 Question 156 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secundae, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of temperance. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 156 of Incontinence, in four articles. We must now consider incontinence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry. First, whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body. Second, whether incontinence is a sin. Third, the comparison between incontinence and intemperance. Fourth, which is the worse, incontinence in anger or incontinence in desire? First article, whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body. Objection one, you would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence. For the philosopher says in Ethics 7.5 that women are not described either as incontinence or as incontinence. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. Objection two further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament. For the philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 that it is especially people of a quick or caloric and atrebilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire. Therefore incontinence regards the body. Objection three further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent because the flesh lusteth against the spirit and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul. On the contrary, man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continents and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continents nor incontinence to the beasts as the philosopher states in Ethics 7.3. Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul. I answer that things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence. Since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite, which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof. Since so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If however the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who become insane through the vehements of their passions, the essential conditions of continents or incontinence cease because such people do not retain the judgment of reason which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways according to the philosopher in Ethics 7.7. First, when the soul yields to the passions before the reason has given its counsel and this is called unbridled incontinence or impetuosity. Secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counseled through holding weakly to reason's judgment wherefor this kind of incontinence is called weakness. Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul. Reply to Objection 1. The human soul is the form of the body and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will insofar as the intellect receives from the senses and the will is urged by the passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman as regards the body has a weak temperament the result is that for the most part whatever she holds to she holds to it weakly. Although in rare cases the opposite occurs according to Proverbs 31-10 who shall find a valiant woman and since small and weak things are accounted as though they were not according to Aristotle in his physics 2-5 the philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that we do not describe women as being continent because they are vacillating through being unstable of reason and are easily led so that they follow their passions readily. Reply to Objection 2. It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness as in bilious persons or from its vehemence as in the melancholic one account of their earthly temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so on the other hand a man fails to stand to that which is counseled because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament as we have stated with regard to woman in the first reply. This is also the case with flagmatic temperaments for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence as stated above. Reply to Objection 3. In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit not necessarily but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly. Second article whether incontinence is a sin. Objection 1. He would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says in On the Free Will 3.18 No man sins in what he cannot avoid. Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence according to Wisdom 8.21 I know that I could not be continent except God gave it. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. Objection 2. Apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. Objection 3. Further no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love. For Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4 that Paul through incontinence of divine love exclaimed I live not now I. In Galatians 2.20 Therefore incontinence is not a sin. On the contrary it is numbered together with other sins in 2 Timothy 3.3 where it is written slanderers incontinent unmerciful etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin. I answer that incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch even as in temperance is as we have said in reference to continence in question 155 article 2. In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons. First because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason. Secondly because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 7.4 that incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong that is by straying from reason but also because it is wicked that is by following evil desires. Secondly incontinence about a matter is considered properly in as much as it is astraying from reason but not simply for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honour, riches and so forth which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence not simply but relatively even as we have said above in reference to continence in question 155 article 2.3 reply. In this way incontinence is a sin not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable. Thirdly incontinence is said to be about a matter not properly but metaphorically for instance about the desire for things of which one cannot make an evil use such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin but pertains to the perfection of virtue. Reply to Objection 1 Man can avoid sin and do good yet not without God's help according to John 155 Without me you can do nothing where for the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent does not show incontinence to be no sin for as stated in Ethics 3.3 What we can do by means of a friend we do in a way ourselves. Reply to Objection 2 The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man not necessarily for then he would commit no sin but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason Reply to Objection 3 This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly. 3rd Article Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate Objection 1 it would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate for seemingly the more a man acts against his conscience the more gravely he sins according to Luke 1247 That servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not shall be beaten with many stripes Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because according to Ethics 7.3 the incontinent man though knowing how wicked are the things he desires nevertheless acts through passion whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate Objection 2 further apparently the graver a sin is the more incurable it is therefore the sins against the Holy Ghost being most grave are declared to be unpardonable now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance for a person sin is cured by admonishment and correction which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man since he knows he is doing wrong and does wrong notwithstanding whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well so that it were good for him to be admonished therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate Objection 3 further the more eagerly man sins the more grievous his sin now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires which the intemperate man does not always have therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate on the contrary impenitence aggravates every sin where for Augustine says that impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost now according to the philosopher in Ethics 7-8 the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent for he holds on to his choice but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent I answer that according to Augustine in On the Two Souls 10 and 11 sin is chiefly an act of the will because by the will we sin and live a right also according to his retractions 1-9 consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin there is graver sin now in the intemperate man the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom whereas in the incontinent man the will is inclined to sin through a passion and since a passion soon passes whereas a habit is a disposition difficult to remove the result is that the incontinent man repents at once as soon as the passion has passed but not so the intemperate man in fact he rejoices in having sinned because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit wherefore in reference to such persons it is written in Proverbs 2.14 that they are glad when they have done evil and rejoice in most wicked things hence it follows that the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent as also the philosopher declares in Ethics 7-7 Reply to Objection 1 Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it and then the greater the ignorance the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin insofar as it renders it involuntary On the other hand ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite and then such like ignorance the greater it is the graver the sin because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something either by passion as in the incontinent or by habit as in the intemperate Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent in one respect as regards duration since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing on account of the endurance of the habit wherefor it is likened to Thesis or an iconic disease as the philosopher says in Ethics 7-8 In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored for the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice insofar as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is about the end itself in as much as he judges this thing good in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 7-8 that the incontinent man is better than the intemperate because he retains the best principle Translators note The best thing that is the principle To wit the right estimate of the end Reply to Objection 2 mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction which induce him to begin to resist his desires so that concupiscence is weakened as stated above in Question 142 Article 2 By these same means the intemperate man can be cured but his curing is more difficult for two reasons The first is on the part of reason which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who heirs as to the principle and it is the same in practical matters with one who heirs in regard to the end The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit which is more difficult to remove whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion which is more easily suppressed Reply to Objection 3 The eagerness of the will which increases a sin is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent as explained above But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 that we blame more the intemperate man because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm that is slight desire For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion? Fourth article Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire Objection 1 It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire For the more difficult it is to resist the passion the less grievous apparently is incontinence Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 7.7 It is not wonderful indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains Now as Heraclitus says it is more difficult to resist than anger as cited in Ethics 2.3 Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger Objection 2 Further one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason as in the case of one who has become demented through passion Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason than one who is incontinent in desire Since anger listens to reason somewhat but desire does not as the philosopher states in Ethics 7.6 Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire Objection 3 Therefore the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous since it leads a man to a greater sin namely murder for this is a more grievous sin than adultery to which incontinence of desire leads Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 7.6 that incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire I answer that the sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways First on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger There are four reasons for this and the philosopher indicates them in Ethics 7.6 First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him and reason dictates this in a certain degree yet he does not tend there too perfectly because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance On the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and no wise in accord with reason Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent Wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly whereas concupiscence is feigned to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous because it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor Reply to Objection 1 It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger because concupiscence is enduring but for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger on account of its impetuousness Reply to Objection 2 Concupiscence is stated to be without reason not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason but because no wise does it follow the judgment of reason and for this reason it is more disgraceful Reply to Objection 3 This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result End of Question 156 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 157 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is the LibriVox Recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance by Saint Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 157 of Clemency and Meekness in four articles We must next consider Clemency and Meekness and the contrary vices Concerning the virtues themselves, there are four points of inquiry First, whether Clemency and Meekness are altogether identical Second, whether each of them is a virtue Third, whether each is a part of temperance Fourth, of their comparison with the other virtues First article, whether Clemency and Meekness are absolutely the same Objection 1 It would seem that Clemency and Meekness are absolutely the same For Meekness moderates anger according to the philosopher in Ethics 4.5 Now, anger is Desire of Vengeance according to Aristotle in his rhetoric 2.2 Since then, Clemency is leniency of a superior inflicting punishment on an inferior as Sinecta states in On Clemency 2.3 And Vengeance is taken by means of punishment It would seem that Clemency and Meekness are the same Objection 2 further Tully says in On the Art of Rhetoric 2.54 that Clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person So that apparently Clemency moderates hatred Now according to Augustine in his letter 2.11 Hatred is caused by anger and this is the matter of Meekness and Clemency Therefore, seemingly Clemency and Meekness are absolutely the same Objection 3 further The same vice is not opposed to different virtues but the same vice namely cruelty is opposed to Meekness and Clemency Therefore, it seems that Meekness and Clemency are absolutely the same On the contrary, according to the aforesaid definition of Sinecta in Objection 1 Clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior whereas Meekness is not merely a superior to inferior but of each to everyone Therefore, Meekness and Clemency are not absolutely the same I answer that as stated in Ethics 2.3 A moral virtue is about passions and actions Now internal passions are principles of external actions and are likewise obstacles there too Wherefore virtues that moderate passions to a certain extent concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions although they differ specifically Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft Whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money which is restrained by liberality So that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect which is abstention from theft This applies to the case in point because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment and this might be prevented by excessive anger Consequently, Meekness insofar as it restrains the onslaught of anger concurs with clemency towards the same effect Yet they differ from one another in as much as clemency moderates external punishment while Meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger Reply to Objection 1 Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance Reply to Objection 2 Man's affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter's punishment in itself but only as directed to something else for instance justice or the correction of the person punished Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment and this pertains to clemency while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation For this reason Tully says that the mind provoked to hatred that is to punish too severely is restrained by clemency from inflicting too severe a punishment so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment Reply to Objection 3 The vice of anger which denotes excess in the passion of anger is properly opposed to Meekness which is directly concerned with the passion of anger while cruelty denotes excess in punishing wherefore Seneca says in on clemency 2,4 that those are called cruel who have reason for punishing but lack moderation in punishing those who delight in a man's punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another Second article whether both clemency and meekness are virtues Objection 1 it would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue for no virtue is opposed to another virtue yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity which is a virtue therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue Objection 2 further Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect according to Ethics 2,2 but both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease for clemency decreases punishment and meekness decreases anger therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue Objection 3 further meekness or mildness is included among the beatitudes according to Matthew 5,4 and in Galatians 5,23 among the fruits now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and the fruits therefore they are not comprised under virtue on the contrary Seneca says in on clemency 2,5 every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man since virtue it is that makes its possessor good and renders his works good also according to Ethics 2,6 therefore clemency and meekness are virtues I answer that the nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason as the philosopher declares in Ethics 1,13 now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness for clemency in mitigating punishment is guided by reason according to Seneca in on clemency 2,5 and meekness likewise moderates anger according to right reason as stated in Ethics 4,5 therefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues reply to Objection 1 meekness is not directly opposed to severity for meekness is about anger on the other hand severity regards the external inflection of punishment so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency which also regards external punishing as stated above in Article 1 yet they are not really opposed to one another since they are both according to right reason for severity is inflexible in the inflection of punishment when right reason requires it while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason when and where this is requisite therefore they are not opposed to one another as though they are not about the same thing reply to Objection 2 according to the philosopher in Ethics 4,5 the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger and is designated by the name of meekness for the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him than to be lacking in that desire since scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself as Salist observes as to clemency it mitigates punishment not in respect of that which is according to right reason but as regards that which is according to common law which is the object of legal justice yet on account of some particular consideration it mitigates the punishment deciding as it were that a man is not to be punished any further hence Seneca says on clemency 2,1 clemency grants this in the first place that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon wherefor it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity the Greek epikei to legal justice whereof severity is a part as regards the inflection of punishment in accordance with the law yet clemency differs from equity as we shall state further on in article 3 first reply reply to objection 3 the beatitudes are acts of virtue while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts wherefor nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue and beatitude and fruit third article whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance objection 1 it would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance for clemency mitigates punishment as stated above in article 2 but the philosopher in ethics 5,10 ascribes this to equity which pertains to justice as stated above in question 120 article 2 therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance objection 2 further temperance is concerned with concupiscences whereas meekness and clemency regard not concupiscences but anger and vengeance therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance objection 3 further Seneca says in on clemency 2,4 a man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty now this is opposed to clemency and meekness since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance on the contrary Seneca says in on clemency 2,3 that clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge Tully also in his on the art of rhetoric 254 reckons clemency a part of temperance I answer that parts are assigned to the principal virtues insofar as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain equality those of fortitude in a certain strength of mind those of temperance in a certain restraint in as much as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch now clemency and meekness likewise consists in a certain restraint since clemency mitigates punishment while meekness represses anger as stated above in articles 1 and 2 therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof reply to objection 1 two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the law giver's intention although not according to the letter of the law and in this respect it pertains to equity the other point is a certain moderation of a man's inward disposition so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment this belongs properly to clemency wherefore Seneca says in on clemency 2.3 that it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge this moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another wherefore Seneca says in on clemency 2.3 that clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul for on the other hand there would seem to be a certain roughness of the soul in one who fears not to pain others reply to objection 2 the annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue which is so to speak a kind of form of the virtue rather than on the matter now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode as stated above though they agree not in matter reply to objection 3 unsoundness is corruption of soundness now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species this occurs both in respect of the reason as when a man loses the use of reason and in respect of the appetitive power as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby every man is naturally friendly towards all other men according to ethics 8.1 the unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence but that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency 4. article whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues objection 1 you would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues for virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness and insists in the knowledge of God now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God for it is written in James 1.21 with meekness receive the ingrafted word and in Ecclesiasticus 5.13 be meek to hear the word of God again Dionysius says in his letter 8 to demophilus that Moses was deemed worthy of the divine apparition on account of his great meekness therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues objection 2 further seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1.34 and 35 that which is agreeable to God is faith and meekness where for Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto himself in Matthew 11.29 where he says learn of me because I am meek and humble of heart and Hilary declares in his commentary on Matthew 4.3 that Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul again it is most acceptable to men where for it is written in Ecclesiasticus 3.19 my son do thy works in meekness and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men for which reason it is also declared in Proverbs 20.28 that the king's throne is strengthened by clemency therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues objection 3 further Augustine says in his commentary on the Sermon of the Mount 1.2 that the meek are they who yield to reproaches and resist not evil but overcome evil by good now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues because a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Timothy 4.8 piety is profitable to all things observes that piety is the sum total of the Christian religion therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues on the contrary they are not reckoned as principal virtues but are annexed to another as to a principal virtue I answer that nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest not indeed simply nor in every respect but in a particular genus it is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil by mitigating anger or punishment now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil where for those virtues like faith, hope, charity and likewise prudence and justice which direct one to good simply are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations for anger which is mitigated by meekness is on account of its impetuousness a very great obstacle to man's free judgment of truth where for meekness above all makes a man self-possessed hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 1031 my son, keep thy soul in meekness yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful and harass more incessantly for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue as stated above in question 141 article 7 second reply as to clemency in as much as it mitigates punishment it would seem to approach nearest to charity the greatest of the virtues since thereby we do good towards our neighbor and hinder his evil reply to objection 1 meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God by removing an obstacle and this in two ways first because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger as stated above secondly because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth which many do through being disturbed by anger where for Augustine says in Unchristian Doctrine 2.7 to be meek is not to contradict holy writ whether we understand it if it condemn our evil ways or understand it not as though we might not know better and have a clearer insight of the truth reply to objection 2 meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and man insofar as they concur with charity the greatest of the virtues towards the same effect namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils reply to objection 3 mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect namely the mitigation of our neighbor's evils nevertheless they differ as to motive for piety relieves a neighbor's evil through reverence for a superior for instance God or one's parents mercy relieves a neighbor's evil because this evil is displeasing to one insofar as one looks upon it as affecting oneself as stated above in question 30 article 2 and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things meekness does this by removing anger that urges to vengeance and clemency does this through leniency of soul insofar as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished End of question 157 Read by Michael Shane Greg Lambert L.C. Question 158 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance by St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 158 of Anger in 8 articles We must next consider the contrary vices 1. Anger that is opposed to meekness 2. Cruelty that is opposed to clemency Concerning anger, there are 8 points of inquiry First, whether it is lawful to be angry Second, whether anger is a sin Third, whether it is a mortal sin Fourth, whether it is the most grievous of sins Fifth, of its species Sixth, whether anger is a capital vice Seventh, of its daughters Eighth, whether it has a contrary vice First article, whether it is lawful to be angry Objection one, it would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry For Jerome, in his exposition on Matthew 522 Whosoever is angry with his brother, etc., says Some codices add, without cause However, in the genuine codices, the sentence is unqualified And anger is forbidden altogether Therefore, it is no wise lawful to be angry Objection two, further According to Dionysius, in On the Divine Names 4 The soul's evil is to be without reason Now anger is always without reason For the philosopher says in Ethics 7.6 that Anger does not listen perfectly to reason And Gregory says in his commentary on Job 545 that When anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul It mangles and rands it by its riot And Caycean says in On the Institution of Marriage 8.6 From whatever cause it arises The angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind Therefore, it is always evil to be angry Objection three, further Anger is desire for revenge According to Aristotle, in his rhetoric 2.2 And as according to the gloss on Leviticus 19.17 Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance Since there should be left to God According to Deuteronomy 32.35 Revenge is mine Therefore, it would seem that to be angry is always an evil Objection four, further All that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God Since God judges with tranquility according to Wisdom 12.18 Therefore, to be angry is always an evil On the contrary, Chrysostom says He that is angry without cause shall be in danger But he that is angry with cause shall not be in danger For without anger teaching will be useless Judgments unstable, crimes unchecked Therefore, to be angry is not always an evil I answer that, properly speaking Anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite And gives its name to the irascible power as stated above In the parts Prima Secunde, question 46 article 1 When we were treating of the passions Now with regard to the passions of the soul It is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways First, by reason of the passions of the very species Which is derived from the passions object Thus envy in respect of its species denotes an evil Since it is displeasure at another's good And such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason Wherefore, as the philosopher remarks in Ethics 2.6 The very mention of envy denotes something evil Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge Since revenge may be desired both well and ill Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passions quantity That is, in respect of its excess or deficiency And thus evil may be found in anger when to it One is angry more or less than right reason demands But if one is angry in accordance with right reason One's anger is deserving of praise Reply to Objection 1 The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions As emotions opposed to the order of reason And accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil As stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde, Question 24, Article 2 When we were treating of the passions It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger For he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's neighbor With the intent of doing him a wrong But according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Agustin inclines For example, in On the City of God 9.4 Anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite Whether they be moderated or not according to reason And in this sense anger is not always evil Reply to Objection 2 Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason First, antecedently In this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude And has therefore the character of evil Secondly, consequently In as much as the movement of the sensitive appetite Is directed against vice and in accordance with reason This anger is good and is called zealous anger Wherefore Gregory says in his commentary on Job 5.45 We must beware lest when we use anger as an instrument of virtue It overrule the mind and go before it as its mistress Instead of following in reason's train ever ready as its handmaid to obey This latter anger, although it hinders somewhat the judgment of reason In the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason Hence Gregory says in his commentary on Job 5.45 that Zealous anger troubles the eye of reason Whereas sinful anger blinds it Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted In the execution of what reason has deliberated Since art also would be hindered in its act If it were to deliberate about what has to be done While having to act Reply to Objection 3 It is unlawful to desire vengeance Considered as evil to the man who is to be punished But it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance As a corrective of vice and for the good of justice And to this the sensitive appetite can tend Insofar as it is moved thereto by the reason And when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment It is God's work, since he who has power to punish Is God's minister, as stated in Romans 13.4 Reply to Objection 4 We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good But we cannot be altogether likened to him in the mode of our desire Since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us The movement of which has to obey reason Wherefore Gregory says in his commentary on Job 545 that Anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice When it bows to the command of reason Second article Whether anger is a sin Objection 1 You would seem that anger is not a sin For we demerit by sinning But we do not demerit by the passions Even as neither do we incur blame thereby As stated in Ethics 2.5 Consequently no passion is a sin Now anger is a passion as stated above in the Pars Prima Secunde Question 46 Article 1 In the triates he's on the passions Therefore anger is not a sin Objection 2 further In every sin there is conversion to some mutable good But in anger there is conversion Not to a mutable good, but to a person's evil Therefore anger is not a sin Objection 3 further No man sins in what he cannot avoid As Augustine asserts in On the Free Will 318 But man cannot avoid anger For a gloss on Psalm 4 verse 5 Be ye angry and sin not says The movement of anger is not in our power Again the philosopher asserts in Ethics 7.6 that The angry man acts with displeasure Now displeasure is contrary to the will Therefore anger is not a sin Objection 4 further Sin is contrary to nature according to Damocene In On the True Faith 2, 4 and 30 But it is not contrary to man's nature to be angry And it is the natural act of a power Namely the irascible Wherefore Jerome says in a letter Is letter 12 to the monk Anthony that To be angry is the property of man Therefore it is not a sin to be angry On the contrary the apostle says in Ephesians 4 verse 31 Let all indignation and anger be put away from you I answer that anger as stated above in article 1 Is properly the name of a passion A passion of the sensitive appetite is good Insofar as it is regulated by reason Whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside Now the order of reason in regard to anger May be considered in relation to two things First in relation to the appetable object To which anger tends and that is revenge Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken In accordance with the order of reason The desire of anger is praiseworthy And is called zealous anger On the other hand if one desire the taking of vengeance In any way whatever contrary to the order of reason For instance if he desire the punishment of one Who has not deserved it or beyond his deserts Or again contrary to the order prescribed by law Or not for the due end Namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults Then the desire of anger will be sinful And this is called sinful anger Secondly the order of reason in regard to anger May be considered in relation to the mode of being angry Namely that the movement of anger Should not be immoderately fierce Neither internally nor externally And if this condition be disregarded Anger will not lack sin Even though just vengeance be desired Reply to objection one Since passion may be either regulated Or not regulated by reason It follows that a passion considered absolutely Does not include the notion of merit or demerit Of praise or blame But as regulated by reason It may be something meritorious and deserving of praise While on the other hand as not regulated by reason It may be demeritorious and blame worthy Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 2.5 that It is he who is angry in a certain way That is praised or blamed Reply to objection two The angry man desires the evil of another Not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge Towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good Reply to objection three Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason Wherefore as to the movements that first stall that judgment It is not in man's power to prevent them as a whole That is so that none of them arise Although his reason is able to check each one if it arise Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger Is not in man's power to the extent namely That no such movements arise Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power It is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate The statement of the philosopher that The angry man acts with displeasure Means that he is displeased Not with his being angry but with the injury which he deems done to himself And through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance Reply to objection four The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason Wherefore its act is natural to man Insofar as it is in accord with reason And insofar as it is against his reason It is contrary to man's nature Third article Whether all anger is a mortal sin Objection one It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin For it is written in Job 5 to Anger killeth the foolish man And he speaks of the spiritual killing Whence mortal sin takes its name Therefore all anger is a mortal sin Objection two further Nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation Now anger deserves eternal condemnation For our Lord said in Matthew 522 Whosoever is angry with his brother Shall be in danger of the judgment And a gloss on this passage says that The three things mentioned there Namely judgment, counsel, and hellfire Signify in a pointed manner Different abodes in the state of eternal damnation Corresponding to various sins Therefore anger is a mortal sin Objection three further Whosoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin Now anger is of itself contrary to charity As Jerome declares in his commentary on Matthew 522 Whosoever is angry with his brother, etc. Where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor Therefore anger is a mortal sin On the contrary A gloss on Psalm 4 verse 5 Be ye angry and sin not, says Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action I answer that The movement of anger may be inordinate And sinful in two ways As stated above in Article 2 First on the part of the appetable object As when one desires unjust revenge And thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus Because it is contrary to charity and justice Nevertheless, such like anger may happen to be a venial sin By reason of the imperfection of the act This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject Desirous of vengeance As when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason Or in relation to the desired object As when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter Which should be deemed of no account So that even if one proceeded to action It would not be a mortal sin For instance, by pulling a child slightly by the hair Or by some other like action Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate In the mode of being angry For instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly Or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger In this way, anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus Yet it may happen to be a mortal sin For instance, if through the fierceness of his anger A man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor Reply to Objection 1 It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin But that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger Because through not checking the movement of anger by their reason They fall into mortal sins For instance, by blaspheming God Or by doing injury to their neighbor Reply to Objection 2 Our Lord said this of anger by way of addition to the words of the law Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment As stated in Matthew 5.21 Consequently, our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger Wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor And should the consent of reason be given to this desire Without doubt it will be a mortal sin Reply to Objection 3 In the case where anger is contrary to charity It is a mortal sin But it is not always so as appears from what we have said Fourth article Whether anger is the most grievous sin Objection 1 It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin For Chrysostom says that Nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man And nothing uglier than a ruthless face And most of all than a cruel soul Therefore anger is the most grievous sin Objection 2 further The more hurtful a sin is The worst it would seem to be Since according to Augustine in his Incaridian 12 A thing is said to be evil because it hurts Now anger is most hurtful Because it deprives man of his reason Whereby he is master of himself For Chrysostom says in his Hummelie 48 on John That anger differs in no way from madness It is a demon while it lasts Indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon Therefore anger is the most grievous sin Objection 3 further Inward movements are judged according to their outward effects Now the effect of anger is murder Which is a most grievous sin Therefore anger is a most grievous sin On the contrary Anger is compared to hatred as the moat to the beam For Augustine says in his Rule As recorded in his letter 211 Lest anger grow into hatred And a moat become a beam Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin I answer that as stated above in articles 1 and 2 The inordinateness of anger is considered in a two-fold respect Namely with regard to an undue object And with regard to an undue mode of being angry As to the appetable object which it desires Anger would seem to be the least of sins For anger desires the evil of punishment for some person Under the aspect of a good that is vengeance Hence on the part of the evil which it desires The sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor Such as envy and hatred But while hatred desires absolutely another's evil as such And the envious man desires another's evil through desire of his own glory The angry man desires another's evil under the aspect of just revenge Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy And envy than anger Since it is worse to desire evil as an evil than as a good And to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory Than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice On the part of the good under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil Anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good In this respect again, absolutely speaking The sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence According as the good of justice which the angry man desires Is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence Wherefore the philosopher says in Ethics 7.4 that The incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger On the other hand, as to the inordinateness with regards the mode of being angry Anger would seem to have a certain preeminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement According to Proverbs 27.4 Anger hath no mercy nor fury when it breaketh forth And who can bear the violence of one provoked? Hence Gregory says in his commentary on Job 5.45 The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed The body trembles, the tongue entangles itself The face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged And fail utterly to recognize those whom we know The tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance Reply to Objection 1 Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger Reply to Objection 2 This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger that results from its impetuousness, as stated above Reply to Objection 3 Murder results from hatred, and envy no less than from anger Yet anger is less grievous in as much as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated above Fifth article Whether the philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger Objection 1 You would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the philosopher in Ethics 4.5 Where he says that some angry persons are choleric, some sullen, and some ill-tempered or stern According to him, a person is said to be sullen, whose anger is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances Objection 2 further Aristotle says in Ethics 4.5 that ill-tempered or stern persons are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge or punishment Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness Objection 3 further Our Lord mentions three degrees of anger when he says in Matthew 5.22 Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment And whosoever shall say to his brother, Raka shall be in danger of the council And whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool is in danger of Hellfire But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting On the contrary Gregory of Nissa says there are three species of irrationality Namely the anger which is called wrath and ill-will which is a disease of the mind and ranker Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid For wrath he describes as having beginning and movement And the philosopher in Ethics 4.5 ascribes this to caloric persons Ill-will he describes as an anger that endures and grows old And this the philosopher ascribes to sullenness While he describes ranker as reckoning the time for vengeance Which tallies with the philosopher's description of the ill-tempered The same division is given by Damascene in On the True Faith 2.16 Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the philosopher is not unfitting I answer that the aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion or to the sin itself of anger We have already stated when treating of the passions in the Parse Prima Secundae question 46 article 8 How it is to be applied to the passion of anger And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nissa and Damascene had in view Here however we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger And as set down by the philosopher For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things First in relation to the origin of anger And this regards caloric persons who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause Secondly in relation to the duration of anger for that anger endures too long And this may happen in two ways In one way because the cause of anger to wit the inflicted injury remains too long in a man's memory The result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure Wherefore he is grievous and sullen to himself In another way it happens on the part of vengeance which a man seeks with a stubborn desire This applies to ill-tempered or stern people who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment Reply to Objection 1 It is not time but a man's propensity to anger or his pertenacity in anger That is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species Reply to Objection 2 Both sullen and ill-tempered people have a long lasting anger but for different reasons For a sullen person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure which he holds locked in his breast And as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger others cannot reason him out of it Nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger ceases On the other hand the anger of ill-tempered persons is long lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge So that it does not wear out with time and can be quelled only by revenge Reply to Objection 3 The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the distinct species of anger but correspond to the course of the Human Act Confer the Pars Prima Secunde, Question 46, Article 8, Third Objection For the first degree is an inward conception and in reference to this he says Whosoever is angry with his brother the second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs even before it breaks out into effect And in reference to this he says Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raka, which is an angry exclamation The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect Now the effect of anger is another's hurt under the aspect of revenge And the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word Wherefore in reference to this he says Whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first and the third to both the others So that if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord as stated above in Article 3, Second Reply Much more so are the others Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them In the first case judgment is assigned and this is the least severe For as Augustine says in his On the Sermon of the Mount 1-9 Where judgment is to be delivered there is an opportunity for defense In the second case counsel is assigned Whereby the judge deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted To the third case is assigned hellfire that is decisive condemnation Sixth Article Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices Objection 1 You would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice Objection 2 further Hatred is a graver sin than anger Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger Objection 3 further A gloss on Proverbs 29-22 An angry man provoketh quarrels says Anger is the door to all vices If it be closed peace is ensured within to all the virtues If it be opened the soul is armed for every crime Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins but only of certain definite ones Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices On the contrary Gregory in his commentary on Job 31-45 Places anger among the capital vices I answer that as stated above in the parts Prima Secunde question 84 articles 3 and 4 A capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability Insofar as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest Which is attractive by its excellence as stated above in article 4 Translators note honesty must be taken here in its broad sense As synonymous with moral goodness from the point of view of decorum Confer question 145 article 1, end of note The second is on the part of its impetuosity Whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice Reply to objection 1 The sorrow when anger arises is not for the most part the vice of sloth But the passion of sorrow which results from an injury inflicted Reply to objection 2 As stated above in question 118 article 7 Question 148 article 5 Question 153 article 4 As well as in the parts Prima Secunde question 84 article 4 It belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end So that many sins are committed through the desire thereof Now anger which desires evil under the aspect of good Has a more desirable end than hatred has Since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil Wherefor anger is more a capital vice than hatred is Reply to objection 3 Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally That is by removing obstacles By hindering the judgment of reason whereby man is withdrawn from evil It is however directly the cause of certain special sins Which are called its daughters 7th article Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger Objection 1 It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger Namely quarreling, swelling of the mind Contumely, clamour, indignation and blasphemy For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore In his questions on Deuteronomy question 16 To be a daughter of pride Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger Objection 2 further Hatred is born of anger as Augustine says in his rule His letter 211 Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger Objection 3 further A swollen mind would seem to be the same as pride Now pride is not the daughter of a vice but the mother of all vices As Gregory states in his commentary on Job 3145 Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger On the contrary, Gregory in his commentary on Job 3145 Assigns these daughters to anger I answer that anger may be considered in three ways First as consisting in thought and thus two vices arise from anger One is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry And whom he deems unworthy, indignum of acting thus towards him And this is called indignation The other vice is on the part of the man himself Insofar as he devises various means of vengeance And with such like thoughts fills his mind according to Job 152 Will a wise man fill his stomach with burning heat And thus we have swelling of the mind Secondly, anger may be considered as expressed in words And thus a two-fold disorder arises from anger One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech As stated above in Article 5, 3rd reply of the man who says to his brother Raka And this refers to clamour, which denotes disorderly and confused speech The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words And if these be against God, it is blasphemy If against one's neighbour, it is contumely Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds And thus anger gives rise to quarrels By which we are to understand all manners of injuries inflicted on one's neighbour through anger Reply to Objection 1 The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride Whereby a man lifts himself up against God Since, according to Ecclesiasticus 1014 The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God That is, to fall away from reverence for him is the first part of pride Confer question 162, Article 7, 2nd reply And this gives rise to blasphemy But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind proceeds from anger Reply to Objection 2 Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause From which it arises more directly, namely displeasure Even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred Therefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger Reply to Objection 3 Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride But for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance And daring is a vice opposed to fortitude 8th article Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger Objection 1 It seems that there is not a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger For no vice makes us like to God Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God who judges with tranquility according to Wisdom 1218 Therefore, seemingly, it is not a vice to be altogether without anger Objection 2 further It is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger In his On Anger 1, 9 and following Therefore, it seems that lack of anger is not a vice Objection 3 further According to Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4 Man's evil is to be without reason Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired if all movement of anger be done away Therefore, no lack of anger amounts to a vice On the contrary, Chrysostom says He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices It fosters negligence, it incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong I answer that anger may be understood in two ways In one way as a simple movement of the will Whereby one inflicts punishment not through passion but in virtue of a judgment of the reason And thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom for he says in his homily 11 on Matthew Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion And when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion Wherefore he is said to judge not to be angry In another way, anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite Which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation This movement is a necessary sequel in man to the movement of his will Since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite unless there be an obstacle Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether Unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak Consequently, lack of the passion of anger is also a vice Even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason Reply to Objection 1 He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry Imitates God as to lack of passion but not as to God's punishing by judgment Reply to Objection 2 The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite Is useful as being conducive to the more prompt execution of reasons dictate Confer the parts Prima Sukunde question 24 article 3 Else the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose whereas nature does nothing without purpose According to Aristotle in On the Heavens 1.4 Reply to Objection 3 When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will But also of the passion in the sensitive appetite as stated above Wherefore, just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed So the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking End of question 158 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC Question 159 of Summa Theologica Sukunda Sukunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Sukunda Sukunde Triates on the Cardinal Virtues The Virtue of Temperance By St. Thomas Aquinas Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province Question 159 of Cruelty in two articles We must now consider cruelty under which head there are two points of inquiry First, whether cruelty is opposed to clemency Second, of its comparison with savagery or brutality First article, whether cruelty is opposed to clemency Objection one, it would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency For Seneca says in On Clemency 2.4 that Those are said to be cruel, who exceed in punishing Which is contrary to justice Now clemency is reckoned apart, not of justice, but of temperance Therefore, apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency Objection two further, it is written in Jeremiah 6.23 They are cruel and will have no mercy So that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy Now mercy is not the same as clemency as stated above In question 157 article 4, third reply Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency Objection three further, clemency is concerned with the Infliction of punishment as stated above in question 157 article 1 Whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence According to Proverbs 11.17 But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency On the contrary, Seneca says in On Clemency 2.4 that The opposite of clemency is cruelty Which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment I answer that cruelty apparently takes this name from Cruditas, rawness Now justice things when cooked and prepared are want to have an agreeable and sweet savor So when raw, they have a disagreeable and bitter taste Now it has been stated above in question 157 article 3 First reply as well as in article 4, third reply That clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of the soul Whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency Reply to Objection 1 Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason While the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency So too, excess in punishing as regards the external action Belongs to injustice But as regards the hardness of heart Which makes one ready to increase punishment Belongs to cruelty Reply to Objection 2 Mercy and clemency concur in this That both shun and recoil from another's unhappiness But in different ways For it belongs to mercy to relieve another's unhappiness by a beneficent action While it belongs to clemency to mitigate another's unhappiness By the cessation of punishment And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment It is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy Yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues Cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness Reply to Objection 3 Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness Which is lack of beneficence We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment Second article Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality Objection 1 It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same Objection 2 further Is it or says in his etymologies 10 that Severity is, as it were, savagery with verity Because it holds to justice without attending to piety So that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment In delivering judgment which is demanded by piety Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty In article 1 first reply Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery Objection 3 further Just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess So is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency Which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean And to the vice which is in excess Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery Namely remission or laxity For Gregory says in his commentary on Job 25 Let there be love but not that which enervates Let there be severity but without fury Let there be zeal without unseemly savagery Let there be piety without undue clemency Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty On the contrary Seneca says in On Clemency 2.4 that A man who is angry without being hurt Or with one who has not offended him Is not said to be cruel but to be brutal or savage I answer that savagery and brutality take their names from a likeness to wild beasts Which are also described as savage For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body And not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone Wherefore properly speaking brutality or savagery Applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished But merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality For such like pleasure is not human but bestial And resulting as it does either from evil custom Or from a corrupt nature as do other bestial emotions On the other hand cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished But exceeds in the mode of punishing Wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality As human wickedness differs from bestiality as stated in Ethics 7.5 Reply to Objection 1 Clemency is a human virtue Wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality Wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency but to a more excellent virtue Which the philosopher in Ethics 7.5 calls heroic or godlike Which according to us would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety Reply to Objection 2 A severe man is not said to be simply savage because this implies a vice But he is said to be savage as regards the truth On account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment Reply to Objection 3 Remission of punishment is not a vice except it disregard the order of justice Which requires a man to be punished on account of his offence and which cruelty exceeds On the other hand cruelty disregards this order altogether Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty but not to savagery End of question 159 Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC