 Chapter 6 Part 7 of A History of Grease to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 1. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Graham Redman. A History of Grease to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 1 by John Bagnell Bury. Chapter 6 Part 7. Second and third European expeditions of Darius. Battle of Marathon. Having suppressed the rebellion, Persia had three things to do. Greek Asia was to be reorganized, Persian Europe was to be reconquered, and those free Greek states which had made war on Persia and occupied Sardis were to be punished. Artiphanes caused the territories of the Ionian cities to be measured and surveyed and regulated the tributes accordingly. It was also ordained that the cities should no longer have the right of making war upon one another, but there was more to be done. The revolt had taught Persia that the system of tyrannies did not answer, and it was now resolved to make an experiment of the opposite policy. The despots were abolished and democratic governments were set up. The world may well have been surprised to see the great despotism of all favoring the institution of democracy. It was a concession to the spirit of the Greeks, which reflects credit on the wisdom of Darius. The king's son-in-law, Mardonius, was sent to reassert Persian supremacy in Thrace and Macedonia, and through Macedonia he proposed to advance into Greece in order to punish the two cities which had helped the Ionian rebels. A fleet sailed along the coast and subdued the island of Thesos on its way. Thrace was reduced, and Macedonia, then under King Alexander, submitted, a submission which was to be avenged in distant days to come by a descendant and a namesake. But the Greek expedition could not be carried out, since a disaster had befallen the fleet which was partly wrecked in a storm of the perilous promontory of Aethos. Mardonius returned. He had lost many ships, but he had fulfilled the more important parts of his task. But Darius was sternly resolved that Athens and Eretria should not escape with our chastisement. Their connection with the burning of Sardis had deeply incensed him. It seemed an insult which the great king's pride could not let pass unnoticed. Moreover, Hippias, the banished tyrant, was at the court of Sousa, urging an expedition against the city which had cast him out. It was decided that the new expedition should not be sent by way of Thrace and Macedonia, but should move straight across the Aegean Sea. The cities of the Persian seaboard were commanded to equip warships and transports for cavalry, and heralds were sent to the chief cities of free Greece that were not at war with Persia, requiring the tokens of submission, earth, and water. In most cases the tokens were given, and among others by Aegina, the enemy of Athens. The command of the army was entrusted to Datus and Artefernes, a nephew of Darius, and they were accompanied by the aged tyrant Hippias, who hoped to rule once more over his native country. The armament, 600 galleys strong, according to Herodotus, setting sail from Samos, made first for Naxos, the island where Aristagoras had failed. The inhabitants abandoned the city and fled up into the hills, and the Persians burned the town. The sacred island of Delos was scrupulously spared, but soon after the Persians had departed, it was shaken by an earthquake and the unwonted event was noted as a sign of coming troubles. Having sailed from Isle to Isle subduing the Cyclades, the fleet went up the channel between Euboea and Attica, and reducing Caristus by the way reached the territory of Eretria. It is strange to find that Athens and Eretria had made no common preparations to meet a common danger. Eretria was severed from Attica only by a narrow water, and yet there was no joint action. Athens indeed directed the colonists whom she had settled in the territory of her dependency Calces to assist their Eretrian neighbours, but she sent no other help. We hear of sharp engagements outside the walls of the Euboean city, but within seven days it was delivered over to the invaders by the treachery of some leading burgers. The flames which consumed the temples of Eretria were a small set-off against the flames of Sardis. The inhabitants were enslaved. Of all the Greek towns which were involved in the strife between Europe and Asia, none was more ill-fated than Eretria. The Persian generals had accomplished the lesser half of their task. It now remained to deal with the other city which had defied their king. Trossing over the strait they landed their army in the Bay of Marathon. For the second time an exile tyrant of Athens came down from Eretria to recover his power. The father had come fifty years before with but a few mercenaries. The son came now with the forces of Asia. Yet so far as winning support at Athens was concerned, the foreign host was the weakest argument of Hippias. The house of the Pisistrates had many bitter enemies, but none was more bitter than one who had also known what it was to rule as a tyrant, Miltiades' son of Simon. We have seen how he returned from the Cursonies after the Ionic revolt. His enemies accused him of the crime of oppressive rule in the Cursonies, but he was acquitted by his fellow citizens to whom he had brought the gift of Lemnos and Imbros. His hatred of the Pisistrates was natural. They had put to death his father Simon, celebrated as a victor in the Olympian chariot race. It is not surprising that Miltiades, who was active as a party man, who was known to be a hot foe of the tyrants, who had probably more first-hand knowledge of the Persians than any other man at Athens, was chosen as the strategos of his tribe. He was the soul of the resistance which his country now offered to the invader. Athens had changed much since Hippias had been cast out, though a generation had not passed. Athenian character had been developed under free, democratical institutions. It has been said that if the Athenians had not been radically different from their former selves, Hippias would easily have recovered Athens. In other words, if the Persian invasion had happened twenty years sooner, the same stand would not have been made against it as Athens now made. The liberty of Greece would have succumbed. But it was no mere accident that the blow had not been aimed twenty years sooner. The Persian invasion was brought about by the same political causes which enabled Athens to withstand it. The Ionian Greeks would not have risen in revolt but for the growth of a strong sentiment against tyrannies. The same cause which overthrew the Pysistrates and created Marathonian Athens. On the other hand, if the Ionic revolt had broken out before the expulsion of Hippias, Athens would have taken no part in it and the Persian invasion of Greece might not have followed. As the story is told by our historian, one would almost think that the enemy had already landed on Attic soil before the Athenians thought themselves how they were to defend their city and their land. A fast runner was dispatched in hot haste to Lacedaemon to bear the news of the fall of Eretria and the jeopardy of Athens. The Lacedaemonians said that they would help Athens, they were bound to help a member of their league, but religious struples forbade them to come at once. They must wait till the full moon had passed. But when the full moon had passed it was too late. The whole army of the Athenians may have numbered about 9000. The commander-in-chief was Calimacus the polymark of the year and the grave duty of organising the defence rested upon him and the ten generals of the tribal regiments who formed a council of war. Fortunately for Athens Calimacus seems to have been willing to harken to the councils of Miltiades and the joint authority of the polymark and the most influential general outweighed the struples of their less adventurous colleagues. The enemy had landed near Marathon and clearly intended to advance on unwalled Athens by land and sea. The question was whether the Athenian army should await their approach and give them battle within sight and reach of the Acropolis or should more boldly go forth to find them. This was a question which it devolved upon the Athenian people itself to decide. The hour when the assembly met to deliberate on this question was the most fateful moment in the whole episode. Miltiades proposed that the army should march to Marathon and meet the Persians there. To have proposed and carried this decree is probably the greatest title of Miltiades to his immortal fame. But if the tyrants had not pulled down the city walls it would assuredly never have been carried. The plain of Marathon stretching along a sickle-shaped line of coast is girt on all other sides by the hills which drop down from Pentelicus and Parnes. In the northern part and on the extreme south the soil is marshy and the plain is cleft into two halves by the path of a torrent coming down from the hills through the northern valley in which the village of Marathon is situated. Two roads lead from Athens to Marathon. The main road turning eastward passes between the mountains of Himetus and Pentelicus and traversing the deem of Pelini skirting Mount Pentelicus and then turning due north when it reaches the coast it enters the plain of Marathon from the south. The other road which is somewhat shorter but more difficult continues northward past the deem of Sefizia and running into the hills north of Pentelicus finds two issues in the Marathonian plain. It divides into two paths which encircle the hill of Catronae. The northern path goes on to Marathon and descends into the plain from the north along the banks of the torrent. The other passing by a sanctuary of Heracles and descending the valley of Avlona is used in the plain at its southwestern corner close to the village which is now called Vranar. Calimacus took the northern road by Sefizia and encamped in the valley of Avlona not far from the shrine of Heracles. The choice of this admirable position was northern half the victory. The Athenians were themselves unassailable in the lower valley except at a great disadvantage and they commanded not only the mountain road by which they had come but also the main road and the southern gate of the plain for the Persians in attempting to reach that gate would be exposed to their flank attack. At this period Athens had accomplished strategists and the brilliant campaign against Biosha and Calces 16 years before has prepared us for the ability which our commanders now displayed in the presence of a grave apparel. The Persians had encamped on the north side of the torrent bed and their ships were riding at anchor beside them. It was to their interest to bring on a pitched battle in the plain as soon as possible. On the other hand the Athenians had everything to gain by waiting in their impregnable position. If they waited long enough they might hope for help from Sparta. Help from another quarter had already come. When they reached the sanctuary of Heracles they were joined by a band of a thousand Pleitians who in gratitude for the protection of Athens against the Theban yoke now came to help her in the hour of Jeopardy. Some days passed and then as the Greeks remained immovable the Persians would wait no longer. Having embarked a part of the army including the whole body of their cavalry they made ready to move upon Athens by land and sea. The land force must follow the main road by Pelini and was therefore prepared for battle in case the Greeks should attack them before they defiled from the plain. Another critical moment had come for the Athenians but the polymark and the generals had probably decided already what should be done when this contingency arose. That Miltiades, as before in the assembly so now in the camp, urged the boldest course we may well believe but the supreme direction belonged to the polymark and he decided to attack the enemy as they marched southward. Calimacus, whether he acted of his own wit or by the council of others showed now a skill in tactics as consummate as the skill in strategy which we have already witnessed. Outnumbered by the foe if the Athenian line had formed itself in equal depth throughout it would have swept the Persian centre into the sea but then it would have been caught in a trap between the sea and ships on one side and the Persian wings which would have closed in on the other. Accordingly Calimacus made his own centre long and shallow so that it would cover the whole Persian centre while his wings of the normal depth would be opposed to the wings of the enemy. The long Persian line crossed the bed of the torrent and advanced along the shore. A large portion was detached to mask the Greek position a precaution which was dictated by elementary principles of strategy in order either to prevent or to repel a flank attack. With these troops to cover them the rest of the host might march securely past. The Greek army had perhaps already appeared in the recess of the hills at the mouth of the valley of Avalona. Calimacus himself led the right wing. The Platian allies were posted on the extreme left. Among those who fought for their country on this day we must notice one who though he held no post of command was destined to hold a greater place in Athenian history than any of his fellow warriors Themistocles the son of Neocles who fought in the regiment of the Leontid tribe. Another of the worldwide fame Aeschylus the tragic poet also bore shield and spear and charged the Medes on this memorable day. When the Greeks drew near to the line of the enemy they were met by volleys of arrows from the eastern archers and to escape this danger they advanced at a run into close quarters. The hoplites did not fail the generals. Their valour secured the victory which masterly strategy and tactics had prepared. All fell out as had been foreseen. The Athenian centre was driven back towards the hills by the enemy's centre where the best troops including the Persians themselves were stationed. But the Athenian wings completely routed the wings of their foe then closing in and leaving the vanquish to reach their ships if they could they turned upon the victorious Persians who were following the retreating Greek centre. Here again they were utterly victorious breaking up the array of the enemy and pursuing them in confusion to the shore where all who escaped the sword were picked up by the ships. Only a portion of the Persian army had been engaged. They doubtless embarked as soon as they saw the first signs of the disruption of the force on which they had relied to cover them from the enemy. It was not a long battle. The Athenian loss was small, 192 slain and the Persian loss was reckoned at about 6400 a number whose very moderation stamps it as probably near the truth. Atheists and Artefernes had still an immense host which might retrieve the fortune of the campaign. Athens was not yet out of danger. The Persian squadrons sailed down the straits and rounded Capsunium while the victorious army leaving one regiment on the field of their triumph to guard the slain and the spoils marched back to defend Athens. They halted outside the city near the shrine in Sinassargis on the banks of the Elesis and they beheld the fleet of the enemy riding off Phalyron. But it did not put into shore and presently the whole squadron began to draw out to sea. Atheists had abandoned his enterprise. Perhaps he had sailed with insight of Athens only on the chance of finding it undefended and when he saw that the army was there shrank from another conflict with the hoplites. But a Spartan army two thousand strong cannot have been far from Athens now. It had set out on the day after the full moon and it reached Athens soon after the battle. We may guess that tidings of the approach of the Spartans if not their actual presence had something to do with the sudden departure of the invaders who though they had received an unlooked-for check had not endured an overwhelming defeat. The Spartans arrived too late for the battle. They visited the field desiring to gaze upon the Persian corpses and departed home praising the exploit of the Athenians. The scene of the battle is still marked by the mound which the Athenians raised over their own dead. Calimacus was buried there and Synagyrus, a brother of the poet Aeschylus who was said to have seized a Persian galley and held it until his arm was severed by an axe. Legend grew up quickly round the battle and there was no historian to record at the time what had actually happened so that when a generation had passed the facts were partly forgotten and partly transfigured. Three motives were at work in this transfiguration. The love of the marvellous, the vanity of the Athenians and the desire of his family to exalt the services of Miltiades. Gods and heroes fought for Athens. Ghostly warriors moved among the ranks. The panic terror of the Persians of the Greek charge was ascribed to Pam and the worship of this god was revived in a cave consecrated to him under the northwest slope of the Acropolis. Out of this grew a story of a cave which added a charming incident to the chain of Marathonian memories. The fast runner Phidipides, speeding through Arcadia on his way to seek Spartan help had been accosted by Pan himself who had asked why the Athenians neglected his worship and promised them favours in the future. But the supernatural can be easily allowed for. It was more serious the extraordinarily brilliant strategy and tactics to which the success was chiefly due should have faded out of the story and that Marathon should have been regarded as entirely a soldier's battle. It was soberly asserted and believed that those wonderful warriors had taken their enemy aback by advancing against them for a whole mile at a run. Miltiades, who was doubtless the heart and soul of the campaign was raised by the Marathonian myth to be the commander-in-chief on the day of battle and it was explained that the chief command each day devolved upon the generals in rotation. This was an arrangement which came into force a few years later when the polymark lost his importance but it supplied the legend with a ready means of setting aside Calimacus in favour of Miltiades. We need not follow the myth further. The battle of Marathon was caught up into a cloud of glory which obscured the truth of the events and historical criticism has been able to rescue only the barest outline. Calimacus in particular received less than his due overshadowed by the fame of Miltiades and it is interesting to find that there was at least a stone in Athens set up perhaps by his son which recorded the services of the polymark of the Athenians in the struggle with the Medes. A few precious words had been preserved. One mysterious incident connected with the battle must be numbered among those historical puzzles which have never been cleared up. When the Persians were already in their ships a shield was flashed as a signal to them on the summit of Pentelicus who held up the shield and what did the signal mean? The popular explanation in later days was that it invited the Persians to sail straight for Athens and the enemies of the Alcmionids said that they were the treacherous authors of the signal. Herodotus doubted the explanation but he was convinced that the flashing of the shield was a well attested fact. In the holiest place of Greece in the Sanctuary of Delphi itself have been found in recent years remains of the noblest monument of the victory of Marathon. Out of the Persian spoils the Athenians built a little Doric treasure-house of marble from their own pentelic quarries. It seems to have been a gem of architecture worthy of the severe grace of the sculptured reliefs which ran round the inside of the building and have been safely preserved under its ruins. The sculptures represent the deeds of Theseus and of Heracles and the battle of the gods and giants. The descendants of the Marathonian warriors derived perhaps their most vivid idea of the combat from a picture of it which was painted about a quarter of a century later one of the famous battle pictures in the Portico of Frescoes in the marketplace. In one scene the Athenians and Plotians advanced against the Trousard barbarians. In a second the Persians in their flight pushed each other into the marsh and in the last the Phoenician ships were portrayed and the Greeks slaying the Fomen who were striving to reach the ships. Calimacus, Miltiades, Datus and Artefernes Synagyrus seizing the prow of a ship could all be recognized and Theseus who was believed to have given phantom aid to the warriors seemed to rise out of the earth. High above the raging strife the artist, Micon was his name showed the gods and goddesses as they surveyed from the tranquility of Olympus the prowess of their Greeks smiting the profane destroyers of the holy places of Eretria. The significance of the victory of Marathon as a triumph for Athens, for Greece, for Europe cannot be gained said but we must take care not to misapprehend its meaning for Greece and for Athens herself. That significance is unmistakable even if we minimize the immediate peril which was averted. The Asiatic invader had perhaps not yet come to an ex he had come only to chastise it was enough for him if the rest of the Greeks looked on with respectful awe for while he meted out their doom to the two offending cities his work in Euboea had been purely a work of demolition he had not sought to annex territory or add a satrapy to the Persian dominion the Cyclad islands and Caristas had indeed been compelled to submit to the formal authority of the great king but it is not proved that Darius thought of reducing the western coast of the Aegean to the subject condition of Ionia thus the danger of which menaced Athens may not have been subjection to an Asiatic despot nor was she threatened by the doom of destruction and slavery which befell Eretria the Persian army had come to restore Hippias and assuredly Darius did not purpose to restore his friend to a city of smoldering temples the Athenians would be condemned to bow beneath the yoke of their own tyrant they would not become like their Eretrian fellows the bond men of a barbarian master to be delivered over to an aged despot thirsting for power and vengeance embittered by twenty years of weary exile this was the punishment of the Athenians and this was the fate which they escaped by their valour on the field of Marathon if they had lost that battle and the rule of the Pisistrates had been restored the work of twenty years ago would have had to be done again but that it would have been done again there can be hardly a doubt the defeat of the Athenians would have arrested it would not have closed their development it might even be argued that it would have saved Greece the terrible trial of the later Persian invasion if that invasion was undertaken solely to wipe out the ignominy of the repulsant Marathon probably if Datus had been victorious the subsequent attempt of Persia to conquer Greece would have assumed a different shape but the attempt would assuredly have been made the history of the world does not depend on proximate causes the clash of Greece and Persia the effort of Persia to expand at the cost of Greece were inevitable from the higher point of view it was not a question of vengeance where Darius stopped the successors of Darius would undoubtedly go on the success of Marathon in spirited Greece to withstand the later and greater invasion but the chief consequence was the effect which it brought upon the spirit of Athens herself the enormous prestige which she won by the single handed victory over the host of the great king gave her a new self-confidence and ambition history seemed to have set a splendid seal on her democracy she felt that she could trust her constitution and that she might lift her head as high as any state in Hellas the Athenians always looked back to Marathon as marking an epoch it was as if on that day the gods had said to them go on and prosper the great battle immortalized Miltiades but his latter end was not good his services at Marathon could not fail to gain for him increased influence and respect at Athens his fellow citizens granted him on his own proposal a commission to attack the island of Peros for the Perians had furnished a trireme to the armament of Datus and had thereby made war upon Athens Miltiades besieged the city of Peros for twenty-six days but without success and then returned home wounded the failure was imputed to criminal conduct of the general his enemies jealous of his exploits in the Marathonian campaign accused him of deceiving the people and he was fined fifty talents, a heavy fine it is not known what his alleged wrongdoing was but afterwards when the legend of Miltiades grew and the part which he played in the campaign of Marathon was unduly magnified it was foolishly said that he persuaded the Athenians to entrust the fleet to him promising to take them to a land of gold and that he deceived them by assailing Peros to gratify a private revenge at Peros itself in the temple of Demeter the tale was told that when the siege seemed hopeless he corrupted a priestess of the goddess named Tymo and that coming to meet her in a sanctuary to which only women were admitted he was seized with panic and in his flight leaping the fence of the precinct hurt his leg certain it is that he returned wounded to Athens however he came by the chance appeared on a couch at his trial and died soon after his condemnation End of Chapter 6 Part 7 Recording by Graham Redman Chapter 6 Parts 8, 9 and 10 of a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great Volume 1 This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Graham Redman A history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great Volume 1 by John Bagnell Bury Chapter 6 Part 8 Struggle of Athens and Aegina At this time Aegina was the strongest naval power in the Aegean Hostile feeling had long been the rule between her and Athens and soon after the fall of the Pisistrates the island had been involved in the quarrel between Athens and Thebes Legends said that the Nymphs, Aegina and Theba were sisters but it was more than sisterly sympathy which drove Aegina to declare a state of standing war a war without herald, as the Greeks called it against her continental neighbour her ships ravaged for Learon and the Attic coast It was to be expected that Aegina would side with the Persian when he sailed against her foe and would cordially desire the humiliation of Athens The Athenians had some reason to fear that she would give the invader not only her good will, but her active help Accordingly the Athenians sought the intervention of Sparta complaining that Aegina was bedising and betraying Greece out of enmity to Athens The complaint was listened to at Sparta and King Cleomenes, proceeding to Aegina seized ten hostages and deposited them with the Athenians By this means the hands of Aegina were tied She was hindered from lending help to the Persians or hampering the men of Athens in their preparations to meet the invaders This appeal of Athens to Sparta to interfere and exercise coercion in the common interests of Hellas and the implied recognition of Sparta as the leading power has been supposed to mark a climax in that feeling of deference towards her which had been growing up both within and without Greece The episode has been described as the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body with Sparta as its chief This description is an exaggeration for we must not lose sight of the fact which is too often forgotten and which Athens took pains to forget that Athens was like Aegina a member of the Peloponnesian League and the appeal to the head of the League was therefore a matter of course The prestige of Sparta had indeed been confirmed and increased by a decisive victory which she had won a few years before over her old rival Argos The battle was fought at Sipaya near the hill of Tirins According to the story the Argyve generals acted with extraordinary folly and were easily overreached by Cleomenes They listened for the commands which the Herald proclaimed to the army of their enemies and then issued those same commands to their own men Learning this Cleomenes gave secret orders that when the Herald gave the word for dinner the soldiers should pay no heed but stand prepared for battle The Argyves dined in accordance with the command of the Spartan Herald and were immediately fallen upon and destroyed by their enemies The disaster lame the power of Argos for more than twenty years The episode of the hostages of Aegina brought to a final issue the great scandal of Sparta the bitter feud of her two kings Cleomenes and Demoratus King Demoratus entered into a private compact with the Aegean Eatons to thwart the intervention of King Cleomenes Accordingly Cleomenes incited Leotichidas, the next heir of the Eorepontid line to which Demoratus belonged to challenge the legitimacy of his rival's birth A trial was held a curious story touching the birth of Demoratus was manufactured and attested and an oracle came from Delphi declaring that Demoratus was not the son of his reputed father Leotichidas consequently became king Demoratus fled to the court of Darius refuge of fallen potentates where as the friend of meadizing Aegina he found a good reception then Cleomenes and his new colleague went to Aegina and seized the hostages but the means which Cleomenes used to ruin Demoratus recoiled upon himself it was discovered that he had tampered with the Pythian priestess at Delphi to bring about the dethronement of his enemy According to the public indignation at this disclosure he fled first to Thessaly and then returned as far as Arcadia where he conspired against his country the Spartan government deemed it politic to invite him to return and he accepted their offer of pardon but his adventures had unhinged his mind he became a violent madman striking with his stick everyone who approached and his kinsfolk placed him in chains under the guard of a helot one day having forced his keeper by means of threats to give him a sword he wounded himself horribly and died such was the curiously inglorious end of King Cleomenes who if he had not been a Spartan might have been one of the greater figures in Grecian history but his ambition was cabined and his abilities hampered by the Spartan system whenever if left to himself he might have pursued an effective policy he was checked by the other king or the efferent on important occasions during his life Sparta was called upon to take action in foreign affairs and on each occasion we find that the policy of Cleomenes falls short of the mark owing to the opposition of his royal colleague even as it is he dominates in Spartan history for more than twenty years after his death the Aegean ethans sent envoys to Sparta demanding the restoration of the hostages whom he and the other king Lyotikidas had delivered over to Athens Lyotikidas had been the accomplice of Cleomenes in deposing Demeratus and was consequently at this time under the shadow of public displeasure the Spartans were ready it is said to hand him over to the Aegean ethans as a prisoner but the envoys preferred to ask that he should go with them to Athens and compass the restoration of the hostages the Athenians flatly refused the demand a gyna resorted to reprisals and a war broke out it began with the conspiracy of an Aegean-ethan citizen named Nicodromus who undertook with the help of Athens to overthrow the oligarchical government of his city his plan failed because the Athenians came a day too late the delay was due to the necessity of increasing their squadron of fifty triremes by a loan of twenty more from Corinth these ships gained a victory and landed troops on the island to besiege the town but the Aegean-ethans on their side obtained some troops from Argos and overcame the Athenians this defeat caused disorder in the fleet which was then attacked and routed by the islanders but the double repulse was not decisive and warfare was protracted between the two cities by desultory plundering raids on their respective coasts the necessity of protecting Attica from Aegean-ethan depredations the ambition perhaps of ultimately reducing a gyna to subjection or insignificance sensibly accelerated the conversion of Athens into a naval power End of Chapter 6 Part 8 Chapter 6 Part 9 Growth of the Athenian Democracy The Athenian constitution underwent several important modifications in the course of the twenty years which followed its reform by Kleisthenes there is reason for thinking that some of the changes which tradition ascribed to Kleisthenes were really not introduced by him under his scheme the power of the Archons remained very great they were usually men deliberately elected for their ability and if the council of Kleisthenes was a check upon them they also were a check upon it the natural development of things was to strengthen the council and weaken the magistrates and at length some years after Marathon this step was taken by means of a change in the mode of appointment hence forward they were appointed by lot 500 men were elected by the deems in the same way in which the council itself was elected and out of this body of 500 the nine Archons were taken by lot the result of any system of lot in the appointment to offices is to secure average honesty and exclude more than average ability hence forward the chances against any prominent statesman holding the office of chief Archon are 500 to 1 it is obvious that the political importance of the chief magistracy now disappears it is also obvious that a polymark appointed by lot could no longer hold the post of commander in chief that post must pass to those who were deliberately picked out as competent to hold it the powers of the polymark were therefore vested not in a new officer but in the body of the ten strategi who were hitherto elected each by his own tribe either now or not many years later a reform was introduced by which the whole people elected the generals but they endeavored so far as possible to choose one from each tribe and we know no instance in which the same tribe was represented by more than two the evil of a divided authority was at first obviated by giving each strategos supreme command for a day an experiment which to our modern notion seems almost childish routine business in time of peace might be transacted on such a system but a daily change of command in time of war was naturally doomed to failure there is no reason to suppose that it ever became the practice at the election of the generals it was assigned to one of the ten a position of supreme authority over all his colleagues during their whole term of office that would have been a reinstitution of the polymark in another form the danger of a divided command was avoided by a simpler expedient whenever the people voted a military or naval expedition they decreed which of the generals should conduct it and assigned a position of leadership or presidency to one of those whom they chose but this superior command was limited to the conduct of the particular expedition and the general to whom it was assigned exercised it only over those of his colleagues who were specially associated with him we have no record touching the attitude of Kleisthenes to the venerable council of the Areopagus nor do we hear anything about that body for a generation after the fall of the Pisistrates but a new institution was originated during this period which weakened the position of the Areopagus by depriving it of its most important political function that of guarding the constitution and protecting the state against the danger of a tyranny the institution of ostracism is traditionally ascribed to Kleisthenes but it was not made use of till two years after the battle of Marathon the ordinance of the ostracismus was that in the sixth Brittany of each civil year the question should be laid before the assembly of the people whether they willed that an ostracism should be held or not if they voted in the affirmative then an extraordinary assembly was summoned in the marketplace in the eighth Brittany the citizens were grouped in tribes and each citizen placed in an urn a piece of potsherd, ostracon inscribed with the name of the person whom he desired to be ostracised the voting was not valid unless six thousand votes at least were given and whoever had most ostraca against him was condemned to leave Attica within ten days and not set foot in it again for ten years he was allowed however to retain his property and remained an Athenian citizen by this institution the duty of guarding against the dangerous ambitions of influential citizens was transferred from the paternal council of the Areopagus to the sovereign people itself footnote it is important to note that the law of ostracism did not leave it to the discretion of the council of five hundred whether the question should be proposed to the assembly or not but ordained that it should be proposed as a matter of course at a fixed time every year this was an additional safeguard to the people it has been suggested that ostracism was intended to replace Solon's law against neutrality and was itself replaced by the graphy paranormal end of footnote if this clumsy and it must be owned oppressive institution was established by Kleisthenes it would follow that for about fifteen years the assembly declined every year to make use of it though it is stated that the chief object of Kleisthenes was to banish a relation of the Pisistratids Hipparchus the son of Carmas and in fact this Hipparchus was ultimately banished by the first ostracism that was ever practiced and in the following year Megacles who though an alchemyonid had espoused the cause of the Pisistratid faction suffered the same fate in these acts as well as in the constitutional reform affecting the archonship we must see the work of the progressive democratic statesmen of whom the three most prominent were Zanthippus, Aristides and Themistocles these leaders however had separate policies and separate parties and the people were persuaded to ostracize Zanthippus and two years later Aristides it is clear that in these cases there was no fear or danger of a tyranny but that ostracism was used as a convenient engine for removing the opposition of a statesman who hampered the adoption of a popular measure we cannot guess on what questions Zanthippus stood in the way of Aristides or Themistocles but it is possible that the ostracism of Aristides was connected with the bold naval policy which it was the great merit of Themistocles to have originated and carried through an excellent anecdote is told of the ostracism of Aristides the just as he was called on the day of the voting an illiterate citizen chanced to be close to Aristides who was unknown to him by sight and requested him to write down the name Aristides on the Ostracon why said Aristides doing as he was asked do you wish to ostracize him because said the fellow I am tired of hearing him called the just end of chapter 6 part 9 chapter 6 part 10 Athens to be a sea power but the greatest statesman of this critical period in the history of Athens greater than either of his two rivals Zanthippus and Aristides greater than the hero of Marathon himself was Themistocles the son of Neocles it may be said that he contributed more than any other single man to the making of Athens into a great state the preeminent importance of his statesmanship was due in the first place to his insight in discerning the potentialities of his city and in grasping her situation before anyone else had grasped it and then to his energy in initiating and his adroitness and perseverance in following a policy which raised his city and could alone have raised her to the position which she attained before his death in the sixth century the Athenians were a considerable naval power as Greek naval powers then went but the fleet was regarded as subsidiary to the army the idea of Themistocles was to sacrifice the army to the navy and make Athens a sea state the strongest sea state in Greece the carrying out of this policy in the face of skepticism and opposition was the great achievement of Themistocles he began the work when he was archon and thus already a man of some prominence two or three years before the battle of Marathon by carrying a measure through the assembly for the fortification of the peninsula of Pyreas hitherto the wide exposed strand of Falyron was the harbour where the Athenians kept their triremes hauled up on the beach unprotected against the surprise of an enemy but with insight of the acropolis at that time after the quelling of the Ionic revolt Persian warships were cruising about the Aegean and the possibility of an attack on Falyron seems to have opened the eyes of the Athenians to the need of reforming their naval establishment the hostility of Aegina was a nearer and more pressing motive the Athenians had not to seek far for a suitable port it seems strange that they had not before made use of the Pyreas the large harbour on the west side of the peninsula of Manichaea which could be supplemented by the two smaller harbours on the east side Manichaea and Zia but the Pyreas was somewhat farther from the city and was not within sight of the acropolis like Falyron so long therefore as there was no fortified harbour Falyron was safer the plan of Themistocles was to fortify the whole circuit of the peninsula by a wall and prepare docks in the three harbours for the reception of the warships the work was begun but it was interrupted by the Persian invasion and by the party's struggles after Marathon then the war with the Aegina broke out and this combined with the fear of another Persian invasion helped Themistocles to carry to completion another part of his great scheme the increase of the fleet a rich bed of silver had been recently discovered at Maronia in the old mining district of Lorion and had suddenly brought into the public treasury a large sum perhaps a hundred talents it was proposed to distribute this among the citizens but Themistocles persuaded the assembly to apply it to the purpose of building new ships special contributions for the same object must have been made soon afterwards more ships were built and two years later we find Athens with nearly 200 triremes at her command a navy which could be compared with those of Syracuse and Corsaira the completion of the Piraeus wall was not attempted at this period but was accomplished as we shall see after the final repulse of the Persians from the shores of Greece End of Chapter 6 Part 10 Recording by Graham Redman Chapter 7 Parts 1, 2 and 3 of a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1 this is the LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org a history of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1 by John Bagnale Burry Chapter 7 Parts 1, 2 and 3 Chapter 7 The Perils of Greece the Persian and Punic invasions we have now reached the threshold of the second and the greater Persian invasion the second and the greater triumph of Hellas the significance of this passage in their history was not lost upon the Greeks their defense of Europe against the barbarians of Asia the discomforture of a mighty oriental despot by a league of their free states the defeat of a vast army and a large fleet by their far smaller forces these surprises made an enduring impression upon the Greek mind and were shaped by Greek imagination into a wonderful dramatic story at a time when the critical instinct had not yet developed no tale is more delightful than this tale as Herodotus tells it when we take it simply as a tale and none illustrates better the story-shaping genius of the Greeks the historical criticism of it is another matter we have to seek to extract what actually happened out of the bewodering secession of daring exaggerations, naive anecdotes fictitious motives, oracles not to speak of miracles in most of which the reflected light of later events is visibly altering the truth while much is colored by the prejudices and the leanings of the Athenians from whom Herodotus seems to have derived a great part of his record Section 1 The Preparations in March of Xerxes The chief event in Persia during the ten years which elapsed between the first and second invasions of Greece was the death of King Darius after the unexpected repulse of his forces at Marathon he had determined to repeat the experiment and begun to make some preparations four years passed and then a revolt broke out in the province of Egypt which demanded immediate attention but its suppression was delayed in consequence of the king's death and was only accomplished under Xerxes, son of Atosa, who had succeeded to the throne the question then arose whether the design of an expedition against Greece to avenge those who fell at Marathon and to redeem the fame of Persian arms should be carried out it is related that Xerxes was himself undecided but was over persuaded by the impetuous councils of his cousin Mardonius on the other hand his uncle Artabanus appears in the pages of Herodotus as the prudent and experienced advisor who weighs all the obstacles and foresees failure Xerxes swayed hither and thither between these opposing councils is finally determined to yield to the wishes of Mardonius by the prempatory command of a dream which overcomes even the scruples of Artabanus in this manner does Herodotus pretend to take us behind the curtain of the council chamber at Susa representing in the light of later events the advice of Mardonius as youthful and foolish although that advice merely amounted to the execution of the design which according to Herodotus himself the old and experienced Darius had initiated and prepared nevertheless the contrast of Mardonius and Artabanus and the dreams divinely sent with evil purpose are though not historical a most effective dramatic introduction into the episode of the invasion further pressure was brought to bear on the king by Greeks who visited his court envoys from the allured princes of Thessaly and members of the Piscistrated family who brought with them the seer Onomachritis to impress Xerxes by favorable oracles it was clear that the expedition must consist of a joint attack by sea and land preparations were begun by the difficult enterprise of digging a canal about a mile and a half long across the itsthmus of Mount Athos on the occasion of the expedition of Mardonius to Thrace and Macedonia it will be remembered that a large part of the fleet had been wrecked in rounding the dangerous headland but wasn't necessary for the fleet to venture on this occasion within the proximity of Cape Athos mine did not sail straight across the Aegean to Greece on these grounds Herodotus suggested that the cutting of Athos was undertaken for display rather than from necessity this is an unsound criticism it was a fundamental principle of Persian strategy in these expeditions that the army and navy should cooperate and never lose touch the Thracean expedition of Darius the Macedonian expedition of Mardonius the Greek expedition of Xerxes illustrate this principle the canal of Athos was intended to ensure that the ships should safely accompany the land forces along the coast of Thrace it seems to be established that the work was completed and used though later writers threw doubts on the velification of Athos when it was finished the workmen proceeded to lay a bridge over the strimen for the passage of the army and preparations were made all along the line of root for the feeding of a vast host Xerxes came down from Susa to Sardis in the autumn he met the oriental contingents of his army at Critella in Cappadocia at Kainai it is recorded the Epithius the richest man in the empire entertained at his own cost the king and the whole army his wealth amounted to four million gold directs all but seven thousand he kept Xerxes bestowed upon him seven thousand to make up for the spent sum Xerxes spent the winter at Sardis Pithius was so pleased with the king's graciousness that when the army was about to start for the Helispont in the following spring he ventured to proffer the request that the eldest of his five sons who were serving in the army might be permitted to remain behind great was the king's wrath at what he regarded as the insolent demand of a slave the body of the eldest son was cut in two one half was placed at each side of the gate of Sardis through which the army was about to march forth the antidote illustrates the severity with which military service was enforced it is impossible to suppose that the whole army wintered in Sardis with the king it is probable that the place of mustering was at the Helispont across which two bridges had been constructed in the neighborhood of Sestos and Abidos by Phoenician and Egyptian engineers but the strength of these bridges was not sufficient and a tempest destroyed them the wrath of Xerxes at this catastrophe was violent he not only beheaded the engineers but commanded that three hundred lashes should be inflicted on the waters of the Helispont those who carried out this strange order addressed the sea as they scorched it in these words oh bitter water our lord lays this punishment upon thee for having done him wrong who never did wrong to thee King Xerxes will cross thee whether thou wilt or not just is it that no man sacrifices to thee for thou art a treacherous and briny river these words are blamed by Herodotus as un-Greek and impious the reconstruction of the bridges was trusted to new engineers two lines of ships were moored across the strait by anchors at Prow and Stern the line nearer to the propontus consisted of three hundred and sixty the other of three hundred and fourteen triremes and pentatacters mixed over each of these lines of ships six huge cables two of flax four of propyrus were stretched and in three places rows were left between the ships and under the cables were small paddling craft to pass planks were laid across the cables and kept in their places by a second tier of cables above on this foundation a road was made with wood and earth on each side palisades were set high enough to prevent the animals which passed over from seeing the water on a marble throne erected on the shore Xerxes is said to have witnessed the passage of his army which began at the first moment of sunrise the troops crossed under the lash and the crossing was accomplished in two days but when the size of the Persian host was magnified in later years to the impossible figure of five millions the story was that the crossing of the helispont required seven days and seven nights the favorite number of fiction without a moment's pause the army was joined by the fleet at Doriscus in Thrace fleet and army were henceforth to act together in the plane of Doriscus Xerxes were viewed and numbered his forces what nation of Asia asks Herodotus did not Xerxes lead against Helis he enumerates 46 peoples with the picturesque description of their array the Persians themselves who were under the command of Otanes wore coats of mail and trousers they had wicker shields large bows and short spears the Medes, Sissians and Hurcanians were retired in the same way then there were the Assyrians with brazen helmets linen curasses, clubs, lances and short swords Bactrians with cane bows Trousered Sakai with pointed hats and carrying axes Indians clad in cotton Caspians in goat skin Serangians wearing dyed garments and high boots Ethiopians clad in lion skins or leopard skins and armed with arrows whose stone points transport us to a primitive age Sagartians with dagger and lasso Thracians with fox skin caps Colchians with cow skin shields the fleet was furnished by the Phoenicians Egyptians, Cypriots, Cilicians Pamphylians, Lichians, Chaurians and Subject Greeks it is said to have consisted of 1207 warships with 3000 smaller vessels a curious story was told of the numbering of the army 10,000 men were packed together in a close space a line was drawn round them and a wall built all the infantry passed successively into this enclosure it was filled 170 times so that the whole army of fighting men was 1,700,000 the number of the cavalry was 80,000 and there were some additional troops not included adding to these the crews of the ships counting 200 each larger and 80 to each smaller vessel the total was obtained of 2,317,000 men this enormous number was further increased by fresh contingents which joined during the march through Thrace and Macedonia besides the fighting men were a vast number of servants, settlers and camp followers whom Herodotus considered to be quite as numerous as the soldiers the whole host would consequently have reached upwards of 5,000,000 not including eunuchs and concubines it is needless to say that these numbers are wholly fabulous the facts which Herodotus states as to the number of the fighting men are false and the principle of his conjecture that the total number of the host was double that of the fighting men is also fallacious the picked body of 10,000 troops called the immortals had the privilege of traveling comfortably with their wives and baggage but this was an exceptional privilege and it cannot be supposed that there is reason for supposing that the land forces may have amounted to 300,000, hardly more a larger force than that would have been unmanageable in a small mountainous country and the difficulties of provisioning even this were formidable the number of the fleet must also be considerably reduced perhaps to 800 triremes from Doriscus Xerxes proceeded to Therma with his fabulous host drinking rivers dry in their march at the crossing of the Strymon near the place called the Nine Roads he sacrificed nine native youths and virgins at Therma he was rejoined by his fleet which had been separated from him while it sailed around Sithonia and Palin most of the incidents which Herodotus recounts concerning this march of Xerxes are pleasing stories designed to illustrate the historians general view as to the great struggle between the Greek and barbarian the cruelty of Xerxes to Pythias his barbarity and impiety in scourging the Hellespot served to characterize the barbarian and the despot the enormity of the host which rolled over the straits the deluge Europe enhances the danger and the glory of Helles and to signify by a solemn portent the destined discomforture of the Persian host it is stated that as Xerxes was setting forth from Sardis this eclipse actually happened two years later the tradition which Herodotus follows transposed its date to an impressive and significant occasion section two preparations of Greece in the meantime Greece was aware of the preparations of the great king for her enslavement and was making her counter preparations the digging at Athos had warned her by times and the coming down of the king to Sardis showed that the danger was imminent Xerxes is said to have the dispatched from Sardis heralds to all the Greek states except Athens and Sparta to demand earth and water these two cities now joined hands to resist the invasion they were naturally marked out as the leaders of Greece in Greece's greatest crisis Sparta by virtue of that generally acknowledged headship which we have seen Athens by the prestige which she had won in resisting the meat of Marathon finally convened an Hellenic Congress at the Isthmus to consult on the measures to be taken for common resistance to the threatened invasion we have already observed certain indications of the growth of a pan-Hellenic feeling but this is the first instance of anything that can be described as deliberate pan-Hellenic policy it is an attempt to combine all the scattered cities of the Greek world to withstand the power of Persia a new fact in greekian history opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage a large number of cities sent delegates to the congress which was called the Synedrian of Pruballoi or Congress of Representatives it met at the Isthmus marked out by its central position under the presidency of Sparta there the states which were represented 31 in number bound themselves together in a formal confederation by taking a solemn oath that they would tie those who uncompelled submitted to the barbarian for the benefit of the Delphic god this was a way of vowing that they would utterly destroy such traders a great many states the Thessalians most of the Boetian states besides the smaller peoples of northern Greece Locrians, Malians, Echeans Delofians and others took no part in this congress they were in action by no means meant that they had made up their minds to midais they were only waiting to see how things would turn out and considering their geographical position their policy might be justified by the natural instinct of self-preservation these northern states would be the first invaded by the Persian and it was hopeless for them to think of them alone unless they could absolutely rely on Sparta and her confederates to support them in defending the northern frontier of Thessaly nothing would be left for them but to submit and with this prospect it would have been imprudent for them to compromise themselves by openly joining the confederacy events prove that if they had seriously relied on that confederacy throwing all of its strength into the defense of northern Greece they would have been cruelly deceived as we shall see they were ready to resist so long as there were hopes of support from the stronger states in some cases there were parties or classes who were favorable to the persian cause for example the oligarchs of Thebes and the alleridae of Thessaly one of the great hindrances of joint action was the existence of domestic disputes there were feuds of old standing between Thessaly and Focus Argos and Lacodemon Athens and Aegina were their first attempt to reconcile such feuds and Athens and Aegina laid aside their enmity to fight together for greece and freedom another important question concerned the command of the confederate forces the claim of Sparta to the leadership of the army was at once admitted the question as to the fleet was not so clear Sparta was not a naval power and Athens which would furnish more ships than any other state had a fair claim but the other cities were jealous of Athens they declared that they would submit only to a spartan leader the Athenian representatives when they saw the feeling of the allies at once yielded the point the congress made some other provisions while spies were sent to observe the preparations of Xerxes and Asia Minor envoys were sent forth to various greek states to enlist new confederates to win over Argos who had sent no delegates to the itthmus and to obtain promises of assistance to Cyra and Syracuse none of these embassies led to anything Galon the great tyrant of Syracuse was himself absorbed by the prospect of an attack of the Carthaginians and even if he had wished could have sent no aid to the mother country when the military preparations for the defense of greece were made and the generals appointed the congress of representatives probably met again in spring and then consigned the conduct of the affairs to the military congresses and the commanders who used to meet together and decide on each movement under the presidency of the Spartan leaders King Leonidas was the leader of the confederate army and Eurobiotis, a Spartan who did not belong to either of the royal families was commander of the confederate fleet the greeks had abundance of time for their preparations for strengthening their defenses and building new ships Athens probably threw herself with more energy into the work than any other city one wise measure shows that she had risen to a full apprehension of the truth that a solemn hour in her history had arrived she recalled those distinguished citizens whom the vote of ostracism had driven into banishment during the last ten years Aristides and Xanthopis returned home their feuds with Themistocles were buried in the presence of the great danger and the city seems to have shown its confidence in their patriotism by choosing them as generals will each play his part in the coming struggle section 3 battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium about the time when Xerxes reached the Helispont the Thessalians sent a message to the confederacy suggesting that the passive Tempe should be defended against the invading army accordingly 10,000 hoplites were sent but when they arrived at the spot they found that there were other passes from Macedonia into Thessaly by which the Persians would be more likely to come there were passes of Volestana and Petra which descended into the valley of the river to Toresius and it was by one of those that Xerxes actually marched 10,000 hoplites were not enough to defend the three passes and it seemed useless and dangerous to occupy this advanced post hence the defense of Tempe was abandoned and the troops left Thessaly this desertion necessarily drove all the northern Greeks between Tempe and Thermopylae to signify their submission to Xerxes by the offering of earth and water the next feasible point of defense was Thermopylae a narrow pass between the sea and mountain separating Thracis from Locris it was the gate to all eastern Greece south of Mount Oeta at the eastern and at the western end of the pass in those days was extremely narrow and in the center the Fokians had constructed a wall as a barrier against the Salian incursions near the western end was Enthela the meeting place of the Amphitheatic Council while on the Locrian side one emerged from the defile near the village of Alpenoi the retreat of the sea and consequent enlargement of the Malian Plain have so altered the appearance of this memorable pass that it is hard to recognize its ancient description the hot sulfur springs from which it derived its name and the sheer mountain are the two prominent features it was possible for an active band of men if they were debarred from proceeding by Thermopylae to take a rough and steep way over the mountains and so reached the Locrian road at a point east of Alpenoi it was therefore needful for a general who undertook the defense of Thermopylae to secure this path lest the detachment should be sent round to surprise him in the rear the Greeks determined to defend Thermopylae and Leonidas marched thither at the head of his army including 4,000 from Peloponnesus 1,000 Fokians 400 Thebans 700 Thespians and Locrians in full force it is possible that there may have been some other Boetians who were not mentioned of the Peloponnesians more than half were Arcadians Mycenae, free at this moment from Argyve control sent 80 men there were Corinthians and Fissalians 1,000 Lacanians and 300 Spartans so far as the Peloponnesians were concerned this was only a small portion of their forces and we may suspect that but for Athens they would have abandoned northern Greece entirely and concentrated themselves at once on the defense of the Isthmus but they were dependent on Athens because her fleet was so strong and they were therefore obliged to consider her interests to surrender Thermopylae and retire to the Isthmus meant the surrender of Attica but the hearts of the Spartans were really set on the defense of the Isthmus and not on the protection of the northern states their policy was narrow and Peloponnesian they attempted to cover the selfish and short-sighted policy by the plea that they were hindered from marching forth in full force by the celebration of the Carnian Festival and that the Peloponnesians were delayed by the Olympic Games they alleged that the soldiers of Leonidas were only in advance guard the rest would soon follow the movement of the Confederate fleets as the land arm and the sea arm of the Persian forces always operated together it was necessary that while the Greek hoplites held the pass under Mount Oeta the Greek tyremes should oppose the Persian fleet in the straits between Yobia and the mainland the Persians would naturally attempt to sail between Yobia and Magnesia into the Malian Gulf and then accompanying the advance of the army along the western shore of the Long Island to the Euripus the object of the Greeks was to prevent this and support the garrison of Thermopylae by controlling the Malian Gulf the Greek fleet which numbered 324 triremes and nine Penteconters the Athenians contributing 200 chose its station near Artemisium on the north coast of Yubia three ships were sent forward to Reconter on the Thermaea Gulf and two of them were destroyed by the Persians this was the first collusion in the war the incident is said to have so depressed the Greeks that the whole squadron sailed back to the Euripus but this is highly unlikely for it was bound to remain at the mouth of the Malian Gulf so long as Leonidas held Thermopylae it was however necessary that the Euripus should be guarded for there was the possibility that the Persians might send round a detachment by the south of the Yuboe and so cut off the retreat as 53 Athenian ships were absent during the first conflicts at Artemisium it may be supposed that they were deputed to the service of keeping watch at the Euripus in the month of July the Persian army arrived at Thermopylae and the Persian navy at the Magnesian coast between Castenaea and Cape Cepius their ships were so many that they cannot all be moored at the shore and they had to range themselves in eight lines parallel to the coast while they were in this unsafe position and they rose and destroyed at the lowest computation 400 ships thus the gods intervene to lessen the inequality between the Persian and Greek forces encouraged by this disaster the Greek fleet returned to its station at Artemisium in this account of Herodotus the main fact is that the Persians suffered serious losses by a storm off the Magnesian coast but the loss is exaggerated in proportion to the exaggeration of the original size of the fleet and the loss of the Greeks are probably misrepresented the story goes on that cowed by the numerical superiority of the Persians even after their losses the Greek commanders wished to retreat again and were restrained from doing so by Themistocles the Euboians were naturally anxious that the fleet should remain where it was as a protection to themselves and to secure this they gave Themistocles 30 talents to their colleagues and kept the rest the facts of this case throw doubt on this story which was probably suggested by what happened some weeks later at Salamis for Uribeatus and the Peloponnesians were bound to stay at Artemisium so long as the land army was at Thermopylae after the storm the Persians took up their station at Epheti they determined to cut off the Greek retreat and secretly send a squadron of 200 vessels to sail around Euboea the news of this movement was brought to the Greek camp by Skylius of Scioni the most remarkable diver of his time who plunged into the sea at Epheti and did not emerge above water until he reached Artemisium at a distance of 10 miles Herodotus indeed hesitates to accept this tale and records his private belief that Skylius arrived at Artemisium in a boat the Greeks decided that when midnight had passed they would sail to meet the ships which were sailing to the Euripus in the afternoon they attacked the enemy just to see how they fought and they succeeded in capturing 30 Persian ships the night was very stormy the gods had again intervened to aid Greece the 200 ships having rounded the southern Cape of Euboea were wrecked off the dangerous coast known as the Hallows immediately afterwards the 53 Attic ships which had not yet appeared at Artemisium arrived there and at the same time came news of the disaster and the Greeks consequently gave up the intention of retreating there was some further fighting with loss on both sides but no decisive advantage according to the Greek account but we may suspect that the Persians had the best of it meanwhile Leonidas had taken up his post at Thermopylae and the Fokians who knew the ground had undertaken the defense of the byroad over the mountains the old Fokian wall in the center of the pass was repaired and such a large army is that which now encamped in the Malian Plain to carry the narrow way of Thermopylae against 6000 determined men for four days Xerxes waited expecting that they would retreat awed by the vision of his mighty host on the fifth he attacked and in the engagements which took place at the west end of the pass the Hellenic spearmen affirmed their distinct superiority to the Asiatic archers on the following day the result was the same the immortals themselves made no impression on the defenders Herodotus says that Xerxes sprang thrice from his throne in agony for his army it was then decided to send round the immortals hardly the whole 10,000 under their commander Hadarnes by the mountain road to take the Greeks in the rear a Malian Greek named Epialtes guided the band and so won the name of having betrayed Greece at dawn they reached the highest point in the path the Fokians were posted the Fokians fled to the heights and the Persians went on paying no attention to them meanwhile deserters inform Leoninus of the Persian strategy he hastily called a council of war the exact plan of action which was decided on is unknown we only know that the Spartans Thebians and Thespians remained in the past while the rest of the Greeks retired southward it was afterwards represented that they had deserted the defense of the position and returned home but in that case it was foolish if splendid of Leonidus to hold the pass between foes on both sides the rational courses were either for the whole garrison to abandon the pass or else just as the Persians aimed at enclosing the Greeks so enclosed the band of Hadarnes we may suspect that the second plan was actually adopted while part of the force including Leonidus and the Spartans remained in the pass the rest we may suppose placed themselves at some distance east of the point where the mountain path descended to the road so was the take Hadarnes in the rear of the 1400 who stood in the pass some had to guard the eastern entrance against Hadarnes others the western against the main army Leonidus and his 300 undertook the western side but they are no longer content with merely repelling assaults they now rushed out upon their enemy their charge was effective but Leonidus himself was slain and a Homeric battle raged over his body two brothers of Xerxes fell many Persians were driven into the sea but at length the defenders were forced back behind the wall they drew together on a hillock where they made a last stand to be surrounded and slain by overwhelming numbers for the immortals having in the meantime routed the Greeks in their rear had now forced their way into the pass it was said that 4000 Greeks fell the valiant defense of Thermopylae made a deep division upon Greece and increased the fame of the Spartans for bravery it was represented as a forlorn defense Leonidus and his band devoting themselves to certain death and clinging to their posts from that sense of military duty which was inculcated by the Spartan system from early youth the brave Thespians would not desert the Spartans while the Thebians were represented as detained by Leonidus against their will because they were suspected of secret medism the malicious tale adds that having taken only a perfunctory part in the defense the Thebians advanced to the enemy and asked for quarter declaring that they were friends of the great king and had come to Thermopylae against their will their lives were spared but all including the commander were forced to suffer the shame of being branded as bad slaves it is certain that this contrast between the Thespians and Thebians was invented in the light of the subsequent medism of Thebes nor is it clear that the defense of Thermopylae although eminently heroic was until the very end desperate if as we suspected an effort was made to meet the immortals then if that effort had been more effectual it might have been possible to hold the pass and in that case a naval battle must have decided whether the Persians or the Greeks would be forced to retreat a column was afterwards erected at Sparta with the names of Leonidus and his 300 among them was to be read the name of Diaconis reputed as the author of the famous Moe which displayed the light hardness of a Spartan soldier in the hour of peril when it was observed to him that the Persian host was so enormous that their arrows hid the sun he replied, so much the better we shall fight in the shade the news of Thermopylae speedily reached the fleet at Artemisium the Greeks forthwith weighed acre and sailed through the Euripus to the shores of Attica end of chapter 7 parts 1 through 3