 to write a something for an occasional paper and he has before and since occupied a very unique and very important space between policy makers, academia and think tanks and basically taking the ideas of people who are in the ideas business to policy makers and bringing the realities of policy makers to the people who are supposed to be thinking about novel mainstream ideas. Since 2012 Antonio has been the director of the EOSS and without anything other than great respect for his predecessors he really has taken that institute to a whole different level over the last number of years and has developed a team of quite extraordinary young researchers and analysts within the EOSS and has brought the EOSS I think really much more focused into the into the central policy making conversations in Brussels and elsewhere. So as I say it's a delight to have him with us both personally and professionally he's going to speak to us on European Security Defense. So without further ado Antonio you're very very welcome. Thank you so much Ben and many many thanks to the Institute for this invitation and this opportunity to come back to Dublin. I was here a few months ago in the context of the outreach and consultation process for the global strategy and I'm delighted to be back after the global strategy has been delivered. It is an opportunity but it is also a challenge because talking the fence in Dublin is always a very very very sensitive thing to do and I will try to live up to the challenge by trying to convey to you honestly and candidly a sort of insider's view of why and how the fence is back on the agenda and even to some extent on top of the agenda at least for the for the coming weeks. As you may remember allow me to recap very very quickly it came up in December 2013 after a few years of absence there was a European Council meeting devoted almost exclusively to the fence issues and in on that occasion the Council conferred the mandate to the high representative to come up with a sort of strategic assessment of how the world had changed since 2003. The assessment was delivered in June 2015 it is the famous paper on the three C's so to speak the world has become more connected more contested and more complex and it was a sort of way of redrawing to some extent the the map of the world around the European Union and to redefine the role that European Union could play in that particular world and on the basis of that assessment the high representative now Federica Mogherini was conferred another mandate to come up with a global strategy for European security and defense policy. For roughly one year there was a large consultation process across the European Union in Brussels with points of context that led to the preparation of a new text. It was an exercise that didn't take place in a vacuum as you may all remember the period between June 2015 and last June was quite interesting in Chinese terms there was the migration crisis terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and more recently in Nice and therefore all these factors played a role in the in the preparation of the global strategy but certainly the the the culmination of the process was last June because the summit when the global strategy was expected to be presented took place three days after the referendum in the UK. Initially you may remember there was even basically the same date for both the summit and the referendum because London decided to hold it on the 23rd of June and Federica Mogherini likes to to tell people privately the joke whereby Philip Hammond called and said Federica I now realize that you have set up a meeting of the European Council the same day as the referendum which of course was a typical case of fogging the channel continent isolated because the date for the summit had been decided long in advance it was the date for the referendum that was set on the same day then wisely the the date for the summit was postponed by a few days but it was the big shock of Brexit on the 23rd of June or the morning of the 24th and on that occasion single-mindedly they have represented decided to go ahead with the global strategy although in the initial negotiations the decision was not to proceed with it you may adjust that as you like I personally believe that it is better to have the strategy presented at the European Council the the strategy was presented during a very very tense meeting of the heads of state and government with David Cameron modifying the the result of the referendum and the summit took a note of the other text and welcomed the presentation that is the jargon that were used on that occasion and what next of course first of all let me say that the global strategy is not an official document in the traditional sense of the term by the EU in the sense that it has not been formally endorsed by all the member states at the level of co-repair or political and security committee but I can tell you from inside that the text has been somewhat negotiated that there has been an effort in in informal contacts with the foreign ministers of all the 28 member states including the UK to have a text that would not be unacceptable to anyone let me put it this way not agreed word by word but there was nothing in the test that would have immediately raised a rejection on the part of any single member state the price to pay for that is that perhaps the text is a bit long and drawn out that was a sort of effect of adding one point that was dear to one member state or the other but there was an effort to make it as consensual as possible what next the high representative in September at the Gimnik meeting the informal meeting of foreign minister presented a sort of roadmap for the implementation of the global strategy that includes at least three or four elements so to speak one is to deepen our understanding of what actually a joined-up approach to conflicts and crises should be and what different instruments at the EU level and the member states level should be brought to bear in that context a second trend is the so-called internal external nexus it is quite evident that our internal security depends on what happens outside and that it is to some extent inevitable that if you combine the issues related to migrations and the issues related to terrorism there is a problem there and also of different jurisdictions that have to be called upon in order to act collectively a third strand is about updating the existing strategies of the EU in light of the new global strategy I think that the new strategy on Afghanistan is about to come out in a few days time and similarly other efforts will be made in order to to work in that field but perhaps the most important trend is precisely the one we're going to discuss today at this security and defence and there is a sort of implementation plan it has been defined like that on security and defence there has been an interesting debate over the summer you may have followed the presentation of papers or rather known papers by some member states there was a Franco-German paper it was made public right before the meeting in Bratislava that starts from the assumption that the summer stage will proceed at 27 I mean the starting point is a EU at 27 after Brexit there is an Italian paper that was delivered more or less around the same time and there is a Finnish paper and right after that the high representative decided to circulate among all the member states a sort of questionnaire a catalogue of ideas to be discussed in which the member states are expected to give a response I think the responses are due as we speak these days and then the high representative will collect the main changes coming from the member state in the global strategy defence is never framed or addressed as a standalone policy it is always presented as part and parcel as an ingredient in a broader approach policy approach to external relations of the internal external access and in particular there is a lot of emphasis on the new threats hybrid threats that call into question the traditional separation between what is internal what is is external but the implementation plan is also an opportunity to tackle some issues in this field that have remained stuck for years in part because of the attitude of the UK that was not particularly favorable to discussing significant progress in the field of defence at the EU level and in part also for sort of lack of willingness or interest on the part of many other member states to address these issues what has changed since well the first is as I said the prospect of a new European Union at 27 and as I said the Franco-German paper starts exactly from that assumption the American attitude has also changed over the past few years you don't hear much noise coming from Washington and across the Atlantic not even from NATO about the risk of duplication or or competition with NATO in that particular respect there is a sort of very pragmatic attitude whereby whatever works you remember Bill Clinton whatever works in order to achieve results to increase the European's ability to take over more responsibilities especially in the neighboring areas of of of Europe and last but not least there is a readiness on the part of the European Commission to play ball the European Commission for a number of years has been quite restrictive in what it could do in that particular field what resources it could put at disposal of the member states now due to the different strategic context there is a much more constructive and pragmatic attitude on the part of the commission so the questionnaire that has been distributed and is being compiled is a way to give the member states not only the last but also the first word on what can be done collectively as you in this field in the assumption that the US such could provide to some extent added value to what can be done that through the EU framework things can be done that wouldn't be done otherwise at the purely national or even for the countries affected by that in the NATO context precisely because the EU is not just a political military alliance and it is a community of countries that share much more than just security and can also mobilize other resources on the financial and the institutional side let me give you a few examples of what is already in the pipeline to this aspect in this aspect as you probably know there is already a preparatory action launched initially by the European Parliament and then approved by the commission on defense related research that is something for the medium long term but it is something for which a budget has been allocated until 2020 and there is a prospect of having an even stronger budget in the next multi-annual financial framework there is a readiness on the part of the commission to disperse money for so-called capacity building in third countries well all their the activities and operations that European Union has carried out also with iris participation in sub-saharan Africa for instance there has always been a shortage of resources and even the training could not be followed up and complemented with equipment and equipping military and police forces over there there is a readiness on the part of the commission to use part part of the development package in order to support those efforts on certain conditions there is a readiness on the part of the European investment bank to free up loans in order to permit investment on defense research and development to that effect the European investment bank is a U institution but is not part of the traditional framework of new institutions there is an idea of providing direct funding from the commission for some types of equipment for instance satellite imagery or maritime capabilities that could also be brought to use by the European Union and last but not least but this is still far from being agreed upon there is a possibility of some tax breaks for those forms of investments on cooperative projects between and among member states that could create common capabilities that is something that could be to some extent that is a quest coming from my own country in particular discounted from the the stability pact in order to allow for more investment in that and last but not least there is a determination to review the so-called Athena mechanisms that govern the way in which military operations are funded by the European Union by adding deployment cost by adding some of the equipment that is involved in there in order to take away part of the burden from the member states that participate in those operations among the other issues that are on the agenda is a different framework for the use of the so-called battle groups also Ireland is involved in that it is in part about the funding it is in part about giving them a sort of a more permanent hub in Brussels that could help deploying the battle groups whenever necessary there is an idea that has been put in the questionnaire about creating a sort of joint civil military planning and conduct facility in Brussels in order to create an additional layer that would permit the operational commanders to liaise with Brussels when that is required there is a request to improve the the rules and the procedures for forced generation for civilian crisis management that has been a shortage of adequate resources in there and the game between the commission and the member states could be improved in that particular aspect and that has been very much in the headlines that has been a discussion on the extent to which some articles in the treaty that have not been used so far can be activated and brought to bear one is article 44 that basically permits a group of member states to be mandated to carry out an activity on behalf of the European Union and the other one is article 46 about the so-called permanent structure cooperation among a group of member states that could operate jointly also with EU resources all this hints at the so-called level of ambition which is to some extent the common thread in the current discussion among the member states that is what are the types of capabilities that would allow for an appropriate level of strategic autonomy for the EU in order to be able to carry out certain activities even when NATO is not on board and a single member state is not willing already to carry out those activities by itself as I said the questionnaire once all the answers are collected is meant to ascertain and assess what the member states are ready to do or not at 28 at 27 and at less than 27 if that is the case my understanding is that the representative will try nevertheless to be ambitious and to come up with a package that is as inclusive as possible capable of covering demands coming from different member states also demands that apparently may not go in the same direction with the view to having a few quick deliverables already by the end of the year that could be put in place before the end of the term of the current institution in 2018 but also putting in perspective a number of measures and resources that could help generate additional capabilities in the medium to long term that will be probably after Brexit and in the next multi-actual financial framework let me conclude by raising the political question why this hurry why is it that suddenly after Brexit there is such a pressure to deliver on security and defence the high representative says that there is a window of opportunity and there is also a window of urgency in this aspect first of all the demand for security is very widespread across the european union and of course one of the challenges is that the drivers or the ingredients of that demand are not the same all across the european union they are very different in in Tallinn and in Dublin they are very different in Cologne and in Paris they are very different in Brussels and in Athens and of course the task of political leaders is try to bring together different strengths in order to come up with a credible and shareable package to that effect there is also language in the global strategy that to some extent raises this issue when it says that the european union has a duty to protect its citizens and to deter threats that is language that is new and goes beyond csdp as we know it csdp has been for a number of years basically about acting outside the european union in order to promote peace and and and build a peace across the world so the demand is there and has to be met it's also a way of proving the the added value and the usefulness of the european union and we have to respond also if i may put it this way acting on security and defence is the area in which it is more likely to to exist a consensus among the member states on other policy areas migration the stability pact position is still divergent among the member states whereas here due to the particular strategic context there is a possibility to show determination and to show that the european union matters and of course the urgency is due to the political agenda next year if you look at what is in the pipeline next year you have french elections first presidential and then parliamentary elections from march april dutch elections in may and german elections in september these are three founding member states of the european union two of them are certainly core members but i would say also in this respect that the Netherlands is no less important and there is a lot of uncertainty about the outcome of those elections at the end of the year we may end up with a different set of leaders across the european union and this element of uncertainty makes it all the more necessary to reach some sort of agreement at least on the way ahead before the end of the year so december in many respects the real deadline although there is a frequent reference to march the 60th anniversary of their own treaty as a sort of a ceremonial moment at which some ideas can be put on the table but march will already be a few weeks before the presidential elections in france so i suspect that december is the real deadline and what about island for the little knowledge i have a security and defense is a very sensitive policy area in this country the country is probably in a slightly complicated political phase with a minority government in that respect but it also has legal and institutional safeguards in the treaties i've read the the the press recently and there is a lot of fear of being marginalized or being outvoted there are many many many safeguards in the treaties so i i think that that is probably a fear that is to some extent overstated i would say if i may that the most important thing would be to have a cooperative approach in which island articulates its needs and its demands that should not be only negative demands about what you should not do but also what the european union could do and what island would contribute to in this particular respect in order to allow the high representative to come up with a package that is more acceptable to everyone a specific challenge for everybody in island and in process will be to find language in presenting these ideas that speaks to to the people in the streets that is not too technical but conveys the right ideas and the right messages unfortunately the debate in europe and on europe regarding security and defense has been hijacked for decades by terms like euro army permanent headquarters and application that is not what we are discussing right now but unfortunately very often these terms come back to haunt us and make it even more difficult to find those pragmatic and feasible arrangements that the high representative in particular would like to be able to deliver by the end of the year