 We have time for maybe one or two questions, but first, Aarild, could you give an example of what an example of red, I mean, we can imagine the ice cream thing, but how is it in real life when it comes to deforestation? How could it be? I mean, a big example of what Norway signed with the agreement in 2010 with Indonesia was a two-year moratorium. So basically a ban, no new licenses for converting forests, natural forests, I should add, to other land uses for two years. So no new concessions. So how did they check that? Satellite monitoring, and well, the licenses are issued by the Ministry of Forestry, so they just simply don't do it. They don't sign any new licenses, that's the idea. They signed a lot before this, took effect, but that's another case. Then they get the money or the aid afterwards when you have proven, or is that the idea? That's a good point because aid organizations, generally, they would like to see the receipts. How were the monies paid, spent? And that was a debate in the Brazilian case. Brazil have the results, but NORAD and the government of Norway, they want to see the receipts. How have you spent the money? So the project's approved, so it's both a result-based and a receipt-based system, which is... Is that good? It's two different ways of thinking, and I would have been a bit schizophrenic if I was the Minister of Environment and Development. So we are glad you're not. Please, do you have any questions from the audience? To follow up on this, Roger Williamson Institute of Development Studies, much of the logging, etc., in Brazil is illegal. Now, do you make the government responsible for illegal activity? Because, by definition, the forests aren't in the capital city. They're in inaccessible areas. So is it right to punish a government for its inability, actually, to enforce a good policy? Okay, that's one. And the second question? I know it's a question from Ghana. Janik, what has worked and what hasn't worked? You said what hasn't worked as finance. How effective is the country-level governance of aid to developing countries? Thank you. So, let's start with Aril. If you have a national system, yes, the government is responsible for everything that happens within the national border. So, yes, they would be responsible also for the illegal part. Now, second question of whether you, if they reduce it, should you compensate for a reduction of illegal activities? And probably not. But in our national system, yes, governments are responsible also for that. Thank you. Janik? Yeah, the first, why do I believe that climate finance doesn't work is because all these profusions of instruments, it's a bit like the equatorial forest. The equatorial forest actually stands on extraordinary poor, feralitic soil. And that's the same thing with climate finance. You have plenty of different instruments because you don't have a lot of money at the end. And it's one major reason for inefficiency. Now, how efficient is disbursement at the local level, at the national level? It's this issue is one of the major drive behind the idea of performance-based payment where you pay only for effective aid. And as example, in addition to red, you have carbon markets, you have green kilowatt hour, where you pay only for the kilowatt hour, et cetera. You have plenty of different instruments. I'm a bit concerned, like Ariel, about too much focus on performance-based payment because actually it's often more efficient to change a policy framework and to eliminate risk than to compensate for risk through performance-based payment. So the efficiency of aid in a given country will depend on the form of aid. Is it through 1,000 instruments or a few? Will depend on the policy framework in which aid is to take place. And what kind of exact instruments you are to use. What we know for sure is that some countries are more efficient than others. Thank you very much both of you. Thank you, Ari. Thank you, Janik.