 Think Tech Hawaii, civil engagement lives here. Welcome to Asian Review. I'm your host Bill Sharp. Our show today, Illusion or Reality, the Trump-Tim meeting. Joining us via Skype from the University of Denver in Denver, Colorado, is Ambassador Christopher Hill, United States State Department retired. Ambassador Hill, doing his long career with the State Department, served as ambassador to South Korea, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Today, he is the Senior Advisor for Global Engagement to the Chancellor of the University of Denver. And moreover, he's a published author, having recently published Outpost, a diplomatic memoir. In fact, before we go any further, let's put that image of the cover of Ambassador Hill's book up on the screen so everybody can see it. And I know this book can be purchased by going to Amazon.com, and it seems to be selling very well. Congratulations. Thank you very much. Great. Well, let's get right into it. Wow. What's your reflection on the Kim Moon meeting that just took place very, very recently, right at Panmunjom? Well, first of all, this story basically started on New Year's Day when everyone kind of expected a sort of blood-curdling annual address from Kim Jong-un, and instead it was quite different. He was very conciliatory to the South. Meanwhile, the South was worried about a lot of things, not the least of which was the Olympics that were due to take place. So Moon Jae-in, the president of South Korea, immediately followed up on Kim's kind of warm words. They sent a delegation there, and lo and behold, Kim indicated, and I want to stress this is still a work in progress, but indicated a willingness to consider denuclearization. And in particular, there's a big interest in fogging with President Trump. In the meantime, Kim and Moon had a summit meeting between the two Koreas in the so-called Peace Village at Panmunjom, and essentially that is given more momentum toward this summit with President Trump. It's still very hard to see how this is going to turn out. There's been relatively very little staff work on it. They don't really have a joint communicate that we're aware of. And there's no real clear indication of where the summit's going to go. So as our president likes to say, we'll see. Well, okay, I suppose that, you know, you've kind of touched on this indirectly, but was this meeting between Kim and Moon really, did it really have substance, or was it just posturing, or how do you see it? Well, I don't think there was frankly a lot of substance. The fact that they had the meeting is substance, I guess, in and of itself. But there's obviously not a lot of substance. It's not clear. They had a joint communicate where they both expressed the desire to have a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Something wrong with that. Kim Jong-un made the surprise announcement or the surprise decision that they're going to change North Korea's time zone, which is half an hour off from South Korea. They're going to harmonize it with South Korea. I'm not sure that in and of itself was a particularly momentous event for the summit. So your points will take it. There was not a lot decided there, except that clearly the whole body language of the thing, the whole sort of warmth of the thing, suggested that indeed there's now going to be a summit between Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump. And so in a way, this summit prepared for that. So that's going to happen in a pretty short period of time. Is there any basis to the notion that Kim was playing Moon, that given Moon has a history of having these very strong, pan-Korean sentiments, and I believe his family originally came from North Korea. I heard the—I listened to Kim Jong-un's translations of Kim Jong-un's species when he's talked about where one people were all the same blood. Was he playing Moon? Well, I mean, to say he's playing Moon, you have to see some further results. So far there hasn't been any diminution of the sanctions. There hasn't been any sort of material improvement in North Korea's terms. So I think it's premature to make a comment that he's playing Moon. That said, as your question or statement applies, Moon Jae-in, his party, it has a lot of people who favor this kind of pan-Korean activity and somehow blame foreigners for the fact of Korea's division. By the way, there's some historical truth to that. So I think Moon—and by the way, there are a lot of people in South Korea that don't approve of this kind of outreach to North Korea. So there's a lot to be a little worried about. Moreover, I think the long-term aim of Kim Jong-un of the North Koreans is not so much to nuke the United States or nuke Korea, South Korea. It's really to somehow decouple the U.S. from South Korea. So I think there's a lot of speculation that maybe the purpose of this meeting was to somehow say to the South Koreans, hey, we can be a good neighbor even if we haven't been to the U.S. Personally, I tend to fall into that camp to think that this is an attempt to drive a wedge in between the United States and South Korea. And I guess, as you say, as President Trump says, we will see. But tell me this, did you see something in Kim at the Pan-Won-Jong meeting that you didn't see any before? The certain characteristics about him come out that perhaps you didn't suspect existed. Was there anything surprising about his behavior or demeanor? You know, a lot of people have pointed to some of the things he said to Moon Jae-in, such as, you know, we're embarrassed by the poor state of our road system. This is a sort of the example of self-deprecating statements that North Korean leaders are not particularly known for. He also apparently showed a sense of humor and was smiling a lot to the cameras. Frankly, none of that really surprised me that much. I think, you know, North Korean leaders always like to look very self-assured and kind of in control. So again, I think the real issue is going to be how is denuclearization going to play out or if it's going to play out? Is he looking for sanctions or relief from South Korea? Is he looking for investments and other things? And is he going to essentially look at denuclearization as some type of long-term thing that isn't going to happen in anyone's lifetime? If that's where he's heading, I think this sort of era of somehow, you know, daytime or warmth is going to change very quickly. You know, I want to stress too that South Koreans weren't born yesterday. They know about North Korean behavior. They don't need, you know, lectures or admonishments for Americans. I know very well what they're up against there. But I think it has been important for the U.S. to take this issue seriously and not to appear to be throwing cold water on it and otherwise to be saying to the Koreans somehow, you know, we don't trust what you, the South Koreans are doing. This is kind of big and dangerous stuff and you've got to be more careful. So I don't think that's the right approach for Americans to take instead. I think the person has done the right thing by saying, okay, I'll make with it. And there was also talk after the beating between Kim and Moon that there would be a road constructed connecting Seoul with Pyongyang. There would be an air link open. There would be a rail link constructed. Do you see any of that happening? Yeah, I wouldn't say on the stove till that happens. I think, you know, these kinds of things always get announced. I think the South Koreans look at their relationship with the United States, their relationship with the international community. And that's more important to them than to make some sort of fictitious progress with the North Koreans. So I don't look for Moon, or frankly, any South Korean president to be doing things that are inconsistent with South Korea's obligations, whether it's to uphold UN sanctions or otherwise. I just don't see the South Koreans creating a circumstance where they have a lot of problems with the United States while they're engaged in a so-called warming exercise with the North Koreans. Has the United States underestimated the North Koreans? Well, I think certainly in the last couple of years, the North Koreans have made tremendous progress on their nuclear program and on their missile program. And so I think that progress, you could argue, has amounted to an underestimation by the U.S. with a view that somehow no one thought they would move this far, this fast. Ten years ago, when I was negotiating with the North Koreans, they had a young beyond nuclear reactor. They were reprocessing nuclear fuel or spent fuel turned into plutonium. They also had had some missile tests, but relatively few, and the only nuclear test was more of a fizzle than a success. Now all of that has changed, and I think the rapidity with which it's changed was surprising to many analysts. Okay, I think this is a good place for us to take a break. You're watching Asian Review. I'm your host Bill Sharp. My guest today is Ambassador Christopher Hill, who served as U.S. Ambassador to South Korea and also as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Pacific Affairs. We'll be back in one minute, so don't go away. Hello everyone. I'm Iwaki Kunisue, a host of the Japanese broadcast of the Big Tech Hawaii broadcast in Japan. I'm here from 2 o'clock on Monday, to give you useful information on the Japanese community, useful information on the Japanese community, useful news, and so on. Hello, I'm Iwaki Kunisue, a host of the Japanese broadcast of the Big Tech Hawaii broadcast in Japan. I'm Iwaki Kunisue, a host of the Japanese broadcast of the Big Tech Hawaii broadcast in Japan. Hi, I'm Ethan Allen, your host on Pacific partnerships in education here on Think Tech Hawaii. Every other week, Tuesdays at 3 p.m., we have guests on and talk about the fascinating, interesting, and unique partnerships in education that occur across the Pacific islands with Hawaii, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Guam. All these places have really rich local education programs going on, and the exchange among and between these programs is a wealth of great information, helping the islands all learn how to survive and thrive in our ever-changing world. I hope you'll join us on Pacific partnerships in education. Welcome back to Asian Review. I'm your host, Bill Sharp. Our show today, Illusion or Reality, the Trump-Kim meeting. And we've been talking to Ambassador Christopher Hill, who served as U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, also Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian-Pacific Affairs, and has had experience of negotiating with the North Koreans. So anybody that's going to go and negotiate with the North Koreans, what advice would you have for them? To be very patient. You're going to have to sit there and go over the same territory over and over again. You're going to have to listen to a few history lessons, most of which are inaccurate. And you're going to have to listen to some analysis, which is kind of out of Alice in Wonderland, for example, the notion that North Korea was invaded by the U.S., not the other way around. All that said, you'll be up against people who have done their homework, who know what they're talking about, and who are intelligent. So it's a challenge, I think, for anyone meeting with them. And it's especially a challenge for a president who often does not go through all his briefing books or take the time to get briefings from his experts. This point about preparation has been made several times in recent weeks. And say, you know, one of the things that observation I had about the meeting between Kim and Moon was that it seemed that people gave Kim a credit for being a much more serious player than he otherwise might have been suspected to be. And a much more knowledgeable, much more in command of a whole range of facts. And thus, in any kind of meeting, would probably be better prepared than President Trump. Probably right. I mean, the issue of nuclear weapons for the Korean Peninsula is sort of one of a number of very serious issues for the U.S., for North Korea. It's obviously number one. So yes, they're going to know it very well. This is what they do. And I think it's true that those who kind of looked at this sort of, you know, corpulent physique of Kim Jong-un and sort of assumed that he was sort of a cartoon of some kind have since discovered that the guy obviously has some sparks and knows what he's talking about. I think though it's very important to understand that at this point, at this stage in the process, we really don't know what we have. Do we have the beginnings of a nuclear deal or do we have just an elaborate photo opportunity? And so we really don't know. Normally what a president would do in certain senses of a summit is to send his National Security Advisor to meet with the other side's National Security Advisor and they might table a dark communicate so that the results of the meeting are known in advance. We don't have any sign that that's happened. Certainly, Mike Pompeo went to North Korea, but we really don't have much indication of what he was able to do while he was there, apart from talk to the North Koreans and conclude they were serious about a summit meeting. So a lot of questions in the still to be answered. And again, I think it's probably the correct thing for the president to go through with this, but I sure would like a much better indication of what it is this is about. Interesting. Of course, the other day, just the other day, President Trump boasted that it was because of his get tough policy that the meeting between Kim and Moon came about. And that really annoyed and really upset Kim Jong-un. What should we make out of all that? Is that just a tactic on Kim Jong-un's part that is leading up to, well, you said this, you offended us, so give us this, give us that, make this concession, or what should we make out of that? Well, I guess even brutal dictatorships have their own politics, maybe even their own feelings. So, they obviously were not amused at President Trump. And I must say that the issue that runs through my mind is there was a lot of sort of end zone dancing about the prospect of the three Americans being released. And as of this moment, to my knowledge, they've not been released. Maybe they will be, but they've not been released. So I think it does speak to the fact that when you go into a negotiation with North Koreans, you should spend a little less time sort of talking about how you somehow scared them into a negotiation and a little more time preparing for the actual negotiation. Look, at this point, all we have is an agreed meeting where Kim Jong-un will come and he will talk. And we don't even know where, we don't really know the precise date, but Kim Jong-un will go somewhere, President Trump will go somewhere and they'll have a meeting. I'm not sure you could say that Kim Jong-un was scared into that. Now, if Kim Jong-un shows up and they bring a few trucks full of fissile material and give up all their military weapons, then I think our president should be able to take a lot of credit for that. But at this point, I would not talk about he's getting credit and rather work a little harder to be prepared for this meeting. That's a really interesting comment. You know, it seems to me sometimes Americans have a... We have a habit of taking the victory lap a bit early, which with the victory lap on the democratization of Myanmar, it seems to me pretty early and Aung San Suu Kyi is proving to be probably a bit disappointing. Well, you know, I think sometimes it's... We make conclusions that are too early, as you suggest. And we don't really know these people that we're conferring the sainthood on. In the case of the leader, she's obviously a very talented person who understands the politics of her country. And I'm not sure she's changed her views so much as we just didn't understand them in the first place. Interesting. Well, okay, we've... So far in this interview, we talked about the U.S. or suggested a lack of U.S. trust of North Korea. But on the other side of the coin, can North Korea trust the United States? And the reason I say this is, we're about, it seems, to pull out of a nuclear deal with Iran. And how will that impact North Korea's level of trust towards the United States? Sort of paraphrase, Tina Turner. I mean, what's trust got to do with it? It's all about verification and whether mutual obligations could be verified as ones that both sides will be pursuing. And you pursue the obligations not by having one side fulfill all their obligations and wait for the other side to start doing what they're supposed to do, rather than work this on a sort of step-by-step sequencing basis. So I think that's probably, if there's anything that comes of this, it'll be in a very sort of tight scenario, a tight sequence of each side doing certain things. But as your question implies, President Obama, whose team concluded an agreement with Iran along with Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China, as well as the European Union itself. And normally, when we have that type of major executive decision, the next president would not want to change that for fear that it will look like the United States is in somewhat disarray and you can't really cost any decision we make because it can't seem to get to administration and allow them to do it. So I wish that issue were more front and center with our current president than it appears to be. Yet I think he's spent a lot of time essentially denying that President Obama has done anything of any value. He's also spent a lot of time talking about something that I'm not sure he understands that well, that is the agreement with Iran. And I think he's kind of put himself into a position now where I want to steal if he has to sort of rescind agreement to this given all the millions of times he's called it the worst deal in the world. What's interesting about North Korea is not only the fact that if we pull out of Iran, North Korea might be concerned that we do the same to them. The issue is also that even in the best of circumstances, Kim Jong-un will probably, if he gives up anything, it will not be nearly as robust as what was done with Iran where they've actually taken most of the Kissel material out of that country. So the president wants to say the deal with Iran is the worst deal in the world, but when he comes back from wherever his meeting was with Kim Jong-un, he's going to have to sell that and somehow a better deal when far less will have been accomplished. So that will be something worth buying a ticket to. Well, we're down to our last few minutes, but let me get into this question here. For some time, the relationship between North Korea and China has been strained, to say the least, and it seemed like Kim Jong-un was trying to do everything he could to stamp out Chinese influence in North Korea. And then, all of a sudden, he made a trip to Beijing, Wang Yi, the foreign minister of China. I believe he's in North Korea today, and Xi Jinping is supposed to be on his way. What kind of influence is China having on this potential meeting between Kim and Trump? Well, I don't think China is going to be ignored on this issue. I think it's very important to China they have a pretty substantial land border with North Korea, the biggest land border that North Korea has. They've made no secret that they have not been very happy with Kim Jong-un. He's kind of held them at arm's length, as if to say that his father was wrong to have a close relationship with China. And then, when he took his uncle, Chung Song-kik, and essentially, he was in a party meeting, and the police came in, and essentially, Kirk walked him out of the meeting, and then had him shot the next day. The Chinese kind of took that rather personally. So all that is, things are changing because China doesn't want to be kind of kept at bay and kept out of this. That said, I think China is in support very much of getting rid of nuclear weapons in North Korea. The issue, though, for China is they don't want to see a situation where North Korea somehow suffers a demise, and then there's a perception that the U.S. is one and China has lost. I mean, the Chinese often talk about win-win solutions. I'm not sure they really know what win-win is. I think they think it's a Burmese dissident or something. I think they're much more inclined to think it's win-lose, and they would lose if North Korea was somehow to collapse and South Korea becomes a successive state. So, in short, they have a big stake at all this. A lot of the churn within China, there's a lot of political churn within China. It would be affected by a major shift in what's happening in North Korea. So I think it behooves this administration, any administration that is down would need to work closely with China. Okay. Well, thank you very much for joining us today. I'm afraid we're going to have to stop here. Of course, there's a lot of other things we could talk to, but we always seem to run out of time. So thank you very much for joining us today. It was really great for you to take some time out every evening to join us from your home in Denver. And thank you and our audience for watching, and we'll see you again.