 Since the turn of the millennium we've seen a continual change to the face of terrorism through the 9-11 attacks, the growth of al-Qaeda, the bombings in Europe including the continent's first ever suicide bombing, the rise of groups such as Boko Haram and the continued destabilisation of parts of the Middle East and the commensurate rise of ISIS. Terrorism today reflects the globalised nature of our society. Currently the preferred method of attack by terrorists is the improvised explosive device, utilising homemade explosives and the use of high-powered automatic rifles by marauding shooters, sometimes referred to as the active shooter. These tactics produce devastating results, spread terror and confusion and meet the terrorist's objective of maximising casualties and has been seen all too recently in cities around the world. So what then, are the so-called weapons of mass destruction, use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material to cause death, harm and destruction? This conference has focused on two of these, the R and the N parts of CBRN. As discussed throughout the conference, access to nuclear material is difficult and the production of nuclear bomb is fortunately beyond the capability of most governments, let alone terrorist organisations. And although access to nuclear material is difficult, it's not impossible, as you've heard from some of the case studies. The production of an improvised nuclear device whilst difficult could eventually be achieved by some terrorist organisations. More worryingly, access to radiological materials is much easier and the harm that has been caused simply by leaving a high activity source in a public space undetected over a period of time would be immense. Which triggers the question, why have terrorists not hit us with an IND or an explosively radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb to date? Quite simply, at present, the acquisition of RM material and a means to deploy them effectively to cause maximum casualties remains largely problematic and it's far easier for a terrorist to attack using conventional means. In Australia, my home country, it was recently observed that all you need to be a terrorist nowadays is a knife, a flag and a video. Could be true. Nevertheless, it's known that terrorist groups seek RM material and actively recruit scientists to their cause in order to have them to develop a method of delivery that will be effective and relatively easy. They haven't got there yet, but there will come a time when a tipping point is reached and it becomes easier for them to deliver a dirty bomb or similar. And when that day comes, we will potentially see a marked increase in this type of terrorism and the trafficking of the materials required. To prevent that from happening, the world's law enforcement agencies need to be ahead of the game and be prepared to counter the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials as well as chemical and biological materials. Here at Interpol, the CBRNE sub-directorate has endeavoured to share information, help build capacity and support law enforcement agencies with operations and investigations in these highly specialised areas. And as we prepare for the Nuclear Security Summit, our goal is to advocate for a more substantial global approach. At the summit, 52 world leaders and four heads of international organisations will reiterate their collective commitment to the goal of global nuclear security. And through its information sharing initiative, Project Geiger, workshops, training courses and exercises, as well as support to operations such as failsafe, conduit and stone, Interpol will help to contribute to make an important contribution to this international effort. This draws to the closing of the Global Counter Nuclear Smuggling Conference which has seen a number of experts in this highly specialised field come here to Leon to share their experiences and knowledge with you and us. You are the experts most likely to conduct an counter nuclear smuggling investigation or command and operation to support such an investigation. Please take home with you the lessons learnt over the past three days, the contacts that you have made and the assurance of Interpol's support and assistance to you 24-7. So on behalf of the Secretary-General, Jürgen Stock, I would like to extend Interpol's gratitude to all of you for supplying your support to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material. I wish you all a safe journey home or as we say in France, bon voyage. Thank you.