 There is this idea, this too big to fail idea. We saw it in the financial crisis when, you know, just before these banks were bailed out, they all had investment-grade ratings. The rating agencies knew they were going to get bailed out. And so this thinking permeates their credit process. And what it creates at investors is this idea that not that we have to understand what's going on with these institutions, we have to make sure we keep understanding which institutions are too big to fail. And so it sort of divorces the credit process away from actually looking at credit metrics and it becomes this sort of game of, okay, which institution today is so systemically important that if there's a crisis, it's going to be fine because the government's going to bail them out. I think that it does raise a number of issues, and particularly the issue that you raised about moral hazard. It does change the calculus of moral hazard, and it provides a safe haven for larger financial institutions that isn't accorded to the other 7,000 financial institutions who live and die by the decisions they make. This is Rob Johnson, President of the Institute for New Economic Thinking. I'm here today with Jim Nadler, he's the Co-Founder, Chief Executive of KBRA Bond Breaking Agency. Prior to today, we'd had some lovely discussions about all of the challenges that we face in the realm of credit, municipal bonds, educational institutions, and the whole, which I call spectrum of things that fall under the umbrella that people are rising to explore now called ESG, Environmental, Social Responsibility, and Governance. Jim, thanks for joining me. Thanks, Rob. It's great to be here. So let's start with big picture. I'm talking to you about public policy, but you're also a person who's serving clients, investors, trying to keep them from losing money. We all know we're in a world of change. I make a joke that the pandemic is what really unmasked us in terms of the need for transition in our social philosophies, designs, and implementation. But you see this very clearly from our previous conversations. And how do you see your role in society as a new and innovative rating agency? Thanks for that, Rob. It's a great question because rating agencies historically have been viewed as a protection, protecting investors. And that is our number one priority. That is why we're in business. It's a raison d'etre. But we have another role, and that is to facilitate commerce. And I like to say that the reason that rating agencies are in that role is a little bit like why we put brakes on cars. You don't put brakes on cars so they can go slow. You put brakes on cars so they can go faster. And it's our job to make sure that the investors know that the brakes work, that the brakes are there, and that there's someone always fine-tuning the brakes. And one of the things that the great financial recession of 2006-2007 showed us was that the two big monopolies that are in this space were asleep at the wheel. And we were born out of that crisis. And our goal was to bring this new thinking, the landscape, the financial landscape is changing so rapidly. And you've got this monopoly that is continually looking in the rearview mirror. And that isn't going to be, that's not going to do for investors the work that needs to be done going forward. We've got to be more nimble. The information landscape is changing so rapidly that you have to be part of that and part of that discussion to make sure that investors are being looked after and that they're getting the best possible information and protection. And so it's one of the reasons that we decided to build the Bond Rating Agency. It's one of the reasons we've been successful. And it's really the mission that we're on to change this entire landscape. Let's talk about this new phenomenon I mentioned in the introduction, ESG investing. One of our board members, Gillian Tett, from the Financial Times now has changed her presentation to what's called Moral Money. She's exploring the ESG environment every week. But tell me how you see what it is, what the dangers are of a false consciousness and what its potential looks like. So I'll start with a really positive aspect of ESG and that is the awareness of ESG and its importance in just in the last, I would say, 12 to 18 months has increased dramatically. That alone is something that we should all be happy about. There have been people ever since Rachel, I believe her name is Rachel Cohen wrote Silent Spring. I don't think I got her name right, but ever since Silent Spring was... Is Rachel Carson, Mr. Named? Carson, sorry about that. Ever since Rachel Carson wrote Silent Spring, there have been a number of activists in the environmental space. We know about the social change that's gone on in this country. It's been happening since the early beginnings of our country, but today the awareness is broad and it's on everyone's plate, everyone's looking at. The downside is, and you raise this, is that there are people who are trying to take advantage of it. There's this phenomenon known as greenwashing where it's just taking some old product, putting a little green wrapper on it and getting investors to buy in to it being sort of this new type of security that's green. I think that we have to be careful about that. There are a number of what are called ESG ratings out there and our competitors have their own ESG rating scales. I think those are very detrimental and I think they stand to do an enormous amount of harm to the investing community because they boil everything down to one number or one grade and the ESG space is just not built like that. There are so many nuances that come with each of the different disciplines, whether it's environmental, whether it's social responsibility or whether it's governance, each of these disciplines are so vast and so nuanced that it's really requiring a new way and a broader way of thinking. The last thing I'll say on the topic is that this new sort of awareness of ESG is great, but now the hard work begins and that's what KBRA is all about. We are all about the hard work of ESG. It's why we're on a project to develop how to think about carbon with respect to companies. Companies are afraid to talk about carbon publicly because they're afraid it's going to be used against them by investors, by regulators, by taxing authorities. We've got to find a way that companies are comfortable discussing carbon and how it's priced so that we can get a handle on it. We're working with community banks to help them find an effective and cost-efficient way to disclose their carbon footprint, to disclose some of the ESG attributes. This is hard work. This is not something that happens overnight and so we're committed to doing this hard work and we've got a lot of hard work ahead of us in this, but it's our mission also to sort of get other people to start doing the hard work of ESG. I come back to you from listening with two notions. One is the famous old notion in philosophy, abstraction enables cruelty, meaning it provides a mask for not doing it. The other is my dear friend Charles Goodheart, who is a monetary economist at London School of Economics, is now a Marinist. Goodheart's law was essentially, anytime you put some kind of measure or marker or rule in place, it starts to lose its power because people figure out how to work their way around it. Deep dive into the texture of understanding these things and understanding what you might call a map of what rules producing behavior and what that does for the environment I think is essential to making progress using the power and the energy of capital around the world. You're absolutely right, Rob. I think one of the things that we realized early on and it's why I spend so much time in Washington and why we spend time in Brussels is the regulatory environment around ESG is going to be critical. What we want is we want regulators to understand how nuanced each of these fields are so that we don't end up with regulation that causes unintended consequences. We end up with when regulators do come out with regulations and that these regulations are able to evolve because this area of ESG is growing, it's changing and so regulation as well as credit analysis has to keep up with it. And I would say to be really fair, we're in the process of a learning curve. We're taking a cutting edge role in protecting your investors as one part of the mission contributing to, I would say, minimizing unnecessary losses from cumbersome, how do you say, constraints on behavior, allocation of capital and what have you. But we're in a learning curve just as in the technology sector. I would think it would be terrifying to work at the Federal Trade Commission right now unless you really knew tech inside out and how many people do. I mean, they know how to program, they know how to play with cryptocurrency or this or that, but how do you govern something that is so, what you might call powerful but not yet completely understood and defined. And you've got to be careful of weeding out the good while trying to protect from the bad and I would imagine also in the realm of things like intellectual property rights, market share and monopolies, you're going to have guys on some side that are pretending something is bad because it would allow new entrants in that compresses their profit margin. We see that in the pharmaceutical research and approvals. That lobbying is quite intense. You know, Rob, I think you've hit on a couple of really interesting points. I think that the idea that the regulation needs to not only incorporate the understanding of BSG but understanding technology because today the world of technology and the world of BSG are coming together in ways that are dramatic and in ways that are speeding up the pace at which we get and analyze information in the ESG space. And I think one of the biggest concerns, both from a regulatory standpoint but also when I think about our competitors who are much larger than we are, is that they are behind the eight ball. That they're not understanding how rapidly this intersection of credit with respect to ESG and technology are merging and integrating that in the way that they evaluate what's going on in ESG. Just a small example, the technology today to understand, to look at a state and determine with heat maps where we're going to see the next problem with wildfires is astonishing. And that technology is only getting better. Every time I meet with this company that's doing it and there were several that are doing it, it's getting better and better. And so understanding that and understanding how to use that information and use that data productively both from a rating standpoint but also just throughout the entire landscape of the financial sector so that all stakeholders understand it and are using it in a way that makes them more knowledgeable and helps them make better decisions. And I know a lot of people have used a lot of technology in that realm. For instance, using online sites with photographs. So for instance, you can detect unrest in Baltimore, Maryland about five days before it hits the newspapers. And I know Palomere and other companies there have now worked closely with people like Bridgewater Capital are very good at helping people see things sooner and more accurately. I know years ago I was involved in a conversation with the Federal Reserve System about the aggregation of credit card data, things on Google's website and others where you could discern the ebbs and flows in the economy all the way down the zip code but you could aggregate it up to state, region, sector, what have you and instead of the Federal Reserve waiting six weeks for an employment number to come out, 72 hours after the transactions occurred. They were much, how do you say, much more accurate and much more timely in helping them, the management of our macroeconomic society. So I think there's a lot of potential here. But I also think there's something that you alluded to early on, the word monopolies. It's so hard to break and when you're profitable, perhaps for reasons that have less to do with your value added and more to do with your value extraction, it may be difficult to change your habits because if you can stay in the saddle and just keep turning the crank and making money, how do I say, that's very satisfying to some people. Yeah, I mean, you know, Moody's and S&P, even after the financial crisis, still have operating margins in excess of 50 percent and today their stocks have a PE of over 30. You know, it's astonishing, but it's true and what you just described, what that does is that doesn't, that's not a great environment for innovation. And for changing the way that you do business. And we see that today in manifests itself in the way that they evaluate all sorts of different types of assets. I'll give you a couple of examples and then I'd love to talk more about the impact that is happening in municipals and large, you know, when you look at municipals as a whole, but particularly in higher ed, but a couple of great examples. When we started Crawl, I've always been fascinated by the bank, the financial institution ratings at our two biggest competitors. They seem to be very size bias. They seem to, you know, bigger banks get better ratings and there doesn't seem to be a lot of sort of differentiation among the financial institutions. It's really has a lot to do with size. It's correlated highly towards size and what that evolved in over the years is that they just had this notion that they didn't like, you know, small regional banks and large community banks. Now, there are probably 2,000 small banks that have assets under $800 million. Those are never going to be investment credit, but there's a large segment of those banks, probably six, five or six hundred, four or five hundred that, you know, are probably, you know, could benefit from a rating. And particularly a smaller group that could benefit from an investment grade rating. And so we did a very large study that looked at how financial institutions fared during the financial crisis. And what we found was antithetical to what was being done. We actually found that this mid-level of regional and community banks performed better than the larger banks that had to be bailed out during the financial crisis. And so we started rating these banks of investment grade, giving them access to cheaper capital, giving investors more high quality rated paper that they could invest in. And what happened over time is that all of our competitors set up units to start rating these mid-sized banks. Now, I assume they're using our research because I still haven't seen any research from them, but I think that that's one area where they were just set in their ways. And once they saw us doing it because it was a competitive issue, they started doing it. And so I do think we've been able to have a positive impact on the industry by being more forward thinking. And we've done this in a few areas. Airports is another one. They were sort of bound up in old criteria. We did new research and started rating airports. Now, you find when you look at our competitors, they've all updated their criteria. But this is an issue that broadly impacts ratings generally, but it's particularly important in the municipal area where I think that there's a combination of things that are happening. The landscape is changing very quickly. ESG is impacting these communities in ways that, particularly if you are a community that may have to deal with changes in storm patterns or you're a community that is on the Atlantic coast and you're worried about rising sea levels or you're a community in California, you're worried about forest fires. And so that's just one example. So this is changing very quickly. And this antiquated thinking and antiquated way of looking at these type of bonds has a real impact, not only to investors. It could put them in jeopardy, could put them in their investments in harm. But it also, in some cases like in the Community Bank illustration, could deny access to the capital markets to a group of companies that really deserve that access to the capital market. And so we see this in a number of places. I think higher ed is a great example. I think particularly when you look at the historically black colleges and universities, that's an area where the criteria that was developed 40 years ago, even though you say to the world, yeah, we look at it every year and we rethink about it. But if you're not really thinking about it in the context of today and the next 10 years, you're really doing a disservice to these universities. And I know there have been several studies, we're actually in the middle of doing our own study, but I know there have been several studies that show that historically black colleges and universities pay more in fees in the market, end up spending, their debt costs them more. And so I think that that's a huge red flag. And I think that a company like ours has a responsibility to not only our investors, but to those schools to make sure that they're treated fairly when their credit is assessed and that you put them in the appropriate light so investors can make much more well. How do I say triggering all kinds of things? But the first one I want to say is that they say that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. So when you got them to do the middle-sized banks, you should be grinning when you look in the mirror. It does make me happy. I would say it waited a few years, but it does make me happy. The second thing, because I used to work with the United States Senate banking committee, is I see this question of the large banks, which some call the too big to fail banks, it's difficult to rate them when you know that their scale and size means that if they fail they can do so much damage to the real economy that they've almost taken what you might call the central banks balance sheet prisoner. The contingent fiscal capacity of the United States is being reserved for those who can do harm in what some have called the mother of all moral hazards. And it's very tricky, I would think, from the standpoint of your business, thinking about the reaction function of bailouts in conjunction with what you might call the ratios and standalone integrity of an institution. But this moral hazard is very dangerous because what it does is it anesthetizes the credit default risk premium in the funding costs for the big banks, gives them a competitive advantage, and they in large market share and are able to take more risk. So I think it's a very, very complicated environment. I'm curious what your thoughts are. You know, I think you hit on a really, really interesting issue and this actually, this issue cuts back to Howard University and I'll bring it back in a second. So there is this idea, this too big to fail idea, we saw it in the financial crisis when just before these banks were bailed out, they all had investment grade ratings. The rating agencies knew they were going to get bailed out. And so this thinking permeates their credit process. And what it creates at investors is this idea that not that we have to understand what's going on with these institutions, we have to make sure we keep understanding which institutions are too big to fail. And so it sort of divorces the credit process away from actually looking at credit metrics and it becomes this sort of game of, okay, which institution today is so systemically important that if there's a crisis, it's going to be fine because the government's going to bail them out. I think that it does raise a number of issues and particularly the issue that you raised about moral hazard. It does change the calculus of moral hazard and it provides a safe haven for larger financial institutions that isn't accorded to the other 7,000 financial institutions who live and die by the decisions they make. The way that this, the way this carries over to Howard is really interesting. So Howard is a federally chartered higher ed school. It clearly, clearly has the support of the federal government. They, as much as every time it comes up, they've as much as said that. And so it's interesting to me that I think one of the rating agencies has Howard below investment grade. So first of all, you think about, and I'm just using this as an example, but you think about Howard, they have about a $700,000, $700 million endowment. And yet being non-investment grade says that you have a 10% risk of default, 20% risk of default in the next five years. I don't think there's a person in any financial capacity, whether you're an investor or a banker, that thinks that Howard University is going to be in default in the next five years. It's insanity. And so why that institution is so willing to apply the standard of too big to fail to a large financial institution, but is not willing to, I'm not saying that's the right way to do it, but if you're doing it over here, you should at least say, well, they're not going to let Howard fail either. So they're at least in investment grade in the way I look at them. And so protections, protection. And so you may disagree with it, but it's the reality of where we live. And so what I really find interesting is the despair, their willingness to on the one hand say, yeah, I believe the government's going to bail them out. But on the other hand, all evidence shows that it's true, but they're willing to say, but oh no, no, you know, they've had a couple of management problems, they've had this problem, that problem. They're really, they need to show us more before we're going to give them an investment grade. So that's, I find, what I find really interesting is this ability to separate, to compartmentalize the way they evaluate the governmental support. You either believe it or you don't. And so I find that the most interesting. And it's specific to what we're talking about, Rob, because it gets to the way that different institutions are viewed and it's probably has to do with the way they've been viewed historically. Let me ask you, because we talked about this one before, which was a large part of what inspired me to want to do this podcast with you. When you compare something like Howard, where the student body is African American, and just by the numbers, a lower net worth group of people than what you might call high brand name liberal arts schools, places like Swarthmore, Avaford, Middlebury, what have you. I'm not picking on anyone in particular. But if you were to look at them blind, in other words, take away the name and look at them blind as ratios and balance sheets, Howard might stand up pretty well with that $700 million endowment. But there is some inference perhaps that's being drawn that the students will all need financial aid. So you're going to draw on that more at those colleges where places like Bowdoin, the student body is wealthy and will, what you might call, rally together, support the institution as alumni, not ever need to draw on financial aid. But these are conjectures that I think that what you might call, they always said a bird to hands were two in the bush. That money and that's $700 million endowment should be raising their credit rating compared to ones with weaker ratios and it's not happening. That's right. And I think you raised a couple of interesting points. So the idea that it is somehow, it's certainly from a, you know, I'm not naive, it is from a standpoint of preferably, of course, it's great to have a, you know, if happier students are full pay, that changes the amount of work that you have to do to raise financial aid for other students. And, but I think the way that we need to start looking at this is through a different lens. And that is that look at Howard's ability to raise this type of financial aid and still have an endowment that is $700 million. And the other thing that I think you raised, which is really interesting is this idea of, you know, this notion that, you know, through a small liberal arts school, predominantly white, that you're going to be able to rally the parents, the alumni, look at what's happened just recently with respect to Howard and their alumni. You know, the vice president is a Howard alum. Chadwick Boseman, you know, one of the greatest films that has been done in the last few years, Black Panther, he was a star. I mean, the sort of now recognition that Howard has these incredible alums in the 70s were continued geniuses and they were friends in Washington DC at Howard. Exactly. And now, now we need to change our view of that and say, Oh, well, they have the same type of alumni, and they're going to rally to their support. And they have rallied to their support when they've had problem. And so I think that this idea that so you're exactly right. It's that we need to I always love the story about the I forget which orchestra it was, but they weren't they just weren't hiring women. And they finally put a screen up when people were auditioning. And lo and behold, they started hiring women. And what does that tell you? And so I think your example of, let's take the names off of the universities, and let's just show what's happening in the numbers and start looking at it through that lens. And that's going to change the way that we evaluate evaluate these these institutions. And just broadly speaking, it's going to be a much better analysis for investors and for those institutions inferences and conjectures and parables and stories, not just the raw science. But if you if you really narrow down the signal to noise ratio to the scientific writers, you probably will in this context improve how you serve your customers, meaning the investors who do place a bet. And I find though, and as you know, I made a podcast recently, we talked about the Destin Jenkins brilliant young historian from University of Chicago's history department, who did his PhD dissertation on California and the admissible bonds and the, which you might call distorted ways of measuring and handling things and the very painful contortions in urban cities. He obviously focused on San Francisco while he was at Stanford. But his insights into things like the Detroit bankruptcy of just a few years ago are extraordinary. So there are there are a lot of ramifications here and getting down to what I'll call that dispassionate science might make more sense. I have one question I want to ask you about Howard, though, when Donald Trump was in the White House, people sensed that, which you might call racial polarity and inclusiveness was on the decline. Did Howard's credit rating go down for fear that that support, that bailout money wouldn't be there in the Trump administration, like it would be say in the Biden administration or in the Obama administration before that? You know, Rob, that is a great question. I don't have to say I don't know the answer. I'm just thinking what kind of conjectures people would draw. I'll have to look now and you raise it. That's a really great question. But you know, the other thing that I think is important here, which you might call scientifically precise and fair quality measures. We talked earlier with ESG about how they may guide us to do better things for society. But the other thing is expertise is under so much criticism now. And when you're doing false rituals, quantitative rituals of expertise that aren't really expert or science, or when you're bailing out the too big to fail guys and pretending like that's all okay or necessary, you're destroying the credibility of governments and of expertise and of the institutions like Moody's and S&P and others that accompany or compliment that process. That demoralizes the public. That's part of what fans the flames and builds the kind of things like January 6th. And I'm not trying to draw too tight a connection, but the process of integrity really matters. No, listen, you are drawing the right inferences, because I think that scientific analysis, you know, however you think about it, has been under attack. And this idea that institutions are somehow doing nefarious work is because these institutions have to do a better job of transparency. And that's the one thing that we believe in. And first of all, I think it was under assault because Trump didn't like the results. That's why it was under assault. We need to all understand that. But I also think that many of these institutions and I'll fault Moody's and S&P in particular, because there's this notion that you didn't have to be transparent. You didn't have to tell, you know, you didn't have to show your work. I used to have a teacher that always said show your work because, you know, you're Moody's and S&P, you're licensed by the SEC. People have to listen to you. Well, you know what? They don't have to listen to you. We built our company based on going out and talking to investors. Everything in the world is not black and white. There's a huge gray area, particularly in the financial landscape. And the gray area is messy and it requires work. And you've got to go out and you've got to get 100 opinions and you've got to bring those opinions back. You have to synthesize them. But you're going to come out with a more enlightened viewpoint that is transparent and people are going to believe you because you've gone through that hard process. And that's what we've done. And that's what I encourage all of our competitors to do. In fact, I encourage all institutions to do that. This idea that you can get away with, it's this way because it's always been this way and because we're telling you that it's not going to cut it. These young people today, they don't buy into that. They want to see the facts. They want to see how you arrived at your conclusion. And we have to be better about doing that. I think it's one of the strongest things that we've done. It's one of the reasons that we have such a strong connection to our investors that we serve us. And I think it's one of the reasons that we've been able to build our company so quickly is that we have spent the time and we continue to spend the time. I mentioned it before talking about ESG. It's hard work. The gray area, the messy part of every problem is always hard work. And that's where we thrive. That's where KBRA really shows what we're made of. And that's what we've really got to change. We've got to have investors that are demanding that of everybody in the financial market, that we demand that you show transparency, that you show us how you came to that conclusion. And that, as you said, that makes things, then they're blind to these antiquated thoughts that have sort of crept in to the way that we look at things. Because when you have to show your work, you can't have a bias one way or the other. If the work doesn't prove it, you can't have a bias. And so I think that transparency is going to be the disinfectant that we need throughout the market. And that's really what KBRA is all about is this idea of showing your work of transparency. Providing a better service as a private sector entity to your customers. That's a good thing. But it has something like an ESG-like side effect, which is if the young people in this world see examples like you're describing your firm as, how do you say, aspiring to be, then the notion that expertise isn't just a ritual in marketing for power or for whatever agenda, but it's actually a public good helps improve the faith and the integrity of our system. And I think that's in very short, that faith and integrity is in very short supply right now. And so you're kind of doing well for your customers and doing good for a rebooting for our society. I think these are very, very important concepts and expertise, whether you call it elite brand names or degrees or whatever, are being laughed at on social media. And there's something dangerous about that. But the idea, yeah, it's very dangerous because then, how would I say, it's like driving the ship without a rudder. So I don't know. Right. Well, it's how you get away with making outrageous claims that you can't support. It's because you get your customers so numb to not seeing how you came to your conclusions or the expertise that people then start to question everything. And that's why I think you're exactly right, Rob. We've got to get back to a time when people can rely on institutions, we can rely on expertise. And it's incumbent upon us to make sure that we're doing everything in our power to make that, to make expertise important again. And that I believe is through transparency. You know, it's interesting. We, every year we hire interns and we hire young people. And there's been a dramatic change in the last 10 years in the way young people view the workforce. They're demanding more of their companies. They, you know, they want to know what your company's view on Black Lives Matter, what's your company's view on Pride Month, what's your company's view on integrity. What do you stand for? And I think that companies need to think about those things and need to be able to articulate those values in order to not only attract the type of investors that you want to attract and customers you want to attract, but also to attract people that want to work for your company, that see themselves in what you're projecting. And so that's a cataclysmic change. You know, when I started at Pricewaterhouse, nobody asked them what their views on racial diversity was. Nobody asked anybody. You were just glad to have a job. You didn't, you didn't want to raise your hand. You wanted to do your work and show that you could do your work. That's not the world we live in today. And I think it's a good thing because I think that the people are becoming stakeholders across the board and they're wanting to be heard. And I think that's going to be a real force for good. And we're, I think, learning as a company how to take that really powerful, powerful, you know, viewpoint and then become, sort of, have that help transform the way that we happen, the way that we relate to our customers, whether they're investors or whether they're there. And they say, you know, why are you so involved with us? It's now about 16,000 young people. And I said, well, I'm here to mitigate the depth and the duration of your future midlife crisis. And I'm making a joke, but not really, which is the nature of what you've done. Because the only thing that you have that's really scarce is time. So how do you use your time? And when you look back and tell your grandchildren, I have one grandchild and one on the way in the next couple weeks, when you give back and you tell them, what did you do? That question of, did I go to a firm where I was proud, not proud of the brand name, proud insight of what I saw. And when I used to, that's right. And when I used to teach as an adjunct, when I was in the hedge fund, proud of what they stood for, was Soros Fund Management. Lots of students at Columbia University would come and want to get what you might call career advice. We'd go out to a local pub or something and look at their resume and talk after class. And I used to say to them, the early part of your career, do not chase money or prestigious brand names. Find a person as a mentor who you would like to be like, and an experience that will make you unusual. And that will create an attraction, and it will create the skills and the compass that helps you navigate through what Odysseus called the siren songs of temptation. And I think the, I just think this, you're, and by the way, it's really awakened now, because when I was talking to those people in the early nineties, the concerns about environment, the concerns about gender and race, we're known near as, as heightened as you just described to me. But this is, this is very important for, like I say, mitigating that future midlife crisis. Because some of this wisdom, rather than being kind of fast and loose, is very important.