 Okay, here we go. Welcome to what the F is going on in Latin America and the Caribbean, a popular resistance broadcast of hot news out of the region in partnership with Black Alliance for Peace Haiti Americas team code pink common frontiers, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Friends of Latin America, Interreligious Task Force on Central America, Massachusetts Peace Action and Task Force on the Americas, we broadcast Thursdays at 430pm Pacific, 730pm Eastern right here on YouTube live, including channels for the Convo couch popular resistance and code pink. Post broadcast recordings can be found at Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Telegram, redindymedia.com, and now under podcasts at popularresistance.org. Today's episode, bearing 200 years of the Monroe Doctrine, and I'm really pleased for all of you to meet our guest today. Activist friend and Venezuelan Vice Minister of Foreign Relations for North America, Carlos Ron. He's joining us live from Chile this evening. And we're going to have him talk to us about the Monroe Doctrine specifically focusing on South America and what Simone Bolivar experienced in his life and, and how this whole US foreign policy has extended through today. And so let me give you all just a brief background as to what the context of the Monroe Doctrine is I'm sure most of you know but let me just do this for educational purposes. Excuse me, the Monroe Doctrine first articulated by US President James Monroe on December 2 1823, making this year 200 years is a United States foreign policy position that opposes European colonialism in Western in the Western It holds that any intervention in the political fairs of the Americas by foreign powers is a potentially hostile act against the United States. The doctrine was central to American foreign policy for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The doctrine remains in place today as a pillar of US foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean, and no longer exclusively applies to European powers. So welcome Carlos. Really wonderful to have your time today. I'm very glad to be here. So maybe for the audience. We should start with with 1823 and what that what that meant for South America and the Caribbean. Well, I'll leave it, maybe I'll even say even a bit earlier than that. But you know that I think we have to, we have to think about the foundations of the United States of America. And the, the ideologies that came forth with, with, you know, with the success of 13 colonies that managed to break away from the British crown and form, you know, a new republic. In a sense, the process of independence was different from North and South America so I'm going to really, you know, usually talk about, but it's different in the sense that, you know, the, they were sort of inverted in order. You had a, you really had a break. You know, when, when the pilgrims came to North America and and then all the other colonies started to be, you know, settled, they were really already breaking off from their relationship to the crown, and starting a new society. So, when, when they arrived in Plymouth Rock in 1620, you basically had an independent group of people that really had, you know, little ties to the crown except for the fact that they were nominally and you know subject to the crown but they were they were pretty almost expelled from Britain because of religious purposes, and they started to settle, you know, their own way of organizing and their own, you know, self ruling system, which later then, you know, started to, you know, on a process of growth and exploration conquest, really, when they started, you know, going against the native populations. And when the crown, you know, centuries later realized, you know, hey, these people can tribute to us, then they try to, you know, say, hey, you know, you should have a relationship with us. We should be able to tell you what to do. And basically, you know, they broke off and said no way, you know, we're already doing our own thing. So, and that's where, you know, the declaration of independence comes about. But the process really had already taken place. It already started as an independent, you know, sort of organization. In the Spanish colonies, it was different. In the Spanish colony, Spain came in, the crown came in, the crown conquered, the crown settled, the crown began the process, and then it was then that, you know, the people already, you know, felt that they needed to, you know, organize, break away. It was, it was a backward sort of process. But what that gave the US was an advantage over, you know, being able to already develop, you know, its own political organization, being able to already develop, you know, its means of production, independent from the crown. We didn't have that. It was actually in the, you know, in the South, it was basically just, you know, centuries of exploitation, just going in, grabbing the gold, grabbing the silver, grabbing the, you know, the pearls, grabbing everything that was here, taking it back to Europe. You know, and not really for Spain, by the way, Spain, Spain became impoverished because of this process, because the different kings that ruled, and kings and queens that ruled Spain at different points in time. They really didn't invest that fortune in Spain, but rather place it in the European banks. So actually, you know, the countries that, the countries that actually become stronger, because of this exploitation is the countries that have the banks like Great Britain, basically, not Spain. It gets to a point where Spain actually, you know, becomes so in that and didn't, because Spain is basically putting all the muscle and paying for the soldiers to be there, but not really investing back that money. So that's when, you know, the crown starts facing, you know, some problems. And that is when, you know, it becomes, you know, it goes, it's so crazy that they start selling titles of nobility, you know, they were doing anything they could in order to, you know, revive their economy. That decay, you know, is something that would eventually in the earlier parts of the 19th century is what's going to help the independence movements in South America. You have a demoralized army, you have, you know, a poor country, and it's just gave way for independence movements in South America and Central America to move forward. Now, this is important because, see, at these times, you know, these, there's these thought currents going through the United States saying, look, we developed, we, you know, became a republic, we are ahead of, you know, of this region. And, you know, you combine these, these ideas of exceptionalism that the US still holds, where, you know, you combine manifest destiny or there's a train of thought where you say, well, you know, the United States, since it was able to develop earlier and to develop stronger, you have, it is our destiny to show the way to the rest of the countries, we must leave, we are the natural leaders, everybody has to follow us, and the thing, or you have another set of ideas, where you have principles such as that you know the white man's and this idea that, you know, we have to do this because, you know, poor underdeveloped countries, they weren't able to do so, you know, we have a, we should help them out, you know, sort of idea. In both cases, what you have is, again, you know, US exceptionalism and a complete disregard for Latin Americans capability of doing things for themselves. I say this because back in 1786, just 10 years after independence. There's a famous letter that, you know, Thomas Jefferson writes, when he's somehow asked, you know, why doesn't the US do anything else, anything more to help the, you know, the Spanish colonies free themselves and become independent and the reply that Jefferson gives in 1786 is our confederacy, I'm quoting, our confederacy must be viewed as the nest from which all America north and south is to be peopled. We should take care to not think it for the interests of that great continent to press too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. Meaning us colonies in the hands of the Spanish crown. My fear says Jefferson is that they are too feeble Spanish they're too feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece. Now, this is the founding father, you know, one of the guy who writes, you know, congressional independence, right. He's telling you right off, you know, we, you know, we don't see anything wrong with Spanish that was being holding these republics we just we're just waiting till we're strong enough to take it from them. From the beginning, the perspective from the north is this belongs to us, we develop earlier so we have the right or we have the duty, whatever you want to, you know, see it as to control this hemisphere. This is later reproduced by all these founding fathers throughout, you know, the rest of the rest of the Latin American war of independence. And then you see this, you know, this, this, this doctrine or the speech that Monroe gives. Again, these are all, you know, people that lived around the same. All the same, all the same plan. Right. And this is the moment when Monroe says, you know, by the way, there was a lot of exchanges between Monroe and Jefferson on issues regarding, you know, the region. And for example, you know, one of the things that Jefferson said to Monroe was, you know, I think the most important thing here is Cuba. We've always seen Cuba, you know, we always seen the Iowa with I've always thought says Jefferson that, you know, the most interesting thing we can do with Cuba is an exit. You know, this is this already seen, you know, from the start. So what we're getting at this is nothing new. This is not this is not only this is nothing new. This is this is a this is a projected plan from the founding of the United States, and it's not going to change unless unless, you know, you have a you have one or two things, either Latin Americans renounce completely to, you know, their independence and their, and their, you know, expectations of being a sovereign continent, or the United States, you know, adopt something different from an imperialist perspective on the region. And that's why, you know, those things haven't had those two things, neither of those two things have happened in the 200 years of history that we have with the Monroe doctrine and I don't think it, you know, that will happen soon. In any case, I'm more hopeful that, you know, things in the United States which some someday change because people in the United States, you know, take control and sort of, you know, change that the attitude of the government, then, you know, Latin Americans basically just renouncing to any, you know, possibility of having a future or a destiny. Now, this is as early as I said at 1786. Meanwhile, this is the same year that Francisco Miranda who's the precursor of Latin American dependence, who's a very important figure, because he, you know, personally, he was a wonderful, you know, military strategist. He fought in the US in the American Revolution. He fought in the French Revolution. And he basically, you know, leads or begins the movement of independence South America, the flags that you see yellow blue red in Venezuela, and he's the one in Ecuador today were his design. The name Columbia is his making. So, so he in the same year that Jefferson is writing the letter that you know that I read to you, he is out in as far as Greece and Turkey trying to find help trying to find support for expedition to free the Latin American or the South American and Caribbean colonies. In the early, you know, 1800s Monroe, while Miranda, I mean, I took 40 years of his life to do this to try to get support for for, you know, Latin American independence, Monroe is ambassador in Great Britain. And he writes, he knows of Miranda going about and he writes to the British count. Be careful this man is crazy. This man is dangerous. Don't help this man. So, see, the idea that the Monroe doctrine was somehow established in 1823 in order to safeguard the independence of the South American Republic is not true. What they were trying to say for was was, you know, the possibility that the United States will not have any competition in the region. And this competition was not only, you know, of the classic European colonial powers that we know, Germany, Holland, at that time, France, Britain, but also, you know, you have the case of Russia, Russia, as we all remember, you know, used to own Alaska. And Russia was also at the same time in 1823. You know, funny that these things, you know, sort of repeat those in history, but Russia at the same time was coming down from, you know, from the West, thinking or, you know, there was there was some possibility that Russia might expand out to, you know, to what today is, you know, the West of Canada and California and so forth and Washington, Oregon and California. So, you know, it was, it was also a message to the Russians as you know, stay there, don't go so, you know, don't go any further that we, you know, we have control over this region. So, can I just interrupt for a moment, just for the audience, because this is, I think it's just really important you've mentioned Russia because for those of us who grew up in the Western United States, specifically California, but the Northwest in general, and also the Southwest, that in 1823 was all part of Mexico and Spain, and Russia had expanded its fur trade, all the way down to Fort Ross, which is the Sonoma, it's on the, what is today the Sonoma Coast of California. And so you had both Spain and Russia to the West, the United States wanted the country to be Atlantic to Pacific. And so you had all of that going on in the western part of the Americas as well. It's fascinating. Yeah. It's fascinating to get the way you are. It's really fascinating to see all the. There was a lot of things, there was a lot of movement at the time. Yeah, we don't, we don't think to, you know, we don't think it happened but you know, again, as part of the way we learn history. We kind of think that these places were, you know, blank on the map and then they started getting colonized. Yes. And then people came in. Your thoughts were there as well. And you had, and what you don't have now is that, you know, at that time the United States didn't have control of the whole, you know, from sea to shining sea kind of thing, you know, you had, you had the, you know, they only had, there was contention there. So, and, and, and, and, you know, and the reason, you know, there are things as fantastic as, you know, Florida is first, you know, freed by, you know, Bolivar's army. And the expedition that went north to Florida, they took over Amelia Island. And then there was, you know, the, you know, there was a, there's a contention there with the United States and, and, and Spain and you know, and try to reconquer the area and so forth. But you know, these, these times were times where things were more even now. But as war basically depleted, you know, the south of resource human, I mean, Venezuela lost half of its population. And think about that half of the country's population fighting a war of independence. So, you know, you had, of course, and then you, and then, you know, all your resources taken away, you know, though you're in the middle of a war reconstructing after that is very difficult, which was not like I said the pattern of development that the United States had, had an advantage over the rest of the region. And that's why it was able to grow faster. So then because he knew that this was going on, it had to, it had to gain control over these resources. See, when you look at the history of the Monroe Doctrine, you have several corollaries, which are, you know, small that adaptations that are made out so that you can have a different, different moments, you know, expand or explain or deepen the meaning of the doctrine. But here you begin to see how the United States vision, you know, just starts growing. The first corollary, you know, that we can mention is the Hayes corollary in 1880. And basically this was an attempt to block any, any attempt from other European countries to build an inter-oceanic canal. There was, there was a project. There was an idea to build a canal through Nicaragua. And they, you know, and so the U.S. would, and then they would lose control. Imagine if you had a canal, you had control of both oceans. Right. That's why, that's why they, they tried, you know, they moved forward towards obtaining the, you know, the goodwill of the Colombian Congress so that they could build the canal through Panama. Panama at the time was part of Colombia. Yes. Now what happens? There comes a point where the Colombian Congress is, wait a minute. You can't have control of this. You know, we, this is something, if anything, you know, Colombia is, you know, it's going to go through Colombia. So there's tensions between, you know, the agreement or the possibility of there being an agreement with the U.S. about building this, this canal. And basically what the U.S. starts doing is promoting an independence movement in Panama, saying these people are being oppressed, you need, you know, we need to help them. They need their freedom. They need their, you know, democracy ideas that we know about. Yeah, it's like the playbook has just never changed. Oh, it's like the 200 year old playbook and they haven't changed one part of it. That's right. And that's how, and that's how Panama, you know, this is a process that Panama, I mean, I'm not, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying there are, you know, original interests and nationalist feelings and, you know, from the Panamanian people, that that's a whole different issue. But the fact that the Republic broke away was was a lot to do, had a lot to do with, you know, the process of the U.S. and the building of the canal. You had an, you had an, you know, you had attempted in the 1880s to, to unite, you know, the region with a, you know, under a U.S., a pro U.S. or U.S. directed customs union. This was what they were doing because, you know, they were so that would benefit, you know, the U.S. In 1895 or something else, the only corollary, you know, they then start saying, well, the moral doctrine allows us to intervene in any place that we believe might generate a conflict or might generate a possibility of, you know, another empire coming in or another international power coming in. It's 1885 is an interesting day for Venezuela because this is where this contention with Great Britain that it's not that we, you know, we're still carrying today with Ghana over, you know, this territory that the Venezuela still claims. Well, this is the moment where the United States comes in, sides with Venezuela or with the Venezuelan claim. So are we talking about the Esaquibo here, the territory between Venezuela and Guyana? Yes, this is, this is the moment where, you know, the United States intervenes in order to kick out basically what they wanted to do is, you know, restrain the British presence. But it was sloppy, and not only was sloppy, it was controlled, it was a process that was controlled by the U.S., by U.S. interests and not by Venezuelan interests because we were in the middle of, you know, civil wars. So part of the reason, and you know, there's a whole, I know there's a whole different subject, but I'll just say this, part of the reason we're in this contention today with Guyana is because the treaty that ends up being signed in 1899 with a lot of, you know, the U.S. intervention in the treaty was completely, you know, it was completely irregular. It wasn't done with Venezuelans, you know, it wasn't done for Venezuela, it was done in the name of Venezuela so that U.S. could, you know, have its interests play out in the region. And that's why we, to today, still contest that treaty. Yeah, that treaty also, that particular piece of land is oil-rich, correct? Yes, yes. Actually, it's seaboard more than anything, but. Yes, okay, yeah, okay. So, bringing, you know, closer to today, you know, in Roosevelt's corollary, 1902, again, it's when they say the U.S. has the right to intervene in Latin American affairs whenever a country is not able to defend or to keep up its financial compromises. Again, it's a time where Venezuela is being blocked by foreign companies trying to, you know, make us pay some debts and so forth. And the United States basically intervenes saying, you know, we have the right to come in and, you know, organize whenever a Latin American country is not able to organize its own finances and its own, you know, affairs. Again, what we see, what we see is how this document or this doctrine became really a tool that you stretch, you know, every year, you know, with something different, and you justify American or U.S., as you say, intervention into any of, you know, the internal affairs of our countries. I'll give you one last corollary, just so you see the extent of this. In 1912, the Lodge Corollary basically says that U.S. has the right to intervene even when, you know, when there's the possibility of foreign interventions by private interests, foreign private interests. There was a moment in Mexico was thinking about selling part of the Magdalena Bay, which is in in in Mexico's west coast. They were thinking about, you know, privatizing basically it's part of the Bay to some Japanese private interests. And here also U.S. intervenes and breaks the deal and doesn't allow this deal to move forward because, you know, again, you know, it was refusing the presence of foreign interests, but not only foreign as a country or as a state, but also as private interests from other countries. So again, it's just look how look how years go on. And look how, you know, you're able to play with this doctrine and, and sort of, you know, shape of all types of interventions throughout the 20th century. This, this is cruel, even further, the United States stab, you know, wanted to, again, have more control over the Caribbean. So you had a series of interventions from Puerto Rico from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua in Nicaragua, you know, you see Nicaragua was was was basically private U.S. citizens going there and taking over, you know, land and then the U.S. coming in the country backing up these. It's as if they, you know, I don't know, something like Blackwater type of, you know, William Walker folks. Yeah, so we'll somehow come in and, you know, take over land and then you have the whole country coming in and backing, backing that up and supporting that. It was, it was, it was the whole, the whole doctrine throughout the 20, you know, the end of the 19th century, the 20th century, and even some of the 21st century has been, you know, a tool for occupating territories for Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, appropriating, you know, customs like they did in Dominican Republic, taking control of the oil production like they did in Mexico, like they did in Venezuela, taking control of the mines like they did in Peru and Bolivia and Chile, taking control of, you know, even the meat production like they did in Argentina or finances like they did in Brazil is a way, you know, to justify all these sorts of intervention against our, you know, region and against, you know, the sovereignty and the will of the Latin American people. Yeah, that's right. Yeah. I have to, I mean, just, I'll say this again, it's just the same. Yeah. I mean, you've mentioned the Nicaragua canal. Okay, that's still in play today. That's an incredibly hot subject now. And it's in my opinion, and I'm sure yours as well, it's part of the whole anti-Ortega government narrative coming out of the United States. The foreign investment by Japan in Mexico just keep, I mean, it's, so today it's Russia, China, Iran, India, all these other foreign investments in the hemisphere that the United States is trying to push out. I think it's probably too late for that. I mean, it's just, it's the same. Now the modalities vary because you see during the 20th century, and this is probably the, you know, the most painful of all of these histories. In just between 62 and 68, you had at least 14 coup d'etats in the region where you had the CIA acting, or you had, you know, outright Marine invasions like in Dominican Republic in 65. For humanitarian purposes. That was the first invasion. Of course, to promote freedom and democracy and so, you know, so, so, so really what we see, you know, is, is, is a very violent type of intervention, which I think after sometime after the Vietnam war. And, and after, and after Chile, I have to say, and after the cool 73 in Chile. Because it really becomes more difficult to, it's not that it didn't happen. There were other, of course, there were other instances where it happened afterwards. But it became less acceptable. Yeah, in US public opinion to have this outright, you know, violent outburst. I mean, you had, you know, there's, maybe because, you know, you started seeing images of these, you know, repressions and, and the torture and, you know, and we don't see so much today. So strategies has to already start changing Chile was was a moment, you know, is this year is the 50th anniversary of the coup against Salvador Allende, who was a democratically elected, you know, leader who happened to be from the left. But what he was trying to do was, you know, a program that basically, you know, increase access to housing, you know, democratized health care education, land reform, all these things that have been the historic needs of Latin America. This is not extra extraordinarily revolutionary was revolutionary in the sense that you know you, you didn't have this before now you have somebody with the guts to do it. But, you know, it wasn't a company wasn't, you know, privatizing. It wasn't a revolution in the sense that you were, you know, you were you were the state was going to expropriate everything and take over all the means of production. It wasn't that it was, you know, was a transformer social transformer. They wouldn't have it. And this and the attack against against Chile and against agenda was something that was where you combine both, you know, the military aspect of the violence with other tools from the, you know, the toolbox, the economic sanctions, you know, make the make the make the economy screen. Yeah. Well, we see the type of interventions that we've seen since the more time goes by, have taken that shape. See today, where we see the blockade against Venezuela that you know the sanctions against Nicaragua sanctions against Cuba. These are parts of this other type of tools that the US under the same principles of the modern doctor is using, you know, it's cutting out your finance possibilities is cutting out, you know, the possibility of you, you know, selling, selling other products. It's, it's, it's a media attack in, you know, fronts of, you know, from from social media to journal, you know, broadcast and broadcast every, you know, every, every, every type of information is diplomatic. And you've seen the thing they try to do with Venezuela, you know, recognize somebody as a different president or block, you know, diplomatically the country. So there's different modalities, different modalities, even in, you know, look out because you know, there's two, there's, I would say two very interesting, you know, modalities that that we often look at but there's an intervention in the religious sphere. Yes, missionaries and you know some that that don't have a religion don't really have a religious agenda they have, you know, a subversion agenda of another type. And there's interventions in the NGO sphere with with this idea where we're doing humanitarian work and we're doing new we're trying to help people out and basically there's their channeling money into, you know, subversion of democratically elected governments that are not lined up with the State Department's idea of what this region should be. So, so when we think about today, you know, today's moral doctrine, we first of all, we have to remember the vision is the same. Clearly. And I mean, it's day one, day one is the same, you know, we are seen as part of the US, you know, belong to us. And the other thing that you have to see is that, you know, the way you implement the doctrine changes. You may even have, you know, during the Obama administration you had Kerry come out and say, you know, the moral doctrine is over. This is it, you know, there's no, you know, this conciliatory type of discourse that then every so often comes out, only to have Bolton reverse that when the Trump administration say no, we're, we're, we're promoting them on route. The moral doctrine is alive and well. And it's from Miami. We're new high tech, you know, type of, of promotion. So that's, that's what you really, you know, that's what we really have nowadays. Now, Terry, one thing that I wanted to, to, to just show and to comment, you know, and that we, you know, we say that there are two currents in this region. We say that there is this, you know, idea of Monroe, and we from Venezuela, but from all other countries as well, you know, we contrast them with the ideas of Simone Boliva, which we think are important in the Bolivarianism that gave the name to the Bolivarian Revolution to, you know, the project that Hugo Chavez has moved forward, but other people also recognize themselves in the same project, because the project that what we were thought for what you know what what what his idea was was that this was me would be an independent region, a sovereign region. He fought for something that you know we, you know, he called the equilibrium of the universe. You do have forces that have to balance each other out that no one force should be able to, you know, over expand or impose itself over others, but that you have different poles or different, you know, regions, you know, sort of balancing their interest in order to have, which is the only way, as Boliva described it that you can achieve sustainable peace. Peace is not just peace that you declare because you're defeated sustainable peace is a piece that guarantees justice development and guarantees, you know, over time, that, you know, that peace remains in place. Now, in 1826, three years after the Monroe that Monroe doctrine was issued Boliva issued a call for a Congress the Panama Congress, where you know that these new republics would come in and would meet. And I just want to say, I just want to mention really quickly just a couple of the things that were on the agenda. So that you, so you get an idea of what the differences between Bolivarianism and this Monroeism. First, you know, there was a call for to to the nouns. Spain's imperialist attitude and to and to the nouns damage it had cost in the in, you know, in, in the Americas. By the way, the United States send representatives to this Congress, not because Boliva invited them but other, you know, Boliva respected the decision of the Colombian Congress at the time, who did invite them. The Colombian Congress at the time is what today is Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador. Yes, yes, it was one republic. Yeah, yeah. So so Boliva and Boliva at the time was president of Peru, because you know, in the process of independence kept going. Moving southward so he became president of Peru. And then you know that the government of Colombia took another decision. And this is important because you know it's often claimed that Boliva was some sort of, you know, outlandish dictator that ruled in and you can see that, despite the fact that he have founded Colombia, you know, he allowed Colombia to take its own decision in the sense Colombia this does invite the United States. And Henry Clay, who is who's the Secretary of State at the time, gives the instructions to the US representatives to go. And he says, there should be no denouncing of Spain. This crime committed. And you should also not. You know, one of the other as another point that Boliva was making in the Congress was calling for the independence of Cuba Puerto Rico, also the Canary Islands and also the Philippines. It was this movement of freedom, you know, of self determination, and the United States opposed. They had specific instructions to oppose this moment. One of the, one of the problems. And this is interesting but one of the problems that justify this decision by the United States was that they feared that any of these countries that would become independent could could fall into the danger of a slave revolution like in Haiti, and people from the south didn't want this. People from the southern United States. The United States. Yes. The United States didn't want this because you know they were still slave holders. So part of the reason. So, and why do I say this because I have been told, you know, we've been told for 200 years that the purpose of these doctrines and the purpose of these, you know, this US intervention in our region is because the ideas of freedom, democracy and equality and this bullshit. Because economics. It's nobody's social not true. Right. See, because you weren't willing to denounce the imperialism that, you know, in the region that and the crimes that were committed by Spain, you weren't willing to free the countries that was still on the subjection of, you know, of this empires. You weren't willing to free the slaves. So you can really talk about freedom, right, because the enslaved people and there was another point in believers agenda for the Congress was the total abolition of the of slavery in the Confederated States of the new republics. So when you see when you see what the two projects are, there's only one project that defends human rights is only one product defense self determination is only one project that defends freedom, and your right to choose your own form of government, and it's not Monroe's project. No. It's just with the Panama Congress and the US giving you know the instruction, not to denounce Spain, and with Bolivar wanting to continue the liberation of the Spanish colonies including the Philippines and, and the canary islands I mean that goes right back to what you were saying that the Spanish is just waiting for Spain to become so weak they could take the colonies for themselves which eventually they took the Philippines. I mean it's very. Oh, there you are. Okay you're back. I was saying what you know regarding the Panama Congress and the US instructions, not to denounce Spain and Bolivar wanting to denounce Spain and continue freeing the remaining Spanish colonies including the canary islands in the Philippines. And that goes right back to what you said earlier whether US was just waiting for Spain to be so weak it could just finish taking it. The last of the empire. Right, right, right, right. Because, and but it doesn't that's actually what happened you know when the Spanish American war that's that's precisely what's what goes on you know you have, you have the United States getting control of Puerto Rico of Cuba and also the Philippines. So then you have, and then you have that that allowed the US to have a country, you know complete map of you know resources from the Caribbean but also from the Pacific. Exactly. Yeah. Yeah. The interest of the growth of the United States as a, you know so country as an empire. Yeah. Let me I know, I know you don't have much time left I wonder if there's just one thing I can have us talk about quickly. This, this being the 200th year. 200 anniversary of the Monroe direct in 2023. One of the things that and you know this because I've seen you throughout the hemispheres. Beginning in October, I would start I mean it started way before then but let's like October 2020 in Bolivia with the presidential elections there, and the return of the master power, and then going on to the Venezuelan National elections in December of 2020 and then all through 2021 we have elections in in Nicaragua and Ecuador in in Venezuela again in Honduras, and through 2022 in Chile and Colombia and Brazil. And I was, as were you, we were international election observers and many if not all of those elections. To me what I see today having looked back at 18 months of elections, the people south of the United States Latin America and the Caribbean voted principally for national sovereignty. And natural resource sovereignty, what your former Foreign Minister was so clear for the audience I was always so clear at stressing natural resource sovereignty along with with national sovereignty. And so people voted for those two things and I believe they also voted for governments that were proposing an economic system, beneficial to the majority of the citizens and that could be anything from, you know, social democratic to revolutionary it's a spectrum of economic solutions it's not anyone. But to me, that has really consolidated. I don't want to say liberation because that's been the people South the United States been fighting for that for 500 years, but it to me is almost as if the Monroe doctrine is being ended in the south so in Latin America and the Caribbean. The people are ending it on their own. And the United States does at this point is going to be reactionary, not proactive is going to be a reaction because the movement to absolve the Monroe doctrine from the hemisphere is coming from the south. And I think all these electoral results really, they don't just emphasize the change in government they emphasize what's happening on the ground with the people. They voted because these are constitutional changes through the electoral process they're not hot revolutions these are what the people have expressed at the polls that they want and mass across the hemisphere. Wish we could do it in the stage. Well the problem is that is that you know this is actually that's actually when the Monroe doctrine gets triggered. Whenever it's not the first time that we've expressed our will to do one thing or the other again you go going back to the example of Chile in 73. In 1970, people elected some other agenda to do precisely those things you know the to to to to to nationalize copper to, you know, to move forward in social programs and then the Monroe doctrine active itself and one of the most vicious, vicious ways and overthrew him and and set up a regional, you know, program called that you know the operation condor to basically destroy any other type of, you know, attempts as such in the region. What I think we should be what we have to be careful about is that you know whenever the you know Latin American the Caribbean reasserts itself is wherever is whenever you know that the doctrine goes out and becomes more more violent and more and more aggressive. So we have to be careful and see how you know how that is going to express itself in the next, you know, a couple of years or because like you said you know the region is now taking and again another turn towards the left. I mean you we saw what happened at the beginning of the 20th century or 21st century. I mean when you have this first wave when you know the people called up, you know the pink tide and everything. You know Chavez, Lula, Evo, Correa, you know you have this movement going, you know, towards a more towards a more like you said cutting off, you know from from from from US dependency, and the reaction was you know we, we hit Honduras and overthrow the government in Paraguay and then try to, you know, just suffocate Venezuela with sanctions and so, and it's been a vicious, you know, second decade and then you know third decade of the of the 21st century trying to file that off. So we have to be careful I think in the sense that you know it's going to generate a reaction. That's why I think at the end of the day, it is very important. Whatever you do in the United States and whatever people, you know, do in the United States to change that policy, because the change, we're going to have the same we're going to have the same, you know, perspective we're going to fight it out and we will lose some battles and we'll win others but we, we want to be careful of determination. What has to change is the way the US and the people in the US see themselves with, you know, within the framework of this, of this doctrine. That's why the US has to say, you know, this is not who we are, these are not our values. These are not what we stand for. This is not the type of relationship we want in a world that we're, you know, where we're threatened by, you know, nuclear holocaust, we're threatened by, you know, famine where we're threatened by, you know, climate change that who knows what's going to how it's going to affect us. We have to look towards cooperation, we have to look towards solidarity, we have to look toward other types of values, not towards this crazy attempt of dominating Latin American and Caribbean resources in order to benefit, you know, just a small group in the United States. It's up to, I think that's where the responsibility comes in place for the movements and the people of the United States to, you know, struggle to change that policy and change that relationship, and you'll be surprised. You know, when you study Latin American history, you realize that a lot of movements, especially during the Cold War, which wasn't called in Latin America as a hot war in Latin America. But during that period called the Cold War, there were a lot of countries that there were a lot of movements that were not, you know, anti American, they were not, you know, they were not even communist. You know, it is very difficult to say, for example, that Akoma Arbings in 1954 was a communist leader in, you know, in Guatemala, but he was trying to do a land reform, and the United States blocked it. Every time that you see, you know, an attempt at justice for Latin America, the United States comes in and, you know, has sort of, you know, pushed that possibility out. So it has to, there has to be a point where the United States, the people in the United States say, this isn't what we stand for. This is not what we want. This is not where we want our resources to be spent. So we want a different type of relationship with, you know, one of cooperation and you'll be surprised how much, how much of a positive reaction you will receive from this continent. Well, I just want to, just for the audience, you know, the push, the pushback from the United States, the aggressiveness when you mentioned, you know, Arbens and Guatemala wanting land reform and now today, you see, like in the past month, the progressive narrative that they, well, and it's getting exceedingly more progressive from Mexico, from the president of Mexico, and this really strong anti-Omlo narrative coming out of the states now. Of course, you know, Mexico is getting ready to go into presidential elections. The timing is not, you know, because I'm was pretty much saying the same things he said since he was mayor of Mexico City, but going into the elections in 2024, you've gotten this really, really strong anti-Omlo narrative out of the states. You know, it's always something, there's always, always that pushback from the states to maintain control and maintain its model and its, its hegemony of the hemisphere and most of the global south, I would, the intervention in Africa is extraordinarily aggressive as well. Really, I am happy you still have faith in the American people to make change, because I think we do too. And I just want to tell the audience there's a really great forum that's going to be taking place the 28th and 29th in Washington to see 28th and 29th of April. It's a Latin American policy forum, and it's called Bearing 200 Years of Monroe Doctrine, and it's about, it'll be four panels in discussion of the panels are theme-based, not country-based. The theme panel is on sanction, so there'll be a very in-depth conversation on Venezuela attached to that, that panel. But it will talk about U.S. policy towards the region and also offer from Latin America and the Caribbean alternatives, what the people have created for themselves outside of the United States. It's an extraordinarily important time for that forum and a good opportunity if you can go to DC and physically attend. Terrific. Otherwise, it will be live stream. You can participate that way as well. You can register for the live or virtual event at americaspolicyforum.org, and I will put that in the chat. It's also in the program notes on the YouTube channel, so just give a plug for that, because it's a great time for people in the United States and outside the United States to exchange ideas and what's possible, what needs to happen to create a peaceful world. I would say so. So, Carlos, I know I kept you way over your allotted time. I apologize, sort of. I'm always so happy to have time, and you're so insightful, and everything you shared with us for this episode is just really so important for us all to hear and learn from, and I'm really grateful for that. Well, thank you for the opportunity. I like talking about this because it's a way of seeing the whole picture. You often don't get a chance to put everything in that framework, and I think it's really important so that we can really understand the story of the relationship between our regions, but yes, always happy to be here. Yeah, I'm happy. I'm happy you had time for the episode. So, and I love the Monroe versus Boulevard. Yeah, I mean that just is perfect. Yeah, yeah. Very, for people to understand, and the difference between the two is really paramount for the region. So thank you again and I just want to thank the audience. We had a really nice live turnout for you this evening. So, so for the audience, so you've been watching what the F is going on in Latin America and the Caribbean, we're a popular resistant broadcast you can find us every Thursday 730pm Eastern on YouTube live on the Convo couch code pink and popular resistance, YouTube channels post broadcast recordings can be found on Apple Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. So, so thank you again Carlos and for the audience we'll see you next Thursday. Take care.