agreeing to join us here. We're delighted to have you. It's my pleasure. Thank you very much, Eric. Buongiorno. I hope you're all doing well. Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. And I very much appreciate the opening remarks. I substantially agree with everything you've just heard. I'm going to take about an hour. Is that what I have? 10 minutes to describe a little of the current situation we're in, and then Steve can disagree with everything I've said, and we should have a very interesting debate. Everyone wants to talk about the future, but there are certain perils in that. If you want to know where you're going, it usually helps to know where you are. And it doesn't hurt to know how you got there. So let me talk just for a few minutes about the past. We are in a very difficult situation where the proliferation threats we face across the board are increasing. But this is not just a matter of bad things happening to good countries. Policy matters. Good policy reduces these threats. Bad policy increases them. We are coming off of eight years of flawed policy. The Bush administration came into office with a radical idea of how to address proliferation threats. It rejected the policies of its Democratic and Republican predecessors and identified the problem as being at the nexus of outlaw states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist groups. Its policy prescription was regime change. We would solve this problem by removing the hostile states. Iraq was the first implementation of that policy. This view expressly rejected arms control agreements, downplayed multilateral for and existing alliance relationships, and focused on an action-oriented approach relying on U.S. military force. The buzzword was that the mission would define the coalition. The war in Iraq was a costly disaster. We sacrificed thousands of lives of our best warriors, billions of dollars of our treasury, and decades of international credibility and legitimacy. Worse, it didn't solve the problem. The threats increased, not decreased. It's not just that Iraq did not have nuclear chemical or biological weapons, or nuclear chemical and biological programs, or an intention to restart nuclear chemical or biological programs. It's that the message that the Iraq war was intended to send failed. When John Bolton was asked in the spring of 2003 what lesson Iran and North Korea should draw from the war, he said, take a number. That was the idea. By force, we would coerce these countries into compliance or collapse. Instead, both Iran and North Korea accelerated their programs. They've made more progress on their nuclear programs in the last six years than they made in the previous 12. Don't get me wrong. There were some benefits from this policy. The proliferation security initiative, for example, is a useful, although limited instrument. We removed a tyrant in the Middle East. We shook up the status quo, creating fissures into which we now see democratic movements moving. But as Big New Brzezinski pointed out on Morning Joe yesterday, the price we paid was disproportional to the benefits. No leader would rationally do what we did for those meager benefits. Over those last eight years, the proliferation threats generated a fierce momentum. We are now dealing with the consequences of those increased threats. They were there before they grew worse during this failed experiment. Terrorism increased. The capabilities of certain states increased. Arms control measures floundered. International cooperation necessary to deter nuclear terrorism decreased. Serious issues over command and control of existing arsenals, including our own, increased. Including serious incidents involving bombers and subs over the last two years. We have to hope that we don't have problems with missiles next. Fortunately, the policy ship is writing itself. There is a new consensus in town. A swing back to moderation. Bipartisan moderation. Two exhibits come to mind. The first is the recent report by the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Posture Commission headed by Jim Schlesinger and William Perry concluding that the moment is ripe for new arms control agreements. A position that Schlesinger in the past has not held. We see a new appreciation of the need, as we just heard, for disarmament measures to take the lead in generating the cooperation we need for non-proliferation measures. There is also a very important task force report from the Council on Foreign Relation led by Brent Scowcroft and William Perry. That also concluded the time was ripe for new urgent cooperative measures involving arms control reductions between the U.S. and Russia, the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Banned Treaty and new international efforts to increase the barriers to proliferation. We have at the head of the country a dynamic leader who is better than almost anyone realized he would be. The speech that President Obama gave on April 5th in Prague is perhaps one of the most important foreign policy speeches any president has given in decades. It charted a new consensus course on nuclear policy. It has all the elements necessary, and it leads not with a warning or a critique of the other guys' weapons but a recognition that we have to lead by example, that we have to start with our own arsenals, that we have to get rid of this Cold War overhang that keeps the United States with 10,000 nuclear weapons, Russia with 13,000 nuclear weapons, and the other seven countries dividing up the other 1,000 or so nuclear weapons in the world. And the analysis is very simple. Through this disarmament you can generate the cooperation you need for non-proliferation. Disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. Disarmament gets you the cooperation you need for non-proliferation. Non-proliferation gives you the security you need for continued disarmament. You keep flipping that coin over and over. Very practical approach, step by step. I think the prospects for this policy are frankly are excellent. U.S.-Russian relations are improving. This is not going to be easy. I was in Moscow just three weeks ago. There is a deep cynicism in Moscow. They do not trust us. One expert told me that they haven't had good relations with the United States in 15 years. So the grievances go back some time. It's not just the Georgian War. It's not just the past administration. They doubt that one president will make a difference in U.S. policy. But I believe the Russian government is ahead of the policy experts from contacts I've had with the Russian ministries. I believe that the leadership at the top wants to make a deal with the United States happen. I expect that by September, October, the U.S. Senate will have before it a treaty negotiated extending and revising the START agreement and lowering, at least partially, the number of allowed, strategic-deployed nuclear launchers. I expect that in the spring, the Congress will also have before it a test-band treaty for ratification. We've seen progress now developing at the Conference on Disarmament, where a 12-year log jam has been broken, and we have discussions on a treaty sought by both the Bush and Clinton administrations to end the production of new weapons materials. We see increased cooperation at the Security Council willing to take stronger measures to deal with countries such as North Korea. Finally, I believe that we've now corrected some of the imbalance in our war strategies and are focusing the greater bulk of our attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, focusing on the greatest threat, which is not some outlaw state, but Pakistan. Iran and North Korea are many years away from a deliverable nuclear weapon. Al-Qaeda is kilometers away. Pakistan, for my money, is the most dangerous country on Earth. It could turn from a major non-NATO ally to the worst nuclear nightmare overnight. As Bob Goluchi said at the Italian Embassy two weeks ago, it's not just that Pakistan could go bad any day. It might have gone bad yesterday, and we wouldn't know it. So we're focusing on the threats, understanding the correct equation that it's not rogue states plus weapons of mass destruction puts terrorism. It's any state with nuclear weapons plus terrorism that matters. That change of the equation gives you a whole new policy. I think this administration gets that policy. Finally, just a word about Iran. On Saturday, I was in the realist camp on Iran. I expected that whoever was elected president wouldn't much matter. That this was Haman-e's Iran, and we had to deal with him. And Musa Bay would not have a different nuclear policy from Ahmadinejad. I've changed. I've changed. You cannot look at the five-and-a-half-mile-long demonstration that went through Tehran on Monday, the mass demonstrations that happened yesterday, the Twitter feeds that are coming through and not want to paint your face green. Something has happened in there that could fundamentally shift the dynamic. We don't know where it's going to go. But even if Ahmadinejad survives, and that is by no means certain, he will be a weakened president. Less able to play the nuclear card as this nationalist rallying cry. It will be a weakened regime. Ahmadinejad will not be able to pose as the warrior president defending the nation against the oppressive west. He will be the oppressor. The Iranian regime has been delegitimized for millions of Iranians. I don't think there's a going back for this. That means, as Leslie Gale pointed out the other day on Daily Beast, that Iran will be in a position where the solution to its problems, I don't get as wrong, the problem is not its isolation by the west, its fundamental problem is the catastrophe that is its economy. In order to correct that, one of the main sources of the demonstrations, it has to make a deal with the west. And any deal with the west involves constraints on the nuclear program. I'm not saying that they are going to give up that program, but I think there will be a greater willingness to constrain that program, to come to some accommodation, to fundamentally start to change the Iranian relationship with the west. No matter who is president, with Musa Bay it would be quicker and easier, but even with Ahmadinejad, I believe we have new possibilities here. And when you can start to solve a problem as difficult as Iran, when you can solve a problem as difficult as the U.S. nuclear Cold War arsenal still sitting ready to annihilate the world, when you can start to end finally the testing of nuclear weapons globally, when you start making this real progress, it builds up confidence for the rest of the agenda. That's why I'm optimistic about our prospects in the near term. I think we've turned the corner, I think we've learned the lessons of the past, and I'm looking forward to increased international cooperation, increased nuclear disarmament, increased barriers to the spread of the deadliest weapons ever created. Thank you. I'd like to note, as a point of information, that a few of the individuals that Joe mentioned in his comments are members of CSIS, in particular Brzezinski's co-croft and Schlesinger are all members of our Board of Trustees and counselors here. That was not by accident. And also our Chairman Sam Nunn, as you all know, has been very active in this regard. Now I'd like to introduce our second analyst, Steven Redamaker, is Senior Counsel at BGR Holding. Steve also has a tremendous experience in this regard. He came to BGR from the staff of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, who is also on the Board of CSIS. There, Steve was Policy Director for National Security Affairs and Senior Counsel. Among other things, he assisted the Majority Leader in managing all aspects of the legislative process relating to foreign policy intelligence and Homeland Security matters. Prior to that, in 2002, Steve was confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Secretary of State, and from that time until 2006, he headed at various times three bureaus of the Department of State, including the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation. He directed non-proliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea, the Prussat-Change, right Steve? As well as the Proliferation Security Initiative. So we're also delighted, it also gives me great pleasure to welcome Steve here, and I've asked him, as I did Joe, to confine comments to about 10 minutes so that we could encourage as much discussion on their points as possible. So Steve, welcome. Thank you, Eric. I know my name can be a little misleading, but you did leave out the most important qualification I have to be here today, which is that I, too, at least partially have Italian descent, so I'm entitled to be here at this Auguste gathering. Joe, that was a very interesting presentation. I thought we were here today to talk about the role of the G-8 with respect to non-proliferation, and so perhaps I should apologize, begin with an apology in saying that I am actually going to talk about that subject besides having a debate about the merits or demerits of the Bush administration and Dick Cheney and what has come in the past. And I do want to talk about the G-8. Maybe I could just, and I disagree with most everything you said, but just to put in perspective how wrong I think it is, I want to begin with just an introductory point, and that is, you know, Joe indicates that the Bush administration had enormous hostility to arms control. He somehow overlooks the fact that the Bush administration brought into effect the Moscow Treaty of 2002, which provided for a two-thirds reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, the deepest arms control reduction ever negotiated between the two sides. And let's compare that to the record of President Bush's predecessors, and I'll do that by asking you a question. Among all of our experts here, who can name the last bilateral strategic arms control agreement negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia by a Democratic president that was subsequently brought into force? By President Clinton or any of his Democratic predecessors? It's a trick question because there is none. The entire alphabet soup of strategic arms control agreements between the United States and Russia was negotiated by Republican presidents, and it's a source of embarrassment. Frankly, it was a great embarrassment to arms control activists. The Democrat presidents never seemed to be able, they talk a good game, but they have a great deal of trouble, it seems, bringing arms control agreements into force. But it's also a source of embarrassment to a lot of Republicans that in fact this whole structure of arms control was created by Republican presidents. So just in listening to Joe's rhetoric on this, I think you should bear some of these facts in mind as you think through the history and then the future of what lies ahead of us. Now, with respect to the G8, the G8 has a... I'm a big supporter of the G8 in the area of nonproliferation. I think it has a very good record over the last decade and I think it can contribute a lot going forward. We have these annual summits of the G8 and typically they issue a statement at the summit on nonproliferation and if you go back and look at the last 10 years worth, there's some really good stuff in there. On one level, there's a lot of good rhetoric and rhetoric is fine, it endorses good ideas and calls for good things in the area of arms control and nonproliferation. But that's not what I think is the critical contribution of the G8. What the G8 has done over time is it has provided a forum for progress on issues where progress was not achievable in other forms and that's a great advantage. The key to success in multilateral diplomacy oftentimes is picking the right multilateral forum in which to engage in the multilateral diplomacy and in that respect, it's useful to have numerous multilateral fora so that you can choose the right one to advance the right idea. We have a lot of multilateral fora. Some are more amenable than others to nonproliferation and arms control initiatives. The UN General Assembly is a bad forum. It's very hard to make progress on most issues in the UN General Assembly. The Conference of State Parties of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is an even worse forum. The reason being that it is a forum consisting of virtually every nation in the world and every one of them has a veto. So the idea that you are going to achieve meaningful progress against Iran at a conference of countries where Iran has a veto over any decision, you have to be a great optimist to think that that's actually realistic. So it's good to have other fora. Unfortunately we do. We have the UN Security Council, which oftentimes is a place where progress can be made in the nuclear area. We have the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is a forum where we can often make progress on export control issues. And then there's the G8. And let me just take off a few of the accomplishments over the last decade of G8 summits. In Damascus in 2002, the global partnership against proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction was announced. This was an effort to bring to bear $20 billion in assistance for programs to control loose nukes and fissile material and other proliferation-sensitive materials. The Nun Luger program on steroids, internationalized and expanded. It's been hugely successful. It's basically doubled the amount of money available for those kinds of programs around the world. At the Sea Island Summit in 2004, we saw the first meaningful international progress to control the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. This has been a very difficult issue, but I think all experts agree it's one of the most important ones to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. We need to constrain the dissemination of the key technologies that enable countries to produce fissile materials, and it's the G8 that has led the way over the last five or six years in trying to do that. Glen Eagle Summit in 2005, great progress made on the issue of financing for weapons of mass destruction programs, and a lot of the financial sanctions we have today can be traced back to Glen Eagle's. St. Petersburg 2006, that provided the platform for the announcement of the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. I think there's a record of accomplishment that we can all take great satisfaction in, and I'm optimistic that we'll see progress at future G8 summits. I think we've just heard what the ambitions are for the upcoming G8 summit, which is an endorsement of the anticipated progress on non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations, particularly the U.S.-Russia negotiations to extend start. I think Joe mentioned CTBT moving forward in the United States. You know, I guess on this, I want to say there is this vision, and I think Sebastiano laid it out and Joe laid it out, that the problem we have in dealing with Iran's and North Korea's is that the nuclear weapons states, particularly under that evil Bush administration, dragged their feet in getting rid of nuclear weapons. They hung onto their nuclear weapons and this created enormous dissatisfaction and opened the door for the Iran's and North Korea's to become proliferators and get away with what they've been doing. The hope, the dream, is that if there is stepped up progress on nuclear disarmament, that somehow this will translate to progress against the Iran's and North Korea's. I would suggest that's a completely untested theory. I hope it's true. We will see whether it's true, but before we pop the champagne corks, I think, recall that fact I pointed out at the beginning, which is for all their goodwill and all their good intentions in the area of strategic arms control, democratic administrations have had a tough time producing over the last 30 years or less 40 years and I would not celebrate the conclusion and entry into force of the start extension agreement just yet. I wish our negotiators well, but I do worry that the Obama administration does seem to have conveyed to the Russian side that it needs this agreement more than they do and that's a very bad tactical situation from which to go into any negotiation with the Russians. And I think the evidence of this is the statement by President Putin last month that Russia now has a precondition to concluding the start extension agreement and that is that the U.S. abandoned plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe. Whether missile defense in Europe is a good idea or a bad idea, I think, is irrelevant to the point I wish to make, which is you don't start announcing preconditions to signing an agreement unless you calculate that the other side wants the deal more than you want it. And again, that's, to me, that spells difficulty for these negotiations. Again, I hope they succeed, but I would not assume that there will be success, at least in the timeframe that we're all looking at, which is before December 5th of this year when the current start treaty expires. CTBT, again, unquestionably, the Obama administration wants to bring the CTBT into force and wants the United States Senate to ratify. Joe referred to the report of the Strategic Posture Commission, which I have here. I think if they're candid, supporters of the CT will have to admit that the report of this commission is a disaster for the CTBT. The commission split right down the middle on the question of whether the United States should ratify. Basically, the Republican members of the commission, who are very prominent experts, said the United States should not ratify, and they laid out their reasons in the report. The Democrat members took the opposite view, but that's not the kind of bipartisan consensus that supporters of CTBT would want to see as we enter a national debate on whether the United States should ratify. More importantly, there was a unanimous recommendation in that report that the United States negotiated an agreed definition with the other nuclear weapons states before submitting the treaty to the Senate for approval. This may or may not be a fatal obstacle to moving forward, but the basic point was there is no agreement among the parties of the CTBT about what the treaty prohibits. In other words, what is the definition of a prohibited nuclear weapons test, and that that should be negotiated. An agreed definition should be presented to the Senate at the time that the administration asked the Senate to approve. The Obama administration had a chance to say, yes, they intend to do that. They did not indicate that they're prepared to do that. I do think it will be very tough for them in the wake of a unanimous recommendation to not present such an agreed definition when they ask the Senate to act. If they try to present such a definition, we will see whether there are actually problems. The dissenters on this commission indicate that Rush has a different definition of what is prohibited. If that's true, maybe it won't be so easy after all to negotiate an agreed definition. My point here is not to criticize the CTBT, but to say I think it's premature to celebrate the U.S. ratification of the CTBT. Not only do I question the whole notion that rapid progress on disarmament is going to translate into progress against Iran and North Korea, but I also question whether there's actually going to be rapid progress. Maybe I'll be proven wrong, but again, I think it's premature to celebrate the rapid progress before we see it. What does this mean for the G8? I think what it means is there's every reason to believe that the G8 will remain an invaluable forum in the nonproliferation area going forward. The expectation that in May of 2010 we're going to have a radically successful NPT review conference, which is going to come up with all kinds of agreements on how to tighten the NPT, strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Assuming that doesn't happen and I'm pretty confident it won't happen, then we'll once again be looking at alternatives and the G8 will present itself as one of the best of the alternatives. All the agenda items that people like Joe put forward and the commission that I served on put forward as goals for the NPT review conference, things like penalties for, agreed penalties for violation of the NPT, agreed penalties for withdrawal from the NPT. I think, assuming we don't actually achieve those at the 2010 review conference, then we can begin to look in places like the G8 where progress on those kinds of proposals may be possible. Thanks. Thank you to both panelists here. You may have noticed, ladies and gentlemen, that there are certain areas of contrast of opinion that have been revealed by the preceding comments. I think that we could have a very constructive and interesting debate just by engaging on some of the issues that were raised, but in lieu of that, let's bring you into this. The whole point is to make this as transactional as possible. We'd like to invite questions and comments short, if you would, from the floor. Let's avoid soliloquies, if we possibly can. But I know that we'll probably get some interesting and varied responses to your comments and feedback. Who would like to break the ice here with a comment or a question? Yes, sir. And I think we have microphones, and yes, if you would wait for the microphone to reach you, and please, if you would identify yourself and your organization. My name is Mark Goldberg. I write a blog about the UN called UN Dispatch. I have a question about the IAEA elections. Specifically, I'm wondering what the panelists think, whether or not the person who leads the IAEA has a significant effect on global nonproliferation, and whether the panelists have a favorite candidate in the elections. I don't have a favorite candidate. I think Mohamed El-Baraday has done an outstanding job as the head of the IAEA, and that was been internationally recognized by the decision of the Nobel Committee to award him the Peace Prize two years ago. I think Mohamed El-Baraday has used that leadership role in a way that no other director general of the IAEA has, and to become an outspoken global advocate for nuclear disarmament. It's always been part of the portfolio, but no one has ever taken it to such a high level as El-Baraday. I doubt very much that his successor will do the same. I expect we'll probably see a swing back to a more technical orientation, perhaps a more consensus president. This is not in any way a criticism of El-Baraday. For me, he's a hero. I've agreed with almost all his recommendations, including his comments yesterday about Duran's intentions to seek nuclear weapons technology. That's just my assessment of where I think the IAEA is going to go. Thank you, Steve. I agree it's a critically important position in the nonproliferation of permanent. I don't think technically El-Baraday received the Nobel Peace Prize. I believe the IAEA received the Nobel Peace Prize as an institution, and El-Baraday accepted it on behalf of the institution. I do have one or two favorite candidates. I'm not going to put them at risk by identifying them, too. But I do think there are a number of highly qualified candidates out there. I don't think it's a criticism to say that the next leader of the IAEA may be more technical in orientation. That is, in fact, the charter of the organization and its leadership. They are not, by design, a political institution. The charter of the IAEA makes clear that, to the degree, political decisions need to be made as the Board of Governors of the IAEA that makes them on behalf of the agency. And when matters get really tough, it's the job of the IAEA to refer those matters to the UN Security Council for political decision. And I think that's a model that is right. I don't think UN civil servants should be making political decisions on behalf of the world community. Other questions and comments, please, in the back here. Thanks, Robert Toretto with International Investor. It occurs to us that there are few nations in between these problematic nations and ourselves. We had someone representing the nation of Italy here this morning. We've got a lot of European nations. It would seem that would be much more concerned with the affairs in Iran and Pakistan than even we should be. There's certainly, within missile range, in some instances, why is it that we consider these matters as though we're the only policemen on the block? Why is it that we're not insisting on assistance from these other nations that should be our allies in these causes? And when we turn to a nation like North Korea, it is our belief also that North Korea is the rattler of the snake, which is China. North Korea owes its very existence to the nation of China. It wouldn't exist otherwise. It's continuing to be sustained by China. It wouldn't be able to sneeze without China wiping its nose. So why is it that we consider only ourselves as the only impediment to the affairs in these nations? Thank you. Steve, would you like to begin on this one? And then we'll pass it back to Joe. I have some sympathy with the question you've put. I agree with you in the case of North Korea that more has to be expected, more has to be asked of and expected of China. China is the one country with the leverage to bring about change there. Joe denounced the notion of regime change that it's an evil concept and destined to fail. To me, one of the great ironies is that regime change, in the case of North Korea, is eminently achievable. China could achieve regime change overnight. And it could do it in one of two ways, actually. Both of them very simple. One would be to close the border with North Korea, cutting them off from energy supplies and other critical inputs to their economy. I don't think North Korea would last very long without that lifeline from China. The other way that China could bring about the collapse of North Korea, it would be to open the border and let refugees stream out. And in the same way that East Germany collapsed at the moment that East German citizens had a pathway to freedom in the West through the Czech Republic, North Korea would collapse very quickly once not just ordinary citizens, but members of the military began defecting to China. China has not been prepared to do those two things up until now for reasons that are perhaps understandable, but solutions to the problem are readily imaginable. What has been lacking up until now is the will to adopt those solutions. Regime change doesn't always mean military invasion. There are other ways that regime can be changed. With regard to Iran, I think I would like to see our European allies do more. I'm a big fan of Italy, but Italy has deep commercial relations with Iran, and the same is true of many other European countries. And as an official of the Bush administration, it was my job often to sit in meetings and be lectured by European officials about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and why the United States needed to do more on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty or on our nuclear disarmament efforts. But talk is cheap. You really want to do something, maybe you adopt the kind of measures vis-a-vis Iran that the United States adopted decades ago, restricting trade, restricting investment. It remains the case that many European countries really allow investment in Iran. They essentially subsidize it by guaranteeing the investment, using their equivalent of the overseas private investment corporation to guarantee European investment in Iran, or their equivalent of the Export-Import Bank to subsidize trade with Iran. So there's a lot more that the Europeans could do, and I guess I'm with where Joe used to be on events in Iran. I think it's interesting to see how things play out, but I think at the end of the day it probably doesn't, no matter what happens politically, it's probably not going to make much difference when it comes to their bottom line policy on the nuclear program. And, you know, if it takes a stolen election and riding the streets to persuade the Iranians, sorry, to persuade Europeans and others to do what they should have done a long time ago on Iran, you know, I'll take that. And I guess I won't complain too much about it. I'll be happy to see it happen. Let me make two quick points. The first is on regime change. Historically, regime change is often a prerequisite for ending threatening nuclear programs. So Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, they require the end of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new regimes in those countries that allowed them to give up the thousands of nuclear weapons that they have. Argentina and Brazil, it was the end of the military hunters in both countries, the creation of civilian governments that convinced both countries to end the nuclear programs that they had. South Africa, the transition from apartheid rule to majority rule, ended the nuclear program in South Africa. The key is to understand that these regime changes have to be done by the people in the country themselves. And the mistake is to think that we can force the regime change by our external intervention or that it is our job to accelerate that regime change through military intervention. That's the key mistake. So Joe, you oppose the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act? Sanctions have a real role. And for example, in South Africa, having sanctions on South Africa for decades definitely helped isolate that regime and accelerate influence, the transition. Sanctions on Argentina and Brazil greatly helped. It didn't cripple the governments, but it slowed down the development of those nuclear programs. Some intervention to bring about regime changes. No, no, no. Every foreign policy has a combination of pressures and incentives. That's not what I'm saying. There's a big difference between collective action to bring pressure on a country and a military invasion of Iraq. That's a distinction that I hope we have learned over the last painful six or seven years. There were huge consequences to be paid for these wars of choice. Let me just say just a quick word on the jeep. I basically disagree with your question and I understand why Steve likes it. But I think there's a certain arrogance in the United States that spans administration, that spans parties, that generally disparages the Europeans. I think it's no secret that ten years or so ago you couldn't go to a cocktail party in town without hearing Neoconservatives talk about the feckless Europeans. That Bob Kagan's book probably epitomized this. The Europeans are from Venus. They're benefiting from our security strength and they're weak. They won't do what only we can do. That view led to the disasters of the previous administrations. I think the Europeans are perfectly aware of the situation. They have a different analysis than we do. I believe those analyses are now coming more into sync with the US, the current US analysis as we moderate our policy, as we always do in this country. It's one of the things that makes us so great. We come back from the extremes. We establish the consensus, the bipartisan consensus. I think you see that consensus now coming into convergence with the European consensus. And one of the reasons, and this is important to understand, the nearly simultaneous transition in leadership that has occurred in the G8 meeting. At the next G8 photo op, there will be only one leader who is there for the 2006 photo op. That's Canadian Prime Minister Harper. Every single one of those leaders is a new leader, less wed to the failed policies of the past, more willing to take on new policies, more eager to make their mark on the world stage. I think that's a dynamic that favors cooperation, that favors us adopting some of the new policies, that there is a consensus on. Every single one of those leaders has embraced the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. I don't think that has ever happened before. They disagree on the pace, some emphasize the vision, others more the practical steps, but you've got a unity now that we haven't seen for a very long time. That's a very hopeful sign for progress on this entire agenda. I was just going to say, I think if you subtract the anti-bush rhetoric, I actually agree with most of what Joe said, and I thought it was a helpful clarification. Regime change does not equate to Iraq policy. That's the most recent illustration of what colors everybody's perception of regime change, but there are a lot of other models. South Africa was a successful model that I think virtually everyone applaud. I think Joe basically endorsed the policies that the United States pursued to help bring about regime change in South Africa. I would say, particularly in the case of North Korea, let's not draw the lesson from all the problems associated with Iraq, and I'm not here to try to minimize all those problems, but don't draw the conclusion from that, that the only thing to do about North Korea is to accept the regime for what it is and negotiate with them and live with them forever, because if you look at the substance of the agreements that have been struck with North Korea over the last 15 years, the bottom line is essentially they put the United States in the position of propping up that odious regime, and any future negotiated solution with North Korea will once again have us throwing them a lifeline of energy supply, food supply, keeping them afloat so that they can continue to do the horrible things that they do to their people, and if that's the only alternative to a nuclear North Korean position to transfer nuclear weapons to al-Qaida and anybody else who shows up with cash to buy them, maybe that's what we need to do, but I don't think we should take a look at Iraq and say, well, you know, we just need to accept the North Korean regime because any effort to move beyond this current regime will lead to disaster. That would be completely the wrong decision or the wrong conclusion to draw. Thank you both. Let's move to some more questions, comments from the audience, please. There's a gentleman here in the front if we could bring the microphone to him, please. Please, if I could remind you, identify yourself in your organization. Yeah, I did correct this. Mary Washington University. Could you comment on what you think is the biggest barrier to a successful conclusion of the start negotiations and can the United States and Russia scale that barrier? I think that for the Russians, the agreement to reduce nuclear arms is tied up intimately with decisions on the U.S. anti-missile bases in Poland and the Czech Republic with programs in the United States that would put conventional warheads on nuclear delivery vehicles, sometimes referred to as global strike, which they feel could substitute for strategic attack weapons. And third, the overall situation is security relationship in Eastern Europe on its borders. They're concerned that U.S. moves are a threat to Russia and trying to encircle it. So they want to talk about all of those together. That's a heavy burden to put on arms control negotiations. So that's together those of the major problems. I believe some of the testimony we heard yesterday from Bill Lin and General Cartwright and others about the U.S. now exploring cooperative measures on missile defense systems in Europe are a major step forward in resolving their concern over the Polish and Czech Republic bases. It's also one of the easiest issues for us to resolve because the systems don't work yet. There is no interceptor that works that we could put in Poland. There isn't a workable radar that we could put in Czech Republic. So we have time to compromise that. The other issues are more difficult but not at all insurmountable. So it's not, in other words in brief, it's not primarily the reduction issues or the verification issues. It's these other sort of European security issues that are going to be the biggest problem in getting a new agreement. I just agree with that. I think the biggest problem is excessive ambition. Let's bear in mind what's driving the negotiation. It's really two deadlines that are on the minds of the negotiators on both sides. The current START treaty which provides the verification regime that both sides with its arms control commitments expires with the START treaty on December 5th of this year. Both the United States and Russia want to continue verification past December 5th. So on both sides there's a desire to do that. And that's the fundamental driver here to conclude a negotiation by December 5th. Beyond that there's the NPT review conference next spring and next May and both countries would like to be able to point to progress as part of the case that they want to make at the NPT review conference for further progress on strengthening the nuclear and amplification regime. If the two sides focus just on verification which is the driver I think agreement can be reached very quickly and there would be no risk of lapse in verification of arms control. What's happened though is that the Obama administration has said they want to go for fairly significant nuclear reductions on top of extension of verification and that in turn opens the door for the Russian side to say well okay we're prepared to engage with you on further nuclear reductions but there's this whole range of other issues we need to talk about then and they bring in missile defense and they bring in conventional strike and missile defense generally. I don't think we should be deceived that the US can give way in Poland and not have the Russian reaction be well now that you've given us what we want on that now let's talk about the rest of your national missile defense and what restrictions you're prepared to agree on with respect to your national missile defense. So as I indicated in my opening remarks I do think the Obama administration has put itself in the unfortunate position of leading the Russian side to conclude that the US wants this agreement more than they do and that creates an opportunity for them to achieve negotiated progress and a whole range of other issues of concern to them and to come back to that point I made it the very outset why is it that no democratic president in modern history has been able to negotiate and bring into effect a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union or Russia I think the answer is in most cases excessive ambition and excessive enthusiasm but in the same way that the breathless teenager teenage boy at the high school dance who is too eager to find someone to dance with sometimes has trouble finding someone to dance with I think many democratic administrations have found that themselves in that position negotiating arms control with Russia and I worry that that's where the Obama administration is today I hope I'm wrong about that I would like to see the start treaty extended the prime minister of Russia just declaring we're not yes we need an extension of verification but we will not agree to that unless you back down on the third site the calculation that lies behind that is that they have leverage why do they think they have leverage well because they're reading the US side as being more eager to reach agreement than they are as I said that's a bad tactical position in any negotiation as one of the poorest dancers in history I can identify with that comment but why don't we why don't we give both our panelists kind of a last a few seconds to lay out their vision for what is to come with respect to the upcoming G8 forum and kind of the broader roadmap I think you've already touched on it I'd be grateful if you could both be succinct in this but unfortunately although I think we could stay here all day we've got to move on to our next panel but if we could hear from you in terms of where things are going and what you think the operative variables are elements through the G8 modality among others we'd be grateful to hear your vision on what is to come Joe why don't we begin with you and we'll give Steve the last word I think our two guidelines for the G8 should be the two guidelines that my friend Michael Crepon at the Stimson Center has put forth number one we all have to do more and number two whatever we do it won't be enough we have massive problems ahead of us Steve and I disagree as to the historical baggage that we're carrying that created those problems but I think there's a general assessment things are getting worse overall not better we all we need all oars in the water here I believe that we have the prospects for a kind of G8 unity that we haven't seen in a very long time it's not just the new dynamic leadership in many of the G8 countries it's not just the new dynamic leadership that we have here in the United States it's a general recognition that the threats are worse a general recognition that the past policies have failed a general recognition that there needs to be a restoration of the balance between disarmament and non-proliferation and a recognition that this policy moment that is opened up could close very quickly so there is a fierce urgency of now if you do not make these policy decisions now in the next year next 18 months to turn in this new direction we might not be able to capture this kind of moment again from everything I've seen coming out of the capitals from everything I've from the talks I've had with embassy officials here so it's not just Barack Obama who's calling for a world free of nuclear weapons it's not just Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger and others you know it's Gordon Brown it's Sokhozi it's Putin who said just a couple of blessures last week that we should get rid of nuclear weapons it's Medvedev it's not a uniquely you know American centric drive at this point and that's what gives this whole effort such promise and there's a general recognition that the problems are while large are not primarily about North Korea and Iran that it's not primarily about these other that these two states are the major problems although that's what gets the share of media attention it's this broader agenda of the threats from existing weapons the threat from terrorism including Pakistan and the general threat that the entire non-proliferation regime could as a UN report said just a few years ago collapse leading to a cascade of proliferation there's a general analysis that shared among that so I'm actually very confident that we could achieve real progress in the next the next year but do I get my 30 seconds? I wrote an article a few years back that said Republicans do arms control better because what Steve said is absolutely historically right this non-proliferation regime this arms control regime has been built by republican presidents there's a good reason for that one of the major obstacles blocking democratic presidents from achieving these agreements is not overreach it's republicans who block the treaties who use this as a political football to attack democratic presidents who propose these kinds of treaties if you look historically the best combination for arms control is a republican president with a democratic congress the worst is a republican president with a republican congress because that accelerates the efforts away from arms control the other dynamic when you have a republican president like Ronald Reagan who talk about overreach who wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons who did the first major reduction treaty and you have a supportive congress you can achieve great things it's when you let those partisan dynamic operate where Jimmy Carter's opposed or Bill Clinton's opposed for his arms control agreement for largely domestic political reasons that's what puts the stick in the spokes it's not ambition Steve, over to you Moscow treaty in 2002 was negotiated by a republican president with republican control of the House of Representatives and a 50-50 split senate so I'm not sure that this was pretty much it I was pretty much it for the eight years and it was the last arms control agreement and you guys said it would be the last arms control agreement you walked away from it no verification it's a joke of an arms control agreement let's Steve have his final comments in the view of some it may be a joke it compares favorably with the strategic arms control agreement negotiated by the previous administration because it wasn't the um vision please with respect to the G8 which we all came here to discuss the uh I think we've heard what the vision that we'll animate the upcoming meeting of the G8 the subsequent meeting in 2010 it is essentially the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and all of the analysis that lies behind that the thought that if there is radical progress on nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapons states that this will translate to progress in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime additional restrictions that would apply to the Iran's and North Korea's pressure on them to accept international demands constraints on the nuclear or potential nuclear ambitions of other countries if you've listened to my remarks you know I have some skepticism about whether that theory is true but I think we are now in a situation where the theory is going to be tested and then we'll see whether the theory holds or not my own prediction is that the theory will not work exactly as predicted and starting in about two years we'll be back to the more difficult world that we've all lived under in the past which is a world where there is no silver bullet to these problems that the obstacles to progress with the Iran's and North Korea's go way beyond issues or apprehensions about the nuclear weapons policies of the United States and Russia parenthetically what is our biggest problem on Iran today can't get the UN Security Council to do enough why? Russia and China are mad about the failure of the permanent five members of the UN to engage in nuclear disarmament I don't think so because they could engage in disarmament if that was important to them their concerns are different so anyway this theory will be tested but my prediction is starting in about two years we'll be back in the old world where instead of thinking what is going to solve all these problems it'll be the more difficult work case by case issue by issue forum by forum trying to make progress and in that world the G8 has over time proven itself to be a fairly amenable fairly productive forum and I'm optimistic that some of the things that we'd like to see achieved in other fora such as the review conference for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty when that fails we can look to other fora like the G8 to try and make progress on some of those issues thank you Steve ladies and gentlemen the chairman of CSIS former senator Sam Nunn is fond of saying that here in Washington you can't take friendship personally we've seen some some politics seep in this debate but this has been a treat we've heard from two contrasting standpoints a very well articulated set of ideas looking at the kinds of significant complexities that all of the G8 member states will be taking on in the upcoming meeting in Italy and I think that we all owe both these candidates a round of applause to thank them