 Question 8 of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 8 of the Grace of Christ as He is the Head of the Church, in eight articles. We must now consider the Grace of Christ as the Head of the Church, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether Christ is the Head of the Church. Second, whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies, or only as regards their souls. Third, whether He is the Head of all men. Fourth, whether He is the Head of the Angels. Fifth, whether the Grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His habitual Grace as an individual man. Sixth, whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ. Seventh, whether the devil is the Head of all the wicked. Eighth, whether Antichrist can be called the Head of all the wicked. First article, whether Christ is the Head of the Church. Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church, for the Head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual sense and motion, which are by grace, are not imparted to us by the man Christ, because, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 112, not even Christ as man, but only as God bestows the Holy Ghost. Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church. Objection 2 further. It is not fitting for the Head to have a Head. But God is the Head of Christ as man, according to 1 Corinthians 11-3. The Head of Christ is God. Therefore Christ Himself is not a Head. Objection 3 furthermore. The Head of a man is a particular member, receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church. On the contrary, it is written in Ephesians 122. And he hath made him Head over all the Church. I answer that, as the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in diverse members has diverse acts, as the Apostles teaches in Romans 12-1 and in Corinthians 12. So likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human Head, in which we may consider three things, notably order, perfection, and power. Order indeed, for the Head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part, and hence it is that every principle is usually called a Head according to Ezekiel 16-25. At every Head of the Way thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution, perfection, in as much as in the Head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence it is said in Isaiah 9-15. The aged and honourable he is the Head. Power, because the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the Head by reason of the sensitive and mode of power there ruling. Hence the ruler is called the Head of a people according to 1 Kings 15-17. When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the Head of the tribes of Israel. Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of his nearness to God, his grace is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of his grace according to Romans 8-29. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he might be the first born among many brethren. Secondly, he had perfection as regards the fullness of all graces according to John 1-14. We saw him full of grace and truth, as was shown in Question 7 Article 9. Thirdly, he has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church according to John 1-16, of his fullness we have all received. And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church. Reply to Objection 1. To give grace, or the Holy Ghost, belongs to Christ as he is God, authoritatively. But instrumentally it belongs also to him as man, inasmuch as his manhood is the instrument of his Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead, his actions were beneficial, that is, by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally or ministerially, according to Galatians 3-5. He who giveth to you the Spirit. Reply to Objection 2. In metaphorical speech, we must not expect a likeness in all respects, for thus there would not be likeness but identity. Accordingly, a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of another, but a metaphorical body, that is, an ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude. And hence the Father who is head of the domestic multitude has a head above him, that is, the civil governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the head of Christ, although Christ himself is head of the church. Reply to Objection 3. The head has a manifest preeminence over the other exterior members. But the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since he invisibly quickens and unifies the church. But Christ is likened to the head in his visible nature in which man is set over man. Second article. Whether Christ is the head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls. Objection 1. You would seem that Christ is not the head of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the head of the church in as much as he bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore Christ is not the head of men as regards their bodies. Objection 2. We share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was head of man as to their bodies, he would follow that he was the head of brute animals, and this is not fitting. Objection 3. Further. Christ took his body from other men, as is clear from Matthew 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members as was said above in article 1, 3 reply. Therefore Christ is not the head of the church as regards bodies. On the contrary, it is written in Philippians 321, who will reform the body of our lowliness made like to the body of his glory. I answer that the human body has a natural relation to the rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. In as much as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which belong specifically to man. But in as much as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of influence, in as much as it is united to the Word of God, to whom his body is united through the soul as stated above in question 6 article 1. Hence, the whole manhood of Christ, that is, according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body. But principally the soul and secondarily the body. First, in as much as the members of the body are presented as instruments of justice in the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says in Romans 6.13. Secondly, in as much as the life of glory flows from the soul onto the body, according to Romans 8.11. He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his spirit that dwelleth in you. Reply to Objection 1. The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally as was said above. Reply to Objection 2. The body of an animal has no relation to a rational soul as the human body has, hence there is no parity. Reply to Objection 3. Although Christ drew the matter of his body from other men, yet all draw from him the immortal life of their body, according to 1 Corinthians 15.22. And as in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. Third article. Whether Christ is the head of all men. Objection 1. You would seem that Christ is not the head of all men, for the head has no relation except to the members of its body. While the unbaptized are no wise members of the church which is the body of Christ as it is written in Ephesians 1.23. Therefore Christ is not the head of all men. Objection 2 further. The apostle writes to the Ephesians in chapter 5 verses 25 through 27. Christ delivered himself up for the church, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing. But there are many of the faithful in whom has found the spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the head of all the faithful. Objection 3 further. The sacraments of the old law are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as it is written in Colossians 2.17. But the fathers of the Old Testament in their day served under these sacraments according to Hebrews 8.5, who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. Hence they did not pertain to Christ's body, and therefore Christ is not the head of all men. On the contrary, it is written in 1 Timothy 4.10, who is the Savior of all men, especially of the faithful. And in 1 John 2.2, he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for our sins only, but also for those of the whole world. Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as head. Therefore Christ is the head of all men. I answer that this is the difference between the natural body of man and the church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body are altogether, and the members of the mystical are not altogether, neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the world until its end, nor as regards their supernatural being, since of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act, and this according to the triple class of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the head of all men, but diversely. For first and principally, he is the head of such as are united to him by glory, secondly of those who are actually united to him by charity, thirdly of those who are actually united to him by faith, fourthly of those who are united to him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to divine predestination, fifthly of those who are united to him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act. Such are those men existing in the world who are not predestined, who however on their departure from this world wholly cease to be members of Christ as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ. Reply to Objection 1. Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the church, are in the church potentially, and this potentiality is rooted in two things. First and principally, in the power of Christ, who is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race, secondly in free will. Reply to Objection 2. To be a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle is the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in heaven and not on earth in which if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, as is written in 1 John 1.8. Nevertheless, there are some notably mortal sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity. But such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually but potentially, except perhaps imperfectly by formless faith which unites to God relatively but not simply, notably so that man partake of the life of grace. Or as is written in James 2.20, faith without works is dead. Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital act that is to believe as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent. Reply to Objection 3. The Holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments not as realities but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image and to the reality as is clear from the philosopher in On Memory and Reminiscence 2. Hence the ancient fathers by observing the legal sacraments were born to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are born to him and hence the ancient fathers belong to the same church as we. Fourth Article Whether Christ is the Head of the Angels Objection 1. It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature with the angels but only with men. This as is written in Hebrews 2.16, For nowhere doth he take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham he takeeth hold. Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels. Objection 2. Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the church which is his body as is written in Ephesians 1.23. But the angels do not belong to the church. For the church is like the congregation of the faithful. And in the angels there is no faith, for they do not walk by faith but by sight. Otherwise they would be absent from the Lord as the apostle argues in 2 Corinthians 5.6.7. Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels. Objection 3. Augustine says in a commentary on John that as the word which was in the beginning with the Father quickens souls, so the word made flesh quickens bodies which angels lack. But the word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life to angels and hence as man he is not the head of the angels. On the contrary, the apostle says in Colossians 2.10, who is the head of all principality and power, and the same reason holds good with the other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the head of the angels. I answer that as was said above in article 1, 2nd reply. Where there is one body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one end with distinct acts and duties may be metaphorically called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one end which is the glory of the divine fruition. Hence the mystical body of the church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the head since he is nearer God and shares his gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels, and of his influence not only men but even angels partake since it is written in Ephesians 1 verses 20 to 22 that God the Father set him, namely Christ, on his right hand in the heavenly places above all principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world but also in that which is to come, and he hath subjected all things under his feet. Therefore Christ is not only head of men but of angels. Hence we read in Matthew 4 verse 11 that angels came and ministered to him. Reply to Objection 1 Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to their souls wherein men agree with angels in generic nature though not in specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can be said to be the head of the angels although the agreement falls short as regards the body. Reply to Objection 2 The church on earth is the congregation of the faithful but in heaven it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer but a comprehensor and therefore he is the head not merely of the faithful but of comprehensors as having grace and glory most fully. Reply to Objection 3 Augustin here uses the similitude of cause and effect that is in as much as corporeal things act on bodies and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nevertheless the humanity of Christ by virtue of the spiritual nature that is the divine can cause something not only in the spirits of men but also in the spirits of angels on account of its most close conjunction with God that is by personal union. Fifth article Whether the grace of Christ as head of the church is the same as his habitual grace in as much as he is man. Objection 1 It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is head of the church and the individual grace of the man are not the same. For the apostle says in Romans 5.15 If by the offense of one many died much more the grace of God and the gift by the grace of one man Jesus Christ at abounded unto many. But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from his grace in as much as he is the head of the church which flows to others from him. Objection 2 Habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, notably the sanctification of his soul, and the capital grace is ordained to another, notably to sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of Christ is distinct from his grace as he is the head of the church. Objection 3 Further, as was said above in Question 6 Article 6, in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace, notably the grace of union, capital grace and the individual grace of the man. While the individual grace of Christ is distinct from the grace of union, therefore it is also distinct from the capital grace. On the contrary, it is written in John 1.16 Of his fullness we have all received. Now he is our head in as much as we receive from him. Therefore he is our head in as much as he has the fullness of grace. Now he had the fullness of grace in as much as personal grace was in him in its perfection as was said above in Question 7 Article 9. Hence his capital and personal grace are not distinct. I answer that, since everything acts in as much as it is a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says, in on the literal meaning of Genesis 12.16 and the philosopher in on the soul 3.19, the agent must act on others by reason of a certain preeminence. Now it was said above in Article 1 and in Question 7 Article 9, Grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way, and therefore from this preeminence of grace which he received it is from him that this grace is bestowed on others, and this belongs to the nature of head. Since the personal grace whereby the soul of Christ is justified is essentially the same as his grace as he is the head of the church and justifies others. But there is a distinction of reason between them. Reply to Objection 1. Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin which is a personal sin. As in him the person corrupted the nature, and by means of this corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, in as much as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsave to us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person, as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person. Reply to Objection 2. Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject is the reason of the justification of others which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference. Reply to Objection 3. Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act, but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree on the essence of the habit, but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a fitness for the union, and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of reason between them. 6th article. Whether it is proper to Christ to be head of the church? Objection 1. It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be the head of the church, for it is written in 1 Kings 1517. When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel? No, there is but one church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of the church? Objection 2 further. Christ is called head of the church from his bestowing grace on the church's members, but it belongs to others also to grant grace to others according to Ephesians 429. Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth, but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers. Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be the head of the church? Objection 3 further. Christ by his ruling over the church is not only called head but also shepherd and foundation. Now Christ did not retain for himself alone the name of shepherd according to 1 Peter 5.4. And when the Prince of Pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory. Nor the name of foundation according to Apocalypse 2114. And the wall of the city had twelve foundations. Therefore it seems that he did not retain the name of head for himself alone. On the contrary, it is written in Colossians 219, the head of the church is that from which the whole body by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted growth unto the increase of God, but this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is head of the church. I answer that the head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, in as much as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members. Secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, in as much as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying. But the influence over the members of the church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others, and in this way others may be called heads of the church according to Amos 61. Ye great men, heads of the people, differently however from Christ. First, in as much as Christ is the head of all who pertain to the church in every place and time and state. But all other men are called heads, with reference to certain special places as bishops of their churches. Or with reference to a determined time, as the pope is the head of the whole church, notably during the time of his pontificate, and with reference to a determined state, in as much as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the head of the church by his own power and authority, while others are called heads, as taking Christ's place, according to 2 Corinthians 2-10. For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ. And in 2 Corinthians 5-20. For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God as it were, exhorting by us. Reply to Objection 1. The word head is employed in that passage in regard to exterior government, as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom. Reply to Objection 2. Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine says in a commentary on John, if the rulers of the church are shepherds, how is there one shepherd except that all these are members of one shepherd? So likewise others may be called foundations and heads, in as much as they are the members of the one head and foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says, he gave to his members to be shepherds, yet none of us calledeth himself the door. He kept this for himself alone, and this is because by door is implied the principal authority, in as much as it is by the door that all enter the house, and it is Christ alone by whom also we have access into this grace wherein we stand, as is written in Romans 5.2. But by the other names above mentioned, there may be implied not merely the principal, but also the secondary authority. Seventh Article. Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked. Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked, for it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as Agloss says, on Ephesians 1.22. And made him head, etc. But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of the wicked. Objection 2 further. By every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is from the devil, and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin through the persuasion of another. So likewise not every sin of man proceeds from the devil for it is said. Not only our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the devil, but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will. Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked. Objection 3 further. One head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united. For evil is contrary to evil and springs from diverse effects, as Dionysius says, in On the Divine Names Four. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all the wicked. On the contrary. Agloss by Gregory in his commentary on Job, Job 1817. Let the memory of him perish from the earth, says, This is said of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head, that is the devil. I answer that, as was said above in Article 6, the head not only influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that any one is the head of a multitude, either as regards both, that is, by interior influence and exterior governance. And thus Christ is the head of the church, as was stated in Article 6. Or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For as is written in Job 4125, He is king over all the children of pride. Now it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God. Hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from obeying the divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end. Inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty according to Jeremiah 220. Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saddest I will not serve. Hence inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their head. Reply to Objection 1. Although the devil does not influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion. Reply to Objection 2. A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey his will, but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some by their own free will. As is plain in the leader of an army, who standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way the first sin of the devil, who sineth from the beginning according to 1 John 3.8, is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate him according to Wisdom 2, 24 and 25. By the envy of the devil, death came into the world, and they follow him that are of his side. Reply to Objection 3. All sins agree in a version from God, although they differ by conversion to different changeable goods. Eighth article. Whether Antichrist may be called the head of all the wicked. Objection 1. You would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked, for there are not several heads of one body, but the devil is the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Antichrist is not their head. Objection 2 further. Antichrist is a member of the devil. Now the head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. Objection 3 further. The head has an influence over the members, but Antichrist has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. On the contrary, a gloss on Job 21 29. Ask any of them that go by the way, says. Whilst he was speaking of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Antichrist, the head of all evildoers. I answer that, as was said above in article 1. In the head are found three things, order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards to the order of the body, Antichrist is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin had preceded as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion. Nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into wickedness by him. Nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence on 2 Thessalonians 2.4, showing himself as if he were God, a gloss says, As in Christ dwelt the fullness of the Godhead, so in Antichrist the fullness of all wickedness. Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God, but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Antichrist, according to 2 Thessalonians 2.7, for the mystery of iniquity already worketh. Reply to Objection 1. The devil and Antichrist are not two heads but one, since Antichrist is called the head in as much as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence on 2 Thessalonians 2.4, showing himself as if he were God, a gloss says, The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride, will be in him. Now he is said to be in him, not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since the trinity alone dwells in the mind as is taught, but by the effect of wickedness. Reply to Objection 2. As the head of Christ is God, yet he is the head of the church, as was said above in Article 1, second reply. So likewise Antichrist is a member of the devil, and yet is head of the wicked. Reply to Objection 3. Antichrist is said to be the head of all the wicked, not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it. End of Question 8. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 9 of Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 9. Of Christ's knowledge in general, in four articles. We must now consider Christ's knowledge, concerning which the consideration will be two-fold. First, of Christ's knowledge in general. Secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge he had. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether Christ had any knowledge besides the divine. Second, whether he had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have. Third, whether he had an imprinted or infused knowledge. Fourth, whether he had any acquired knowledge. First article. Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the divine. Objection 1. You would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except for the divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by his divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in him. Objection 2 further. The lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the divine. Objection 3 further. The union of the human nature with the divine took place in the person, as is clear from question 2 article 2. Now according to some there is in Christ a certain knowledge of the union, whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ but only one, pertaining to both natures. On the contrary, Ambrose says in On the Incarnation 7. God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh. He took upon himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh. But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge. I answer that as said above in question 5. The Son of God assumed an entire human nature, that is not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore behooved him to have created knowledge for three reasons. First, on account of the soul's perfection, for the soul considered in itself is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things, since it is like a tablet on which nothing is written. And yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said in On the Soul 3.18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act? But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature. Since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the divine knowledge. Otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because since everything is on account of its operation, as stated in On the Heavens 2.17, Christ would have had an intellect of soul to no purpose if he had not understood by it. And this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, notably, that whereby we naturally know first principles, since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ since he took the whole human nature, as stated above in Question 5. And since the Sixth Council condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms. Reply to Objection 1. Christ knew all things with the divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very essence of God, since God's understanding is His substance, as the philosopher proves, in Metaphysics 1239. Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing, and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation. Reply to Objection 2. If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminance. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminance, and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner, the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the divine knowledge, which is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world, as is written in John 1.9. Reply to Objection 3. On the part of what are united, we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to his divine and as to his human nature, so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one apostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above in Question 3, Articles 1 and 6. But on the part of the union itself, we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ, for this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature. Second article. Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have. Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ, there was not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of divine light according to Psalm 3510. In thy light we shall see light. Now Christ had not a participated light, but he had the Godhead itself substantially abiding in him according to Colossians 2.9. For in him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead corporeally. Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed. Objection 2 further. The knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, according to John 17.3. This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the one true God and Jesus Christ whom thou has sent. But this man was blessed through being united to God in person according to Psalm 64.5. Blessed is he whom thou hast chosen and taken to thee. Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in him. Objection 3 further. To man belongs a double knowledge, one by nature and one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man but above his nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge, that is the divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ. On the contrary, the knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge of God. But he knew God fully, even as he was man, according to John 8.55. I do know him and do keep his word. Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed. I answer that, what is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is an act, for that whereby things are heeded must be itself hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, and is ordained to it as to his an end. Since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, in as much as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of Beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Hebrews 2.10. For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by his passion. And hence it was necessary that the Beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ preeminently, since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect. Reply to Objection 1. The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in person, not in essence or nature, yet with the unity of the person remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from the divine nature, is perfected with the Beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence. Reply to Objection 2. By the union this man is blessed with the uncreated Beatitude, even as by the union he is God. Yet besides the uncreated Beatitude, it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of Christ a created Beatitude whereby his soul was established in the last end of human nature. Reply to Objection 3. The Beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength. But in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the likeness of God as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul. Third Article Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge Objection 1. It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused knowledge besides the Beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the Beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as the clear face-to-face vision removes the enigmatic vision of faith as is plain from 1 Corinthians 13, 10 and 12. Since therefore in Christ there was the Beatific knowledge as stated above in Article 2, it would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge. Objection 2 further An imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more perfect. As opinion, the result of dialectical syllogism, disposes towards science which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now when perfection is reached there is no further need of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to Beatific cognition as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had Beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for him to have any other knowledge. Objection 3 further As corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect. Neither can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect, and hence the same conclusion as above. On the contrary, it is written in Colossians 2-3 that in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. I answer that as stated above in Article 1. It was fitting that the human nature assumed by the word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things, and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its competitive forms, as is plain from what is said in On the Soul 3, 32 and 38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, in as much as the word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him. Intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality, even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine, in On the Liberal Meeting of Genesis 2-8. And therefore, even as in the angels according to Augustine, there is a double knowledge, one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in the word, the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species. So likewise, besides the divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in his soul a beatific knowledge, whereby he knows the word and things in the word, and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby he knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind. Reply to Objection 1. The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as was said above in the parts Sukunda Sukunde, Question 1, Article 4. But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. Therefore, there is no parity. Reply to Objection 2. Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways. First, as a way leading to perfection. Secondly, as an effect proceeding from perfection. Thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and when this comes, the heat does not cease but remains as an effect of this form. So too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet when this has been acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge which is based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled to better understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude. Reply to Objection 3. The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is, a similitude of the divine essence, or of whatever is known in the divine essence, as is plain from what has been said in the first part, Question 12, Article 2. But it is a knowledge of the divine essence immediately, in as much as the divine essence itself is united to the beatified mind, as an intelligible to an intelligent being. And the divine essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this super exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind intelligible species, proportioned to its nature. Fourth Article Whether Christ Had Any Acquired Knowledge Objection 1. It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and inquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ he had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since he did not devote himself to the study of letters by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection. For it is said in John 7.15. The Jews wondered, saying, How doth this man know letters having never learned? Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge. Objection 2 further. Nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of Christ's soul was filled with intelligible species defiantly infused, as was said above in Article 3. Therefore no acquired species could accrue to his soul. Objection 3 further. He who already has the habit of knowledge acquires no new habit. Through what he receives from the senses, otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing together. But the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that he acquired a new knowledge through what he perceived by the senses. On the contrary, it is written in Hebrews 5.8. Whereas he was the Son of God, he learned obedience by the things which he suffered. That is, experienced, says Aglas. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge which is acquired knowledge. I answer that as is plain from Article 1. Nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the philosopher says on the heavens 131, still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now what is not its proper operation is useless, as is said on the heavens 217. Now the proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible species and act by abstracting them from phantasms. Hence it is said that the active intellect is that whereby everything is made actual. And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect, which means that there was inquired knowledge in him, which some call empiric. And hence although I wrote differently elsewhere in the sentences, it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge springs from Christ's active intellect, which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the first part, Question 12, Article 4. Reply to Objection 1. Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge, by discovery and by being taught, the way of discovery is the higher and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said in Ethics 1.4. He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself, yet he is good who obeys him that speaks a right. And hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, especially since he was given to be the teacher of all according to Joel 223. Be joyful in the Lord your God, because he hath given you a teacher of justice. Reply to Objection 2. The human mind has two relations, one to higher things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, that is, to phantasms which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fullness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behoved it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms. Reply to Objection 3. Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together, for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phantasms. Hence another habit of the same kind cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high and not from phantasms, and hence there is no parity between these habits. End of question 9. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 10 of Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 10 of the Beatific Knowledge of Christ's Soul in Four Articles. We must now consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the divine knowledge in the first part, question 14, it now remains to speak of the three others. One of the Beatific Knowledge. Two of the Infused Knowledge. Three of the Acquired Knowledge. But again, because much has been said in the first part, notably in question 12, of the Beatific Knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the Soul of Christ. Under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether the Soul of Christ comprehended the word or the divine essence. Second, whether it knew all things in the word. Third, whether the Soul of Christ knew the infinite in the word. Fourth, whether it saw the word or the divine essence, clearer than did any other creature. First article, whether the Soul of Christ comprehended the word or the divine essence. Objection one, you would seem that the Soul of Christ comprehended and comprehends the word or divine essence. For is it or says in, on the Supreme Good 13, that, the Trinity is known only to itself and to the man assumed. Therefore, the man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that knowledge of itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore, the Soul of Christ comprehends the divine essence. Objection two, further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says in, on the True Faith 3.6, the whole Godhead in one person is united to the human nature in Christ. Therefore, much more is the whole divine nature seen by the Soul of Christ. And hence it would seem that the Soul of Christ comprehended the divine essence. Objection three, further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God, belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says in, on the Trinity 1.13. But to comprehend the divine essence belongs by nature to the Son of God. Therefore, it belongs by grace to the Son of Man, and thus it seems that the Soul of Christ comprehended the divine essence by grace. On the contrary, Augustine says in his 83 questions, question 14, whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself. But the divine essence is not finite with respect to the Soul of Christ, since it infinitely exceeds it. Therefore, the Soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word. I answer that, as is plain from question two, articles one and six. The union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused, that is, the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature, as Damascene says in, on the true faith three, three and four. Now, it is impossible for any creature to comprehend the divine essence, as was shown in the first part, question 12, articles one, four and seven, seeing that the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the Soul of Christ no wise comprehends the divine essence. Reply to Objection one, the man assumed is reckoned with the divine trinity in the knowledge of itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures. Reply to Objection two, not even in the union by personal being does the human nature comprehend the Word of God or the divine nature, for although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one person of the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. Hence, Augustine says in his letter to Volusianus, number 137, I would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world's government, neither did he narrow or reduce it when he transferred it to that little body. So likewise, the Soul of Christ sees the whole essence of God, yet does not comprehend it, since it does not see it totally, that is, not as perfectly as it is knowable, as was said in the first part, Question 12, Article 7. Reply to Objection three, this saying of Augustine is to be understood by the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in his divine nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the divine essence, not indeed by his soul, but in his divine nature, even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator. Second Article Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word Objection one You would seem that the Soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word, for it is written in Mark 1332, But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father. Therefore he does not know all things in the Word. Objection two further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle, the more he knows in the principle. But God ceases essence more perfectly than the Soul of Christ does. Therefore he knows more than the Soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the Soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. Objection three further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If therefore the Soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the Soul of Christ would equal the divine knowledge, that is, the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible. On the contrary, on Apocalypse 512, the Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive divinity and wisdom, Agloss says, The knowledge of all things. I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, all things may be taken in two ways. First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the Soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things, the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to his dignity, all things to some extent belong, in as much as all things are subject to him. Moreover, he has been appointed Judge of all by God, because he is the Son of Man, as is said in John 527. And therefore the Soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time and the thoughts of men, of which he is the Judge, so that what is said of him, in John 225, for he knew what was in man, can be understood not merely of the divine knowledge, but also of his soul's knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, all things may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the divine power alone, and not all of these does the Soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the divine power, and consequently the divine essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature. And all of these the Soul of Christ knows in the Word, for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and consequently its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature. Reply to Objection 1. Arius and Eonomius understood this saying, not of the knowledge of the Soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above in Question 9, Article 1, but of the divine knowledge of the Son, whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said in John 1.3. And amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him. He is said therefore not to know the day and the hour of the judgment, for that He does not make it known, since on being asked by the apostles in Acts 1.7, He was unwilling to reveal it. And on the contrary, we read in Genesis 2212, Now I know that Thou fierest God, that is, now I have made thee know. But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence by saying, But the Father, we are given to understand that the Son knows not merely in the divine nature, but also in the human, because as Chrysostom argues, in his homily 78 on the Gospel of Matthew, if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge, which is greater, much more is it given to him to know the less, notably the time of judgment. Origin however, in his commentary on Matthew number 30 expounds it of his body, which is the church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this to be understood of the adoptive and not of the natural Son of God. Reply to Objection 2, God knows his essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are an act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what He ever Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the first part, Question 14, Article 9. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence. And thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ. Reply to Objection 3, The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ, which He has in the word, is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition. Since the uncreated light of the divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ. Although, absolutely speaking, the divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above. Third Article. Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the word? Objection 1. You would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in the word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the definition of the infinite, which in Physics 363 is said to be that, from which however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken. But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that contradictory exist together. Therefore, it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite. Objection 2. Further. The knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore, the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite. Objection 3. Further. There can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more is contained in the divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge of Christ's soul, as stated above in Article 2. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. On the contrary, the soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to first John 2.2. He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows the infinite. I answer that knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways. First, simply, that is, whatever is a being in act. Secondly, relatively, that is, whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said in Metaphysics 9.20, everything is known as it is an act, and not as it is in potentiality. Knowledge primarily and essentially regards being an act. And secondarily, regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but in as much as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are an act at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last forever. Consequently, there is a certain number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows the infinite things in the word, for it knows, as stated above in Article 2, all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence and not by a knowledge of vision. Reply to Objection 1. As we said in the first part, Question 8, Article 1, the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have the negatively infinite, that is, a form or act not limited by being received into matter or a subject. And this infinite of itself is the most knowable on account of the perfection of the act. Although it is not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature, for thus God is said to be infinite. And this infinite, the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privately. That is, in as much as it has not the form it ought naturally to have. And in this way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of itself is unknown, in as much as it is, as it were, matter with privation of form, as is said in Physics 365. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore, if this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said in Physics 3, 62 and 63. And in this way it is true that if we take something from it, that is, taking part after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely. And thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things, in as much as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity. That is, in any creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the word himself. Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, that is, in multitude. But as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the first part, Questions 7 Article 2. Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in On the Soul 326, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to but does not comprehend what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above in Article 1. But the infinite in potentiality, which is in creatures, can be comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to the soul according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands the universal, for example the nature of a genus or a species, which in a manner has infinity in as much as it can be predicated of an infinite number. Reply to Objection 3. That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence the philosopher says in On the Heavens 1, 2 and 3, that since bodies have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the existence of several such infinite things, as if we were to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the philosopher says in Physics 3, 37 and 38. As the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so too a property of the infinite must be multiplied in such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite. So too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore, of necessity in this particular line, there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts. Yet in another or a third line, there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite. Yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every way infinite. But than the infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order. Yet we may oppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence. Yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding. Fourth article. Whether the soul of Christ sees the word or the divine essence more clearly than does any other creature. Objection one. It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing. As the knowledge we have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the word immediately in the divine essence itself, as was said in the first part, question 12 article 2. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not see the word more perfectly than any other creature. Objection two further. The perfection of vision does not exceed the power of seeing, but the rational power of a soul, such as is the soul of Christ, is below the intellect of power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius in On the Celestial Hierarchy IV. Therefore, the soul of Christ did not see the word more perfectly than the angels. Objection three further. God sees his word infinitely more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible immediate degrees between the manner in which God sees his word and the manner in which the soul of Christ sees the word. Therefore, we cannot assert that the soul of Christ sees the word or the divine essence more perfectly than does every other creature. On the contrary, the apostle says in Ephesians 1 versus 20 and 21 that God set Christ on his right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion, and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. But in that heavenly glory, the higher anyone is, the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore, the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature. I answer that the vision of the divine essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the word of God, according to Ecclesiasticus 1.5. The word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom. Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the word in person, is more closely joined to the word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the word himself than any other creature. And therefore, more perfectly than the rest of creatures, it sees the first truth itself which is the essence of God. Hence it is written in John 1.14, and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full not only of grace, but also of truth. Reply to Objection 1. Perfection of knowledge on the part of the thing known depends on the medium, but as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way, the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the divine essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the divine essence in itself. Reply to Objection 2. The vision of the divine essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was said in the first part, Question 12, Article 4. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is supreme than on the order of nature in which the angelic nature is placed before the human. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above in Question 7, Article 12. There cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the word, and the same is to be said of the perfection of the divine vision, although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime degree by the infinity of the divine power. End of Question 10, Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC