 Thank you very much, Frederick. Good evening. Thanks for being here. Just landed five minutes ago. Before I take your questions, maybe a couple of words by way of introduction. As you know, this visit was, for me, very important. An opportunity to talk to the president, for the minister again, and other important counterparts in the nuclear sector of Iran. In view of the situation that you have been following, and was marked by lack of results in our interactions with Iran over the past few months, coupled with a few recent events in the form of some problems at facilities and unexpected finding in terms of a high degree of enrichment in one of them, I thought it was indispensable for me to establish a dialogue at the highest possible level and to try to put things back on track and hopefully get some results. I hope you may have already seen a joint statement which has just been issued in parallel in Tehran and here in Vienna, which is addressing the points I just referred to. In the first place, the interactions we have in the inspections, the normal inspection activity and what is expected from Iran. In the second place, the issues related to some of the questions about which locations where we have been trying to find clarifications from Iran. And finally, very importantly, our ability to establish monitoring and verification measures that we believe are indispensable as a very concrete and very tangible result of this important mission. So this is a bit, if you want, the general framework of what I believe was achieved. And I'm very happy to take any questions that you may have at this point. Thank you very much. We have a mic before us. Yes. Hello, I am Ahmad Samadi from Iran International TV. I'm sure a big part of the talks in Tehran were about the three undeclared sites. I want to ask you, how was the Iranian response? Do you have a new response or the response was the same before? Well, as you can imagine, when I have a conversation with the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran or with the foreign minister, we are not discussing technical details of one or the other location, but rather, as I just said, how we are working and the fact that we need, as I think my recent statements and my reports have been saying the fact that I believe that it's high time we come to some concrete results. So this was the spirit of the meetings we had. And I believe we have a clear understanding in that regard so that we can start implementing a number of very concrete measures very soon. Thank you. Stefan Löwenstein with Frankfurter Eigemeine Zeitung from Germany. Have, for example, the enrichment activities up to 60 percent been in detail, technical detail, or have you been discussing this with the heads of state? You have been meeting regarding that it is hardly to explain an enrichment program to this extent with a non-military enrichment program. Have they been able to give you an explanation for that? Well, in fact, they don't need to give me an explanation of why they enrich at 60 percent. What we need to ensure is that we have the necessary ability to inspect the activities there. They enriched at the levels that they declare. There are certain parameters, as you know, between an inspected state and the IAEA. They tell us this is what we are going to do and then we perform the necessary inspections. So in that regard, in terms of motivations and reasons, which I believe is a little bit behind your question, we don't discuss that. For us, what is important, the only thing that matters is that we are able to inspect, that we are able to account for every gram of enriched material that is there. And this is the spirit of the exchanges. And we have been working satisfactorily in that regard. There have been other types of issues, as you know, but they are not directly related to this particular issue. Yes. Hello, Digi. This is Stephanie Lichtenstein. I'm a freelancer and today reporting for Associated Press. In your joint statement, you say that Iran has expressed a readiness to continue its cooperation on the outstanding safeguards issues. We need a bit more, some more concrete information here. This probe has been ongoing for four years. There was a joint statement exactly one year ago. In what way do you have any more concrete assurances from Iran today than you had a year ago? What have they promised, so to say, concretely? Well, yes, of course. And as you can imagine, and I have been saying, we also have been longing for results. And this is why we needed to have this conversation. What we have agreed is on a number of concrete actions, like accesses that we are going to have to information and places. As you can imagine, this is something that we agree with Iran. And we are going to be reporting subsequently on our conclusions or our evaluations, if you want. But what we decided is that we are going to be having a number of technical meetings starting very, very soon where the effective places, we have discussed the places and the things that we are going to be inspecting. And you know them because they have been described in all my reports. So when you say details, if you want me to tell you that on this and that date, we are going at that exact time of the day, be visiting Marivan or something related to Turkezabad, no. That is something which is not relevant. What is important and I can tell you is that we have agreed that we are going to be moving on to concrete visits, concrete access to certain people of interest and certain material. So it's a change. Yes. Albert Otti, DPA, Chairman Price Agency. Did you have a follow-up and a further question? My follow-up on the open safeguards questions is just so people understand what this agreement means. For how long have the Iranians not been engaging in the open safeguards issues substantially? That's my first question. And the second question is on the further verification that the Iranians have pledged, the third point of the joint statement. Can you go into a bit more detail? Does that mean more frequent inspection? Does that mean turning on cameras that had been turned off? What does it mean? Yes. Thank you very much. I think there are different issues in your question. One relates to what I was addressing in my reply to Stephanie, meaning that the issues, the so-called outstanding issues where we have been working with Iran for a long time. The evaluation, as you know, of the agency has been that we have not, at this point, gotten the engagement we are aspiring to. Iran has its own evaluation, and of course you can ask Iran about that. So we are trying to have a meeting of minds so that we can understand what is that, in what areas they cannot give us the kind of information we need. And perhaps they need to understand what exactly is it that we want. We have been able to do that. We have been able to describe exactly the kinds of things that we need for the different places. So, and the process has been long. I must say I have not hidden that for us it has been too long. But, well, these things happened. The important, for me, the importance of today is where we are today. And that I believe that an improvement, a marked improvement, at least in terms of my dialogue with the Iranian government has been registered. I think I was heard, and I hope we will be seeing results soon. We will see. The other point that you mentioned is a very important point for me, and it is related to other monitoring measures. As you know, over the past few months there was a reduction in some of the monitoring activities, additional monitoring and further activities in the area of verification that we had related to cameras, related to online enrichment mechanisms in terms of flow monitoring systems, which were not operating. So, we have agreed that those will be operating again. Now, again, this is a very technical matter, and we are going to be agreeing on the modalities to re-establish this. But this is very, very important. It's very, very important because I have been referring quite frequently to my preoccupation about the diminishing continuity of knowledge. It's a bit of a jargon, but what this means is that we are losing information on certain areas which are very important. In particular, I should say in the context of the possibility of the revival of the JCPOA, since if we don't have information about important aspects related, for example, to the fabrication of centrifuges and other things, it would be very difficult for us to give Iran and the parties the necessary assurances to re-establish the necessary baselines. All of this requires a lot of time, requires painstaking efforts on the parts of mine specters and also their Iranian counterparts and reconciling figures looking at the information. This had been lost. So, if I can maybe use a figure of thought, we have put a touriquette on the bleeding of information and lack of continuity of knowledge we had. So now we can start working again, reconstructing these baselines of information. And these are not words. This is very concrete. And this was the deficit we had, which we have agreed with Iran that is going to be redressed. So I hope this makes sense. Thank you for the second question. So just to make sure that I understood you, all of these cameras that have been removed and all the other equipment you referred to, you have a pledge from Iran that all of this will be reinstated, reinstalled, so to say. Yes. Okay. So my second question is, in your statement, when you speak about additional inspections and monitoring, this is what you are referring to? Or are you also referring to? Again, I'm sorry, because these things are a bit... Because my question would be, do you have any additional pledge that there will be additional inspections in Fordo, where the 84 percent enrichment was deducted? Yes. We have been discussing, as part of the normal, I would say, safeguards procedures that we have with any country, we came to the conclusion that this particular facility required more inspection activity. We proposed that to Iran. Iran agreed to that. And now we are increasing the intensity of the inspections effort there, which we believe is important because of the reconfiguration of this cascade. It's a very efficient cascade. It goes very fast. So we came to the conclusion, okay, you can do this, but we need to inspect more here. And this is what was agreed, and it's a very important step forward. 50 percent more inspections that we are going to have there. So I think it's a very good improvement in terms of transparency, yes. Yeah, about the equipment that will be turned on or again, because I don't remember anymore where exactly it was turned off or taken down. Does that relate to Fordo or also to... It relates to a number of places. Sorry? Number of places. It's a number of places, not only there. Okay, if I may, can you describe your discussions relating the 84 percent particles or traces that were found in your report? I think you said the IA is trying to find out whether it was intentional or not. So the question is... No, no, no, what we are trying to do again, we don't judge intentions. We saw an event which is, of course, worthy of clarification, worthy of clarification, because we had information on a certain level of enrichment in a certain facility. After taking some samples, we see a peak. Sometimes in this type of facilities, there can be oscillations or peaks that can be accidental or can be limited in time, but it can be otherwise. So the idea of this process is to sit down, to look at the way in which the cascade in this case has been operated, to analyze it. The operator knows how to explain that, our inspectors know what it means, and so this is the sense of the dialogue, to determine how it happened. And what is important at the same time to say is that there hasn't been any accumulation, production of enriched uranium at that level. This is also very important so people are not misled. There was a detection of a certain level and then we asked for clarification, but what we have seen in our continued observation of the facility is that there has not been production or accumulation of uranium at that level, which is a very high level. Of course, 60 is already very high, but as I said, we have ways and means to inspect it. Thank you. Another question for me, sorry, Tigi. On the reinstallation and reconnection of the equipment, do you have a specific timeline? Do you know exactly when that will take place? You may have seen in our joint statement that we said that there are modalities that are going to be agreed. In a very few days, we will have a team there arranging for all of this. It's going to be a process. It takes some time. Okay. And on the 84 percent enrichment from your reply just now, I understood you do not have any additional clarifications that you bring back from Iran on why and how this occurred? No, and I would say that what's important there is to understand, and this is a technical discussion, the reason for this for this reading that we had. What's important for us is that Iran has confirmed the degree of enrichment that is expected at that facility and that degree is being respected. There was this event we want to and we need to clarify it. That's all. Time question, but related to the open safeguards issues about the access to information, provision of information or access to locations or people, when do you expect that to happen? Are we talking about days, weeks, months? Well, we try and we will try to go as fast as we can. We will determine as in any process of this type, you can imagine that at the beginning, because we haven't really started in the way we would like, we had, and I think I need to say it, we had exchanges on all of them. Iran gave us some explanations. We provided comments and there was a little bit of a ping-pong without us seeing eye-to-eye on these things. So now at a different level, I would say, of interaction is going to start and we hope to go as fast as we can. But frankly, I'm not avoiding the question or eluding an answer. It's very difficult for me to say because once the inspectors go and see some elements, maybe we need to take samples and analyze them and come to conclusions. So as fast as we can. This is, I'm sorry for the vagueness, but I cannot give you another answer. Do you have an assessment on how long it would take Iran, if they intended to, to break out to have enough weapon grade enrichment quantities for one or five nuclear bombs? Well, this is again something that we always say that we do not apply this kind of metrics, if you want, of breakouts and things like that. We know and it's no secret that there are certain amounts of material at 60 percent, at 20 percent, etc., for which you cannot exclude that as the safeguards terminology applies that a nuclear device could be developed. That doesn't mean that Iran is doing that. Iran is not doing that. We don't have any information. Nobody has that type of information that they are doing that. And by the way, amounts like this exist in many, many countries. What is important again, and this is the key to the whole issue of confidence, is that we have the access we need. When we have all the access we need, when there are no limitations, then materials and reasons and motivations is up to you and to others to analyze and to pass value judgments, not for me. So yes, these amounts are there, but I don't like to speculate three, four, five. I don't see a lot of sense in that conversation. It's there. We inform and this is what matters and the value that the IAA provides to that. I would even say if you look at different analysts out there, you will see all sorts of calculations. So we don't get into that. For some, there are no significant quantities. For some others, there are dozens of significant quantities. It's a game of speculation in which the IAA is really not interested. Hello. From the voice of America. So as you said, it seems that Iran offered you a series of promises. And I have two questions about that. First of all, I would like to know if do you have any deadline for this cycle of promises and then not not fulfilling it by Iran? And the second question after your report, do you think is it the possible there is a possibility for a Board of Governors to censure Iran again? Well, the last thing is not a question to me. It's a question for countries. I don't know what countries would like to do or have to do. So I'm not into that. On the second, this issue of promises, well, I think I hope you saw the joint statement. And I hope you heard me just now. We have agreed on a number of very concrete things. We didn't get a promise that we are going to agree. We agreed to restore monitoring and verification capacities. We agreed that we are going to have certain accesses. We agree on many things today. So of course, we will have to do that. And as always, the agency will be fully transparent in terms of its success, which I hope for or lack thereof. But no, I didn't receive a bunch of promises. We were there precisely not to do that with Iran, to try to move into the area of concreteness. And I think we are taking steps in the right direction. I don't want to sound over optimistic or over pessimistic. I think it's hard work ahead of us, a lot of work ahead of us, for Iran and for us. Thank you very much. I thank you for having taken the time and staying for so late waiting for me. A pleasure, like always, and I think we will be seeing each other very soon. Thank you very much. Bye.