 or in Japan, whatever, but I've written it a couple of times. But it's too good. Well, welcome back. Welcome back to the second panel of our session today. Thank you for joining us. Again, I'm Jim Schoaf, I'm a senior fellow here in the Asia program at Carnegie. And it's my pleasure to be the moderator for the second session, very appreciative of our first panel and General Ayers' contributions. Our first panel was able to talk about and got to the issue of what needs to be done or what can be done or what are some of the options of what has to happen going forward. I think if I'm gonna characterize our session now, it's really about how do we make that happen? And what are some of the trade-offs in terms of the different approaches we could take to help make that happen? The art of diplomacy, as it were, but also importantly as a theme for today's program is looking at this and doing this in an alliance context. In a private session we had yesterday, one of the comments we broke it up into assessments and goals and priorities, and then looking at trade-offs. And one member emphasized the goal of that a key goal at the end of this process should be the remainingly strong alliance relations because of the value of that relationship. And so keeping that in mind as we think about these different trade-offs I think is very important and that's with both Japan and with South Korea for the United States. So to join us here for this panel, we're very pleased to have Ambassador Sasai, Kenichiro Sasai who is now no longer the ambassador to Washington, no longer the Vice Foreign Minister or Director General of Asian Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he was thoroughly involved in the six-party talks and a leader representative for Japan in previous negotiations with North Korea. He is now the President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo. Congratulations on your new assignment and welcome back in a more kind of relaxed and less demanding role here, hopefully. Thank you for having me. Thank you. And we're also welcoming back to Washington on my left, Susan Thornton, who was until very recently the Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asia State Department and I was just joking with a friend we were talking about that you're no longer at main state, you're now in main state because she's spending a lot of time in the state of Maine where she keeps tabs on what's going on here in Washington from afar, but she has a lot of experience. In Asia, she joined the State Department in 91 and spent the last 20 years working on U.S. policy in Eurasia and in Asia, former Soviet Union and with a particular emphasis in China. She was DCM in Turkmenistan and posted in Beijing and Chengdu and elsewhere. We also have, on my far left, Chungmin Lee, who's a senior fellow here at the Carnegie Endowment in the Asia program. He runs our Inside Korea program, relatively new program. He had been a professor for many years at Yonsei University in Seoul and from 2013 to 2016. He served as Ambassador for National Security Affairs for South Korea, a dear friend and we're very lucky to have him here in Washington. And then also, we're bringing a lot of Carnegie firepower here today. Suzanne DiMaggio, on my far right, is a senior fellow here at Carnegie now where she focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and Asia. She's famous and has, for leading a series of track two dialogues and various dialogues with both Iran and North Korea coming at very difficult and challenging diplomatic issues in a, through a collective dialogue and we're really pleased that Suzanne is now part of the team joining us from New America and she had also previously worked at the Asia Society. There's an empty chair and it's there for a reason because when we get to the Q and A portion of our dialogue, we're gonna invite General Ayer to come back up because some of the things I think we're going to talk about will get to the issue of trade-offs and what do we give or what are we prepared to give North Korea to build confidence, to build trust and stability as was discussed earlier and that could have very direct bearings on the UN command and other issues so we wanna bring that voice into it. But I'm gonna start before we get into what we're willing to give, I'd like to start a little bit with what do we want to get from North Korea in this process and I'll start with our senior diplomats here but I'm encouraging active discussion and dialogue and participation from everybody but Japan in particular has been notable for emphasizing the whole package for really saying that we need to not only focus on nuclear weapons and the nuclear program but it should be missiles and not only ICBMs but also other ranges of missiles and the Kenbio program and other W and D and notably resolving the abductee issue of Japanese who have been abducted by North Korea many years ago and has still not been resolved. So if we think of, if we're really striving for real and lasting peace and security in the region I think this is the right list to pursue but objectively speaking it doesn't seem that we have quite sufficient pressure or leverage at the moment to realize all of these demands. So I wanna ask maybe start out with is it right to kind of put all these things on the table from the very beginning in terms of our discussions with the North Koreans and if we have to put them in some kind of sequence or priority what is the good way or the right way to think about that both from Japan's perspective and from the US perspective. So Ambassador I'm gonna put you on the spot first maybe to help get us going on that. Well thank you Jim. First of all it's nice to come back to Washington where you could have a freedom to speak. But anyway, well of course we do have a freedom to speak. Right, exactly, we pride ourselves on that. Yeah, I just pride the citizen of the far. Well you know what is the goal of the pictures we like to get, of course this deep new realization is a most pressing issue for all of us that is clear in terms of pressing threat coming on to us. But when you go on on this deep new realization negotiation talks obviously there is issues of confidence. People are talking about confidence gap of the thought. And as we move on obviously you have a doubt about the intentions of the others and so forth. Then there is other process which would help. For example when we had a sixth party talk and people believe that was a failure because that didn't really get us to anywhere at the end. But I think when we started this process back in 90, 2005 I think the debate we had with Chinese and even the United States at the time was, what is the end state, what's the picture we are working on at the end. Just getting rid of nuclear weapon is sufficient for the peace and stability of the peninsula. And that's getting rid of nuclear weapon is a very important essential element of confidence building. But that's not enough because I think you might still think that North Koreans might choose a missile, right? Without any nuclear weapon. That is also challenging to us. And what about the fundamental relationship including some other convention weapon somebody was addressed, what are the end states? So I think we try to work on the elements, not necessarily the whole picture, but elements of what we are trying to get. Whether it is nuclear weapons, whether it is a normalization, whether it is an economic assistance program, whether it is an energy assistance program, or whether it is a lifting sanctions, whether it is a security guarantees or a whole bunch of the elements which we might discuss as a part of overall ending game. Without that one, we just talk on the nuclear issues, we move inch by inch, Myeongbong facilities, and we are not sure that how much North Koreans are willing to cover. And then even if we get this done, what are the missile issues? Can't we normalize the relationship? We don't know. So I think that was this idea at least, even without agreeing all the details, what should be the major element we need to address in order to secure the final peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. That was the whole idea. So my Japan-based approach is that we need to look at the issues in a holistic way, not simply because we don't think that this deep nuclearization is not important. That would continue to be essential part and prioritize part, but don't forget. At the end of the game, we need to cover other issues because as you move on this talk, you tend to forget, like Iranian deal. We didn't forget. People thought that this behavior could support his ball and others. People say this is not enough. We can't trust Iran. So I don't say the situation is the same. I think we don't have much trust between each other. That's why I'm saying that we need to approach the issue in comprehensive way. So that one day either one of us would pull the leg. Right, right. No, that's a good point. Susan, what about from the U.S. perspective? And this can be just your own thoughts, but obviously you have some insight into what Washington and the Trump administration is thinking about what it wants to get or how it outlines its priorities in this process. That's Jim and thanks to Carnegie for having me here. It's great to be back in Washington and I feel a little bit probably like Ambassador Sassai does, a little bit unshackled and a little bit freer to think about sort of what, you know, if given more free reign, you know, we could do. You know, I started working on North Korea during the days of the agreed free. And many, many, many of the issues that have been existing in trying to deal with this problem, not only do they still exist, but they've gotten kind of more complicated. So as a diplomat, I am extremely supportive now of the effort underway to try to resolve this issue diplomatically and people have, you know, complained about how the process is going, how it's been undertaken, et cetera. But I think first and foremost, we absolutely have to see that there's an opportunity here to test out are the North Koreans, have they changed their mind about something fundamental? Does Kim Jong-un have a fundamentally different approach? And we have to test it. Of course, there's no trust. And I thought the general's comments about some of the problems we're having and keeping all of our partners and allies aligned on the tactics and the process stem from this fundamental sometimes difference we have about whether actions produce trust or whether a relationship can produce trust that can then produce actions. And I think that we often see that differently in the international community, even among our partners, never mind among the people we're trying to sit across the table from. But I do think that there's a fundamental tension in going forward between, and it comes from our long experience with North Korea. We want to agree on what the top priority is so that we can start this process of getting actions and verification, et cetera, and build that trust that we need to get further down the road. At the same time, we understand and know from dealing with the North Koreans that if you haven't mentioned something at the very beginning, when you try to bring it up later, it is going to have a detrimental impact on everything that you've done up to that point. So it's very hard for people to sit here and say, we need to focus on denuclearization. And I agree with everyone's comment that we still don't know exactly what denuclearization is. What are we talking about? So we haven't even gotten agreement on that yet. But I think we do have agreement that that is the first and most urgent and top priority, not least because we have grounds in the international system on which to go after that program which will come up in the negotiation with Korea with regards to its missile programs, space launch programs and other things and a question of rights and sovereignty, et cetera. And those will all come up. But having a priority, having all of the partners and allies agree that that's the priority and still have North Korea understand that there are other things we're going to be concerned about that we're going to want to address in the course of discussions along the way. I mean, this is kind of fundamental. And I think that the first really important thing we need to do is get with our closest allies and make sure that no matter what the tactics are that we're pursuing, we all agree that denuclearization and we should have a better sense of what we mean by that specifically is what we're all agreed we're going after in the first sort of set of interactions. Great. No, that's a good point about making sure at least everything is on the table and Ambassador Sisi alludes to it with the dynamic with the negotiations with Iran. And it makes me think that if, I understand that impulse, but if we lay out all of those things, it's a pretty big list in terms of denuclearization, WMD, missiles, abductee issue, and really the issue of human rights is still there. So how do we lay this out in a way that's not, almost immediately kind of shuts down the response or the interaction with the North Koreans? And I guess to some extent we do that by in terms of what we're offering in exchange for it, but I don't know, it seems right now we have relatively vague promises of a beautiful promise, a beautiful future for North Korea if they agree to this whole long list of specific things that we're demanding. Suzanne or Chungmin, do you have any thoughts? I mean, you've been following these negotiations and interactions for a while. Okay, let me jump in and I've been unshackled my whole career. So I'm gonna continue fulfilling that tradition if you don't mind. So I think we need to step back and think about what the North Korean mindset is going into this. And it reminds me of a visit I had to Pyongyang in February 2017 to meet with officials there. This was just a few weeks after President Trump's inauguration and the key question that kept coming up is is this indeed an opportunity to think about the relationship in a different way? Can we think anew? And the North Koreans were very taken with this approach. This was something that they wanted to talk about extensively. Could this be a fresh start? They certainly liked what they heard from President Trump as a candidate when he said, yes, he'd be willing to sit down with Kim Jong-un and have a hamburger and begin engagement without preconditions. So that was a big win. But there's been a lot of water under the bridge to put it mildly and very hard feelings on both sides, a deep sense of mistrust that we can't escape. But on the plus side, unlike Iran, when Trump came in with Iran, there was no agreement there that saddled the relationship. There was no agreement in place that the president wanted to undo. So in a lot of ways, it was an opportunity for a fresh start. And in February, when I was in Pyongyang, I was quite surprised when the North Koreans brought up the idea of a presidential summit. But my reaction was, well, it's much too soon for that. We really need to have some concrete deliverables before we could even talk. So that proves what do I know? So now we did have this summit in all its pageantry in June. But here we are four months later. And the fact is, we really have not made much progress. I'm struck by General Ayer's presentation this morning. All that the UN command is doing is quite impressive. But the reality is the US, North Korea, bilateral part is at an impasse. And I think we have to face up to that. I would contend that we really have to get back to the basics. We are really in a pre-negotiation phase. We are not even in a negotiation phase with the North Koreans. The fundamentals aren't even in place. We haven't had discussions of what are the objectives that we share? What the definitions of the various concepts, what are the red lines that each side sees? Is there a win-win that's possible at the end of that? And when I think about the Iran negotiations, months were spent on these very questions in secret talks before they even got to negotiate the table to get these things ironed out. And we're not there yet. So we've hit an impasse. And I think what appealed to North Korea was the promise of this new kind of relationship. And it's no coincidence that this is how the document that came out of Singapore starts. And I agree with that approach. I think this is exactly the way we should be approaching North Korea. But the fact is we don't have a diplomatic process in place. And my hope for Secretary Pompeo's trip to Pyongyang, it's a very important time. I would really like to see him go in there and lay out the vision for how do we get to a peace regime? Step by step, what are the, everything from the declaration of the end of the war to getting to a path for normalization, security guarantees, how we tackle sanctions. And let's try to seize the North Koreans minds around these issues. And of course, put it in the context of action for action. The problem we're facing is that in the discussions in Singapore, North Koreans like very much what they heard from President Trump. There was a private meeting between him and Kim Jong-un by a lot of accounts. There were no officials in the room, unfortunately, to corroborate this. But by the North Koreans' accounts, President Trump did agree to a end of war declaration. And then we've had President Moon come forward and say he'd like to get that done by the end of the year. So I think this is the approach we need to take with the North Koreans. They're not gonna budge until they get that end of war declaration. I think we have to face that. In the meantime, we have leverage that we need to use and we're only gonna get there if we have a serious diplomatic initiative in place to do that. Yeah. Okay, thanks. So you mentioned a bunch of things that begin to come on the other side of the ledger, the issue of sanctions, the issue of security guarantees, peace regime, economic development, end of war declaration. So we're building maybe something to help counteract various things where we're looking to get from North Korea. Chung-Lin, what do you think about some of these things you've heard? You know, Jim introduced me as being on the left, very far left, and that doesn't really drive with my political views, nor am I on the far end of the spectrum, either. If you look at President Moon's strategy over the last eight, nine months, everything that he has wanted has come to fruition. And it begins with his Berlin speech, and then the Olympic thaw, Kim Jong-un coming to the opening ceremonies, and she stole the show, as you all know. And throughout the two summits in April and May, and now in Pyongyang in September, and if Kim Jong-un comes to Seoul for the first time, sometime in the fall, by the end of the year, I guarantee you that there will be a media frenzy that has no parallel. And so I go back to the so-called pre-Gorby days, when Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as the Secretary General in March 1985, there was a lot of skepticism in Washington, whether this guy was for real. And it took two, three years before people began to believe that perestroika and glasnost was actually happening on the ground. What I see happening now is that, optically, Kim Jong-un is trying to act like Gorbachev, but substantively, he is not. And I think the political mood in Korea is being driven so harshly, and so it's accelerating at a pace that nobody can control, that the whole world peace regime encapsulates everything, but if you really go deeply into the bowels of what that means, there are still outstanding issues that will never be resolved, either this year or by next year. I'm talking about whether it's biochemical weapons, whether it's about North Korea's Special Operations Forces on the military side, the long range artillery based along the DMZ. But if you look at the political and humanitarian issues, not a single word has been spoken by the government, the Korean government, on the plight of human rights in North Korea. Our foreign minister said just a few days ago that she's not gonna bring this up, and understandably for politically sensitive issues, but not a single word on the future of the North Korean people was included in the two declarations. And for me as a Korean, the end state that I envision, although I have no say in this, is to have a unified Korea that is free, that is democratic and enjoys universal values. And for a South Korean president who has been a stand bearer of democracy and for human rights throughout his adult life, I think it is very important for a Korean president to say that over the longer term, however this evolves, I hope to see a unified Korea that really is free. And of course, Kim Jong-un's never going to accept this. But that's the big issue that we have to circle. And I just don't know how we're gonna get there from here. So all these technical issues are important, but the political speedometer is growing at like 180 miles per hour. But at some point, that's going to be blocked by real political walls that we have to overcome. Well, thank you. Hearing all these different comments really makes me think on the one hand optimistically that this idea of having everything out on the table even if it's a longer time horizon, having some vague understanding about a long distance goal or objective mutually. And I mean this with North Korea and us and among the allies gives us a chance to I think bridge some of the gaps that exist between Washington Seoul and Tokyo on what's the right near-term strategy? What should we do next month? So in a way, I'm optimistic that that's helpful and a possible method of managing the situation unless it contains elements that are so fundamentally distasteful or non-starters from a North Korean point of view that they wouldn't even enter into that. So we have to manage that process. But I'm interested by that. Could I just add one small point? People talk about East and West Germany as a historical model for the two Koreans. And there are similarities. But the biggest difference is German unification occurred at the nadir of Soviet power. The Moscow was on its knees. Korean unification whenever it comes and in whatever form or shape will come at the apex of Chinese power. And how you actually deal with this from an American, Japanese, and multilateral perspective I would argue is something that none of us have really spent much time on. And unless you get the Chinese on board, none of this is really going to happen. And they're going to have a much larger footprint whether we like it or not on these issues. Yeah. And I do want to come back to China because we haven't talked about it much. And it's interesting in the context of how you look at Vice President Pence's speech yesterday and how challenging or competitive now the US-China relationship is in this regard. But on the other hand, Prime Minister Abe is scheduled to go to Beijing later this month and we have some potential warming there. So maybe there's some balance. But before I get to China, I want to focus more specifically on this end-of-war declaration issue as potentially something that we might offer in North Korea, even though they say it's not necessarily a bargaining chip. From Japan's perspective and Washington's perspective, how big of a deal is this? The South Korean side has tried to emphasize it's a political statement. It doesn't necessarily undermine the legitimacy of UN command and other presence of US forces et cetera, but is that the view from Tokyo? Does Tokyo see an end-of-war declaration as potentially a slippery slope or dangerous or is it something that would be a good step towards building peace on the peninsula? Well, again, I have to say I'm not representing big up. Right, right. But still, I could say this one. This declaration of ending the war is pretty much symbolic to be honest. I mean, if you look at the current status, I mean, it sees fire, no war, no fighting, and so it's basically to confirm the status quo in a way and also showing some peaceful intent if there is any. So for that reason, I think it doesn't much affect actual things on the ground, but what is worrying a bit to Tokyo is that all this political mood that we are getting into new phase, which is fantastic, for the recombining the relationship without having the real things shaping up on the process of didn't realize them. And people think it's great. We are ending the war. It's now a new area. We could celebrate without getting into the heart of the matter. That is a danger. And if this declaration to ending the war is simply the political expressions of the things and doesn't have anything tangible showing the seriousness on the part of North Korea to go for big nuclear disease, this could be ending up simply the political show. And that is worrisome. And so I'm not against this declaration ending the war itself. If that is accompanied by serious specific commitment of the actions on the part of North Korea for deep nuclearization, not simply confirming a good will or honest will or just a beyond the commitment without telling what's in there. So these are the real issues, but we wanna see that one. If that will come out, that'd be great, right? Can I agree profusely with the ambassador? I think it's largely symbolic too. It's also quite psychological in the point of view of the North Koreans. And I do think that if it is embedded in a long-term strategy that gets to the other priorities that we have, then that's a point of leverage we should be using and maximizing. The other thing is from a US point of view, I think there's some worry here in Washington that I'll have implications for our forces on the peninsula, legal implications. But again, I see it as largely symbolic that those issues would be tackled down the line when we get to hopefully a peace agreement. The other thing we have to keep in mind is there is a very real process of reconciliation happening between North and South Korea now. And we should be doing all we can to support that process. It's in our interest that they're pursuing reconciliation. And I do think a declaration of war would help that process move forward as well. Like to also profusely agree with the ambassador, I think I heard a story recently about back in the agreed framework days, our negotiator was sent to get the North Koreans to give up their nuclear program. And so he asked, well, what is it that I'm gonna offer? And the response was, well, you can tell the North Koreans they'll be part of the Asian economic miracle. And up with two light water reactors and keto and everything else. But so that tells you something about what kind of leverage we have on our side and what kind of compelling leverage that you're gonna end up meeting in a negotiation. So negotiator's dream is to look for something like this that's mainly not giving up any of the sort of real nuts and bolts, substantive things that you're gonna wanna get to in the issue, but something that sets a good frame for a hopefully successful negotiation. When I think about this end of war declaration, the Koreans, the South Korean government, President Moon very much wants to see this go forward. And I think we also need to do what we can. Yeah. You know, Jim, if you look at the Pyongyang Declaration, it says it is basically an end to hostilities and to make the Korean Peninsula into a peace zone. So the two leaders, Moon and Kim, have already said, as far as I'm concerned, a de facto end of war statement. Problem is, will they come out with the U.S. and sit down and say, this is, we are formally announcing the end of the Korean War, leading towards a peace treaty. I agree with all the speakers before me. Rapp Rosman is good. Nobody's against South North Daytona. But you have to ask yourself, what is really, well, how do we define real inter-Korean Daytona? And it is, will the borders be open? Will North Koreans be able to watch free TV? Will they be able to make phone calls to their relatives in the South? Will there be unfettered exchange of views? And the answer is no. And so the government is driving Rapp Rosman and Daytona, which is great at the highest political levels, but it is not, you know, filtering down into the everyday life of North Koreans. That, to me, is much more important than leaders saying, the war is over. Let's go ahead with issues X, Y, and Z. Yeah, well, that gets to this issue of substance versus symbolism that is a theme coming out of this. I mean, my view is, end of war declaration has some potential utility, but it needs to be a two-way street. And I think what we need to get from North Korea in this context is something substantive in the context of peace building now, whether that's a declaration of their nuclear program or whether that's moving troops back farther away from the DMZ, I'm not exactly sure. I think it could be the opening bid of a process going forward. The North Koreans want it badly, so it does give us leverage. One thing we can think about are what are some initial corresponding measures that we could put on the table and ask the North Koreans to report. They've already put one on the table, dismantling Yong Beyond. Now, some critics have said, well, that's not a big give, but as Sig Hecker put it, Yong Beyond is old, but it certainly is operational. That's how I felt when I woke up at 3.30 this morning to come here, old but operational. So I didn't. We're not talking decommissioning here, though. So I think it's a starting point that you should take that. The other thing I think it was discussed in the earlier panel, we have now a cessation of testing, both nuclear and missiles that has been ongoing. Let's verify it. Let's codify it. I think that could be an early win. It's not difficult to verify, but is that a way to get inspectors back in on the ground at an early stage? What if the Clinton health factor? So these are the things I think we should be thinking about. As the North Koreans themselves say it has to be a corresponding, the question is can we find a way to jump off the diving board together? Are diplomats creative enough to be able to think of ways where we can take the first step simultaneously? Maybe we can make a big production out of it that would appeal to President Trump, have a giant clock, they do something at the exact moment we do. I think we just need to get this done. Well, the mention of missiles and or testing moratorium makes me jump ahead to a different question, but I'll come back to something else I wanted to mention before. Wouldn't the inclination be then, because we're in a unspoken freeze-free situation, perhaps, where we have frozen major US military exercises and they have frozen suspended nuclear missile testing. If we want to codify it, how do we respond if they come back and say, well, sure, we'll stop this if you stop that? So part of this process is also us drawing certain lines at which we won't compromise further. And is that one of those lines? Because I think from a US-Japan alliance perspective and from a US-Rock alliance perspective, the readiness issue, the deterrence factor, there's somewhere there's a line where you're not willing to give. And I wonder if we should address that a little bit. Jim, when North Korea is talking about a number of issues, the fact that in 1998, India and Pakistan had a number of nuclear tests. And since then, they've not had any nuclear tests, but the number of warheads, especially in Pakistan, have continued to increase. And so there is no more need for North Korea to conduct tests. I don't think that's a real natural good, but I agree with you the moment the US and the ROK begins these major exercises, that will be a problem because politically, the North Koreans will say, you are now going backwards on your earlier commitments. The second, I think, a very important factor here is the type of message that President Trump sends to his allies, as well as to North Korea. He mentioned this beautiful letter that he got from Kim Jong-un. I hope he makes it public so that we can see how beautiful it is. But seriously, it's very important for the president to assure his allies, while also taking the North Koreans and saying, I will deal with you under these conditions. But he has to really assure the Japanese and the Koreans that we are actually talking from the same sheet of music. Yeah, yeah. I have some skepticism about this wisdom of words versus words, action versus action, step by step. This is kind of a deja vu. We tried this before, and we were stuck because there are too many stages from one stage to another when we go to the stage where we expect the declarations and the verification issues. People argued in the previous sessions. There is suddenly other elements coming in. If we don't do that, we don't do it. They don't declare for the nuclear weapons. It's something else. We would declare Myeong-byeong facilities. But to get this done, or even to move, you need to give the remaining part of energy assistance all this come in step by step versus action versus action. Then what would you do if after these declarations were ending the war, North Korea would want to see all these declarations of ending joint exercise, say. Then if that is done, well, we give some Myeong-byeong facilities and so forth without committing anything about nuclear weapons. Then they might ask you, well, can you think about reducing US forces? That's a pretty headache to us. We are reducing the threat mutually. We are going to decrease the nuclear weapons, whatever. You guys have to do the same stuff to us. So in that way, what is the measurement of equivalency of the step to be taken? I'm not quite sure about there is all this, you know, quality of the action to be taken by each other. So in that way, they will continue to play nuclear cards throughout the process. They never give up the nuclear weapons. And Myeong-byeong facilities is a good thing, of course. But you keep all those nuclear weapons and other facilities intact, not to mention the missile. Then they would argue that you need to do all the things before they would complete the action. Then we attack. That's my concern. Well, let me approach this a different way then with a specific example. The sanctions are a form of leverage that we have. That is the potential removal of them. And one way of using them, well, there's two issues. One issue is that leverage depends heavily on their successful enforcement. So sanctions are more valuable to us if they are being well enforced because the desire then by North Korea to have them be alleviated in some way is greater. So personally, that's why I think the sanctions enforcement piece is particularly important. And so there, there's another alliance issue in the terms of making sure we're all stressing strict enforcement of sanctions. And hopefully we can get Seoul to see it in the same way that Washington and Tokyo sees it. But we also have to, I think, demonstrate to Seoul that we're willing to be flexible on sanctions when that moment arises. So my specific example is this. What if we were to propose not necessarily removing sanctions early in the process, but certain types of exemptions and specifically target at inter-Korean relations? So there is a pent-up energy in South Korea, as you've described, Jungman, to get going on roads and rails and various projects. What if you opened up reliefs, some of that pressure with a special exemption and a couple of key special economic zones that inter-Korean projects could go forward? Would that be a useful tool early in the process to help get some of these more substantive steps by North Korea? And what would we want to see in return for that? Well, so far, although the detailed blueprint has not yet been made public, what has been made public so far based on the agreements made in Pyongyang is that South Korea is interested in investing over $100 billion in improving North Korea's infrastructure, especially roads, ports, and railways. And they want to do that. And as you recall, four of the top CEOs of South Korea's largest conglomerates visited Pyongyang at the same time. But the businesses will not commit major investments until, as you correctly pointed out, the UN sanctions issues basically either revolved or they make a U-turn or something really happens. What I worry about is that as that happens, Jim, the political will to continue to maintain so-called maximum pressure by the UN Security Council will become weakened. I see that happening. So if you give the Koreans even more leeway, which is good for inter-Korean cooperation, but the ability of the sanctions to really apply pressure on Pyongyang will become, in my opinion, much weaker. And just last week, in New York at UNGA, we did hear both the Russians and Chinese say, it's time to loosen the sanctions. So maximum pressure, I think, we should come to realize is dead. It's not what it was. I don't think we can capture it unless the North Koreans do something really provocative or really stupid. So I think we fall into this trap of looking at sanctions as if they're the ends. But they're really the means to get to a change in behavior. And unless you're willing to release the valve at appropriate times in exchange for corresponding actions, then we're missing the point of what sanctions are meant to be. They're not meant to be punitive in a pure sense. They're meant to influence behavior. So I think I like the way you put it, Jim, how you laid it out. I think that's something that should be thought about seriously. I would also like to say, I mean, I think that one of the problems was identified by the ambassador, which is the things that we have to give that North Korea wants. We're going to have to give early. And the big things we have to do early and the big things that North Koreans are going to have to do come late in this process. And by the way, this is going to be a very long process. We haven't talked to North Korea for now years. We're starting to talk to them again. We have a new leader. We have a lot to learn about what this process is going to look like. It's going to take a long time to hash out all these details if there are steps in corresponding steps. These are things that are going to talk. We're going to talk to the North Koreans about for a very long time. So I'm very happy to see that the administration have gone away from this needs to be done in three months to now we've got more time. This is going to take more time because that's absolutely the case. I mean, I do think that what the North Koreans are masters at is splitting the international community. I mean, they have a very weak hand that they play. And they play it very well. And it's been too easy for them to divide the international community. And if we are not very, very well coordinated, if we do not have a completely united front, we saw this with the maximum global pressure campaign. We managed to get that maybe for the first time that frankly I can remember on North Korea, we had this unified front and in the face of very bad North Korean behavior. And that's what it took to get that. And I think Suzanne is right. Basically, maximum pressure is dead because not just China and Russia, but other countries, I mean, we've been getting a level of North Korean delegations. We have the warming between North and South. I mean, it's just a different feeling out there. And so our leverage is diminishing by the day. I hate to tell you. And so it is going to be a very hard negotiation. This is very hard to do. Yeah, no, I'm sorry. I mean, I understand what you're saying, but I'm so reluctant to try to give up on the pressure. Yeah, yeah, I think I disagree One point is that this maximum pressure is not dead yet. Although, you know, seemingly there is some loosening on the part of China and Russia, they are sneaking around. We all know it. There is a UN sanctions committee. I mean, talking about how there are some violations of the things and South Korean government is not working on some of the project with some condition. But all those projects are done. You have to change the Security Council's decisions. And because all these things are exceptions, even if you say exception, these are not exception anymore. These are the major current of assisting North Korea economically and other terms. So even if we maintain the sanctions, these sanctions are becoming thinner and very nominal. And people believe that this is already a political one, knowing that all these sanctions are becoming less edgy of the thought. But still, I don't say that the maximum pressure is dead because I think as we move on, if there is a stack in this negotiation, I don't say that it will be stacked, but if there is always a possibility, then we have to come back to again the maximum pressure. So we need to maintain the basic structure of getting other countries together around us, continue to put up pressure unless we get the real denuclearized process. And let me clarify. I'm not advocating that we lift all the sanctions in one fell swoop. I like the idea of exemptions. If that can be done through the UN Security Council, I think we should try it on a project by project basis. But I think there's a 800 pound elephant in the room and that is our own president. That is also, I think his actions have helped put the nail in the coffin of maximum pressure. For example, when he says North Korea is no longer a nuclear threat, that undercuts our diplomats. When he says we're not in a hurry, what's the rush? We have time to do this. If I'm a U.S. diplomat going to the table with the North Koreans, that's, you're killing me. You're cutting off my legs in order to get things done. So I think in some ways our own president has diminished the maximum pressure we were exerting. And this is a bigger issue that I think we have to address is how to get the president to step back, stop tweeting, be quiet, send in the diplomats, let them do their work. We have a special envoy for North Korea now. We need to ramp up, certainly the key people working on these issues, as Susan said, this is going to be a very intense negotiation. It will be probably several multiple negotiations happening simultaneously. We need to beef up our bench in order to do that. And the question is, can we imagine our president doing this, stepping back? Maybe we'll say you can continue the love letters while this all goes on, but I'm not asking rhetorically. A show of hands, how many people think the president is capable of this? Okay, one. So this is a real issue I think we have to face as we move forward is stop undercutting our diplomats. This is really hard work. Let them get in there and do the work that needs to be done with the full support of the U.S. government, the military to back them up when if we ever need that, it worries me. Well, that presumes you have a willing partner on the other side who's willing to engage with you in that level of depth of discussion. There's two quick issues I still wanna get to before I open it up to the audience. And one relates to this issue of process. And Susan, you're welcome to comment whether or not you think the president is undercutting the diplomatic corps or not. But I'm thinking more broadly about now the Six Party Talks was an experience that we had that had some success but obviously didn't accomplish what it was meant to. And nobody seems to wanna go back to the Six Party process. But what else can we do to really pull together a multilateral coordination, collaboration, cooperation? So we had the TCOG in the past, the Tri-Lateral Coordination Oversight Group which was a U.S. Japan, South Korea means of coordinating policy. We had the Six Party process, et cetera. I had another moment in time. I'm thinking we should be launching now. How do we bring China into this process of talking about verification? Even if we don't have an agreement yet, we can talk about how would we fund it? How would we staff it? What's the role of the IAEA? We don't have to make decisions necessarily but we have all this shuttle diplomacy going on that seems you have to get to a broader multilateral process. And I'm wondering is it too soon for that or how do we stimulate some of that? I would say it's too late. Ooh, late. Not too late that we shouldn't do it. We should have started this a long time ago. And it's interesting when I think of my discussions with the North Koreans, for a very long time, they were only interested in talking to the United States. They were not interested in talking to South Korea. They were not interested in talking to China. They just wanted to have direct dialogue with the U.S. And then something changed around this time last year. I think it was the personal insults by the president to speech at Anga and they turned their attention to President Moon and he offered a diplomatic off-ramp with the Olympics and thankfully led that process to where we're today, where the reductions, where the tensions have been reduced dramatically. But I think, so there are two, just to follow up on my previous comment, there are two challenges I think we face, how to conduct the bilateral diplomacy effectively and how to conduct the multilateral level of diplomacy effectively. And I think right now we're doing both very poorly. You know, Jim, the quick answer is, NAFTA is now called the US MCAs, isn't it? Yeah. Right, so it just changed the six party talks to whatever fits the menu of the week. But in a more serious vein, I agree absolutely with you that it is crucial to get the Chinese and the Russians on board because since they have veto power in the UN, anything that gets to the final stage of a peace deal or whatever, you have to get those two powers involved. And the other thing is US, Korea, Japan, tri-lateral cooperation. And I think that is being discussed and Seoul gives support for that. But I believe that South Korea has to be much more forceful in enhancing tri-lateral security cooperation because if these three critical allies do not understand topics that are critical to Korean security, I guarantee you that once the negotiations start down the path, there will be, I would argue differences of opinion between Seoul, Tokyo and Washington. I can jump in. I mean, I think my comments about the maximum global pressure campaign being the first time I've ever seen that level of unity in the international community and the act that it had on getting us to where we are is sort of a platform from which we can leap off into, now where are we and what has happened to that kind of international unified front vis-a-vis North Korea? And it's exactly your question. What are we doing to try to preserve that unity? And the answer is we're not doing much. And I think that's extremely unfortunate. We should have started a long time ago. I don't understand the aversion to the six-party format. I don't understand the aversion, frankly, to multilateralism. And I think that's what I did. And we will not get anywhere in this negotiation. That's like I said, and the North Koreans and we've already seen it is they're just masters at playing us off each other and they will exploit it in a negotiation. We have seen it. We aren't even really lined up with our allies on the prioritization of what it is we want to get out of this negotiation. And they will exploit that first and they will continue to exploit other differences with China, Russia and Europe and other countries that are gonna end up being involved in this negotiation have always been involved in these negotiations, have things to bring to bear in the negotiation. And I really just think it is not wise for us to be thinking we can go on our own track and leave our partners and other people that have a very large interest in the state. I think they're also masters at splitting our own government. I mean, you know, what the North Koreans are telling people is President Trump agreed to this end of war declaration. It's Bolton and Pompeo who are not allowing him to move forward. And one of my concerns is it seems like they're only interested in summit diplomacy now, leader to leader with very little getting done in between. And I'm worried that they may no longer see Pompeo as a viable interlocutor. And what does that mean for Steve Behan who's just started, who hasn't even met the North Korean. So that worries me. So I agree with Susan. They are masterful in seeing a weakness and honing in on that and exploiting it. And I think they've done that with this administration. Yeah, and the splits in our administration have probably inhibited our ability to really play this role, Ambassador. Yeah, I think the good part about this US-North Korea talks is that it has been always a desire of North Korea to be recognized as an equal partner to negotiate. And this summit talks is giving that. So that doesn't mean that they would not exploit the process. That's what's now happening now. And but it's easy to say that North Korea is exploiting and we are not doing good enough. Possibly that could be the case, but still I think we need to work this out. My point is that this de-nuclearization negotiations is in essence always US-North Korean talk. Even during all this four-party talk, the party talk or six-party talk, the essential part of negotiation is bilateral US and North Korea. We all know it. But the function, the role of the others, especially the friends and allies of the United States to be together with the United States and give a good advice and register its own concern and move together. I think that's why it is important for us to have US, Japan and our okay together. I think that's what Secretary Pompeo is trying now. He's stuffing by and talking before and after. And I think that process is very important. I don't have any sort of doubt about the sincerity of the United States to be a full respect to the opinions of friends and allies. I think he's exactly doing that together with his Secretary of State and all the others and the National Security Council. We are doing pretty good conversations all the way. The issue is possibly that how more of the tactical dimension, if there is any sort of a subtle difference of the approach. And when it comes to the usefulness of Chinese role and Russians, I agree. I can't agree with more. But Chinese position at this moment is that possibly they are not concerned as they used to be before because they have regained the relationship with North Korea. And North Korea has also regained the relationship with China. I think their priority for the moment is to strengthen this relationship rather than China pushing North Korea to come forward on the negotiations. And also China has a big problem with the United States. Well, so I think there is a reason for China to wait for United States to seek the Chinese support on the issues. So you have to carefully design the timing of working together with a country like China. And my personal view is that when the negotiation is stuck, I think there is a big role for a country like China to play. When the negotiation is moving forward nicely, again China, we need China because in order to wrap up the process without Chinese involvement, especially on the peace and security issue, it's very difficult. So we are knowing it, but for the moment, I think US and North Korean truck is essential. We need to get this going. Yeah, no. So my last quick question before we open it up is related to this point. We've faced various little setbacks here and there, canceled summits back on. We're striving toward success, but could we prepare or how do we prepare for potential major setbacks constructively? In other words, how do we prepare for failure of this process? I don't want to say complete failure, but maybe we have some breakthroughs out of this process and we move on to Yongbyon and we start moving some inter-Korean projects. But what if we have a major setback? How do we prepare for that as an alliance and diplomatically? So in a constructive way. I think we should count on the fact that there will be major setbacks, given the level of mistrust, what's at stake, the fact that we have not been engaging with the North Koreans on a regular basis. So I think we should expect that. That's what happens when you engage in adversary where there's a lot of different point of view. But we should be prepared to deal with it. One thing I think is the communications channels need to be strengthened and improved. I like the idea of liaison offices. If we actually had a presence, a diplomatic presence in Pyongyang, I think that would be a big plus and a diplomatic presence here reciprocal in Washington. That would be a key channel for communication. So when these points of disagreement happen, when we have a setback, those channels don't break down. And we're committed to it. So I think having a presence on the ground would help. That's just one idea. Definitely going to be setbacks. And this again feeds into this. And talked about communication. Constant communication with other partners in the maximum global pressure campaign if you need to turn to a space where you need to leverage because there's a setback and you need to find a way to push. You're gonna need those partners. The US is the lead negotiator. I agree on denuclearization, but we don't have a lot of leverage or trade with other things to give. And it's our other partners that have those things. And it's also the other partners that can withhold that kind of recognition and other things that North Korea want. If we haven't brought the partners along and how the negotiation is unfolding in order to be able to show them that it's North Korea and that's sort of at fault in this setback that we've encountered or that it's something that they're failing to do as opposed to the North Korean version, which will be that it's the US that has failed to do it. We can't make the case to our partners because we've been convincing them and telling them all along what we're doing. That will be a very hard case to make, I think at that point. And it's too late at that point to come to them and tell them, oh, this is what's been happening. You know, Jim, I think it's very important for President Moon and the Korean government to set very realistic expectations. Right now it's basically on cloud nine. And so they're basically saying that everything's going to work out according to the principles declared in Panmunjom and Pyongyang. One way to prepare the Korean public for a more realistic view should things walk backwards is to have a bipartisan policy in North Korea, which I don't see happening now. And the main reason is because the conservatives basically don't have a voice. So it is very important for the ruling party to reach out to the opposition. And it is critical for the opposition parties, mostly conservative or centrist, to really say, okay, if we want to really make this work, it's got to be a hold of government effort. And unless that happens, expectations are soaring now, but when they come tumbling down, there will be huge political, I would argue, headwinds against the government. Professor Susai, any final thoughts on preparing for failure? Well, the diplomat, you always think about it, but don't say that in public. I say it, okay. But I'm not a diplomat anymore. But I think of course we have to prepare for it. One way of doing it is we need to go back to square one and to again go for the maximum pressure campaign, including every option is on the table, including military, which I don't think that is North Korea and even our okay would appreciate it. If we would keep that in mind as a future option, we could let that work as a deterrence for their wrongdoing in the future. Thanks. Well, I'd like to invite General Ayer to join us up here because some of the questions he may want to weigh in on and I'd actually give him a quick option if you have any, what you've heard in this panel so far, if there's anything that motivates you to make a comment now, you're welcome to before I. No, and thank you for that. It's been a fascinating discussion and highly educational for me. The whole discussion on the end of war declaration is of particular interest because it calls into question legitimacy of our own organization. And I mentioned what President Moon said here a couple of weeks ago. Well, you have to question why North Korea is pushing so hard for that end of war declaration. The optimist would say that he needs it for a domestic audience to declare victory so he can change his ways and have a new approach. The pessimist would say it's another way to split the allies apart, as was very eloquently said, they are experts at separating allies. And it started right from the beginning of their regime. Kissinger's book on China has got a great article or a great chapter on Trilateral Diplomacy on separating China and the Soviet Union to get support for the 1950 invasion. My boss likes to use the analogy of an open hand where North Korea is in the middle and each of the five fingers represent the regional partners and they're experts at separating those partners apart instead of keeping the fingers together. So what could an end of war declaration mean? Well, even if there is no legal basis for it emotionally, people would start to question the presence and continued existence of United Nations command. And it's a slippery slope to then question the presence of US forces on the peninsula. So it's no answers for it, but it's something we are definitely looking at closely. Great, oh, thank you. So I'd like to open it up to the audience, same process as before. We'll have a microphone, let us know who you are and ask your question. I have a woman here. And then I'll come up here and then I'll go in the back. Hi, I'm Soyeon Kim from Radio for Asia. So this weekend Pompeo is going to meet Kim Jong-un who Trump fell in love with. So ahead of this visit, South Korean Prime Minister Kang Kyung-hwa proposed that maybe at this time, US is not going to demand for a full declaration from North Korea. Instead, maybe US offers some corresponding measures in exchange for young young sides' dismantlements. And we all know that it's not the most ideal approach, but I'm just so wondering how the panels see this approach as in order to proceed the negotiation between US and North Korea. Thank you. I open it up to anybody who would like to respond. I can't help but offer a quick analogy that I was going to mention earlier. If you're crossing a river, ideally you want to plot out which rocks you're going to hop on and then where that next rock will take you to go and eventually get yourself across the river. If we're following this approach right now without all the lead-in dialogue and negotiations that we have not had really to date, we're just hopping on a rock and then looking around for the next rock, as far as I'm concerned, but I welcome some additional thoughts. I think the Yang-Biond issue will feature prominently in Secretary Pompeo's talks in Pyongyang. I think when we look back just a little while ago to the summit between Kim Jong-un and President Moon, it was very important for that declaration to have something specific, concrete in it that we could call towards denuclearization and I think Yang-Biond was it. This allowed the US to say we now can move forward with engagement and here we are. So I think it'll be a prominent feature of the discussion and I think that's a good thing. And to Jim's point, it's only going to be a good thing if indeed it is put in a context of a process going forward. Is this one of the early steps? Well, what's next? Those are the sorts of discussions we should be having with the North Koreans at this stage and that's why I feel very strongly that we should be going into these talks with a very robust proposal for how to get to what they call a peace regime. What are the steps we see going forward and what are the corresponding steps we see along the way? I think that's really the only way the North Koreans are going to. Any other thoughts or we'll come up here? Thank you. Rita Chen from Central News Agency, Taiwan. My question is about China's influence that we just seen the Vice President Pence deliver very strong and unprecedented statement towards China and I think the real people will expect the tension between U.S. and China will end anytime soon. I'm just wondering that under this momentum will China still help to deal with the issue of North Korea and especially for Susan that you are on the first round that how will it influence the cross-strait issue as well as cross-strait relationship as well and how will you suggest Taiwan to secure its own interest under this circumstance? Thank you. Well, I'd rather leave the cross-strait question for another day because this is really about the PRK and the allies but I think that obviously we've already talked a little bit about China's involvement in the North Korea issue. I think their cooperation was essential when we had the maximum global pressure campaign going. I think that we were, I personally was surprised by the level of going beyond the UN sanctions that we saw coming out of Beijing in many respects both on this sort of crossing of economic goods to and from across the border and also in other ways that they went sort of beyond the UN sanctions to help the maximum pressure campaign and I would just note that the maximum pressure campaign involved a lot of things that went beyond the current UN sanctions, not just on the part of China but on the part of other countries. So that's the part that I think I see has already fallen back, not that we should lift the UN sanctions but that we're not really in the same kind of mode that we were in during that campaign and to resurrect that kind of focus and fervor would be difficult in the absence of some kind of major bad behavior on the part of North Korea I would submit. So but on the issue of China, I agree with what the ambassador said that I think China is quite satisfied with the way things are unfolding at the moment vis-a-vis the North Korea issue. They see the reduction in tension which is something that is very much that they wanted to see. They've reestablished their relationship with North Korea which had been on kind of hiatus and they've actually really stepped up their engagement with North Korea and reasserted their influence there I would say. So I think despite what may be happening in the US China relationship and there is an indication that there's sharp deterioration underway, they will continue to treat, I mean Korea they have a major security interest in it too. It's on their border and their number one priority has got to be to keep stability in that area and maintain their influence level of control over the process. And I think basically those needs are now currently being met and they are still interested in seeing the US and North Korea continue to talk. So I wouldn't expect anything that's happened recently to end up to that. Ambassador, you've had a lot of experience with China and we see Japan-China relations improving a little bit. Is this potentially a way to contribute to the North Korea issue as well? Yes, I think so. But coming back to your questions on vice president statement, very strong vis-a-vis China including all these trade issues, some of the concerns expressed there we share. It's not because of all the Chinese behavior per se but it's related to fundamental discourse China has been taking over the opening of its market and its trade policy. I think there are a lot China could do without proclaiming its status as a developing country. I think they need to get rid of all this old fashioned way of handling the border measures and also adjusting some of their policy including the introduction of the issues, government subsidies and so forth. And these we share some of the concern and I think that if that is addressed and done properly that'd be great. Not in terms of US-Chinese relationship but also for the sake of Chinese, but it's great. And even after that one, I think there will be argument China could be a market economy but still I think it's a good thing for China. Now, having said it, I think when it comes to the dealing over North Korean issues in that context my opinion is that we shouldn't really mix up some of the things we face as a challenge from China on the trade and the front. And once you try to mix this dealing on the North Korean issue with some other issues we shouldn't be transactional. That would complicate the matter. I think because the nature of the threat is different and the nature of the threat coming from North Korea is totally different from some of the concern we have over the rise of China or Chinese trade policy. Having said it, I think our relationship with China has been strange for the reason familiar to all of you but I think what is happening now is to kind of normalize the relationship, normalize, mean that we didn't have any exchange of leaders reasons, it's abnormal. So I think it's a process of normalizing all this political dialogue between the two countries. I hope that would help to continue to get the support from China on the North Korean issues because as I said at the end or even before we get stuck, we need Chinese support and we should recognize, you know, a legitimate Chinese interest in there. So we can't really shine away a Chinese involvement so we need to be proper. And that's why I think our improvement of the relationship with China would help. Great. I'm gonna take two questions back to back. I have, let me go to the back here. I have two hands in the back and we'll do those two and then I'll come back up to the front. Thank you very much. Taishuke Miibai from Atlantic Cancer. I have a question to Professor John Mindy. When we talk about trade-off, we think it moves very in a positive direction. One ultimate possible trade-off could be a trade-off between the denuclearization and alliance. I mean that the U.S. ROK alliance. And so if you have to face this trade-off, for example, if you come up with a sort of a condition that they can come up with a total denuclearization in exchange with the withdrawal of U.S. presence in South Korea and withdrawal of U.S. nuclear umbrella provided to the South Korea. A little bit, would it be acceptable to you and the Moon Jae-in administration and South Korean people? Okay, think about that and then we have one more here. Virginia Ferris with the Catholic Bishops Conference. So Professor Lee, I am interested, you made reference to the fact that the need for a to get the opposition on board with what President Moon is trying to do. So my question is related to overall public opinion. How is public opinion viewing what President Moon is trying to do? Is he way far out? And related to that in terms of U.S. or UN forces within Korea, what is public opinion now about the presence of those forces and how long they should stay? Let me just quickly take those two questions. Both are very, very good. I think if you look at the opinion polls in South Korea over the last seven, eight months as the so-called, you know, thought has begun, the support for the U.S. ROK Alliance is about 80%. And support for sustained American forces presence in South Korea is about 75% or even higher. And that I think is indicative of the fact that the public supports both a reduction in tensions in South Korea relations, but they also understand you cannot trust North Korea 100%. So in that sense, for the vast majority of the Korean public, a strong U.S. presence is a very important, I would argue, variable for sustaining Korean security on my colleague from the Atlantic Council. My personal, it's not a choice. You want to have both the nuclearization and a strong U.S. ROK Alliance. If I had to choose personally, I would choose the Alliance. Because that I think is much more important because then we can deal with denuclearization by enhancing deterrence packages, making sure that extended deterrence by the U.S. is stronger, et cetera. But if you simply cannot choose, but if I had to choose, I would choose the Alliance. For President Moon, I don't speak on behalf of the Korean government. He has said publicly that denuclearization South North, rapprochement and the Alliance are separate. So, to date, he has said the right things. General Ayer, can I ask you, just related to this question about public support and the Alliance, the UN command gets put in the uncomfortable position from time to time of having to approve or disapprove of certain proposals for inter-Korean exchanges and such. If this ramps up significantly going forward, is that something you have to, is that a potential problem or how is the command kind of approaching some of these challenges of more frequent back and forth? No, it's absolutely something that we are concerned about. Especially if there's a divergence between South Korean and U.S. approach with UNC stuck in the middle. It could become a convenient punching bag without directly insulting the U.S., if you will. So, we're watching that one very, very carefully. But in terms of public opinion, from what I have seen, the people of Korea are extremely thankful for UNC sending state contributions during the Korean War. There is less awareness about the current commitments and international commitments on the Korean Peninsula, whereas most of the focus, rightly so, is on the Bilateral Rock U.S. Alliance. And so it's just a lack of awareness and thus our efforts to get out there and engage and educate. We have time for one more question. This gentleman had his hand up from the very beginning. So, my apologies to those that I couldn't get to. My name is Roberto Anquera, I live in the West Coast. I have no association to any institution so I am just personally in the public. I apologize for my simplistic approach, but in the long term, I don't think that Kim Jong-un is afraid of the United States, South Korea, or Japan. He's only afraid of his own people. And he sees this whole process, my opinion, as another way of making the clock in a different way and holding his grip in power. Well, thank you, that gives me a quick opening, though, maybe to end this and get your feedback on this topic. If Kim Jong-un goes to Seoul by the end of this year, that strikes me as a pretty dramatic event. And there are kind of two narratives about what Kim Jong-un is up to. One is potentially just this is a strategy for holding onto power and splitting the alliance and weakening the sanctions. But another view potentially is that he's not naive, he's not just gonna give away his nuclear program, but if he can trade away parts of the nuclear program and maintain some deterrence, and then open up much more opportunity for a one-party rule, authoritarian government, but with major economic development and really play the improving the North Koreans' lives angle as the way to deal with that potential threat of concern about his people, that's a different, more constructive outcome that maybe we can work with. I don't know, we might be ending on a note of what's your overall big picture take about what's going on, and what would Kim Jong-un's visit to Seoul tell you about his intentions in that regard? Kim Jong-un is a very different leader from his father or his grandfather. He's very educated, very smart, savvy. He knows how to play the media to his advantage. When he comes, if he comes to Seoul by year's end, as I said, all the TV cameras here will be in Seoul. And it'll be a humongous media event. Having said that, I think the real mistest as a Korean, as speaking personally, is whether he will give up the call for personality, whether the police state apparatus will be drawn down, whether the gulags will finally be eradicated. And if he does those three things on top of coming to Seoul, then yes, he will be another dung-shelping, but unless and until those three conditions are met personally, I think the old Kim Jong-un will still remain the old Kim Jong-un. Any other thoughts, any thoughts? Well, I hope that will be the case. I mean, you know, obviously he's now going campaign to make North Korean people believe that the United States could be a good friend, right? So Nalati, sometime before, is an act enemy, right? So a complete change of the domestic campaign education. So if he's designed to get on the United States on board for normalizing the relationship, using this nuclear car, play out, if the end goal is to become a good friend without any nuclear weapon, that's the idea. I hope that will be the case. Thank you. I tend to agree with that. Kim Jong-un is in his 30s. I'm sure he imagines decades of rule ahead of him. I think he understands probably what he needs to do in order to maintain the continuation of the Kim dynasty under his leadership. So I think it's a proposition. We shouldn't accept it face value, but we certainly should be testing it along the way. And more than testing it, we should be helping to shape the outcome in a direction that moves that way. And again, when I think of how the US is approaching North Korea diplomatically, are we helping to shape that outcome? The fact that he is selling this to his own domestic audience indicates a certain level of seriousness that we should be pursuing. But diplomatically, I think the US is punching well below its weight. And we should be moving from maximum pressure to maximum engagement to make sure that outcome happens, not standing by idly and letting President Moon is doing a fabulous job, but he should not be negotiating on all behalf. I can just close with that thought too. I mean, we are confronting decades of hostile suspicion. I mean, North Korea is part of the axis of evil for a while. I mean, we, I think, oh, the administration, the benefit of the doubt for a while here. I mean, we have this opening. We have a new leader in North Korea. Are we right to be suspicious that maybe he's not gonna do everything we want? I mean, I think that's obvious. He's not gonna do everything we want. He wants to hold on to power. He's got a family dynasty legacy that he's protecting, but he has put himself out on a limb in a different way than previous leaders. And we owe it to humanity, to future generations, to test this for as long as we can make it continue. And I think they missed a lot of credit for that. I do agree with Suzanne that we need to be doing a better job of implementing that, kind of testing the opening. And I hope we'll get to that soon. Thank you, Susan. Thank you for coming down from Maine to join us and to my other panelists. Thank you, Ambassador Sasai, for all of your contributions to U.S.-Japan relations as ambassador and for coming back and being with us today. We wish you much luck in your new role. And thank you, General Nair, for coming today and being a part of this whole event. And we wish you all much success in managing peace on the peninsula as well. My thanks to you all for joining us and those that supported this event. And we hope to see you again here at Carnegie as we keep track of developments on the Korean Peninsula and in the alliances. Thank you. Nice to meet you.