 Now, yeah, maybe as a development economist you could try and make a synthesis, where are we going to, from what we have experienced this year and the previous year? What are the structural trends that you see, again, you are at the head of the network of economists globally? So you have a global view. Can you share with us? Thank you, Yonell, and let me also start by thanking Thierry and the WPC team for having me here and also for organizing this miracle. It is also for me the first time I take part in an in-person meeting over the last two years, so it's quite moving to some extent. You ask me, Yonell, to reflect on the structural implications of COVID-19, and I would like to make five points. First, I think the pandemic has exposed a growing social unease toward complexity and uncertainty. And what I mean by that is that from the reaction that we observe from our public, people want to know what will happen. So we are always in a sort of illusion of determinism, and even more, they expect governments to solve that uncertainty for them. And if the government says something and then changes mind because information has changed over a space, let's say, of one week or two weeks, then there is a strong critique about the inability of the governments to take decisions that would conform with the evolution. So one lose one big aspects of policy, which is precisely to manage shocks and uncertainty. This is not what the public expects. So this tension, I think, is at the core of some of the political difficulties that we observe during the crisis. I'm reminded of a book written by a Harvard psychologist called Daniel Gilbert. He wrote a book several years ago called Stumbling on Happiness, in which he related happiness to the lack of uncertainty about the future. And he said, what makes people unhappy is uncertainty about the future. Well, I think the pandemic has really powerfully demonstrated that. But at the same time, we all know that the pandemic is one of these unexpected unknown shocks. But there will be more. So we need to teach our public that uncertainty is a part of life, and we need to learn how to think about risk and to manage risk. To some extent, we need more financial reasoning about all these issues. The second point I would like to mention is that we have had very encouraging policy and technology reactions. And the reason why we are here is precisely because in the face of these terrible pandemics, there were solutions, policy solutions, and technical solutions. So in a way, we could be satisfied with that. Except that we, and this is related to the first point, we forgot that solutions create new problems. Solutions don't create the perfect world. So we are now talking about inflation and public debt, at least public debt, from the point of view of developed countries, also a world about developing countries, I think the external dimension of the debt is a bigger issue. But these are, I mean, I prefer debt to death. So we were right to do what we did. It was a wonderful policy decision in the face of preexisting rules that would have in principle prevented us from doing so, especially in Europe. We took the right decision, so now we can lament about the problems it creates. It's a fact of life. We are constantly dealing with problems that we created. So let's deal with the current debt and inflation problems. So let's start with inflation. I fully agree with my neighbor about inflation. We just don't know whether it will be transitory or permanent. We can follow it, monitor it very deeply. And there are indicators to do that. The indicators that maybe the more relevant ones are trimmed inflation. You take out of inflation the extreme price movements. Why? Because we know that these extreme price movements are related to a surge of growth after a big decline during the pandemics and supply barrier and supply constraints that may be transitory. If we look at trimmed inflation, we get a picture that is not that worrying. It requires monitoring and we can accommodate some more inflation. There is nothing in economics that tells you that 2 percent is better than 3 percent. What the economics will tell you is that if you go from 2 to 3 and then from 3 to 4 and then from 4 to 6, then you may have created a dynamics of inflation that is problematic. But the level of inflation itself is not per se the problem. So let's be realistic about that. We are managing the problem central banks monitoring on a daily basis and there is a number of people taking part in the debate that also contribute to that monitoring. That is a different subject because that mixes moral arguments with economic arguments. And when people see debt increase, then they react from the moral argument and say, oh, that's bad. There are two things in debt that we occupy me as an observer. One is this moral dominance of the judgment. And the second one is the ongoing inequity between debtors and creditors. Debtors are always wrong. They took debt. But when we say that, we forgot that for debt to exist, you also need creditors. So when there is excess debt, why should it be the fault of the debtor? It is also the fact that creditors lend too much. On the very specific issue of public debt, there is another very important dimension, which is that it is part of the savings investment balance. What would rich people do? And of inequality, by the way, what would rich people do if there was no public debt instruments to invest in? Well, they would invest right now in more speculative titans. And we know that it's a problem. So public debt is also one way to solve or to address this excess savings situation in which we are. And there are structural reasons for excess savings. One is the demography, but the other one is inequality. With inequality, you have a bigger distance between rich people and poor people, and rich people save more. So you have excess savings. And in a world where you don't have the private productive investment opportunities, or people don't know them and they need to discover them, then that goes to speculative measures. So public debt is one way to restructure these excess savings from speculation to spending that can make sense socially. Therefore, the big issue about debt is not its level. It is the quality of public spending. And that leads me to the third point. The problem is that we don't know how to assess the quality of public spending. It's a judgmental behavior. And therefore, we try to replace that by quantitative rules. Well, and what COVID-19 has shown is that these quantitative rules don't work because they are not adapted to crisis situations. So in a way, we need to find something better to monitor debt than arbitrary criteria. That again means nothing from an economic point of view. They mean something from a management point of view. To avoid making mistakes, let's control, let's put ceilings on the debt. Well, this is not adapted to a situation in which we have recurring shocks. So we need to find more. And that's one of the implications I draw, the fact that we need to think hard about the kind of rules that might be useful to help us manage these ongoing problems more successfully. The fourth implication is the necessary change in the value system. You mentioned something which struck me as very important. You said that in times of war and in times of crisis like this, we rediscovered that what you call ordinary people play a big role in society. Yes, indeed, but this big role is not recognized by the economy, the market values. That's something that will have to change. And the other dimension of this crisis of values is, of course, environment, biodiversity, and climate. These are not well recognized by the market system. And in order for government policies to help, we need to have these ongoing, it has started to take place, change of values that will be a long term thing, but it is also necessary to see it happen. The final point I would like to make is about the power of globalization. Power in both the positive sense and the negative sense. In the negative sense, we saw it with a pandemic. It was really a globalized crisis. And there will be more. In the positive sense, there was a global response to it. I think we should not underestimate the virtue of scientific and technical cooperation across countries. That continued to happen. So we have an example of what Massoud Ahmed described in the first session. This tension between very powerful forces of globalization and indeed the digital economy is one of them. The global public goods is another very powerful globalization necessity. These questions we cannot solve on our side. We need a global response to climate change, to biodiversity protection, to security issues, and to the movement of persons which indeed is the weaker frontier in this open economic world that we wanted to create. My only point there is that I believe that the management of globalization has to be based on politics. And it was, it was based on a high political agreement that took place after World War II, that was based on shared global values and the Cold War. That has exploded now. And the main reason for the difficulties are partly the U.S.-China conflict and the problems created by China's emergence and the prospect of changing China power grow up until 2049 and beyond. But it seems to me that one aspect of the crisis has a lot of bearings on the governance of globalization. It is a domestic dimension of the crisis and the lack of legitimacy of liberal democracies in our country. And that is something that worries me a lot because I think that this need to find ways or a path toward a higher political debate around shared values in the world to incur the future governance of globalization requires finding also shared values within countries. And this has become a political problem in all our societies. So there are some of the structural trends, some of them produced by COVID, some of them revealed by COVID, some of them preexisting the COVID situation. But I think that they will characterize certainly many of the political debates to come in the future. Brodel was quoted this morning as mentioning that capitalism needed a patron. I do think personally that economics needs politics and that without a political framework, markets do not function. And I believe in markets. So the opposition between markets and politics for me is wrong-headed. Thank you. Thank you very much, Pierre. Really, it was very much a synthesis and with great clarity.