 Good morning to everyone and welcome and to those tuning in we meet this morning To hear the status of actions taken by the NRC and industry in response to lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident our first panel we will be joined by Joseph Pollack vice president of operations and chief nuclear officer of the nuclear energy Institute Bill Patisa senior vice president and chief nuclear officer Duke Energy Corporation Patrick Mulligan chief bureau of nuclear engineering division of energy security and sustainability of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Mr. David Lockbaum Director nuclear safety project Union of Concerned Science scientists before we begin I want to Acknowledge the fact that this is the first NRC public commission meeting that I am chairing I am very grateful and humbled by President Trump's designation of me as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Before we begin I just wanted to address a comment First of all about how grateful I am for the service of former chairman burns I many of you know that he has a very long association with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and also After a brief period abroad returned as a commissioner then so ably stepped in and a somewhat Unexpected request with the departure of chairman McFarland and you know I want to say that personally I have a long career in public service and so does Commissioner burns and again to me. He's an inspiration and a role model of what is you know What is the call to public service? What is it to demonstrate such commitment to an organization? And so? Please join me in acknowledging his whose services chairman and for I wanted to share a reflection about commissioner Barron as well So he didn't feel left out. I just want to say that you know I knew Steve when he returned to the commission and I did not know you but it has been Such a pleasure working as colleagues and I I sit here, you know really grateful I just I don't think that I could work with with two more gracious individuals and the gentlemen who sit on either side of me So thank thank you both so much and with that we can turn to the subject matter of the day It's interesting as I prepared for today's meeting to think about the long journey that the NRC is an agency and The industry as well have been on since the tragic Tsunami and earthquake event in Japan. It was interesting on Friday I had an opportunity to be at a US nuclear power plant I had not visited the operating site there since before Fukushima and as we took a Tour of the site the actions the implementation of the post Fukushima actions were so visible to me You don't even have to be particularly close to or knowledgeable About all the actions that have been taken and implemented at sites to have it to be struck by the Further enhancements that have been made to the preparedness of the sites their resiliency to withstand extreme natural events and other hazards, so I Think it's interesting to prepare for this meeting I've been here for the entirety of the NRC's journey as we've taken these actions and as a body of work between the Regulator and the industry the implementation It's it's very impressive to me And so we will hear a status report today, but for those of us who have been here during the entirety of these events There's a tremendous amount of effort. I think for NRC's part It would have to be many hundreds of NRC staff that have participated in where we find ourselves today and and it is So evident that we have increased the resiliency and responsiveness of these facilities So I look forward to hearing from our presenters today What either of my colleagues like to add any comments commissioner baron well Thank you for your for your kind opening remarks And I had something I wanted to say to Steve and to you to Steve I just want to join Christine and thanking you publicly For all of your hard work as chairman I think you can tell everyone in this room appreciates everything you did as chairman in your efforts and I want to officially congratulate Christine and on her designation as chairman and wish her all the best We don't always agree on policy But I respect you tremendously and I look forward to working with you in your new role. Thank you very much There I have to do it all myself now No, I Want to thank my colleagues for their kind remarks and you know, it's interesting as I said when I Came back from and I think my wife will still kicks me once in a while for coming back from Paris But I let her go back when we go back a little bit and all but it's it has been an interesting journey and And I appreciate the support that my colleagues have we've as Jeff said we have I think good debates don't always agree, but I think we try to do the best for the American public and I do wish Chairman Savinicky all the best she and I were talking the other day and there is something and something about this You are still your own person, but a lot of people think they own a piece of you And all that I'm finding that out. Yeah, and I won't go on actually from most You know, I was not a nuclear engineer But I was actually a German major and there is an old German play by Frieder Schiller about Don Carlos Which talks about Philip the second the king of Spain and he's actually basically he says I can't get anything done Because all you people Are doing things well, it's not quite that bad. It's not as bad as it was maybe for the king of Spain But sometimes though you that you have to work those those struggles through and I wish you all the success And all the support for that. Thanks. Thank you. Thank you both. Mr. Pollack. I believe we'll begin presentations with you Thank you Chairman Savinicky commissioner parent in the commissioner burns I don't know how to follow up this introduction started, but I'll try I'd like to talk about where we've come from as you said over this journey Coming up on our sixth anniversary actually the events of Fukushima Go to next slide, please The significant safety enhancements across the industry have been accomplished as a result of the actions taken Fukushima the tier one Activities which were the priorities identified by the Commission to move forward on or substantially complete the NRC rulemaking Aligns with the industry efforts that were taking place and in this case many things were done in parallel So we were working and installing as we were writing the requirements to work and to install and I think that speaks to the Open communications that in dialogues that we had throughout this time period And in fact by our accounts is somewhere over 300 public meetings that discuss these with thousands of participants To make sure that we had clear communications as we continued forward the focus now is going to be changing from Installation to inspection while inspections took place throughout the time period of installing the Plants of substantially installed the modification for mitigating strategies, and now we're going into the NRC's inspection of the final installations and going through so it is a transition taking place the next slide The spent fuel pool level instrumentations are completed I already spoke to the flexion implementation and as we found out Suspendingly an information is that the fuel pools did survive the events of Fukushima With minimal damage, but the uncertainty surrounding the levels in the fuel pool distracted attention and response so while Information provided later on would identify that it was not a requirement It was something that was taken on and directed by the NRC and I think the operators find value in it having that To be able to focus their attention on what's more important The hardened vent implementation is on schedule as you know that the NRC has Required orders and modify those orders as a result of a lot of research activities gone concurrently To that development and we expect those to be completed on time going through the size of it and flooding evaluations Which were substantial was we went in to look at new information and could anything change our position and more Importantly could have changed the ability to implement the mitigating strategies with the new information that was developed And then the sport we do support the status recommendations on the tier 2 and tier 3 Actions and in fact the majority that tier 2 was consumed and the actions that were taking place for tier 1 And then the disposition of tier 3 we concur with the decisions made by the Commission going forward next slide So the flooding hazard re-evaluation hazards as you walk through are about 85% complete As you're aware, there's a couple of the sites that were extremely complex need and the Army Corps of Engineers to do analysis on parts of the Flooding planes and the dams that are upstream from that in order for the sites to complete that analysis But we have completed that analysis the focus evaluations and the integrated assessments are on schedule through the 2017 and 2018 time period The focus focus evaluations again were to evaluate whether you could handle the mitigating strategies Still implement those mitigating strategies or alternate strategies as a result of these evaluations And then the mitigating strategy assessments as I said will be completed this year going through in the area seismic the request for the Information is about 90% complete by the end of this year It's on schedule as some of the plans requiring seismic probability risk assessments or a schedule to go out into the 2019 time frame and that was understood from the beginning with resources both in the in the public domain For people capable of performing these assessments as well as NRC staff to review the assessments And again the mitigating strategies assessments or will be about 80% complete in alignment with the seismic Probability risk assessment being complete and what that means is the sites have went back and looked at their flex mitigating Strategies with the new information they had as a result of these evaluations on some seismic to me determinations of Would they be able to still implement those strategies or deploy an alternate strategy and that has been completed in about 80% of the sites Next slide the flex inspections There's a current focus on inspections and it's important to understand that focus while inspections have taken place throughout this time period from the initial inspections for the NRC and walkdowns of the current fleet status prior to Modifications as well to inspections throughout the time period going through the industry through all this has Routinely shared the lessons learned we had called workshops Which the NRC has participated to identify the findings they're seeing so that we could share with the rest of the industry and learn from those So that the subsequent inspections would not have the same items happen to be revisited the industry could learn and move and In fact, we're holding in a workshop next month In the land it would regional and headquarters inspectors as well as the industry to talk about the going forward There is a knowledge retention and transfer and and that's taking place both at the NRC in the industry And what I mean by that is is chairman Saviniki said she's been here through the whole time period In the industry that is the case in some and in many cases people to start either to retire or be reassigned to other projects So new people are taking responsibility. So we're making sure that that knowledge that was captured on this time frame is being transferred to the industry and As well the NRC's inspectors are participating to share that knowledge and learning going through that So it's important for us in the clear communications and a transparency That this information being provided and we've held those throughout the implementation phases of the mitigating strategies and then the The last points I want to do we do support the draft final rule as regulatory centerpiece of post Fukushima activities It codifies the work that's been done in response to the NRC orders and combines the work and ensures mitigating strategies remain feasible for the reevaluated hazards and Again, the rule has been thoroughly vetted Overall, we believe that our comments have been satisfactory to resolve and and that has a lot to do with the 300-plus public meetings I talked about where we could be very clear and what our concerns were and the staff could voice our concerns and we could come to the Understandings so we can move forward. So that concludes my remarks Thank you very much. Mr. Patisa Thank You bill Patisa chief nuclear officer Duke Energy, and I certainly appreciate the invitation also from the commissioners and the chairman you know, it's a Listen to your marks chairman on opening up and talking about Fukushima all the chief nuclear officers in the country had an opportunity to go there in 2013 and it is absolutely eye-opening the Circumstances that it presented themselves and the response that the operators took at that time and and to me the most valuable aspect of this horrific tragedy is the fact that that we are going to learn from it and take advantage of things So that they don't happen here I commit to our operators in every visit to control rooms across our plants That that we will make sure they have the equipment the training and all the things they need Such that that event cannot happen at one of our plants And I think that's such an important piece of the lessons learned We can have I'll talk about all the specifics But that overarching message is just so important because we are a better industry now Then before this event happened and and you know I'm gonna talk through representing some of my peers quite frankly I thought it's a little challenging because I think you guys have seen more flex equipment than I will ever have seen in my career Because you've been to many plants and seen many things and it's incredibly important that that we keep an eye on the tragedies That happen in Japan and also the application and the ultimate benefits not just in the US But the entire industry so if you look very specifically on my first slide It really talks about the chief nuclear officers got together about five years ago and started talking about the flex and Ultimately, what can we do? Collectively to respond to an event such that we can take advantage of equipment across sites across Locations and it's really probably the first time we came together in a way that ultimately led to a common Solution to an industry problem our history had always been each of us will do it differently And in this case we did it in a very common manner And I'm certainly very proud of the fact that now all 11 reactors at Duke have completed flex have completed spent fuel pool level Instrumentation and ultimately we're very committed to completing the beyond design basis rule events Next slide please So if you look at the implementation of flex and spent fuel pools I've got some pictures later on but but overarchingly it does has created a significant level of improvement and safety and And we've established maintenance Activities with this equipment. We've given training to our operators. We've tested the equipment So I'm very confident that if that equipment is needed it will it can be utilized by people who know how to use it and that's very important and Certainly over overall as I said before. I think we are a much safer industry now with the implementation of this equipment next slide So we're still working on the hardened vents at our two units That are a boiling water reactors and we're on a very clear path to closure in the 2018 2019 timeframe and And feel very confident that we'll have that implemented exactly per the orders and rules Next slide Always appreciate the pictures You know and I look at the the domes we built we built these at the domes At four of our sites at one of our sites We were able to use an existing facility and at one of our sites We used the three buildings versus the dome It was our first one and we weren't sure exactly if the rules are going to change So we decided it was safer to to implement the three buildings But overall I'm very when I visit inside these domes when I visit the response centers at At Memphis and Phoenix it really conveys that we're we've got good equipment We're taking care of that equipment and if it's ever needed it's going to be available to us Next slide So I had to give you more pictures and you can look a little bit more at that But like I say, I know you guys have seen all of this equipment But we're committed to taking very good care of it and making sure it will work when we need it Next slide So beyond just what we've done with equipment beyond just what we've done with With all aspects of building these buildings and putting equipment inside of it We've also done a significant amount of inspections and analysis And on this slide really just trying to convey the level of effort We've done with seismic with flooding walk-downs with flooding re-evaluations and seismic re-evaluations We're very committed that these industries are not These occurrences are not hypothetical. They're ones that we're going to be able to respond to if they were to actually occur and that requires Inspections and then follow-up on those inspections with activities in the plant to make sure that all aspects of the way that we Will preserve our ability to safely shut down the reactors will be available whether it's flood or seismic events next slide and And then just the last is just thought I'd give a breakdown of you know This has been a large investment by our industry, but but it you know And it was intimidating on the front end, but I would say in retrospect It's absolutely been there been a beneficial in every way and and when I look going forward I think now that we've made these safety improvements to our plants We'll look at crediting those safety improvements how we can utilize them more It's it can't just be we put this in place and just set it to the side now It's a one and done it needs to be really alive as part of our our way of The way we work day in and day out now I'm looking at ways during outages that I can go ahead and pre-deploy Flex equipment or other things and say you know if something were to go wrong if equipment didn't work, right? I've got available backup equipment that I can just readily hook up and use so I think I think it it's still There's a wide opportunity now of taking advantage of all the improvements that we've made With this flex equipment with the analysis we've done with the inspections we've done That's all I've got. Thank you Thank you very much. Mr. Mulligan Good morning Chairman Sunicky and Commissioner Bannon and Commissioner Burns. I want to Thank you for the opportunity and the invitation to come down and present to you this morning My topic I'll be talking about real-time monitoring And so I'd like to start with an assessment of some of the points that were brought up in the document That was put out recently in December on real-time monitoring Now I think I believe that the the current regulations and the guidance that we have in place provides us with a mechanism Where we can make protective action recommendations for public health and safety Prior to the need for even gathering radiation data I think that the EL schemes we have the notification schemes we have and The processes we have in place for off-site response gives us that capability However, I believe that the off-site monitoring capability is all robust I mean we have mature off-site response programs that have those capabilities have been developing them for a long time So I believe that to support those assessment and those decisions that we make we have Sufficient off-site monitoring capabilities Well, I believe that public release of data won't necessarily enhance our decision-making process. I do believe that making Radiation data public can be beneficial. I'll talk a little bit about that towards the end of my comments here next slide, please New Jersey was one of the first to install fixed monitoring stations And we believe firmly that it is a an excellent system for early warning and detection of any releases from nuclear power plants We believe that there are still a couple of EALs in place that that where you can actually classify an event based on off-site Doses if nothing else is available. So so we believe that the fixed monitoring stations that we have in place can provide a Good early warning system for for us to detect off-site radiation doses And I can talk a little bit more about that, you know, New Jersey has a Fairly robust system around both of our nuclear power plant sites in New Jersey We've got all of the wind sectors covered at both sites and that that data is transmitted to the state of New Jersey Real-time minute by minute 24 hours a day seven days a week So we've got sentinels out there constantly We do believe and next slide, please We do believe so much in this that that after a couple of events one of them was The incident Fukushima and the other one was Superstorms Dandy, New Jersey where we were challenged And at that point in time during Superstorms Dandy are our fixed radiation monitoring sites We're probably the only way we were gonna get any radiation data Should have been an accident at one of those power plants and as you know Orc Creek did go to an alert during that event and that was really the only only way we would have had to monitor off-site Roads were impassable. It would have been impossible to get field teams out. So so we believe that they provide a measure of Redundancy for us to our real-time field teams going out And and and to support that Realizing how important it was we tried to make our network of fixed monitoring sites better and we invested a lot of money in doing that Redundant network systems automatic failover on power failures within the state Accessibility through various means on the internet and internet For the DEP and we also have battery backups at each site And we're actually looking at making those battery backups a little bit more robust so that we can have extended power Next slide Field data is important and it's important for us to get data faster And so we've recently invested quite a bit of funds into coming up with Mobile radiation detection equipment. We have four vehicles now that can transmit data back to our assessment facility real-time those are Capable of monitoring ambient gamma radiation air iodine concentrations and air particular concentrations So we can get those in real-time as well As the as teams are out there Gathering data in the field And we also have plans and procedures that can dispatch additional field teams to supplement that if necessary with handheld instruments I'm going to spend a little bit of time talking about data sharing because that's really important to us We've been involved with that for a while. We've been actively involved with CRCPD on their interagency environmental data sharing and communication committee We were instrumental in helping us draft the policy recommendations that were incorporated into the latest draft of the national Response framework to rad nuke incident annex And we're currently involved that a committee is working on Trying to come up with a policy on how we can share public data publicly We've not reached any resolution on that. It's a tricky subject, but we're still working towards making that happen Next slide, please Our real-time data is shared within the state through a web application that we've developed through Esri So we share that with our partner agencies the State Office of Emergency Management the Department of Health and others And we're also Working with the federal agencies We actually were one of the first agencies to to share live data with through the rad responder net network with our federal partners So we are sharing that minute by minute data in real time with the Department of Energy and Department The Environmental Protection Agency and others who have requested it So we do make that that data available And like I said, that's that's real-time live data. That's that's coming through that network So we are very interested in sharing our data that we that we collect with other outside organizations so that Everybody has access to it Next slide, please The commitment for New Jersey is to make all of our radiation data accessible within the state government To all agencies and to also making the rad responder network our primary way of means of sharing data With outside organizations including neighboring states local organizations Licenses and with the federal government And we also are still evaluating the policy recommendations for making radiation data publicly available And I think a couple of the things While it doesn't help us make decisions for the public making that public I think you can go a long way sharing that data with the public to giving them confidence That the decisions that that are being made for them are the proper decisions If I if I'm told the shelter if I can go when I can look at radiation data that backs that up It makes me feel more comfortable with taking that action or if I'm told to evacuate and I can actually go look at data that that that says I need to be evacuating that it makes me more comfortable with the decisions that are being made So I think that it can be helpful. However, there needs to be some guidelines on that I mean, you can't put radiation data out there publicly without context So we need to come to a consensus about how we can put that out in good Context so that the public can understand it and they can't Interpret it in ways that it's not meant to be interpreted So we need to have context and we also have to have validation and verification before it's made public We can't just be putting data out there before it's vetted by some people who know what the data means Obviously there there there are times that that you're going to collect data and there's going to be mistakes There's going to be errors So that we need to make sure that the data before it's made public is validated and verified and Finally, we need to come up with policy decisions. You can't you can't go into an emergency and Try to make policy on the fly We have to have a mechanism set up in advance to have permissions to allow the data to be publicly available It's it's not the time when in the middle of an emergency for me to go trying to find a chain of command That's going to help me get that done So I need to have that in advance so that so that I am empowered that I can make the decision That it's my data that I can release it and that everyone else is comfortable with that So those are the three things that I think that are that are really the hurdles that we need to get over to come up with a policy for for making data public and And that concludes my comments. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Lottbaum Good morning. Thanks for this opportunity to share with you our perspectives on the progress made and the steps remaining For the lessons learned from Fukushima. I was a little concerned about duplicating prior presentations So I appreciate Joe and Bill holding back. So I'd have some new ground to cover. I Will focus more on the steps remaining but recognize and appreciate the many steps Already taken by the Commission NRC staff and industry. We're clearly better off today than it were six years ago Next slide, please Due to their complexity and breadth the implementation of the NRC's Post Fukushima lessons learned has been a marathon rather than a sprint the passage of time reflects that reality and not Stonewalling or foot dragging on the part of the NRC or the industry But it's a good time to ask if we're there yet And if not what additional steps should be taken Given the time constraints on my presentation, I will focus on flood protection and to a lesser degree mitigating strategies We believe these concerns we have about these lessons also apply to many if not all the other lessons to next slide, please After Fukushima the NRC required walk-downs and reevaluations to reduce vulnerabilities due to flooding hazards These requirements were a supplement to existing regulatory requirements that had been in place for decades In other words the NRC in the industry had more than a passing acquaintance with flood protection requirements next slide, please The NRC's familiarity with an enforcement of these long-standing requirements to help Fort Calhoun be ready When it became an island in the Missouri River in June of 2011 The NRC did a stellar job at Fort Calhoun Giving us confidence that flooding can be a manageable risk next slide, please But on the other side of the coin Arkansas nuclear ones March 2013 event Casced out on whether that flood risk is being properly managed everywhere This picture shows the 550 ton stator that dropped onto the turban deck and crashed through an opening Into the truck bay below the center of the picture shows pipes and cables damaged by the falling stator next slide, please After walk-downs Concluded that the plant was adequately protected against flooding this event clearly showed this conclusion to be wildly optimistic at best Or entirely bogus at worst The walk-downs had not missed a pathway or two It missed more than 100 next slide, please An Arkansas nuclear one was not unique This is a picture showing some of the 50,000 gallons of rainwater that flooded the auxiliary building at St. Lucy in January of 2014 Through pathways that the owner had told the NRC simply did not exist next slide, please After performing the flood protection walk-downs mandated by the NRC the owner gave the NRC a thumbs up the January 2014 events suggest that perhaps using a different finger may have been more appropriate next slide, please It's hard to suspect yet alone believe that these are the only two reactors in the US With defective flood protection measures Maybe the rest of the reactors got it right, but maybe not seems it equal equally valid Situation Just two days ago. I read that 10 nuclear plants in Japan were discovered to have missing flood protection features These discoveries were made during inspections mandated by the Japanese regulator after six and a half tons of rainwater Flooded the unit to reactor building at the Sheikah plant in September of 2016 Next slide, please About 90% of the walk-downs conducted after Fukushima identified deficient flood protection measures against long-standing requirements that had been routinely inspected Does this mean that only 10% of the plants have properly implemented the post Fukushima flood protection measures? Being adequately protected against the flood and less the flood happens is at least 100% unacceptable next slide, please The mitigating strategies order expanded the post 9-11 upgrades that the NRC imposed by B5B and subsequent rulemaking these measures have undergone less road testing to ensure they meet their good intentions next slide, please I Apologize for sounding like a broken record, but nuclear safety is achieved by the NRC establishing and enforcing proper regulatory requirements The NRC has established proper regulatory requirements for flood protection and mitigating strategies But ample evidence strongly suggests that not all reactors meet these requirements next slide, please The NRC's baseline inspection effort and its post Fukushima temporary inspection efforts have not provided reasonable assurance of adequate protection against flooding hazards and extended loss of power events The St. Lucie event led to the discovery of defective flood flooding barriers that had been missed for 30 years Including missed by post Fukushima focused inspections Re-recommended at the NRC conduct vertical slice inspections at eight plants for flooding protection and mitigating strategies compliance The results from these inspections would either confirm that we are there or to reveal what additional steps Are needed to get there next. Thank you Thank you very much. We Rotate the order of recognition for questions and it happens to fall to me to go first. So I will begin the Q&A period Thematically in some of your Presentations I heard you touching on the topic of really what I call sustainment meaning going forward. You know the NRC Requested and and demanded certain actions those have been implemented to a very great or very extensive at this point extent but there is the sustainment question and I Take from mr. Lockbombs presentation even if you look at the post September 11th B5 B measures when we went out and looked at those You found variability and in some of the sustainment measures there mr. Batisi you talked about Differentiating between a one-and-done I think that was your term versus keeping the flex programs mitigating strategies alive And I would note you showed pictures of equipment It's not possible to show pictures of procedures or you could but it wouldn't be very interesting But the key thing is that there is a lot that undergirds the existence of that equipment. There's training There's procedures who's going to use it when are they going to use it for any of you that would like to talk about the challenges and concerns of this theme of sustainment going forward maybe for mr. Pollock and mr. Batisa what what are the measures that give you Confidence in sustainment of you this new resiliency that you've created at these plants and mr. Lockbombs I'd offer to you an opportunity to address the same matter Mr. Pollock. Yeah, thank you chairman If I'll start and then Bill can add on there that the one thing we talked about is continued workshop and the Formation the industry actually requested that we continue with this going forward even though we've been implemented Which is somewhat unusual for? Implementation of regulatory requirements. The second thing is is and bill can talk to it to more We're looking to use this equipment the procedures that we've developed in other areas So this stays fresh so whether you're using it for refueling outage is backup equipment or you're using it for mother Risk advantages it's not just a one and done and it's expanding to use of this mitigating equipment So it doesn't just go sit somewhere house or storage not to be used other in surveillance And I think that's what we're saying There's been utilities across the country that have utilized this equipment already have seen the benefit of defense and death Just for that application Thank You mr. Batisa. I mean just to echo on that message. It's very true It's becoming part of our operation of the plant and that to me is the differentiator that makes it sustainable We'll be using this equipment routinely whether it's through outages whether it's through during an ero drill Whether it's through activities that are going on Quite frankly, we we have even used this equipment for other activities Things like bulldozers and things to keep people fresh on being able to use them should there be debris that has to be removed Getting them giving them practice on a more routine basis so and and then on top of that that's that's kind of the The hands-on aspect of it, but our processes our procedures our training Just just literally forces a level of refreshment that that's going on almost continuously with this equipment And I certainly Anticipate that we'll be viewing this equipment as part of our infrastructure Maybe more so than when it was first in first put into the dome or in the flex buildings that that ultimately Many of my operators many of my engineers many of my PRA folks the folks that are looking at Designs and changes and everything will recognize this equipment as part of the infrastructure of our plant Have you before I turn to mr. Lockebaum though, you know hearing that it sounds so logical but we force ourselves to look at every dimension of things and Are there any potential challenges though when when it becomes such an integrated part of The overall operation of the plant or is used and invoked in other instances because right now as you walk about In the plants where there is the flex equipment it has the special painting on the floor It's like so, you know if someone absconded with it and took it and is using it for some other purpose But has that dimension of sustainment been fulfilled that it will indeed be there And it wasn't called into service in some other way that it never made its way back to where a responder is looking for it that's a great question and We are very systematic in the way that we require that equipment to get right back to where it belongs And then ultimately doing a follow-up inspection to make sure it's back and it works okay I won't deny we have had some challenges Around early on implementation. We had a situation where someone used something put it back and didn't reconnect the battery charger We found it the same day, but but ultimately we have to make sure our processes and procedures are robust enough They give us confidence that that equipment will always be there if it's ever needed and and then the But the aspect of the other uses I do think is still an important piece of our path forward I think we saw problems with B5B equipment because we weren't regularly putting our hands on that equipment that That led to some some quite frankly embarrassing revelations when we went back and looked at it as an industry and And our goal collectively and all the CNOs are very committed to this is we're going to make sure This equipment never Reaches a dormant stage of inactivity that we don't that we that That we have seen maybe in other things in the past. Thank you. Mr. Lock bomb. Did you want to talk about the challenges? Just briefly. I think to add to what both Joe and Bill said is by integrating it into day-to-day or more day-to-day At plant activities. I think the benefit from that is if there are some problems because the Fukushima lessons the flex equipments more universal more standard across the industry the lessons learned from plan a or more Learnable or transferable to other plants. So not only the lessons benefit that plant how to do better But it also there's it benefits the industry and that's a little bit different than B5B in the post 9 11 They're both great intentions, but that operating experience value was less more diminished on 9 11 Thank you for that. It's interesting yesterday at NRC The office of nuclear security an instant response conducted at one of our knowledge management seminars And we were very honored to have Governor Tom Ridge the first secretary of Homeland Security and the first advisor to the president for Homeland Security after 9 11 addressed us about 9 11 Katrina and Rita and just he kept using this term of a culture of preparedness and you know How is the nation do we develop that and he reflected a lot on his experiences in those events? But it was interesting to me that you know he we talked about this notion of no event is actually Responded to an address from Washington or from a corporate office It is really the responders on the ground that are the ones that do that and he spoke a lot about federal state Partnership and also just the integrated law enforcement responders federal state all of that Coherency through planning and exercises that needs to come together. So mr. Mulligan You did mention the CRCPD the work the input that that group the recommendations and lessons learned They've done in terms of the federal state coordination In addition to to the data sharing issue and things that you've looked at Do you have any sense of in general? Do you think that the contributions and input through CRCPD have shown? improvements and other actions in terms of just our preparedness overall to Coordinate maybe a little bit better than we did on the radiation issues post Fukushima I believe they have and there have been another a number of other initiatives that have been cooperatively developed between state Locals and federal agencies that have improved response. There's a there's a program out there now to develop a Radiological operation support specialist what's called a Ross. So we're training state state and local individuals to be experts In response to where we can share the that resource with other states if there were an incident in California We have people on the east coast that can go there and support them because we know that we're going to run out very quickly of radiation experts Within the state and we're going to run out of them at the federal level They could all going to be busy at maybe at Fermac and so that we need those experts in other areas to be at the At the local EOCs and the state EOCs to help explain radiation. So that's that's one of the initiatives that we've done we've also worked on On on the advisory team for food health in the environment to come up with some other initiatives Where the state federal partners can work more cooperatively? And and improve that response. So so they see our CBD has been involved with a number of initiatives Make public data, you know for Mac Mac products We've you know, we've improved on all of those things that is only you know made our response Capabilities more enhanced. So I believe this has been a lot going on Thank you Well, again, I thank each of you for your presentations and we make reference to this 300 public meetings I know that each of you and the organizations you represent have been very involved over the last number of years and all of the Activities we're talking about today. So I thank you for that effort in those contributions. Thank you very much Commissioner Baron Thanks. Well, thank you all for being here. We appreciate it Mr. Mulligan the commission is currently considering the NRC staff's proposed resolution of three post Fukushima open items And one of those is the recommendation to study the efficacy of real-time radiation monitoring at nuclear power plants I want to get more of your thoughts on Fixed monitoring stations because as you explained during your presentation, New Jersey uses them at Salem Hope Creek and Oyster Creek Can you talk a little more about the situations where you found the monitoring stations to be useful? You mentioned this the example of Superstorm Sandy Are there other examples? Do you do you see benefits during emergency preparedness exercises or other times? We actually we do see we use them at every one of our emergency preparedness exercises We have a simulation program that runs so we're looking at them as we would be looking at them during a real emergency So we're in tune to those We use them much like another field team I mean if there's if there's a one of our fixed radiation monitoring sites located somewhere We don't need to send a field team there So we can actually save some radiation dose to some of our field team members by having those in place On a day-to-day basis You know when when there was a rain event post Fukushima We saw that on all of our monitors There was a period of time a four-hour period where it was raining out that we actually saw some of the some of the fallout from that That's how sensitive they are There have been out. I mean we see fuel shipments in and out and Materials going by and and it was also one incident where where there was a Industrial radiographer doing some work and not using their shielding as they should and we caught that on one of our sites So so there are there are a number of opportunities and a number of ways we use that But first and foremost, it's that early warning system that that we can detect Prior to anywhere else because you know and in Jersey, we're kind of close I mean we're we're an hour to an hour and a half away other states where the response time from from Organizations might be longer in a larger state. They could be valuable While teams are in transit to get there they can give you some some real off-site data And so there sounds like there are some cases where In a super storm sandy situation where you don't necessarily have the use of the monitoring vehicles and The fixed monitoring stations are useful there. There may be some dose reduction Benefits at other times are there other cases where do you find it useful in terms of directing your your mobile monitoring equipment? In other words, you get some readings off the fixed monitoring stations that allows you to zero in and where you're going to deploy The vehicles is that is that a use or not really? Not not really, but it can give us an idea, you know What I a lot of the modeling that we do leads us down that road that you know A plume is going to look exactly like it does when we do our modeling and then that's just not the case I mean if you look at you know the modeling results and what really happened if Fukushima were at Chernobyl It just goes everywhere. So while it doesn't directly tell us where we're going to go It can redirect If if we're picking up radiation in areas We didn't believe that it should be based on the wind direction and the wind patterns, you know The micro meteorology in areas can can move it all around especially in an area like Oyster Creek where you have sea breeze effect You know so so they can help us redirect teams to areas where we didn't believe there should be radiation But there is in its in its evaluation of this issue the nrc staff focuses quite a bit on a 1982 study that concluded that a monitoring system consisting of 16 or 32 stations Couldn't provide reliable information about a potential radioactive plume because the plume could pass between the stations or Could be underestimated if a less radioactive part of the plume was what crossed over a station What do you think about that conclusion? I'd have to say that I really I disagree strongly with that I you know for me I don't believe that you're gonna sneak a plume between two of those I mean the shine from a plume that's that's a significant plume was gonna be picked up by one of these radiation monitors that we have these Picks are very sensitive The other thing is is that any data that I get there in a radiological incident is valuable data Whether it's a centerline point or an off the centerline point because I've got you know as a health physicist And knowing if I have an off-center line data knowing how far that is away from the centerline knowing where that is I can back calculate to what the centerline dose is so so for you to for them to suggest that I can't tell what the peak is based on an off-center value is just not true I can do that and so that I you know I do believe that while you're you're you may not be able to get the Most accurate data, I mean you can get data that you can really work with okay, and you mentioned that You either have or you've looked at upgrading the equipment over the years based on your experience in New Jersey How have the cost and reliability of the fixed monitoring stations changed over the last you know 30 35 years? We we are just in this process right now upgrading our systems The last time we upgraded was in 2000. So the so the units that have been on there have been operating without issues for Probably close to 17 years And and the only reason why we're replacing them is because the manufacturers no longer supporting that model They are still working fine, and we just didn't want to be caught without them. So we're replacing them now so So you're looking probably at a 15 or 20 year life Of these that we've only replaced them two times in New Jersey original installation was an 88 We upgraded in 2000 and we're upgrading again And I believe if you're I mean if you're looking at at a cost benefit for the amount of time that they're in service and and for the amount of protection and Data that they give you 24 hours a day, you know minute by minute I believe that I think I believe that they're a cost-effective way to to maintain Surveillance around the site and do you have a sense if you're kind of heading into the third generation of these How have have costs changed over time? Is it cheaper or more expensive to do it this time than in 88? Actually, I believe the cost have either stayed the same or they're a little bit less now The the Fukushima near-term task force Recommended considering whether radiation monitoring data should be available on the internet and it sounds like that's an issue You're grappling with in New Jersey You talked about the importance of Validating and vetting that data before it goes out there if if you get to a point where you can validate and vet What do you see it as the pros and cons of releasing information publicly? I? Think one of the pros would be public confidence obviously You know if you're if the public knows that you're getting data and gathering data you're not sharing with them They have the sense at least that from what some reports are that you're withholding things and when you're withholding information from somebody There's a level of distrust So I believe that making that data publicly available Will generate trust in the in the decision-makers that are providing the protective actions that that they're that they're taking Again some of the cons are that that if people don't understand what the data means it could cause a general panic, too If you're looking at something that's twice background and they see that oh, it's you know It's double that's going high and they don't understand that that's not a big deal You know then then that could create things that you don't want to happen Especially you know for for incidents where there's actually no actions that need to be taken at all and you know So those that's the downside of maybe sharing things publicly as well Are you hearing interest from the public and getting access to the data? Is that all the time all the time? Yeah, Dave Do you have thoughts about a review on? Radiation monitoring stations generally are about this more specific question of of public availability of the data Public availability is generally good But there's a strong caveats on this one in it the validating and vetting process If the public perceives that as you're pulling out the bad data and only presenting the good data Even though there's valid reasons for perhaps then that that's a big confidence hit. That's hard to recover from Patrick mentioned that the state is training people to help other states if they need because there's a shortage of people There's even a shorter Short is in the public. I I'm a nuclear engineer. I wouldn't understand those numbers whether the shelter shelter Evacuate if I saw it so I don't want that that doesn't help me I want to have trust in the people who are telling me that decision I think there's other ways of gaining that trust then me looking at the data During this presentation Joe indicated that NEI supports the draft final rule for mitigating beyond design basis events Does UCS have thoughts about the draft final rule? To be honest we have we haven't looked at the draft neither at or I long to a kid. Yeah Okay, let me ask one more question just to follow up on something you mentioned in your presentation On the idea of the eight vertical slice inspections. Can you just talk a little bit more about what you have in mind and how that? Compares to the inspection the agents inspections the agencies are already doing For mitigating strategies and the staff assessment the agency is doing on the flooding side Sure, the role model ahead or the template I had in mind was the inspections that the energy did after the millstone the design basis events issue Back in the mid 90s the energy sent out and teams to think of 17 or 18 nuclear power plants to look at How design basis information was translated into operating procedures training maintenance procedures, etc And they found some problems at certain plants that had to be fixed certain You know broken widgets that had to be fixed or but they also grew some insights more broadly into a lot of the findings had to do with Calculations and calculation control that were then built in or factored into the inspection program the routine inspection program So I think a similar effort here a deeper dive on flooding protection and mitigating strategies Could she could reveal individual problems But the bigger value from that would be to gain confidence in what parts of the baseline inspections are effective And what tweaks may be necessary to sustain that effectiveness going for improve or and saying that Effectiveness going forward. I think the if we continue the status quo The inspectors are looking at whether there's a flood protection barrier there or not They're not then pulling the string to make sure that it's properly designed and maintained to be there You know, they're basically a checklist. Is it there or not the deeper dive will ensure that that's the appropriate Barrier for that penetration of that pathway And again if those inspections show that that homework's there then we just continue it if it shows There's our recurring theme then that leads to a different fix more broadly. Thank you. Thanks Commissioner Burns, thank you. Thanks all thanks for the presentations a sort of reflection on the response of Fukushima, oh, I think one of the interesting things and I think Most our interest are your representatives and Mr. Lachbaum for UCS touched on it is One of the Venice who we see is sort of a standardization. I think back to post TMI I mean one of the big arguments was greater standardization across it, but and this is an area Perhaps where we've really achieved it in a way or and I think need to sustain it Because I think they've sort of touched on this and I think Joe and Bill as well is that there is a way of learning from What we see in terms of the implement how the equipment is implemented and of course and you know, I Think one of you mentioned I think we all have have gone. I mean, it's been one of those things You know on my list and going out to plants that you know go see what they've done and also had the opportunity to see sort of internationally And it's very very common, but particularly for a large fleet like that in the United States, you know, nearly a hundred operating plants in addition the the National Response Centers in Phoenix and Memphis I Think that I think that's In terms of a lesson learned or what's impressive about that is that sort of focus on This greater or broader standardization across The response, you know granted each you know each plant where things are is different But the the notion of for example the the color coding on some of the cabling the type of equipment you have there I think I appreciate the comments or That have been given here this morning because I think that really for me Reinforced that aspect One of the things we've spent a lot of time I want to ask a few questions on is so is more off on this on the flooding and the other Natural hazard Evaluations and Joe I just want I'd like to ask a clarifying question on I think it's your slide for And I may have missed the explanation, but in the beginning it talks about 85% Completion of responses the 5054 F requests and then a hundred percent Mitigation strategy assessments complete and I'm trying to understand the numbers Are we talking about two different things there if you can help me out? I just may have missed it in in in your talk, but There's two aspects to it There's the one where we actually did the evaluation of what the new flooding hazard would be so in essence What would you have to protect against to be able to implement the mitigating strategies and what the consequences work to the plant? In some cases, they're not totally complete because there's an aspect missing The plants have made the evaluation or whether the aspect is still missing so I can't submit it to the NRC I try get the complete data would impact their ability to implement mitigating strategies They've done that determination and went through that they could still do the mitigating strategies for those So that's what the mitigating strategies assessments on why that's a hundred percent complete although not everything's been Turned in to the NRC for the 5054 F because in some cases it may be a data point that we don't have But doesn't appear that it will influence the outcome of the evaluation. Is this an incomplete data point for me to submit Okay, okay, and and the in the seismic area. I know this I mean I remember early on You know one and one of the challenge always I think in the seismic areas is the the number of experts you have To do that, you know the kind of work that needs to be done Is that is that continue to be a challenge or you see your industry see itself in a fairly good position? Well, we haven't we haven't got any more experts where we might have got But we've been through most of the evaluation So the plants that had either no change or minimal change their evaluations are complete more So now the focus is on the plans to on the seismic probability risk assessments, which is the more complicated part of the evaluation Okay, and bill you talked about the importance of knowledge of Knowledge transfer in this area. So what are the types of things that you're doing? You think that need to be done to assure that you know Because you know there there are fewer of people like me and particularly those who left and came back And so what is it that you need to you know, what is it you need to do? And I think Dave you talked touching on this as well What's the strategy what's the success path one of the interesting things about Particularly flex equipment some of the things we've done is they are a very recent analysis and things So we're not talking about somebody did this in the 70s and now we need to transfer that knowledge to another generation Quite frankly, I've got an individual behind me Adam. Who's here. He leads it for Brunswick if he'd raise his hand, please and He's not of the same generation I'm from and and so I think it does paint a picture that that that We across our organization have pulled these experts in and everything but now If we're able and I believe we'll be able to keep this very real Going forward to me the best the best way to to learn is always hands-on You can take all the classrooms in the world But until you touch it is and what we're working very hard is to make sure that across all aspects of the Operators or engineers or maintenance people who need to touch it were given on that opportunity And so I don't envision that at least the lessons we've learned from Fukushima the equipment that we've got in place He is going to be a challenge from a knowledge transfer Position because literally there they're the ones learning it almost from the beginning Okay, yeah, I do want to correct my 2017 all the mitigating strategies assessment will be completed. Okay, okay and Mr. Mulligan, I appreciate the dialogue on this this question on Public release or when how do you communicate, you know actual readings to the public alike? I'm wondering if in one of the considerations Is in what kinds of units that it would be actually because I tell you my old OECD NEA buddies used to jab me all the time about we Americans in our Miller rem and rem Versus of becquarels and millisieverts and all that is that one of the considerate because that would be actually if we had an incident here and Translating it for I think some of the international community that might be an issue. So I don't know if that's one of the considerations That goes through the it goes through people's heads as they think about how you how and when and what form to report this Yeah, it took me about 24 hours to get on the seabird scale So so yeah, that's one of the one of the things I mentioned was context. Yeah, so when you're putting out Data publicly to put it in context that would be units what units actually mean And then putting units even even in simpler terms of what that means to the public You know so so putting data out in context and that includes units and what health effects and those kind of things Those are the kind of issues were we're struggling with because it's not not easy to put that in terms that that almost anyone from the public can Understand so that's that's the struggle right now Okay, and I know of some of the was I think it was some of it for example recently With the trip a tritium spill at at Indian point site earlier this year when you look at the No, you know the numbers when because you start to talk about tens of thousands of Whatever the unit why? Yeah, Pico carry when you tens of thousands. I mean most of us in comp, you know It says that's a big number, you know The type of thing so I mean it's I just to sort of emphasize sort of underlines I think the challenge but Appreciate the sort of the work on that because I think a lot of good just regurgitating Information doesn't always help people so trying being thoughtful about the context and try again with the objective transparency but also assuring that Really with that the right thing that needs to be communicated about protective actions whether it's sheltering evacuation or the like I think that's important So I appreciate your work on that and thank you my question was answered Dave on the on the vertical slice and I Do remember I was actually cleaning out some old files and found my old Copy of a millstone millstone report a couple weeks ago So I may go back and look at the look at that But I appreciate that because that was one of my questions that you answered. Thanks, Mr. Madam chairman That's okay. I've been yes, sir to Building in my time here. So that's all right. Did you have anything additional? Okay? Well once again, thank you to each of the panelists and we will take a brief break perhaps about ten minutes after so five minutes Ten after we will reconvene. Thank you All right, if we can reconvene and get started I will Hand it over to mr. Mike Johnson to start the staff's presentation. Thank you Thank you. Good morning chairman commissioners. We're pleased to be here today to talk about the status of the Fukushima lessons learned activities as Has been noted several times today We are very close to the six-year anniversary of the accident of Fukushima Daiichi and in the time that has passed We've accomplished our goal set up by the commission of having a majority of the safety enhancements in place at US nuclear plants by the end of calendar year 2016 I'm gonna leave the details of the actions that we've taken and the results that we've achieved To the members of the panel that I'll introduce in a minute I want to focus if I can for just a minute or two on the high level overall lessons learned Activity first it really was an enormous endeavor and a tremendous accomplishment as the longest serving member of the steering committee I can remember the early days after the accident and the early days after the near-term task force report thinking about sort of projecting ahead on On the just the the significant amount of work that we would have to to to take on We need to evaluate the task force recommendations, of course and identify needed changes We would need to address several policy issues and raise them for consideration Of course in some instances and with stakeholder involvement We would need to identify potential new requirements and new guidance And in addition to that we would need to develop an approach and an overall schedule For the implementation of that those requirements and guidance Licensees would need to develop plans and submit Submit those plans to us we would need to review each of those plans and Ultimately licensees would need to procure the equipment and make the modifications that change the procedures and train on them We would need to document our review of the acceptability of those plans and and verify the implementation through inspection and we needed to do all of that with a sense of urgency But with sufficient technical rigor so that we could do it right the first time While ensuring that we didn't distract from other priority activities that were ongoing Well, so with the work of the staff and the industry and other stakeholders and the advisory committee on reactor Safeguards in over 300 public meetings as we've described or was described in the previous panel with more than 20 public meetings between the In our C steering committee and the industry steering committee with over 30 meetings with the advisory committee on reactor safeguards with close collaboration of our international partners and of course with the direction and oversight of the Commission we counted I think about 40 Commission papers and over 15 Commission meetings with all of that activity. We did it That's my first. That's my first high-level Conclusion or statement. I wanted to make secondly over the six years of folks who took part or were present on on The at the early stages in the endeavor Many of those folks left to take on other assignments and so we've continually had new folks join us It was true for the steering committee. It was true For the Japan lessons learn division director and then division It was certainly true on the part of the working groups the external hazards folks for example And it's true. I think as you heard in the earlier panel from Joe Pollack true on the part of the industry Despite the significant turnover of individuals both on the NRC side and on the industry side We maintain continuity of purpose and continuity of direction. We maintain focus and Momentum throughout those changes and I think that is significant Third, I think you're going to hear in the presentation today That the effort really demonstrated our ability to integrate separate but related activities To seek and identify Insights based on lessons as we were moving through implementation of the activity and then to self adjust towards a more effective outcomes I think that was a significant accomplishment throughout this lessons-learn activity and then lastly The effort demonstrates our ability to innovate for example to make changes to processes and procedures and approaches To address challenges that we projected And so you'll hear those examples. You'll hear how We we were able to do that to again achieve the success that we have achieved Slide to please Immediately after the accident we established near-term task force in response to Commission direction to review NRC Processes and regulations to determine Whether the agency should make improvements to our regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy for policy direction The task force concluded at that time that continued operation of the fleet And continued licensing activities did not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety But they also presented a number of recommendations and this slide lists the Categories of those recommendations and the specific recommendations But also on the right of that slide it Emphasizes where we are on disposition in each of those recommendations and as you can see we've dispositioned almost All of those recommendations and those few that remain are on a closure path And so as a result I agree with some of the statements of the first panel safety has been has been improved Next slide please In our in our presentation We are going to provide you additional detail of our progress what implementation looks like today and what we've left to do First Bill Dean who's the director of the office of nuclear reactor regulation is going to provide an overview of the tier one status implementation Mike Franovich who is the acting director of the Japan Lessons Learn Division will provide an update on The status of the remaining tier one activities in an overview of our assessments regarding the tier two In the tier three activities and then finally Tim Reed and Eric Bowman Will walk us through the mitigation of beyond design basis external events rulemaking and so now I'll turn the presentation over to bill Thanks, Mike. Good morning chairman commissioners It's a pleasure as always to be here this morning and in particular Chairman Saviniki for your first turn at the helm even though it's probably you like your one thousandth Commission meeting probably something like that. Yeah And I do apologize in advance if I stumble over titles as we go through Q&A, but I have to interrupt you now I printed out something yesterday and I grabbed it off the printer and it said the chairman approves whatever and I'm like Well, this is burns is where's my email and I'm just like wait a second. That is mine So anyway, so the next slide please This slide should be fairly familiar to the Commission. We've been using it for geez almost since the beginning I think and it's proved to be an effective slide to provide a snapshot of where we stand in terms of our efforts to complete the tier one activities Which were the ones that were of most substance and safety enhancements And so obviously this demonstrates that we're well along as as Mike indicated in his opening remarks So let me talk about these in in segments. So with respect to the orders 85 of the 99 operating plants are in compliance with the 12049 order on mitigating strategies in essence Really all of the plants have met the requirements except for the fact that the 14 BWRs mark one and mark two BWRs Still have work to do in terms of coming into compliance with the containment vent orders and for those sites There's a a close relationship or inner interrelationship between the vents and the mitigating strategies So while they have put in place all of the equipment and the strategies to date until they complete their vent orders Which is still another year or two away They can't claim victory relative to the the mitigating strategies order, but in essence all of that work has been done at all the sites With respect to the spin-fuel pull Instrumentation all plants with the exception of Fitzpatrick are in compliance with that and Fitzpatrick is an outlier because of the fact that Their path until very recently was to shut down. They had asked for an exemption from that So they have plans to to get in compliance with that order later this year So by the summertime we should have all the plants in compliance with the spin-fuel pull instrumentation orders And then with respect to hardened vents as you all know there there are two phases to that There's the wet well phase or phase one and the dry well phase phase two At this point about 20% of the plants are complete with their phase one work And we expect by the end of this year 70% of the plants to be Complete with their phase one wet well venting hardened severe accident capable vents And then we're well ahead in terms of the pace in terms of coming into compliance with phase two I think you're aware that that all the plants that have to come in compliance with that order plan on using Water addition strategy and not to install a specific dry well vent And so we expect them to be well in advance of the 2019 backstop for those orders in the area of the 5054 f-request of the re-evaluations with respect to seismic re-evaluations Approximately 50% have completed this work and that will continue over the next several years in terms of flooding hazard re-evaluations We've received all of the flooding hazard re-evaluated flooding hazards from all the licensees. We do have two sites remaining Beaver Valley and Brunswick that have some complexity to them that we are specifically focused on in terms of completing our Evaluation of their re-evaluated flooding hazard once we give that to those sites Then they can then begin developing their mitigating strategies assessment. So And a matter of fact Mike just a week or so ago was at Beaver Valley specifically to walk down the site with his counterparts from The office of new reactors and to work with the licensee to make sure we have a Alignment in terms of a foregoing strategy at that site I will mention one thing in terms of flooding hazard that we're seeing is A number of licensees are queuing up to provide us with a revised Re-evaluated flooding hazard. So that's something that we're going to have to deal with in terms of how do we look at that information in a efficient and effective manner And and not have it distract us from the primary mission that we have in terms of getting through the mitigating strategies assessment So that's something that we're in conversation with the office of new reactors and the staff there in terms of how to do that efficiently and effectively Mike's going to talk in a little bit about where we are with tier two and tier three And then Tim and Eric are going to touch on the the mitigating beyond it beyond design basis event rulemaking And so those obviously are centerpieces of our of our post Fukushima response And I will say the Commission obviously has Knows that we have two papers in front of them And we certainly look forward to your feedback in your direction as a result of those two commission papers And hopefully today's meeting will help clarify or answer Perhaps some of the questions or issues or concerns that you might have so hopefully we can help in that regard Before I turn it over to Mike I do want to provide a couple of comments or observations so first of all in a little bit Eric and Tim are going to talk to you about the rule making and Those two individuals as well as Howard Benowitz from from OGC I think I've done a phenomenal job in terms of leading the staff effort a lot of people have contributed to that rule making It's a substantial accomplishment, and I just want to recognize their efforts Collectively in leading that effort and developing what I think is a very coherent rulemaking to the Commission Over the past several months Mike Franovic and I have had the opportunity to actually participate and observe several of the TI-191 inspections these are the inspections that the Regents are doing to evaluate and validate that the license have indeed implemented what they committed to in terms of the mitigating strategies order and it's been very impressive not only to see the quality of our inspectors and inspection teams and the way that they are inspecting licensees Implementation but also the robustness and the capability that exists out there not just for Mitigating of beyond design basis events, but how this equipment might be used in other Ways, and I'll talk to that later on in our presentation when we talk about flex and then the last thing I want to mention is just the recognition of the entire Division over the years it started off as a director at Grudeau a division and Now that a lot of the major work and particularly much of the major policy issues had been brought forward to the Commission particularly with the Rulemaking in the tier 2 and tier 3 while there still is remaining work to be done in substantial and important work that Mike's going to talk about Collectively the JLD organization has done a phenomenal job I think in terms of managing and and working through a very complex involved and evolving Environment and so you know my my compliments to them You know we're looking at obviously with the decline in some of the workload reshaping JLD and on our plans are in beginning of fiscal year 18 to a downsize the division to two branches And it's an important to keep those two branches Solid for some period time because of the knowledge management that they have the knowledge transfer that needs to occur And so it's very important that we keep that collective group together because of that corporate knowledge that they have and I think Mike Will talk later about some of the KM type work that we plan to do so with that Let me turn it over to Mike and tell you about coming attractions. All right. Thanks, Bill Good morning chairman and commissioners and go to slide five, please Please to tell you that implementation of the mitigating strategies order is nearly complete as you've heard from other panelists We have completed on-site audits at each of the US plants nearly every plant has notified us that they comply with the Orders requirements. We've now issued about half of the site specific Evaluations safety evaluations documenting our assessment of the licensee strategies and the regions continue with their inspections to confirm order compliance We have now completed about a quarter of these inspections and have identified no substantive findings to date We credit this to the thoroughness of the audit process including the week-long on-site audit that is done by a multidisciplinary team of experts and Also to the dedication of licensees to improve site safety Looking toward the future. We have developed and are implementing a plan to transition the JLD activities to long-term oversight The plan outlines roles and responsibilities and provides for enhanced knowledge transfer opportunities This plan assures consistent implementation through deliberate cross-regional engagement To ensure the benefits of these safety enhancements endure We are updating and developing inspection procedures to incorporate beyond design basis features in the reactor oversight process The procedures will be informed by the lessons learned from the ongoing mitigating strategies inspections if I can go to next slide Okay, regarding the BWR reliable hardened vent containment order The order entails two phases as bill cap Describe phase one requires licensees to upgrade containment wet well venting Capabilities the upgrade ensures that the hardened vent can operate longer have better hydrogen control and can function under severe Exxon conditions in order to remove heat and to better preserve the containment function For phase two requires a similar dry well venting capability Phase two entails either installation of a dry well vent that can operate under severe exon conditions or implementation of a Containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely to need to vent from the containment during a severe accident No licensees to date have elected to install a dry well vent as an option We have reviewed licensees plans for phase one and phase two And issued interim staff evaluations well ahead of schedule Maybe I should pause here for a moment to stir refresh memories about the ISC's themselves We did develop the ISC concepts starting with the mitigating strategies order The ISC's provide a licensee a degree of assurance regarding acceptability of their plans This approach enables licensees to move forward in a timely way with equipment procurement and installation in advance of issuing our safety evaluations We are now looking working with the industry to expedite closure of the remaining open items Well as licensees complete their analyses and finalize their designs. They will provide appropriate information for staff review using the auto process and the electronic portals the Staff will develop the safety evaluations as the open items are closed to expedite the completion of these documents in addition industry and staff are developing templates and sub for submittals And regarding the safety evaluations and are coordinating when information becomes available to more efficiently use resources We will inspect the sites after they are in compliance and have received the safety Evaluations similar to what we're doing under a mitigating strategies order approach a draft inspection procedure is now under development And we expect the compliance inspections to begin and admit to your late 2018 time frame I can go to next slide, please slide 7 We have continued to make steady progress in the area seismic and flooding hazard re-evaluations all sites have submitted their analyses for our nrc review For seismic. We issued the last of the staff assessments at the end of last year We are now focusing on assessing the impact of any hazards that exceed a sites design basis Majority of sites with exceedances will perform limited scope evaluations such as assessing potential fuel pool impacts Fewer than one third of the US plants are preparing seismic probabilistic risk assessments We expect to receive the first of these over the next in the next month The remaining sites will make their submittals on a staggered schedule to allow us to best utilize optimize our resources For flooding we have sent nearly every site its hazard acceptability letters with the exception of beaver valley in Brunswick As bill noted informing them that the flooding levels to use for the subsequent evaluations These letters are then followed up by full staff assessments documenting the technical basis for the conclusions in the letter We have now issued over half of the staff assessments Licensees that identified exceedances in the flooding level will also perform additional analyses to form Inform rather though they'll do either a focused evaluation or they'll do what's called the integrated assessment The results of these will also be Put into our what's our called our phase two decision-making process to determine if backfits are appropriate In addition to recommendation 2.1 process the reevaluated hazard information will also be used to show compliance with the upcoming mitigation beyond design basis rule as directed by Commission SRM Comsecchi 14-37 Most sites have evaluated their mitigating strategies against their reevaluated hazards We have begun reviewing these assessments and we'll continue over the next 18 months Next slide, please So regarding tier two and three Recommendations we have completed our final assessments of the remaining tier two and three Recommendations and submitted our assessment to you for your consideration through Secchi paper 16-144 Recall that the majority of the tier two and three recommendations were previously closed in Secchi papers 15-137 and 16-41 The remaining recommendations require additional assessment or development of a resolution approach Including stakeholder interaction before the staff can determine a firm Disposition path over the past several months. We've discussed these final recommendations with our stakeholders including the public Industry state and federal government agencies and the advisory committee on record safeguards For two of the three recommendations natural hazards other than seismic and flooding and real-time radiation monitoring We have recommended no further regulatory action For ongoing confirmation of natural hazards We concluded that the NRC can meet the intent of near-term task force recommendation 2.2 Which is related to periodic assessment of hazards using a more efficient approach than a proposed rulemaking We have recommended enhancing existing processes and developing associated staff procedures The proposed framework will ensure that we proactively and routinely aggregate new external hazard information Assess new information in a systematic and predictable manner and inform appropriate regulatory programs Promptly about new hazard information that likely affects safety The proposed framework has three components the first being Knowledge retention activity that preserves and leverages the hazard information gathered from various regulatory reviews second a continued collaboration and coordination with stakeholders including other federal agencies and third and Assessment activity which includes aggregation evaluation of significant new information as well as referral a potential significant Issues to appropriate regulatory programs like the generic issues program The full details of the framework are proposed and described in Secchi 16-144 With that I will now turn over the presentation to Tim Reed and Tim will cover the mitigation of beyond design-based events rulemaking Tim Thanks, Mike. Good morning chairman commissioners as the slide states and go to the next slide, please The draft final mitigation of beyond design basis events rule would integrate into final Regulation the key requirements that stem from almost six years of our ongoing efforts to address the events in Japan of course in 2011 I think it's very clear from the discussion today that the majority safety improvements have in fact either been complete We're about to be complete as a result of implementing the ongoing Fukushima orders and the associated license conditions for new reactors So the question arises and what's the rulemaking doing that's different? Well, the rulemaking would make generically applicable these key requirements and by that we place into the regulations predictable stable Requirements and we have advantage here because we can learn the lessons from the ongoing implementation We've folded that into the infrastructure of the rule and we also of course have benefited from the external stakeholder feedback That's been provided as part of the rulemaking process So once the regulations in place then we no longer have need to use orders or license conditions So I think the graphic on the slide then depicts the approach. We've taken it's as you know And in fact directed we have followed a performance-based approach to address these events for beyond design-based external events That is in turn to enable their flexible and adaptable Mitigation capability, but put in place and that fits well with beyond design-based external events And this approach is similar of course to what we did following the events of 9-11 for power reactors So then the objective then of this mitigation beyond design-based events rule is to take this work and produce a coherent and Integrated set of requirements to reflect the lessons learned as well as its feedback And I think what we provided you in draft final form has accomplished that task That objective, excuse me So since we issued the proposed rule in November of 2015 for 90 day 90 day comment period I think it's been approved significantly and that's a benefit credit to the folks who Provided the feedback on our proposed rule. We've simplified it. We've clarified it We've aligned it with its guidance. I think there's been a lot of improvements there So as a brief overview then I'll walk through the rule at a very high level here That'll sort of set the table for the remainder of my discussion in Eric's discussion on the rule It's structured first as most rules are in part 50 to contain the applicability provisions and paragraph A It's followed by the integrated response capability requirements in paragraph B And really the rest of the rules there support that so we have equipment requirements. We have training requirements We have drill requirements We have the spend fuel bull monitoring requirements set in there really by themselves Then we have a configuration management provision as document tension of changes in there also as most rules do we have a Scheduler and compliance provision in there and then finally we have a paragraph that we rescind orders and facilitate the removal of the license Conditions, so that's the structure of the rule I'll talk about the applicability portion the schedule and compliance portion the last that last paragraph to rescind orders and remove License conditions. I'll finish with the integrated response capability Requirements, and I'll hand it off to Eric and he'll finish that rule and also talk about the supporting guidance So that's the plan so I go to the next slide please So I just mentioned we followed a performance-based approach, and I think that's better really understood I think Mike actually mentioned earlier. It's it's really enabled licensees to implement innovative approaches I think most you folks have been out there and seen this is pretty impressive And it fits with their specific facility designs their their events their operational practices They're their external events And that's enabled the safety improvements to be put in place While minimizing what otherwise would be larger amount of regulatory impact and cost have we been we followed a more Prescriptive regulatory approach, so I think it's been very good. This slide also talks about our broad view What are we talking about there? Well as you know a very well know We looked at all the ongoing regulatory actions internally We tried to and several different actions with commission consolidate those down to what became the mitigation beyond sign-based defense rule I think that directly led to our development of the rule and and producing more effective efficient rule So that's what that's the inside look But I think the more important look is is how we view the rule itself We were thinking the entirety of the reactor lifecycle not just the beginning when you scope Applicants licensees in but the end of reactor life, so we have built in decommissioning provisions from the get-go So that's some of our views there We also were very mindful the fact and this is always the case when you're making generically applicable orders You know at the end state you're going to be doing with a rule at least and orders in this case We have unfortunately have a very complex circumstance because we have orders and license conditions and a rule So we had we were mindful of need to address that that end state also So let's talk about the first paragraph paragraph a that's the applicability provisions The draft final rule applies to the same sets of licensees and applicants as the font as the proposed rule And those are operating licensees under part 50 combined license holders under part 52 and Applicants for the same applicants for operating licensees under part 50 and applicants for combined licenses under Part 52 no other licensees and no designs for example on power reactors Now having said that designers are certainly free to address our regulation as they if they choose to in effect You as you probably wear we do have such an example in house right now And moving on then to our decommissioning provisions What's referred to is phase out on this slide These decommissioning provisions reflect the recent decisions we've made on decommissioning So there's no new regulatory territory carved out there However, what is new is we built them into the regulation and so what that means is licensees no longer would have a need to Request exemptions and stuff would not have to review those that would happen as part of the regulation So this would I think were resulting less resources spent and that's and that's by the way another mindset We had throughout this thing about everybody's resources. So So that's a very good provision in the rule the the approach in the final rule is the same as it was in the proposed rule is basically at a High level to three stage approach Simply put if once you remove the reactor fuel from the vessel permanently to the spent fuel pool Clearly now your mitigation strategies come down to your spent fuel pool so you can simplify it there Once you get to a low enough to k heat that you're basically have a lot of boil off time time to take out of Hock measures to sustained function You can now move down to the extensive damage mitigation guidelines portion of our rule now That stays in place until the spent fuel pool is empty of all fuel which typically when you move the dry cast towards so at that point Then all requirements see so it's the same approach as the proposed rule But I think you'll find in hopefully throughout the regulation that we've clarified and improved the language in paragraph a so moving on then to our scheduler and Compliance provisions that's paragraph age I think there's two things interesting about that versus the final rule that we're not in the proposed rule first Flexible scheduling provision when we put the proposed rule out We were very well aware of the challenge the licensees would face and trying to address the reevaluate hazard information I within the proposed to your compliance period So we actually requested feedback on how to address that issue in the in the regulation in the proposed rule We've got a suggestion to use in a flexible scheduling provision. We like that Suggestion we worked it into what you find in h2. Okay, so that what that means that provision only applies to Addressing the reevaluate hazard information and other respects we think are I'll call it default compliance period Which is two or three years. I'll talk about a moment. That should be sufficient for everything else in the rule In terms of licensees who want to voluntarily use that flexible scheduling provision They would need the first show good cause they cannot comply with it the nominal two or three year compliance provisions in the rule and then provide a proposed schedule and supporting basis for that schedule Okay, so then here's some more of that mindset again on resources We we structured this to be approved if unless we notified to the licensee to the contrary within 120 days of submittal of that So that's that's the same mindset that we built throughout the regulation another interesting feature of Paragraph H is and I just mentioned we have a two or three year compliance provision now in the in the regulation This three year is new. This applies only to Licensees having boiling water reactor Designs e-designs with mark one and mark two contaminants This is feedback we received in our final rule CER meeting and cumaflex regulation meeting so This is in fact a directly reflects the fact that these folks are implementing the Syracs in a capable venting order ea 13109 The venting system obviously is a very important part of their mitigation Strategies if they were to have to comply within two years They will likely have to do procedures more than once training more than once So this is basically given them an extra year as you'll recall that order was issued in June of 2013 more than a year later Than the orders that were making generically applicable part of our rules. So This will avoid that unnecessary distraction unnecessary resource expenditure. So I think this is the CR process working very well for us moving on then to paragraph I Last paragraph in the rule This is our as you'll look at it's a set of requirements that would rescind the orders and support and removal the license conditions I mentioned briefly but going back to that again when we integrated everything into this rule We not only have post Fukushima strategies and guidelines We have the post 9-11 strategies and guidelines that were implemented about 10 years ago for 5054 HH to so we're bringing Those all in as a result There are license conditions and orders Associate with both and those license conditions and orders are completely redundant to the new rule We're going to be putting in place So what we want to do and by the way we got feedback on this issue is part of our CR questions There was confusion as to what would apply when and so this is our effort to address that feedback What we would do is try to transition from the effective date of the rule out to three years and at three years Past the effective day of the rule then our rule was established the only set of requirements for all the applicants licensees to which this rule applies so we're rescinding orders and removing license conditions and a Discipline process that there's no regulatory gap that occurs anywhere throughout that process We built it into the regulation Because that I hope that we believe that I'll save resources Obviously the highest approval you can get is the Commission the most information support This is in that rulemaking package So we think this is the way to get it done and less the resources on all people's parts So that's that's the objective of paragraph five next slide please So I'll go on to now the paragraph B. That's the integrated response capability That is truly where Eric and I started when we started developing this regulation So the regulation really is built around it and everything really is there to support that so as you recall These are the requirements to develop implement and maintain an integrated response capability Now the draft final rule has two or possibly three guidelines sets associated with it the proposed ruling had two and so I'll focus on that difference The first set of guidelines and strategies in the final draft final rule are the flex Strategies and these by volume are clearly a large majority of this regulation and these of course are to address Mitigate beyond design basis external events They're there to implement order e8 12049 the mitigation strategies order those were in the proposed role They're in the final rule the second set is what appears to be new These are seismic and flooding mitigation strategies and guidelines and they can include events specific approaches Now these frankly in most cases will be flex in other words You can take your flex as is address these scenarios without change Well, there'll be a modified version of flex again flex can do what it needs to do It can also address these strategies in which case you're not going to have a different set of strategies You're gonna have flux or flex modified if you will but they can involve events specific approaches That's allowed that flexibility in this regulation And if that involves strategy and guidelines, then you could have another set of strategies and guidelines So as you know these only apply the operating licensees The new this new reactors are designed to these standards. So these this is not an issue for those folks And it only applies when the calculated values using the new methodologies Exceed their external design basis for flooding and seismic. So that's that's the second set Then the third set is the what was also in the proposed role and that is the extensive damage mitigation guidelines Or it's what referred to as the post 9-11 strategies as you as you know We're simply relocating those into this regulation recognizing the overlap with the flex strategies and Also recognizing the fact to any proper integration integration you do need to consider those those guidelines and strategies So that's the final rule. So what appears to be new of course is Re-evaluated seismic and flooding had strategies and guidelines and really it's not new the actual regulation had this Flexibility built into it in the proposed rule, but it was built into the guidance now that guidance is still there in the final rule What we've really done is aligned the regulation now with the guidance So the same flexibility it was there has now reflected in the regulation So this is a I think a good example of improving a final regulation such as much more clear and understandable Moving on then to the rest of paragraph B The next provision is is the same provision basically there was in the proposed rule And that was the requirement that these strategies and guidelines need to be integrated with the symptom-based EOPs and and I said with an emphasis on with the symptom-based EOPs are step-by-step procedures They were put in place following events of TMI in the 1980s The strategy guidelines have more flexibility as you need to address beyond design-based conditions So there's so they're fundamentally different, but nonetheless we can integrate them recognizing those differences The next provision was also in the proposed rule You have to have obviously sufficient staffing to implement this integrated response capability That's in the final rule course and then the last provision is really a command and control provision if you will You have to have an organization that directs the staffing to implement this integrated capability So that's the structure of bees I rounds out B and I'll hand it off to Eric and we'll talk about the rest rule And this morning guidance Thank You Tim. Good morning chairman commissioners I'll be discussing the portions of the rule that support the integrated response capability that Tim mentioned as well as the guidance supporting the rule The draft final rule contains requirements that support the integrated response capability Some of the supporting requirements are directly linked only to the flex strategy and re-evaluated strategy mitigate the re-evaluated hazards portions of the Strategies as opposed to including the post 9-11 B5 B strategies There are reasons that I'll go into why we're treating the two sets of strategies different as far as the supporting requirements are concerned As Tim mentioned, we're just moving the requirements from After 9-11 from where they exist now in part 50 to the new section 50 point one five five We are not changing anything with what the requirements are and we're sensitive to the need to meet the back fit Rule if we move anything that's currently existing in guidance for those Requirements from the guidance level of the requirement level the first of these Supporting strategies have to do with the capacity and capability of the equipment in paragraph C the Equipment that supports the mitigating strategies the flex strategies are required to have the capacity and capability or perform the functions that they're designed to accomplish the post 9-11 strategies that capacity and capability is designated in the at the guidance level similarly the Flex equipment has a requirement for reasonable protection. It actually has two requirements for reasonable protection against natural phenomenon one of the requirements for the equipment that supports the flex strategies that were originally developed under the mitigation strategies order is against the design basis natural phenomenon and there's a new one for the Re-evaluated hazards that came out from the seismic and flooding portions of the request for information the 50-54 F letter They're specific to the different things that the equipment will be used for because we have seen in the implementation process that licensees have developed some event specific Strategies for addressing the flooding hazard or the seismic hazard They can use the equipment for specific hazards So we've laid it out so they can have the reasonable protection for the phenomenon that the equipment would be used to mitigate and the post 9-11 strategies that again is in the guidance level It's set us in the guides level by a selection of the storage locations as Compared to what would be potential targets of a hostile action the Other differences communications capability is also required to support the flex strategies, but not the post 9-11 strategies again that is in the Guidance level for the B5 B post 9-11 strategies Next slide please The second area a couple of these areas Tim already mentioned because they were included in paragraph B instead of paragraph C There are other supporting requirements the staffing to support the strategies in this case the staffing is In the rule is designated to support both the flex strategies and the post 9-11 B5 B strategies The reason we were able to cover both flex and B5 B with the staffing requirement has to do with the 2011 emergency preparedness enhancements rulemaking where we had required staffing analysis to show that the onsite on-shift personnel were capable of Performing the functions they were assigned including the B5 B strategies as well as the emergency preparedness Efforts so we already had the requirement from that rulemaking and similarly we had in that rulemaking the imposition of a requirement for Periodic on an eight-year cycle exercises for the B5 B strategies As you'll see in the rulemaking those requirements are being moved from what we had proposed in a new section 7 of appendix e to part 50 into the new section 50 point one five five Additionally, there is a training requirement to train the staff that will be performing the strategies using the systems approach to training in order to ensure that they're capable of Performing the functions that they're assigned to perform for the strategies one part of the requirement for the training that we've included is We've allowed a cut out if you will for training that's already considered responsive to an existing requirement for example the Flexed strategies do in general for some of them require the use of Flexible hoses that the response personnel would have to roll out and connect that are essentially the same thing as a fire hose That would be used in a fire protection program We've got existing fire protection training that covers How a licensee needs to train their personnel on how to put out fire hoses connect them and ensure that they will Function we aren't asking licensees to go back and Revisit whether or not that training is adequate because it's supported already by a regulatory program any other similar types of things where there would be elements of the strategies that already exist in regulatory programs They don't need to redo using the systems approach to training Next slide please as Tim mentioned we've included the need for a remote monitor and capability for this bent fuel pool level instrumentation We had previously in the proposed rule Had that as a supporting to the mitigating strategies It's been moved to a separate section within the new section 50 point one five five that is separate and distinct from the Mitting in strategies That's because of the genesis from the two separate orders the spent fuel pool instrumentation order It's as you recall was for the prioritization of actions between the spent fuel pool and the reactor elements of the casualty at the guidance level the spent fuel pool instrumentation and the mitigating strategies are fairly closely linked because the spent fuel pool level instrumentation at the guidance level was Set to be able to function in the same context of the mitigating strategies would be used however, it wasn't required to be used for the mitigating strategies and Similarly the guidance level for the mitigating strategies points to the spent fuel pool level instrumentation We're leaving that as it is where a licensee can continue to rely on using the spent fuel pool instrumentation that was initially installed under the order ea 12051 and Will be required under the new portion of 50 point one five five and a licensee that does that would therefore have that equipment Subject to the same requirements that are in the new paragraph C as Because then it would be equipment relied upon for the mitigating strategies However, it's not mandated that they Interlocked the two requirements if you will next slide please There are three regulatory guides that are supporting the rule the These regulatory guides draw heavily on the interim staff guidance that was issued for the request for information that was sent out at the same time as the post Fukushima orders and also the Updates that we've had to make to the interim staff guidance as a result of the lessons that have been learned in the implementation of the mitigating strategies order The first of the regulatory guides is regulatory guide one point two two six which covers the flex strategies For the b5b strategies, we have not developed a new regulatory guide in 2014 there was a section that was added to the standard review plan section 19.4 that covers those strategies and that guidance remains the same Regulatory guide one point two two seven covers the spent fuel pool instrumentation it essentially carries for the interim staff guidance from the spent fuel pool instrumentation order without any substantive changes and Finally regulatory guide one point two two eight Which covers a lot of the remaining portions of the rule it addresses the issues of integration of the sets of strategies with the EOPs the command and control training and drills It also provides Guidelines for the performance of staffing and communications assessments that carry forward the Assessments that were done for the request for information on that subject And finally in addition to providing regulatory guidance for how to comply with the draft final rule these regulatory guides One point two two six one point two two eight and the standard review plan in particular are responsive to the direction You provided us on the proposed rule to ensure that there's appropriate coordination in the guidance with the severe accident management guidelines With that I'll turn the presentation back over to bill next life. Yeah. Thanks, Eric. Yeah next slide So real briefly As I mentioned earlier from the visits that Mike and I have recently made and and to the sites and having a chance to see firsthand the flux equipment it also has allowed me to be able to visualize and Evaluate or assess firsthand how this equipment could be utilized in other ways besides For a beyond design basis external event. So the staff has been hard at work in terms of developing Revising our guidance documents that will help incorporate flex in areas like how could you use flex for credit and significance determination process determinations? How could you use flex for example and making the decision on a notice of enforcement discretion and how it can be utilized in licensing applications? And we've also begun work based on commission direction in terms of how could flex be integrated into for example security related areas So while this guidance is under development, we are making Practical use of it now. We've leveraged our existing processes For example the recent emergency license amendment on a Palo Verde where they had the failure of their measles emergency diesel generator We were able to leverage licensees application of flexion incorporate that as both a defense and depth measure as well as how it could be accommodated in a risk assessment and and basically supported a decision where we allowed Palo Verde to extend their allowed outage time for the diesel to 62 days So and then also licensees are incorporating flex in their PRA Models and as they do that that will provide us with a more consistent and reliable Capability to basically leverage flex and some of our licensing decisions before I turn it over to Mike for last time I do want to recognize this individual on my right Mike Franovic Mike last summer actually had been selected for an SES position in the office of new reactors And I implored Jennifer you all at the time that when Jack Davis departed I really needed to sustain the corporate knowledge and and leadership that Mike had been providing to this program and I think that was one of the best decisions that that Jennifer and I cooperatively made was to allow Mike to stay in position Mike will be going over to his new job now in a couple of weeks, but he helped shepherd us through these very important policy Activities and to get these in front of the Commission I just want to personally thank Mike for his leadership and his willingness to stay with us to see this through so thanks Mike Mike Thanks, Bill. So as you've seen in the presentation today We the the great majority of safety enhancements are now in place in the US fleet And the US fleet is better prepared to cope with extreme events. What work remains is on a sound path We believe continued focus is warranted to make sure that we complete those activities that remain and we'll devote that focus As we discussed the policy issues have been substantially resolved the mitigating the draft final mitigation of beyond design basis rulemaking package and a final tier two recommendations Closure plans are with the Commission our next steps with respect to sunsetting that the Japan lessons learned Staring committee and completing the transition to the line are imminent And so as we complete the transition we're placing additional focus on knowledge management and knowledge capture So that Tim and Eric and others can can ultimately retire We want to make sure that we ultimately at some point We want to make sure that we capture not just what we did but the rationale behind we did it It was why we did it and so that's what is involved in our knowledge capture activities I want to conclude this Presentation with with just a tremendous sense of pride that we feel all of us I think with respect to what we've been able to accomplish accomplished so with that we're ready to take the Commission's questions Thank you all for the presentations and I'll pick up where you left off Mike Johnson to say Observing this as a member of the Commission throughout these events. I'm also very proud of the NRC staff at a Speech at our regulatory information conference a few years ago I talked about how proud I was of our country for the fact that its reaction to what on TV You know is a very hard thing to watch the events that happened at Fukushima We were allowed as a federal government agency the space the breathing room that we needed To apply the technical rigor and the discipline to a set of actions that we're going to have the kind of safety improvement effect that we analyzed and We were allowed the space to set implementation schedules for those that were not so quick that they were a distraction from the day-to-day operations of those plants And I'm proud of that as a very reasoned reaction to something again That was hard to watch was happening to our friends and colleagues in Japan But we were provided that space. I think we made excellent use of that space And so I also want to commend the staff and and I mentioned in the previous panel that it was by my estimation hundreds of NRC experts and and staff with a direct involvement, but it was probably You know a thousand two thousand when we when we take in the indirect support that is needed and all the different functions that provide Support so that the Tim's in the Eric's of the world, you know can do with the rulemaking activity that they do so I think it will stand in the history of this agency is a tremendous body of work to have done this And by the way, there were lots of other things going on for us in in that time period So so let me begin with that and and it is important and I think in this moment. It's good to recognize that That being said I still have some questions that I'm going to direct to you one of the areas of concern going forward for us and Sustainment is a little note I wrote to myself here when the previous panel was talking about knowledge transfer and the generational shift the turnover to Successors that come and take our jobs. I wrote our regulatory interpretations well documented and I'm going to tell you What what causes me to be focused on that in this moment? I in my first I would say maybe a couple of years of service on this commission I joined the agency when it was deep deep into codifying the post September 11 security orders and This is a term near and dear to many of us. Oh, we're just going to codify some orders So some of the experience in that process was we codified the orders But with additional things now let me be clear from the start you get into the implementation of something and you cannot Proceed Mindless of the lessons you learned the moments of gosh if I knew then what I know now I would have written this order slightly differently and it's not all just Originating from NRC many of it is you know people have implemented the things that we've directed them to do and we both learned lessons in that process But as an agency, it's important to bring discipline to that process of I'm not picking on Tim, but I wrote some of his he said improving the final rule and lessons learned in Implementation because we could sit as the regulator and introduce a number of new measures I appreciated that both Tim and Eric were specific about being sensitive to back fit about looking at the things That increased the efficiency and effectiveness in moving from the orders to the rule But that being said we will have people who will come along in the future whether it's the actions taken post 9-11 or Today the other thing to Navigate is this split between what do you bind us to in the rule language itself? And what do we put in guidance and Tim and Eric talked quite a bit about how they tried to navigate that But that that discussion also takes me back to that very first question a regulatory Interpretations well documented so that all of our successors don't get together and say between the Commission's vote their Staff requirements memorandum the direction to the staff where we ended up in rule space I find myself now on issues You know I go back and try to take the mosaic of all of that It's like the equivalent of a legislative history in the Congress You know people gave floor speeches people wrote committee reports How do I stitch that together into saying the intent and clear intent of the law is X So we have a version of that as regulators Would anyone speak overall to the approach to that to making sure that an inspector in the field ten years from now Knows the regulatory expectation for X or Y that arose out of the Fukushima response. No, that's a great question I'm gonna hand it off to Mike in just a minute But it's something that we've been extremely conscious of and you talk about the lessons learned from the 9-11 And the or implementation of course Tim has some of the scars I think from that activity that I think He was very conscious of in terms of how this rule was developed But in terms of knowledge management knowledge transfer We actually have a handful of Specific actions that were taken to do exactly what you identified is that this ultimately is getting Translated into the regions and the inspectors are going to be the ones that are going to have to basically approach the sustainability So maybe I can let Mike talk a little bit about a couple initiatives and Mike before you do Let me just just at a high level also Make the point so we were mindful of both of the things that you raised one about what happens when you codify and things can grow In fact, I remember very vividly some some of the early steering committee meetings with The industry steering committee where we talked about this plan to codify and how do we make sure that we exercise discipline in that process? And and so the emphasis that we've placed throughout the process to make sure that that we didn't grow that we applied Backfit along the way. We looked at what is necessary if we're going to make these improvements I think we did do diligence and we got great input from external stakeholders when it where they thought we got it wrong And let me be clear the codification is absolutely necessary I don't like us to be regulating for decades at a time in order space necessarily I mean there are instances where it's one off, but where it's generic We need to move to codification. I'm pleased that we did that and if you can move to codification with a lot of the Same people it's best. The other thing I was going to make point I was going to make is there came a time when we were thinking about From an expediency standpoint whether or not we could afford for example to do safety evaluations at the back end or whether we needed to get past those to get to inspections and I remember very vividly Maybe bill was engaged in that activity as a member of the steering committee as well where we said You know what ten years from now some inspector in the field is going to be looking at what we did And they need some sort of a beacon or some sort of a stamp About what we thought about what? Licenses were proposing to provide consistency and stability going forward and so I think I think again That's an example of where we were mindful of the challenge and we took actions to address it. Please Mike Thanks, Mike. That's a great place to For me to start off with have been in the field Sometimes you get a vintage plan and you're trying to interpret the original licensing basis And sometimes it doesn't have that level of detail or documentation go with and then you can wind up in a protracted process Calling back headquarters and and writing agreements to try to make those interpretations. So the safety evaluations is essentially one of those lessons learned Let's make sure we spend the time appropriately and be very clear and detailed as to what we looked at during the audits What the position papers were that we supported whether they were white papers presented by the industry? or our own generated white papers and that we use those products to inform the TI 191 inspection so the inspectors actually take it in the field and We work with them on inspection plans So go look in this one area that maybe we the audit teams didn't spend as much time Vise the areas that we've already documented in the SCR I mean there are other layers of KM KT knowledge management knowledge transfer For example, we are working on a new rag to document a lot of the lessons learned from the JLD staff itself Fortunately, we have Eric Bowman with us who lived through the 9-11 Legacy when the Commission directed we need to have more of a KM KT effort in that arena So we were able to leverage that experience as well The red guides are another set of documents that obviously take clear staff positions on interpretations of industry implementing guidance So it is a myriad of documents and the last thing I'll note in the training arena We are trying to leverage what industry's done and we actually have under our MOU with impo Where they have a set of online video training videos regarding the flex program So we want to incorporate that those features into our own call program for inspectors and for staff So those are a few of the features that we're kind of working on right now I appreciate that and that's helpful. You didn't mention but I I also would credit the reintegration Organizationally and otherwise of a lot of this work into the standing line organizations. I think is a sustainment measure I know I've evidenced a certain amount of impatience about that over the years But it is happening now And I think if this is the time that the staff determined is comfortable and appropriate to take this You know the phasing is I guess Syveniki needs to be patient and say we're in we're getting there eventually and we did get there The one other thing and I only have a few seconds left But we haven't talked about this although Commissioner Burns did raise the issue of all of the international collaboration that's gone on since the Accident in Japan and the fact that regulators have collaborated and cooperated we talked to each other some countries did stress Test some some countries did there were changes in nomenclature, but I think at bottom We discovered that the post focusing machine a set of of areas of concern. We had good parallels around the globe But we have had very special and intense integration of things with the Our Japanese counterpart as the government of Japan looked after the accident at restructuring of various Organizational and process elements of their oversight of operating reactors So I would ask Mike Johnson or bill at a high level. Is there anything you'd want to say about how that's evolved to areas? I know that the area of Resident inspection is something of interest to our colleagues in Japan and they're they're looking at our model a little more closely Just so just at a high level sure. Thanks for that Commissioner We have had a lot of international collaboration and certainly in various international committees Through NEA and IEA and others as well as distinct interrelationships with with our counterparts in Japan One of the things that we're currently doing right now is hosting Five individuals from from our counterpart the NRA organization in Japan to basically firsthand evaluate The way we conduct our inspection program And so they've been out in in region 3 and region 3 and region 4 have been sharing responsibility for hosting them at various sites and inspections Next month they will come to headquarters and be here for several months and and get with the program office and Understands or the program office focus and then we're having dialogue with them about a future cohort group coming over again to To learn from us so that they can integrate that into their planning and efforts to refine their revise their oversight process Thanks and of course on the other side of that Japan and and our regulatory counterpart in Japan Has provided tremendous ability for us to look from afar to gain insights as they gain insights into what happened And how do we prepare to make sure that never happens again? That's been a long sort of a long-standing Close engagement that we've had with them and it's been very beneficial. Thank you both for that. Thank you Commissioner Barron Well, thank you all for your presentations and more importantly for the years of work you all have been doing to implement post Fukushima safety enhancements I Want to there's really so much material here is so many plate so many ways to go But I think I'll focus my questions on the staff's proposed resolution of the open tier two and tier three recommendations One open item is an evaluation of natural hazards other than seismic and flooding hazards And after applying a screening process the staff focused its more detailed analysis in two areas high winds and snow loads I thought the high wind analysis was pretty thorough. So I don't have questions about that I want to ask about the snow load evaluation, which isn't as lengthy The staff identified five northern plants that could have issues with heavy snow loads on plant structures like ruse and other things And the staff concluded that no additional action was needed at these sites in part because they have procedures To take precautionary actions prior to winter events and to monitor potential adverse effects at the sites The staff's paper didn't really describe the procedures though in any level of detail Do these five plants have detailed procedures for removing large amounts of snow from plant structures? Who does it with what equipment and what time frames? I'll take that question You're right the actual Secure paper doesn't have a great amount of detail on the snow load aspect Especially about characterization of what we looked at in the procedures. We did look at some of the procedures We did not as a staff put a heavy reliance on them because we took more of a structural analysis type of approach and looking at margins available In particular looking at the ASCE code And looking at how whether it's a BWR, which may have more susceptibility to snow load on the roof Versus a PWR. So we put more emphasis on the structural Analysis and capability when it came to the procedures All the five plants you've mentioned They do have procedures for clearing roadways Ensuring that the operating crews can come on in and handle the turnover if in case they're snowed in Submission personnel emergency response capability, etc. Not all of them had detailed Procedures regarding snow loads on roof for example, so I wouldn't that's why we didn't put a heavy reliance on that That particular element when we went back to the structural analysis piece So you're the staff wasn't concerned about the lack of detailed procedures In that regard because of margin and the structural analysis you get that's a fair characterization. Okay another open item I want to ask about is Is an evaluation of the efficacy of real-time radiation monitoring at nuclear plants and we discussed this at length on the on the first panel? And I mentioned at that time that the staff Staff's evaluation cites a 1982 study that concluded that a monitoring system consisting of 16 or 32 stations Couldn't provide reliable information about a potential radioactive plume and from my point of view, there's nothing wrong with looking at the Studies that are out there and have been done over the years But my expectation is that the staff's going to take a fresh look at the effectiveness of these monitoring stations Did the staff take the next step and examine how many stations would be necessary? for a radiation monitoring system to be effective So Correctly pointed out that it's prudent to start with the history. What have we done as a agency? particular post Three-mile Island accident we did go back and look at that and that is documented in the Secchi paper And it did point out some vulnerabilities about having a fixed station fixed monitoring capability While it may be of more utility to perhaps emergency officials who might be able to derive You know Where the center line of the plume may be falling by sort of vectoring off of different detectors when it came to actual? In the you know sharing that information with the public we had to be we're looking at it from a sensitive standpoint What do you do if you have a real-time monitoring capability that's publicly available? Where it might give false indication of true dose and so there were issues like that We went back and looked at we sought stakeholder input I think that's documented in the in the actual Secchi paper itself to get the different perspectives because there are advantages of such a system So we didn't go back and look at you know Let's say you had a 32 detector system and we did any kind of sensitivity studies or anything like that to see if that would Be a better system. We were Sensitive to the fact that there are in the federal enterprise Other capabilities for example with the environmental protection agency in the radnet system as you're probably familiar with there are 130 more than 130 fixed stations across the country There is a portable deployment capability as well and actually that has served From a federal perspective some useful information when we're looking at for example the Chernobyl event which was mentioned by the first panel Regarding the plume and contour maps going across the United States at the time So there is value in it and we are aware of what else is in the federal enterprise But we didn't go back and do any kind of updated analysis because ultimately we look at initial protective action Recommendations are really primarily based on the plant conditions We want an earlier warning type of approach rather than relying on deposition of radioactive material Although there's value in having that information. We'd rather have Operators declaring early from an emergency standpoint if I see eminent core damage I want to start making some recommendations to the local and state officials I don't know if Maybe Steve LaVie was the principal author of the study if you have any more to add to that Thanks What Mike said was pretty is correct What I one of the things I wanted to point out is in this 1982 study They did consider the difference between a 16 station and a 32 station and as I recall I'm standing here trying to remember what the number was it was only about a 5% improvement in the reliability over the 16 station Recognizing a course you just doubled the cost of the system and Making it even a higher resolution just keeps multiplying costs on a system which Is probably not it's not going to be a result in a substantial increase in public health and safety Well, I guess I take your comment on the role that you know these Modders would play What I want to make sure as an agency we're doing is we're really grappling Seriously with the recommendation that the near-term task force had which is they had an explicit recommendation We as an agency should take a look at the effect efficacy of of monitoring systems and While there's value in going back and seeing what you know in 1982 contractor study determined about that I Would expect that we go further than just that if we're going to take a fresh look at at the effectiveness value of these systems Like to see various ways to do that one way would be to look at and say okay Well, how many monitor how many monitoring systems? You know what today's technology would you need for an effective system? And what do we think the cost of that would be? You mentioned cost so it sounds like we didn't really look at well if 16 or 32 isn't enough How many would be on the cost side of things, you know, they're The staff briefly discussed that in the paper It provides the 1982 costs for the system from this study and then it asserts and it's the quote quote given inflation since 1982 the current costs would be significantly greater and quote and I think that's a pretty odd statement to make it's First of all, it's conclusory. There's no analysis behind it, but it just Just asserts that well the only factor is inflation But I think we'd all agree that there have been some pretty significant technological advancements in the last 35 years in the area of sensors data communications battery power sources And I would imagine that you could probably get a monitoring station today with more capabilities at lower cost than you would have in 82 and that's we heard that from mr. Mulligan on the first panel that he thinks the stations you get today are More reliable have more capabilities probably cheaper than the ones you would have gotten in the 80s Did the staff look at the current costs of radiation monitors? No Okay, and so to me and you know, this is maybe kind of a blunt question But if you didn't look at how many stations would be needed for an effective system and you didn't look at the cost of the monitoring stations How can you be sure that they wouldn't be a cost-beneficial substantial safety enhancement? So if I can take a shot at that commissioner Steve if you don't don't mind from from a high level And I appreciate your your comments and your remarks about you know how detailed on evaluation did we did we do on this? But I think that we looked at it from a from a much more higher level global perspective And that is from a perspective of protecting public health and safety The key is what is the par decision of the power recommendation that a licensee is going to make and when does that occur? That occurs well before there is any release or in need to have any off-site radiation monitoring And so a decision to shelter in place a decision to evacuate The way the EAL schemes are developed is that those recommendations would be made well in advance because you want to evacuate people Before there's a release and there's a plume right so To then have to Potentially require licensees to invest resources no matter you know whether it's a thousand dollars for a monitor or twenty five thousand dollars for a monitor There was not going to be any Substantial increase in protecting public health and safety there may be an increase in the potential for Additional knowledge to be available, but there's other means that already exists for doing You know you have teams that go out and do plume surveys We have the capacity for Firm act to come in from from FEMA to do whether it's Flyovers or whatever to get information about where the plume is and so on so forth So it would it was I think viewed and this would be my perspective It would be a nicety to do that but that There was no way that we could make a justification for no matter what the cost was that this was something That was needed for adequate protection for public health and safety or a cost-beneficial substantive Increase in safety well I want to push back on that a little bit because it to me that what that sounds like is a Disagreement with the underlying premise of the recommendation that this is really something that's important to look at and then Kind of jumping to the conclusion that well, it's not important to look at it And there's no way it could be a substantial safety enhancement. I mean is that I don't want to put words in your mouth That's kind of how I interpret what you just said. That's not grappling with the recommendation That's saying it's not a good recommendation. Right. So Mike's going to interpret for me Mike So and what I was going to say is that we we did not we took every one of the recommendations That were made Seriously, and I think I think the approach that bill laid out is exactly the approach that we had in mind we started with With with such an approach is something necessary for adequate protection based on the recommendation No, is is something would something represent a substantial increase and then would it be Cost justified so implementing the 51-9 as a way to look at this And so we didn't that's why we didn't get the cost We didn't get the cost for all of the other reasons that we've talked about about what exists in the current framework and What would be needed beyond that to to result in a substantial increase and we didn't see it I'd like to address the commissioners comment about We're deprecating the recommendation in the recommendation language the paragraph that preceded it The task force specified as long as field teams radically staffed equipped and capable of transit Given the nature of the natural disaster field modern remains an effective method to acquire radiation data But yet they then went on to recommend that we take a fresh look at the efficacy of real-time monitoring, right? I mean well I want to separate real You know, I don't want to separate But we did look at the real-time Data and based on the studies done by in 1982 and the recognition that the technical basis of that analysis was still valid Not the dollars and cents but you know the plume dispersion is plume dispersion. It's science. It's physics The location of the monitor in relation to that plume an Elevated plume and a boiling water reactor will pass maybe thousand at least a thousand feet above the monitor And I agree with my colleague from New Jersey. There is plume shine But not as much that but they were referring to in the study was getting a reliable indication and They said we can't get a reliable indication under all conditions And therefore they believed it wasn't worth the effort the staff apparently at that time agreed because they retracted the requirement from red Guide 197 but I'm over on my time, but I just want to follow up and kind of close the loop on this So there's the 1982 studies there. Is there new analysis? I mean you basically said that the science hasn't changed those The staff believes those conclusions are still valid Is there supporting analysis for the staff's new conclusion that the 1982 Findings are still true today Well, we if the basis of the conclusions is valid One would assume the conclusions are also valid But I want to point out and emphasize and even in the paper That conclusion was only one of the aspects we considered in making the recommendation Let me ask about quickly on one other aspect I mean one way to do this is how many monitors do you need and how much they cost another way to do it would say Hey, there are monitors operating right now in New Jersey and New York and Illinois did the staff evaluate the effectiveness or capabilities of those systems that are active today those systems as Mr. Mulligan pointed out do provide data that could be useful but Our question is do they substantially increase the public health and safety? Having confidence and response actions and having transparency are wonderful things But what how did they help us with the criterion substantial increase in public health and safety? When everything we see already in the plants provides that assurance the NRC's protocol for relying on plant condition The NRC has been right on plant conditions ever since TMI They've always downplayed The use of assessment Now once the event is going full force and you start to get that data available by all means licensees are expected to use it But our initial protective actions the most protective part of it are done on plant condition So if I may add to that just I mean granted we did leverage the 82 study It is informed by the outreaches to the EP community and emergency preparedness specialists and experts Through various forums to get their input I would also say we enter we leveraged the experience actually at Fukushima itself and how effective that system was at the time Given shifts in wind, but the other thing we leveraged may may come out clearly in the paper But in the backdrop you recall we went through a very large EP rulemaking here I think it was about five years ago six years ago And then part of that was looking at evacuation times and shadow evacuation effects if you recall Which is a real known effect would such a system if deployed in a real-time basis to the public cause Some unintended consequences there. These are qualitative considerations But something certainly in the back of your mind where it's let's say I had an indicator system out there and it was available on the internet and Public officials are saying one thing, but the indicators saying something else will people make their own decisions and perhaps Self-evacuate to a region where perhaps the winds are shifting and the plume is now moving in that particular sector No, that's not a quantitative piece It's a qualitative piece the other thing that's not in the paper I would say as a manager that I I keenly think about when we look at kind of decisions that we're looking at here in terms of merit for Public protection and that we do have a state-of-the-art reactor consequence analysis And it does give us some pretty good insights about the accident progression The effectiveness of emergency actions that are currently in place And that they are effective and that the fact that there were orders of magnitude away from the commission safety goals in terms of safety And we're actually much much better than what the safety goals have provided So that is context if we were to do a more rigorous analysis from a cost-benefit standpoint I think those would be factors that would have to be brought to bear But we're trying to temper how much do you invest in looking at this particular issue vice doing a more Detailed analysis, so I just wanted to provide that for some of the context that may not be in the paper No, I appreciate that and I am way over time. So I just close and say Thank you for mentioning the the kind of public availability Aspect of this we talked about that a fair bit on the first panel it strikes me as a as a complex kind of nuanced question My observation reading, you know The staffs work here is other than a statement that says well, this could make shadow evacuations worse We don't really grapple with that question or any of the complexities of it Maybe it's because you know, you didn't see the merits of the monitoring stations in the first place Even though that was part of the recommendation on the public availability aspect of it I Guess just a close on this I would say, you know, there are three three three open items here one of them was on how do we more proactively aggregate and Review and assess new information on natural hazards. I thought you guys did a great job on that And then high winds. It was really thorough snow loads a little briefer this, you know piece Doesn't have the rigor of like the high winds analysis and you know, it's pretty obvious when you read it It doesn't have that rigor and you know, I'm just not convinced. We did enough there on this Thanks Thank You commissioner Baron and that is a complex topic. I know went a little over time But I think it was important it was was important to explore that and commissioner burns if you need a little extra time Please I might have one follow-up question myself at the end. Thank you I just gave me more time to think about what my questions would be so that may be too bad for the staff Actually, I want to come back to I'm going to talk a little bit about some of the well-called administrative law or process Issues with respect to implementation of this rule as a and I use it guardedly as a codification I actually worked on the as well on the post 9-11 orders as well as the development of some of the Well of the rulemaking beyond and one of the and I want to I may ask Tim and Eric a Question along these lines. There is a there was a significant difference in terms of the rulemaking that came about probably about the time you got here chairman Which was that the the initial orders in the in the security area Were clear responses to the 9-11 context, but the interesting thing and I know my Former boss and general counsel Karen sear would be here slapping everyone's hands for calling the security rule a codification of the orders. Ah, you all remember She was quite adamant about that partly because one of the significant reasons We had to go forward with the security rulemaking was is we had these supposed 31 new applications for new reactors coming in the door That did not have which would have been entering with an application without in effect an updated security framework We had a security framework that went back Probably to my youth in terms of late 1970s and in early 1980s So one of my questions for for I think Tim or Eric or anyone is I don't in terms of what we're And I will use a word codifying what we're codifying now with these orders. My sense is What what's the delta between what the orders did and what the rulemaking does here for the Fukushima? For the midi-bitty Rulemaking I'll take a cut now. I'm sure Eric will chime in as our usual Motor stop or end I but the order I view the difference is being the reevaluated hazard effort That's a really difference Otherwise, I think of the rule is virtually the same as the order Okay, and I like to use the word make generically applicable and I do that because We mentioned several times today, but I think we're going to be on about rev4 of any I-1206 by the time we're done that's become almost 250 pages of of Guidance that reflects all that Continual lessons learned it's gotten bigger and better right as we've gone along and so That's and of course we have stakeholder feedback in this case. It's really improved the rule That's why I say generically applicable So I see only the real difference being the reevaluated hazard information in fact That's why we have the flexible scratch scheduling strategy there because that effort stand extending out So that would be my answer that so I Go along with what Tim had to say about that but looking at it holistically We've gone through two revisions to the interim staff guidance that we initially issued with Following the issuance of the order and that's feeding into the regulatory guides And there were some clarifying language That's actually in the rule now for example the inclusion of staffing as a per se requirement It was clearly intended in the order where we had the specification Requirement in the order for training of the staff you can't have training of the staff without staffing But it would be something that I would consider potentially Someone could view that as a as a back fit So one of the things I want to understand two is in terms of the schedule and and you know I will with first confess I have not started to dive into the rule yet as I consider part of my weight training program as I Take it back and forth to the apartment my apartment But in a in all the kidding aside, you know, I'll I'll be taking a close look at it What what I try want to make sure I understand up front because this struck me is you are all talking You know, we talked about that the industry has implemented Much of what's done. We talked about some of the hazard the hazard issue. So What what maybe you can explain very succinctly What this difference in scheduling because it's like all rules rules come into effect, you know a certain time so Tell me what really there is an extension of time for if really anything Versus What I want to get some confidence We're not really undoing the the compliance nature of what the industry has to done or what our expectations are It may be with respect to certain Improvements or whatever in the rule so maybe Tim if you can try and I'm sure I can do better But basically what you're doing there is you're looking at this re-evaluate hazard information the seismic and flooding scenarios You're you're basically looking at whether you can take that information In fact was mentioned in the first panel you calculate a hazard then you take that hazard and you see what that means for your mitigation strategies You know, you're looking for example first whether you can take flex as is You'll flex has got its own purpose and be one now Would take flex and see if I can do these different scenarios and if I can do all these scenarios without change You know, it's it's a great answer, right? If I can do that with modifications and so do both then I'm back to a single set So that's a lot of work. It's actually a lot of back-and-forth. It's ongoing right now And it's it's got it got some time to go as you I think you heard in the first panel There's some pure work that's coming in that's very important for one of the paths in the guidance That's path five if you want the seismic information and so that's that's really I think the main driver the seismic I think is the one's going to go on the furthest And I think that's where folks will probably need that extra time to look at information See what it means for the mitigation strategies and comply with our rule And I think giving them this two years fits very well with that so that's The only thing I would add is that We've written about it in the statement of considerations as far as what good cause would be for using the flexible scheduling Option our intent is not to leave any regulatory gaps. We have the regulatory gaps covered to prevent them from existing with the two year and three years until we have included in the draft final rule the rescission of the requirements from the orders or the license conditions Good cause for going beyond the three years would include Licensees including in the Their schedule for compliance their continued compliance with the requirements of the order or with the requirements of those portions of the rule Yeah, that's a great point if you look at B1 in our rule It's really the order and so if you were going to extend the regulation You want to have a schedule goes out past when we rescind that order I think a license you have to say I have to comply with B1 in other words the equivalent requirements. I'm in compliance Yeah, okay good that that that helps me one of the things that I again I think I compliment the staff in terms of Thing is that to the extent that we can remove administrative what would be administrative requirements? or Basically licensing actions for the sake of licensing actions. I think being creative and looking at that is a good thing One of the things though, and this is all you know over the year my experience And I think a lot of your experience is you need to be on the same page link So when we say you can get rid of that license condition or yeah The order is kind of issue the beauty of the order and actually I'm a I'm a bigger on the on the center line on and probably a little bit different side of the center line on orders and commissioner I mean chairman Saviniki is But I you know I understand With this I think this is a good effort in terms of bringing into the regulatory framework What was the intent behind these orders improving at all? But you got to have you know We all have to see eye-to-eye do we know and how do we document what it what those license conditions or? other License requirements license terms are that we think are you know disappear because by force of the by the rule Itself because I think that's an important we a mutual understanding has to eventually emerge there. We took a very hard and strong look at The different license conditions that are out there and for the old b5b license conditions it was fairly simple because of What the Commission found that the new regulation? Required the same thing that the license conditions did when we did the power reactor security requirements rulemaking for the new ones the new reactor license conditions for the ones that receive their combined licenses after the EA 12049 mitigation strategies order there are some pieces in some of them that require a little bit different things that would be Verification of as built stuff like battery capacities and so forth as you look through Paragraph I in the draft final rule You'll see that it's not a wholesale removal of the entire license conditions that require the mitigating strategies But there are some exceptions that leave in place the stuff that is a delta between what's necessary for a verification of As built new reactor that wouldn't have been in the requirements that were issued in the order and wouldn't Necessarily have been in how we thought of putting in the requirement for the mitigating strategies in the rule So so the key is they have to be truly redundant with the rule I mean that's that's what we're trying to make sure that that's the truth And so then if that's the case then you can remove them, but you know there'll be some interaction with the licensee about what As I say a meeting of the minds on that I would expect and then there's the minister of removal of the yeah Okay, if I can to to last question first Tim you you talked about in terms of the applicability of the rule and obviously with respect to operating fleet COL's that That all have been maybe Issued but you you talked about an exception. I want to make sure you said there's something In how in house that might and might not apply and I'm kind of want to understand the other universe because I'm wondering if this Other universe or the other set, you know now that we've started getting the you know a lot of Potential interest in advanced reactor design. So how does that? Intersect here, okay, our rule doesn't have design requirements in them. However There's one application in house is designed. It looks very very good. In fact so good They may be able to dress an entire regulation Basically by their design actually designed to address in he lap and so That now becomes a challenge because they can dress what art is really an operational type program in their design So that's our challenge to figure out how to do that But we're that's that's that issue there But I was trying to say is it's not a requirement for folks to do that Certainly, they can own their own free will if they wish to and certainly designers are motivated to do that You know and we've seen the case already of a small reactor that does that new scale so new scale Okay, okay. Thank and my last last question of you. Well is Dave lock on suggested I mean one of the things he suggested this this approach of a more of a vertical slice and I know I mean one of the challenges is is that and this isn't You know attributing bad motives to staff or to industry or whatever, but sometimes you don't always see things So I don't know if you had any reaction about thinking to the suggestion that that he made actually Dave lock bombs Suggestion is quite timely We have had a continuous look at flood protection just as a matter of point. In fact since 2012 We've had more than 10 Greater than green findings in the reactor oversight process and we have made modifications to our procedures To put more emphasis on for example on seals seal integrity service life Those kind of insights have been woven back into the program We've also looked at our operating experience program and use smart samples But we are looking at the long-term transition to oversight And where do we take the insights from our TIs and put them into a long-term baseline inspection program? And so we're trying to balance adding in the beyond design basis capability Attributes of what we're doing here with the current program so that we're not Impacting some of the safety related type of focus is an inspection program But we're now looking at how to craft that procedure actually so we will take that Suggestion under under consideration. I will note that we did do eight on-site audits That did a more pervative look at how the walk-downs licensees were following the guidance from industry and The two sites that were noted in his presentation were not in that set of eight So while it's not a exactly a vertical slice in terms of looking at calculations Necessarily it was a little bit more pervative look Okay, no, thanks very much. Thanks, and I'm chairman Well, I appreciate everyone's presentations There's been such an interesting discussion that I wanted to offer just two quick observations. They're not really questions The first is that I want to maybe clarify. I didn't mean anything derogatory about the use of orders It's just long been my temperament that the ability to compel individuals or entities to take action Is among the most powerful and sober authority that we can be given under law Therefore, I always approach it with a need for discipline and rigor But I in no way question the legitimacy of that authority under law because there is occasionally Necessity to operate outside of the transparency of the Administrative Procedure Act and the rulemaking process and that's just simply Yeah, a reality, so I didn't mean to to be anywhere on the Disdiagnosed it but I want us to always approach it in the way We do so that we wouldn't even venture near any abuse of the discretion of that Massive power that we are entrusted with and should you know take take very soberly The other thing that I thought might be helpful is to offer an observation was occurring to me about the near-term Task Force report as a member of the Commission in receipt of that report We gave a group of very capable nrc employees albeit a small group It might have been five people with one administrative support person They represented a lot of nrc knowledge But I don't think a single one of them would indicate that they replicated the entirety of the nrc body of knowledge And when we gave them 90 days Frankly in a time period when facts on the ground from Fukushima were still emerging and I'm talking you know weeks and months later But it took a long time to have confidence that things there had stabilized We were receiving good Information from our friends and colleagues in Japan and assessing that these folks though We're trying while all of that information was still coming in to do a quick assessment of a pretty broad Set of issues and when we received the report we I think struggled with being sensitive to what we had asked them to do and that in Essence that they had not been given the time to really push those ideas Through the prism of the regulatory framework through our processes and as a commission How I would represent what we did and we had lively deliberations about you know We've got this this task force report We asked for this thing but look at all of the constraints We put on these good folks trying to give us this work product and they did a great job to a person We were very complimentary of the work they had done But we knew what was missing what was missing was the ability for the entirety of NRC's experts to take that report from five very knowledgeable people and Put it through that rock polisher of you know How does it meet these other constraints and so as a commission? We struggled even with the language of that in terms of the SRM in the direction We're like is it kind of without prejudice we give you NRC staff this report from other NRC staff, but in truth You know there was a thought of we really want to hand it off in a neutral way and not say we don't we don't disfavor Any of these recommendations, but we were clear that we were not endorsing them even in the form at which they existed We wanted the body so the intervening years when I say I'm so proud of what we've done Because we did take that and put it through the rigor of what everybody else in the hundreds of other experts thought and we arrived you know where we arrived so I Sit here as a person feeling very satisfied with the staff's understanding of that direction and what they ultimately did So I just wanted to share that the commission did struggle with it It was a complex question But that was where the majority ended up and and so I appreciate the work that you've done on that And if my colleagues have nothing I might have one last one I mean madam chairman you you mentioned public service at the beginning your remarks at the beginning of the meeting and I just want to acknowledge Public servant who served this agency in the country well who passed away at the beginning this week Harold our Denton Who was the director of nuclear reactor regulation at the time of the three-mile island accident and I think Harold? Was a you know was an honest plain-spoken guy I think we would all take lessons from him in terms of his communication and ability to can Basically transmit Information of a highly technical nature that was perhaps the hallmark of his as leadership Or taking as a governor Ridge said yesterday is sometimes you get thrown into it and you have to do it and that's what? Harold did he gain the Confidence of the president president Carter in terms of being that that communicator and even after that as we looked at and you know we were talking today about recommendations and improvements to safety in the wake of the Fukushima accident But Harold took that on and continue to take that on is that the director of NRR? I had the honor of working with him on a number of number of things including Post TMI orders and other implementation requirements 2206 petitions I think in fact, I think I know there was at least one from UCS, which Harold granted at least in part But it was an honor to have worked with him But you know particularly that was one of those moments when someone's put in the spot where they have to stand up and lead And I think he did I I remember him well And I know a number of the staff who maybe here knew him and remember him well as well I and I really appreciate that Steve I at the seminar the knowledge management seminar that you just referenced that I talked about earlier Our executive director for operations Victor McCree began with a moment of silence over Harold's passing It's awkward when you don't really know an individual. I know you have a richer set of personal experiences I met Mr. Denton one time but Victor and I were talking about it later And I said, you know, I didn't know him, but what of I know it's like I look around and I see a lot of Harold Dentons here today You know the folks who were in our ops center activated 24 hours, you know, we cycled through people and I I feel like in my one conversation with Harold He was the kind of guy he was thrown into something but his view would be you know Any number of my colleagues could have been that guy and I see that proud tradition here today I really do through Fukushima and just you know how how the commitment with which people come at things So I think Harold's legacy is absolutely alive and well and the people I see in the lunchroom and the elevator here I think that you know that I think is really his legacy So thank you for mentioning that and with that we are adjourned. Thank you