 the atomic bomb, the sinew, muscle, and knockout punch of the world's military power. In all its force and fury, it did not just appear out of the blue. If by some magic, we could reverse the process of time and peel back the years, if we could march back into the history of the A-bomb, we would see, first of all, it has a history. A long period of development before it became a weapon of warfare, first there had to come the creative breakthrough, expressed perhaps in a mathematical formula. Even that does not emerge full grown, but is built on generations of creativity, of trial and error and tiny advances. A mathematical formula is many things, but this certainly, a springboard into a period of further research and development and testing. It may, and almost always does, take years before a prototype is ready. The laborious time-consuming testing goes on at every phase, and then one morning on a new Mexico desert, a new kind of bomb, a new world of bomb is set off. Nothing will ever be quite the same again. During the achievement and in the production lines to come, from drawing board to finished product, are millions of man hours. Because these are weapons of immense military significance, time is important. We try to develop them before effective countermeasures can be worked out. That's why, all along the span of years, when a decisive weapon is developed and finally made available to our military forces, we try to keep what is going on a secret from potential enemies. The longer our military secrets are secrets, the more time America will have before an effective countermeasure is ready for use by hostile forces. The security program in your plant or office is intended to make our military secrets last longer. Your company security officer is the man to go to for guidance in proper security procedures. Along with the counterintelligence measures provided by the Department of Defense Industrial Security program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation assists you in protecting classified defense information. Helping maintain the lead time of many of the projects you're working on is an important part of the FBI's job. Maintaining lead time is particularly difficult because potential enemies use espionage and subversion to obtain their ends. Espionage has been a staple of spreading Russian influence and power since the Bolshevik Revolution. Americans need no better proof than the atom bomb. 1960, that's the year our technical experts thought Russia would finally be able to develop a bomb. 1949 is when they had their bomb. For much of that 11-year pole vault, credit Russian espionage agents aided by national traitors. They did away with much of our lead time on the atom bomb. Despite the increasing manifestations of friendship offered by the Russians, their unwavering desires are plain. Can anything be plainer than the flat statement of Nikita Khrushchev, we will bury you. And the you is us. But words, threatening or whatever, are still only words. We look for deeds, proof. Americans at heart are all from Missouri. Perhaps there is no better proof of the steady intensity of the Soviet offensive against the security of the United States than an actual documented case that had its start on a Brooklyn, New York residential street. It was 1953. A young news boy had just finished the weekly collections from his paper route. He began to count the nickels and dimes to make sure the total amount was correct. A five-cent piece slipped out of his hand to the pavement. He was astonished at what he saw. The nickel had split into two equal segments, revealing a small piece of microfilm. The coin was hollow. The news boy could not understand it, but he had the good sense to report the incident to the New York police, who in turn passed the hollow coin and its contents to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The microfilm contained a code which bureau crypto analysts were able to break, with the aid of information supplied to the bureau by a former Soviet secret agent. His information, along with the decoding of the message found in the hollow coin, were to lead only a short distance away from the federal courthouse in Brooklyn to a building nearby. On the top floor of 252 Fulton Street, a studio had been rented in the name of E. Goldfuss, occupation, artist, or so his neighbors thought. Did you ever wonder about him, what his occupation was or anything? Well, I thought he was an artist. He dressed like an artist. How was that? How did he look? Well, he... Most of the times that I've seen him, he wore a brown suit and a tie open, you know, shirt unbuttoned. He wasn't too talkative, the man. Only, if he walked into my shop, he'd sit down and talk to me about electronics, what his problems are on his radios, and so forth. And I would advise him and he would tell me if he's doing the right thing and I would, you know, talk back and forth with him. Much to the surprise of the neighbors of Goldfuss, on August 7, 1957, the tenant of that studio was charged with being a colonel in Soviet intelligence, his real name, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. The United States attorney declared that colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was the most important Soviet spy ever caught in the United States. He was charged with being an active spy over a period of nine years. The FBI carefully investigated the contents of his apartment and his nearby studio. Church turned up such espionage items as radio and electronic equipment, including microfilm and a shortwave radio set. There were hollowed-out pencils containing film and numerous cryptic messages, some in coal. They also found other cleverly fashioned containers for the transmission of defense secrets, hollow bolts and hollow nails, cufflinks or earrings that could contain secret messages. Colonel Abel had rented a safe deposit box in a New York bank, where agents found $15,000 in cash. When he was arrested, Abel had another $6,000 on his purse. Abel pleaded not guilty and was defended by one of New York's most prominent attorneys, appointed by the Bar Association to ensure him a fair trial. In a pre-trial statement, the attorney made clear what the nature of Abel's defense would be. It should be sharply distinguished from such a case as that of the Rosenbergs who were charged with betraying their own country. Assuming that the charges in this indictment are true, Abel is quite evidently, not only a man who has performed an exceedingly hazardous mission for his own country. The basis of Abel's defense then was that he was an admitted professional spy and had conducted himself within the code of that profession. Abel did not testify in the trial and offered no defense witnesses. The United States attorney offered several witnesses, both Russian and American, to make his case against Colonel Abel, proving the Colonel to be an active operative in the Soviet espionage apparatus known as the KGB, operating directly under orders of the USSR Council of Ministers in Moscow. The KGB serves as a worldwide collector of information. In each country, a number of independent spy cells pass information into the apparatus. Members of one spy cell do not know of the existence of agents in other rings. After the government's attorney rested his case, the defense attorney made his presentation. Through newspapers, radio and television, the eyes and ears of a perplexed, troubled American people were on this courthouse. Then on November 15, 1957 came the verdict. Colonel Abel had been found guilty, said the U.S. attorney. I believe that the jury verdict in this case was more than amply warranted by the evidence, which I feel was overwhelming, and which strikes a very, very severe blow at Soviet espionage in this country. Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel was sentenced to 30 years in prison. How many secrets passed from Colonel Abel to the Soviet Union is not yet publicly known. But this is clear. Abel and his Russian Confederates were basically intermediaries who collected their information from Americans in a position to know our defense secrets. Colonel Abel was the leader of only one Soviet spy network in the United States. Industrial and technical workers were Abel's major target. Abel did not refute the evidence that espionage meetings for transfer of information had been held in such important industrial centers as Quincy, Massachusetts, Long Island, New York, Newark, New Jersey, and New York City. Targets for the Colonel Abels are Americans who work daily at building up America's military strength. Very few of these men and women convey secrets willingly to the Russian collectors of information. Carelessness eases the job of the professional spies like Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. And somewhere in this country right now, trained agents, just as clever, just as inconspicuous, possessing large amounts of money and the most refined tools of espionage are going on with Colonel Abel's job. These men are hard-working, dedicated to their cause, and will stop at nothing to get their hands on classified information. The Department of Defense Security Program is designed to defeat their efforts. By complying with these requirements, you live up to your security obligations and thereby aid your country. Whether Colonel Abel's successes succeed or fail is strictly up to you.