 Throughout its history, NATO's development has been influenced by the actions of the great or superpowers. During the Cold War, NATO was the main institutional vehicle by which the US and its allies faced down the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War saw NATO repurpose itself. The alliance absorbed a reunified Germany in 1990 and the following year adopted a new strategic concept, its first since 1968, which foresaw a relationship of partnership with the former communist state, including Russia, the Soviet Union's continuing state. That repurposing occurred against a backdrop of two other significant international developments, the consolidation of communist rule in China and the emergence of the European Union. In this light, the international politics of the post-Code War period might be characterized as having four centers of power, the United States, Russia, China and the EU. All are relevant to NATO. The United States remains the world's foremost military power and NATO's most important member. The US is crucial to the defense of Europe and NATO operations out of area in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya and Afghanistan have all relied on American forces. Politically too, the US is vital. NATO would not have survived the end of the Cold War were it not for American leadership. That leadership has also been evident in relations with Russia. NATO's policy of enlargement, which has seen the alliance nearly double its membership since the late 1990s and decisions on Allied defense spending. The last of these however illustrates some of the tensions that have occurred in the transatlantic relationship. The US under successive presidents has called upon its European allies and Canada to spend more on defense. The defense investment pledge agreed at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 committed all allies to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense by 2024. President Donald Trump has been outspoken in reminding the allies of the importance of meeting that target. NATO's relations with Russia were generally cordial in the first decade after the Cold War. Then Russian President Boris Yeltsin even entertained the idea of Russia joining the alliance. NATO's dual track approach with Russia involves on the one hand a firm posture of defense and deterrence and on the other hand a continued openness to dialogue with Russia as an important neighbor to the alliance and member of the international community. NATO operates something known as the NATO-Russia Council underpinned by something called the NATO-Russia Founding Act. While we continue to support dialogue between NATO and Russia, we also believe that Russia has not approached this dialogue in good faith over several years and therefore the dialogue with Russia has not been as effective as we would have liked. NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 however proved a turning point. Moscow objected to the intervention even though NATO had compelling reasons to act in the face of Serbia's attacks on its Kosovo population. In an attempt to restore relations, NATO and Russia agreed in 2002 to the creation of a NATO-Russia Council. Relations soured again however in 2008 following Russia's war with its neighbor Georgia. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to a more significant break. NATO in response launched the Readiness Action Plan designed to support its eastern members. Today NATO maintains an enhanced forward presence in Poland and the Baltic States along with a tailored forward presence in the Black Sea region. Further controversies have surrounded Russia's role in Syria. NATO's claim that Russia has violated the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty and Moscow's opposition to Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO. While the current NATO-Russia standoff is not as deep-seated as that with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the relationship is far from healthy. Both sides view the other as a presumed antagonist, political dialogue is at a low ebb and military and civilian cooperation suspended in 2014 is still frozen. We still face security challenges here in Europe of the classic kind, countries in particular Russia that would potentially threaten our security and harm us. NATO is there to make sure that we can deal with that and defend and deter against it. NATO describes the EU as an essential and strategic partner. The joint declaration of July 2018 is the most recent expression of that partnership. NATO and the European Union cooperate in several areas including the development of defence capabilities, countering hybrid threats, cyber security, the coordination of exercises, capacity building in partner states, coordination of missions including operations at sea and promoting the woman, peace and security agenda. The scale and effectiveness of cooperation has increased in recent years, prompted in part by shared concerns over Russia and instability in North Africa and the Middle East. That said, the relationship has not always been plain sailing. The US and Turkey are members of NATO but not the EU and this situation has led to certain difficulties. The US has at times been skeptical of the EU security and defence role, fearful that it might duplicate NATO's functions. Differences between Turkey and non-NATO EU member Cyprus, meanwhile, have been a constraint on cooperation. And with Brexit, the UK will join the ranks of important non-EU NATO allies, a development to watch. These challenges aside, the NATO-EU relationship still remains a very productive one. China has been almost entirely absent from NATO's public policy positions. None of NATO's summit declarations mention the country and China is not designated as a NATO partner. Distance in this case is not an explanation. NATO after all has partner relations with Japan, South Korea and Mongolia. The underdevelopment of relations reflects in part awareness on the part of Beijing, but it may also be because the allies have tended to see issues that relate to China, trade, intellectual property, infrastructural investment, climate change and so on, as best aired at or with the UN, the World Trade Organization, the G20 and the EU but not NATO. That is a view that has recently started to shift. China's rise as a military as well as an economic power mean that Beijing and not Moscow is seen in the US as America's main strategic rival. Similarly, the NATO Secretary General has spoken of China's rise as having implications for the global rules-based order and our security. This does not mean that NATO is about to execute a reorientation toward the Asia Pacific. NATO's priority remains Russia and the arc of instability to its south. It does mean, however, that NATO is likely to be talking more about China and even with China in the near future.